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      ABSTRACT 
    
          Logic in Hegel’s Logic  
   
      Jacob McNulty 
My dissertation concerns Hegel’s mature theoretical philosophy. I focus on the role of logic, 
meant here in a much more conventional sense of the term than is usually thought relevant to 
Hegel’s thought. I argue that Hegel’s main achievement in logic is to attempt a noncircular 
derivation of its laws and materials. Central to my interpretation is a sympathetic treatment of 
Hegel’s claim that Kant did not have a comparably rigorous justification for logic. In Hegel’s 
view, the critical philosophy’s pervasive reliance on logic precludes it from evaluating the latter 
in a non-question-begging way. As a result, Kant is forced to ground logic psychologically 
(though not “psychologistically” in Frege’s sense). For Hegel, Kant’s critical philosophy is 
insufficiently self-critical with respect to its own logical foundations. It is therefore vulnerable to 
criticism on logical grounds — especially from a Hegelian direction. As I also hope to show, 
Hegel rejects Kant’s critique of metaphysics, arguing that its logical presuppositions are 
unfounded. Once those presuppositions are overhauled, the true source of the metaphysical 
tradition’s impasses becomes apparent, and a non-Kantian-idealist, metaphysical solution is at 
hand. The lesson is that metaphysics is an enduring possibility, provided it is based on secure 
logical foundations.  
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                   Abbreviations 
Throughout this work, both in the body and in the footnotes, I provide references to the German 
and English versions of primary texts by Kant, Fichte and Hegel. The following are the 
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Hegel  
There are two editions of Hegel’s complete works in German, Suhrkamp and Meiner. My 
references refer to the Meiner edition, (1968- Gesammelte Werke, Deutsche 
Forschungsgemainschaft. Hamburg: Meiner) except where otherwise indicated. References to the 
English translations refer to titles from the series, “Cambridge Hegel Translations” edited by 
Michael Bauer. I have occasionally referred to other translations of works by Hegel not yet 
available in this series.   
The Science of Logic is cited by volume and page number for the German, and just page number 
for the English. The Encyclopedia is cited by section number (§) followed, where relevant, by an 
A for the Anmerkungen (remarks) and/or a Z for the Zusätze (additions). The 1831 lectures on 
logic are cited by the corresponding section number in the Encyclopedia, and the page number in 
the English translation. The Lectures in the History of Philosophy are cited only by the English 
section name and sub-section name, e.g., “Aristotle: Logic.”   
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EL  =  Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im  
 Grundrisse Teil 1: Logik. Werke vol. 13/Encyclopedia of the Philosophical  
 Sciences in Outline: Part 1, Science of Logic. 2010. Edited and translated by Brinkmann,  
 Klaus and Dahlstrom, Daniel O. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
VL/LL =Vorlesungen über die Logik, Berlin 1831. 2001. Transcribed by K. Hegel. Edited by U.  
 Rameil and H. C. Lucas. Hamburg: Meiner/Lectures on Logic, Berlin, 1831. 2008. Trans.  
 by C. Butler. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
VGP/LHoP = Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophy. Werke vol. 30/Lectures on  
 the History of Philosophy. 1995. 3 vols. Translated by E. S. Haldane and Frances  
 H. Simson. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.  
WdL/SoL = Wissenschaft der Logik. Werke vols. 21, 11, 12/Hegel’s Science of  
 Logic. 2010. Translated by di Giovanni, George. Cambridge: Cambridge University  
 Press. 
Kant 
References to the German are all to the Akademie Ausgabe (Immanuel Kant: Gesamelte 
Schriften. 1902-. 29 vols. Berlin: De Gruyter). I use the English translations from the Cambridge 
Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, except where otherwise noted. For the first critique, I use 
the standard A/B page references to refer to the first (1781) and second (1787). editions of the 
work. 
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A/B = Kant, I. Kritik der Reinen Vernunft. Ak vol. 3-4/Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason. Ed. and  
 Trans. by Guyer P. and Wood A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.  
P =   Kant, I. Ak. Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik Ak. vol. 4/Kant, I.  
 Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Edited and  Translated by Hatfield, G.  
 Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
JL =  Kant, I. “Jäsche Logik” Ak. vol. 9/Kant., I. “Jäsche Logic” In: Kant’s Lectures on Logic,  
 ed. and trans. J. Michael Young, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Fichte 
German references are to the version of Fichte’s complete works edited by his son, I.H. Fichte. 
Fichtes Werke. 1971. ed. Immanuel Hermann Fichte. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co. This is 
not the favored edition, but I refer to it because many of the English translations have references 
to it in the Margins. English references are to what were, at the time of this writing, the most 
recent English translation. 
References to the first Wissenschaftslehre are by volume and page number (German), or just 
page number (English). 
WL/SoK - Fichte, J.G. Wissenschaftslehre (1794-5). Werke vol. 1/Fichte, J.G. Science of  
 Knowledge. Ed. and Trans. Heath, J. Lachs, P. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
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Introduction.   Philosophy of Logic in Kant, German Idealism (and after) 
i. Logic in Hegel’s Logic 
 In spite of its title, Hegel’s Science of Logic does not seem to be a work in logic at all. 
Clearly, its ambitions go well beyond those of formal logic, the area of philosophy traditionally 
concerned with the nature of valid argument. For this reason, the Logic is more commonly 
considered a work of metaphysics, one whose primary aim is to defend an account of the 
fundamental nature of reality. Hegel himself certainly appears to present it that way when he 
introduces the work as a critical survey of different “definitions of the Absolute” (EL § 85). In 
the course of this survey, definitions from nearly all of the great figures of Western metaphysics 
are considered: for example, Spinoza’s substance, Aristotle’s actuality, Parmenides’s Being, 
Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception, and so on. Since Hegel’s case for his own definition 
of the Absolute will take the form of a critique of virtually all preceding ones, the Logic will also 
provide us with a purified reconstruction of the entire history of philosophy. This historical-
reconstructive aspiration has no parallel in logic as we usually know it. As if further confirmation 
of its distance from formal logic were needed, Hegel’s speculative logic has a religious 
dimension. As is well known, Hegel also understands his own definition of the Absolute to be 
reflected in the Christian religion, especially in its conception of God. He will therefore often 
describe his project in unabashedly theological terms, calling it “the exposition of God as he is in 
his eternal essence before the creation of nature and of a finite spirit” (WdL 21:34/SoL 29). 
Finally, and as this last passage suggests, there is the role of speculative logic in Hegel’s larger 
system (“The Encyclopedia”). In Hegel’s system, logic lays the groundwork for the philosophies 
!1
of nature and mind (spirit) which will follow in subsequent parts. It is pure logic, and they the 
applied versions. Yet however exactly this claim is understood, it does not seem to suggest any 
parallel with the role logic has today.  Admittedly, none of these claims concerning the nature of 1
Hegel’s Logic project is uncontroversial. Ever since his death, and even while he was still living, 
Hegel’s followers would vigorously debate all of them. Yet there is little controversy on the 
following point. Speculative logic and formal logic are different, so much so that they probably 
have almost nothing to do with one another.  
 Even so, the title of Hegel’s Logic is not a complete misnomer. As commentators observe, 
the Logic is also a successor to the enterprise of “transcendental logic” inaugurated in Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason. Both works are concerned to offer theories of the categories or, as 
Hegel calls them, “thought-determinations” [Denkbestimmungen]. Categories, such as quantity, 
quality, and cause are among the most fundamental concepts we possess. They are presupposed 
in nearly all our thinking, and in scientific inquiry as well. Yet as Hume and others had shown, 
such concepts are incapable of being derived from sense-experience: causation, understood as 
“necessary connection” rather than “constant conjunction,” is an “idea” with no corresponding 
“impression.” Unlike ordinary empirical concepts, categories like these stand in need of a special 
type of justification. If they are to be legitimate, then they will need to be shown to have a 
different source than sense-experience. What, then, might that source be? In keeping with his 
Copernican revolution in philosophy and transcendental idealism, Kant offered a clear answer. 
For Kant, the categories are contributed by the knowing subject as “conditions on the possibility 
 Cf. Longuenesse (2013) for an account of the pre-history of Hegel’s three-fold division of philosophy into logic, 1
nature and spirit (mind). As she makes clear, this goes back at least to the Stoics, and can be found in Kant as well, 
most notably in the Preface to his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. 
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of experience.” Rather than have the categories derive from experience, Kant will have 
experience derive from them. This is Kant’s idealist strategy of defending our entitlement to the 
categories, but it has well-known costs. In particular, it requires that the use of the categories in 
theoretical knowledge be restricted to objects of possible experience or appearances. They cannot 
be used to know things as they are in themselves. Hegel too is involved in the enterprise of 
giving a theory of the categories, but departs from Kant in important ways. He certainly agrees 
with Kant that there are non-empirical concepts of this type, with a pervasive role in both 
scientific inquiry and everyday experience. He also agrees that they stand in need of a distinctive 
type of justification  which ordinary empirical concepts do not require. However, he attempts to 
avoid the costs of Kant’s strategy for justifying our use of the categories. More specifically, 
Hegel wants to avoid the “subjectivist” character of Kant’s theory of the categories, and embrace 
a more robustly “objective” theory. How, exactly, he does so is a point of controversy. Does he 
reject Kant’s idealist theory of the categories in favor of an alternative pre-Kantian theory, like 
those found in the Aristotelian tradition? Does he instead adopt Kant’s theory, but amend it in 
some crucial respect so that it no longer leaves us disconnected from things-in-themselves? Is 
this, perhaps, a false choice from Hegel’s point of view? Might his position by some type of 
hybrid of Kantian and Aristotelian approaches, as some commentators have recently suggested? 
And, if so, how, exactly, should it be understood? Which strand if any — the Kantian or 
Aristotelian — would predominate? The jury, it seems, is out.  
 Whatever the precise nature of Hegel’s theory of the categories, it will be of little use in 
understanding whether, and in what sense, Hegel’s Logic is a logic at all. Even granting that 
Hegel’s logic is some type of descendent of Kant’s transcendental logic, this would simply 
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relocate rather than resolve the issue. After all, and as Kant himself was well aware, 
transcendental logic is not logic in any ordinary sense either. The details of why are complex, but 
for now the following should suffice to explain the difference between the two. In concerning 
itself with such substantive topics as causality, substance, and so on, transcendental logic has a 
content that ordinary logic, owing to its formality, would not treat. Although not yet empirical 
science, transcendental logic does seem to operate at a slightly lower level of abstraction than 
formal logic. As we have already seen, Hegel’s speculative logic departs from ordinary logic in 
this respect as well, perhaps even to a greater extent than Kant’s transcendental logic. For Hegel, 
cause, substance, and so on, are just the beginning when it comes to enriching logic with content. 
Yet Kant at least does his readers the courtesy of providing an account the precise relationship of 
his innovative new form of logic to the traditional variety (“(pure) general logic”). Unfortunately, 
Hegel does not do so, at least not in any comparably explicit way. We are therefore left with the 
impression that Hegel was oblivious to the existence of logic in the ordinary sense. However, this 
impression turns out to be misleading. 
 Even a cursory glance through Hegel’s Science of Logic confirms that logic in the 
traditional sense is a frequent topic of discussion, and that innovative new varieties of logic from 
the German idealist period are by no means the only ones Hegel recognizes. Alongside 
discussions of speculative and transcendental logic, there are others focusing on what Hegel calls 
“the former logic,” “ordinary logic” and “the older logic.” Some of these formulations imply 
more unanimity among Hegel’s predecessors than actually seems to have existed. When we turn 
to Hegel’s remarks on the history of logic, we find out why. To all appearances, Hegel shares 
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Kant’s assessment that there have been few developments of consequence in this science since 
the days of its founding by Aristotle. Passages like the following are representative: 
Aristotle is the founder of this science…To this day, the logic of Aristotle 
represents the logical [sphere], which has merely been made more elaborate, 
primarily by the Scholastics of the Middle Ages. The Scholastics did not add to 
the material, but merely developed it further. The work of more recent times with 
respect to logic consists primarily in omitting many of the logical determinations 
spun out further by Aristotle and the Scholastics, on the one hand, and in 
superimposing a lot of psychological material [on the other]. (EL § 20A) 
…we have still Aristotle’s science of abstract thought, a Logic, to consider. For 
hundreds and thousands of years it was just as much honoured as it is despised 
now. Aristotle has been regarded as the originator of Logic: his logical works are 
the source of, and authority for the logical treatises of all times; which last were, 
in great measure, only special developments or deductions, and must have been 
dull, insipid, imperfect, and purely formal. And even in quite recent times, Kant 
has said that since the age of Aristotle, logic like pure geometry since Euclid’s day 
– has been a complete and perfect science which has kept its place even down to 
the present day, without attaining to any further scientific improvements or 
alteration. (VGP “Aristotle: 4. The Logic:) 
From a certain perspective, Hegel’s conception of the history of logic is disappointing. Can a 
catch-all term like “the former logic” really do justice to the more than two millennia of 
reflection on this subject that includes Aristotle’s logical writings, Stoic logic, Scholastic logic, 
Port-Royal, the logic of the Leibniz-Wolff school, and Kant’s logic? Here, there is a strong 
temptation for the commentator to step in and add some much needed nuance and complexity to 
Hegel’s account of the history of logic. Yet in my view, this is a temptation we should resist. For 
better or worse, I will defer completely to Hegel’s own account of the history of logic. Later, I 
will argue that a failure to do so has led to fundamental distortions of Hegel’s thought on this 
topic. 
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 Ultimately, then, Hegel and Kant are in broad agreement about the history of logic, 
though it would be a mistake to conclude from this that they agree about logic itself. As we have 
already seen, Hegel refers more than once and, by and large, approvingly to Kant’s famous 
remark about logic from the preface to the first critique. As Hegel reminds us, Kant had said that 
logic had not needed to take a single step since its founding by Aristotle, in contrast to that 
endless battlefield of controversies metaphysics (B viii). Yet Hegel here sounds a note of 
disagreement. He quips that, if this is true, then Kant ought to have drawn the opposite 
conclusion. Rather than conclude that logic is complete, Kant ought to have concluded that a 
change is long overdue:   2
Kant thought further of logic, that is, the aggregate of definitions and 
propositions that ordinarily passes for logic, as fortunate because, as contrasted 
with other sciences, it was its lot to attain an early completion; since 
Aristotle, it has taken no backward step, but also none forward, the latter because 
to all appearances it seems to be finished and complete. If logic has 
not undergone change since Aristotle – and in fact, judging from the latest 
compendiums of logic, the usual changes mostly consist only of omissions – 
then surely the conclusion to be drawn is that it is all the more in need 
of a total reworking…(WdL 21:35-6/SoL 31). 
In spite of this sarcastic barb, Hegel does share Kant’s view that logic attained a certain form of 
completeness in Aristotle. Certainly it had not already achieved everything we might hope for 
from logic, which is why Hegel looks forward to a re-working. Yet in other contexts, he is 
willing to concede that it achieved the more modest goal of completeness in its own limited 
domain. A passage like the following is representative of this tendency 
A logic that does not perform this task can at most claim the value of a natural 
description of the phenomena of thought as they simply occur. It is an infinite 
merit of Aristotle, one that must fill us with the highest admiration for the power 
 See also Bowman who cites and discusses this passage (2013: Introduction: “A Totally Transformed View of 2
Logic”: 0.1 Hegel’s Metaphysical Project)
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of his genius, that he was the first to undertake this description. But it is necessary 
to go further and determine both the systematic connection of these forms and 
their value. (WdL 12:28/SoL 525) 
 As we will see in more detail later, Hegel also inherits from Kant and the tradition the 
conviction that four topics are central to logic. As we will soon see, they are as follows: the laws 
of logic, concepts, judgments and inferences (syllogisms). Broadly speaking, these topics are 
unified by a conception of logic as the authoritative source not only of the laws of good 
reasoning, but also of the basic materials reasoning uses. Unclarity about either could lead to 
different types of error. These four topics are discussed in passing in Kant’s first critique, and 
more extensively in his logical writings. All are discussed in Hegel’s Logic as well. To be clear, 
the four topics do not form a natural set in Hegel’s Logic in the way that they did in more 
traditional works like Kant’s and also those of logicians before him. Treating them as such, 
however, can be useful. The aim of doing so would not be to falsely assimilate Hegel to the 
tradition. It would, rather, be to take the full measure of his divergence from the tradition by 
comparing his views on these traditional topics to the views of his predecessors, including Kant 
himself. If Hegel is broadly in agreement with Kant about the history of logic he is by no means 
in agreement with Kant about logic itself. On the contrary, the conception of logic’s history 
which both share is only the backdrop to a debate about logic in which they find themselves on 
completely opposite sides.  
 As we have already said, Hegel’s treatment of logic’s laws and materials is part of a 
broader philosophical enterprise encompassing much that is patently extra-logical (the history of 
philosophy, the Christian religion, the nature of God, the categories like cause and substance, and 
so on). If that is so, then we are confronted with a question one commentator has put with 
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admirable clarity: What is the place of logic “commonly so called” in Hegel’s Science of Logic?  3
Admittedly, there are good reasons to doubt an investigation of Hegel’s views on more 
conventional logical topics would be fruitful. In addition to being few and far between, these 
discussions are somewhat incongruous with their surroundings, where topics that are anything 
but formal are discussed (life, freedom, chemistry, and so on). Even considered on their own, 
Hegel’s more classically logical discussions are by no means the most promising or influential 
part of his legacy. Notoriously, Hegel, at one point, appears to deny the law of non-contradiction, 
providing fodder for some his critics in the Anglophone or “analytic” tradition who view him as 
an opponent of exact thinking. More recently, Hegel’s fortunes have improved considerably with 
the massive revival of interest in non-classical logics among Anglophone philosophers. Today 
certain logicians, e.g. Priest, are more approving of this particular part of his thought than even a 
great many Hegel scholars.  Still, this is a minority view.    `  4
 An additional reason for concern has less to do with Hegel’s unorthodox views in logic 
than with the broader tradition of logic in which he worked, a tradition now considered obsolete. 
Figures in this tradition have always seemed to their analytic critics to be much too interested in 
the subject-predicate judgment as well as the syllogism. These were topics central to Aristotelian 
logic, but marginal (at best) in the new and more powerful mathematical variety invented by 
Frege. Syllogisms can be reduced to special cases of a more general theory, a project announced 
in the introduction of Frege’s Begriffschrift. More fundamentally, the central place these items 
 Redding (2014)3
 See Priest (1989), (1995) and (2006) as well as Bordignon (2017), Redding (forthcoming 2019) and Ficara 4
(forthcoming) for discussions of the parallels.
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had in the older logic was thought to be a symptom of that logic’s impurity. In particular, 
judgment was thought of as being of merely grammatical or psychological significance. 
 As if to confirm his critics’ worst fears about the impurity of the older logic, Hegel tells 
us that his Logic is a work in which logic and metaphysics coincide.  Much of the best recent 5
scholarship shows that Hegel considered this to be his work’s chief innovation.  Before turning 6
to the topic of the relationship between logic and metaphysics in Hegel’s own work, it is worth 
reflecting on why the two areas of philosophy would have seemed distinct to readers from his 
time, and often still do to us today. One reason concerns the differing roles they have 
traditionally had in philosophy. Logic may be able help us avoid certain gross errors in 
reasoning, like embracing a contradiction or drawing an invalid inference. However, it does not 
guarantee metaphysical truth. If principles as elementary and widely known as those of logic 
could resolve the persistent controversies of metaphysics, then one imagines they would have 
been resolved long ago. This is not to deny the obvious fact that logic is a field of sophisticated 
inquiry in its own right, but merely to remind us that it is somewhat rare for its more technical 
findings to bear on metaphysics, especially of the traditional variety.  Logic is authoritative in a 7
way vaguely comparable way to metaphysics (first philosophy). It lays down rules for our 
thinking in all areas of philosophy and the sciences. However, logic is also typically neutral, 
incapable of being invoked on behalf of any especially controversial position, metaphysical or 
otherwise. Finally, logic has occasionally been said to be completely empty of content, lacking 
 As with other of his most famous slogans, there are slightly different versions, and the ones in the published text 5
are more nuanced.
 Pippin (2017)(2018), Pinkard (2017). 6
 A dramatic counter-example would be Gödel’s ontological argument.7
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any subject-matter at all.  This is a view sometimes attributed to Kant and the early Wittgenstein, 8
though it is not popular today. Yet regardless of whether we hold that logic is completely empty 
or not, it should be clear that it lacks the type of content traditionally attributed to metaphysics. 
For example, we could recall here the objects of special metaphysics: God, the world, the soul.  
 Clearly, these philosophical intuitions concerning logic are deeply entrenched. Yet they 
also suggest an intriguing possibility for any philosopher willing to challenge logic’s traditional 
role. I mean the possibility that logic, whose status was traditionally to be a point of 
unquestioned common ground for proponents of rival philosophical points of view, might 
nevertheless be invoked on behalf of a particular one: Hegel’s own. 
ii. What justifies a law of logic? A dilemma 
 In this dissertation, I argue that Hegel’s thought contains a response to a very old problem 
from the history and philosophy of logic. This is a problem going back to Aristotle, though also 
one I hope to show took on a new and unexpected significance in the wake of Kant’s critical 
philosophy. The problem concerns the justification of logic’s most fundamental laws and 
materials. We rely on these principles in all our efforts to justify ourselves through rational 
argument. How, then, can they themselves be justified? The stakes are high. At issue is the 
justification of justification itself via the logical principles on which it depends.  If we cannot 9
answer it then not only logic or philosophy, but all our efforts at rational argument in all areas of 
See Conant (1992) for whom this view is characteristic of Kant and the early Wittgenstein, though not of Frege. For 8
Frege, logic has a subject-matter, though one more abstract than those of other sciences. Logic studies the laws 
governing concept and object, just as physics studies the laws governing matter in motion.
 This problem could be seen as a specific instance of a more general one often said to be Hegel’s principal focus in 9
the recent literature: sense-making of all sense-makings, account-giving of all account-givings. See Pippin (2018) 
and Pinkard (2017). Especially when it is put in the form of a dilemma, it could also be seen as a version of the 
Agrippan problem at the center of Franks (2005). 
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human knowledge might conceivably be thrown into doubt. Yet in attempting to answer this 
question, we confront a dilemma.  
 At first, it may seem that our entitlement to these principles is some type of brute fact, 
one for which no reason can be given. They are, perhaps, self-evident to anyone who reflects on 
them, whether for psychological, semantic or even perhaps pragmatic reasons. They could also 
be said to be foundational in a formal system where they are the un-proven basis on which 
everything else is proved. Or maybe they are unchallengeable for some other more exotic reason. 
However, this approach soon proves inadequate. Today, as ever, there are figures who do not find 
such principles self-evident in any of these senses. As is well known, there are (alleged) counter-
examples to them: for example, dialetheias, apparent cases of true contradiction, many of which 
are millennia old. The liar from the well-known paradox is the primary one. His claim about 
what he says is both true and false, true if it is false and false if it is true. Even today, however, it 
is not the only such example. Although seldom cited in the analytic tradition, Hegel’s own 
favorite is Zeno’s account of motion in the arrow paradox. It was later emphasized by Engels and 
other dialectical materialists, as in the following passage: 
Motion itself is a contradiction: even simple mechanical change of position can 
only come about through a body being at one and the same moment of time both 
in one place and in another place, being in one and the same place and also not in 
it. And the continuous origination and simultaneous solution of this contradiction 
is precisely what motion is.  10
On this account, motion appears to involve a type of “blurring” in which a thing is in two slightly 
different positions at one and the same time.  Regardless of what dialetheia one chooses as the 11
 Engels (1947)10
 See also Priest (1985)(1995) and (2006). Part of the reason this example is not often cited in the analytic tradition 11
is that it was long believed that the paradoxes had been resolved by modern mathematics, or even modern science. 
The classic statement of this view is Russell (2015). For a dissenting perspective, see Grünbaum (1967). 
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most promising candidate for a counter-example to the laws of logic, the challenge is clear. Of 
course, we may not be persuaded by such counter-examples. But that anyone should regard these 
cases as potential counter-examples is unsettling enough on its own. After all, it was claimed that 
those laws are self-evident to anyone who reflects them. Clearly, this is not so, regardless of 
whether we ourselves share the dissenting perspective. In the face of this type of skeptical 
challenge, appeals to brute fact can seem complacent. 
 A second possibility is that we respond to this request for a justification of the laws of 
logic in the way we would in any other area of philosophy. I simply mean giving some type of 
rational argument in the way we so often do as philosophers. However, this approach soon 
confronts a significant obstacle as well. In the first place, it is unclear what could possibly be 
more fundamental than the laws of logic (psychology? language? natural-science? something 
else?) But even assuming some more fundamental basis could be identified there is a deeper 
problem. The logical principles in question are so elementary, so fundamental, that any argument 
we might be able to give for such principles would, it seems, already need to rely on them. Our 
argument would need to do so in order to take even a single step from premise to conclusion. If 
the preceding approach seemed complacent, then this one seems far worse. It helps itself to the 
very principles whose credentials are in question. It is question-begging, even circular. 
 Worse still, the problem quickly generalizes. It not only arises when we attempt to argue 
for a law of logic, and find we must rely on it in doing so. It also arises when we attempt to 
justify, in some broader sense of the term, the use of certain basic materials employed in 
reasoning. At issue is less compliance with a logical law then the legitimation of some logical 
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tool but the problem has the same abstract form. Here too these materials are so fundamental that 
any attempt to legitimate them would seem to already rely on them. 
 In some version or other, this problem is very old, going back to Aristotle’s Prior 
Analytics.  There, Aristotle proposes the disturbing possibility that there can be no 12
demonstration of the principles on which all demonstration depends. These would seem to be 
either brute or justified circularly. In vol. 2 of his Logical Investigations Husserl also raises a 
version of this problem for the nascent program of “psychologism.”  In this program, logic is 13
said to derive from an empirical science: psychology. However, a science is a body of empirical 
propositions, standing in particular logical (deductive) relations to one another. If that is so, then 
the attempt to derive logic from psychology will be circular, relying on the very laws it seeks to 
derive. Frege encounters a version of this problem, closer to the second we considered then the 
first. This he does when he is forced to deny that the language of the Begriffschrift can be used to 
talk about that language.  We are, apparently, forbidden from making even the most basic 14
statements about this language (“The concept horse is a concept.”) Yet such statements are 
necessary if we are to induct others into our way of speaking. If the form of this problem reminds 
one of Wittgenstein’s idea of a ladder one must climb and then cast away, then this is no 
coincidence. Similar problems are broached in the Tractatus. There, the propositions of logic, 
those on which all our sayings depend, cannot themselves be said, only shown. Finally, this 
problem has been raised in the recent literature on inference by authors like Wright, Boghossian 
and others. Boghossian helpfully describes it as the problem of rule-circularity, relying on the 
 I owe this reference to Aristotle to Wolfgang Mann, but see also Lu-Adler (2018: 46ff.).12
 Husserl (2013)13
 I here follow Conant (1992) 14
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very rule one is attempting to prove. Here he is explaining how it would arise if one tried to 
construct an inferentially-based justification for the rule of inference known as modus ponens 
(MP):  15
This brings us, then, to the inferential path. Here there are a number of distinct 
possibilities, but they would all seem to suffer from the same master difficulty: in 
being inferential, they would have to be rule-circular. If MPP is the only 
underived rule of inference, then any inferential argument for MPP would either 
have to use MPP or use some other rule whose justification depends on MPP. And 
many philosophers have maintained that a rule-circular justification of a rule of 
inference is no justification at all. (Boghossian 2000: 231) 
iii. Jäsche’s observation 
 Is there any reason to think this age-old problem in the history and philosophy of logic, 
present in Aristotle and also in recent philosophy, might have been important to German 
idealism? After all, German Idealism is a movement more commonly thought of as preoccupied 
with questions in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, politics, and the philosophy of 
history — but almost never logic. None of its major protagonists is considered an important 
contributor to logic, and this received view is one I would not contest. Still, German idealism is 
above all a post-Kantian movement, a response to Kant’s critical project which revolutionized 
philosophical reflection on all of these topics. Yet logic had a new and unprecedented role in 
Kant’s project as we have just seen. If that is so, then it would not be at all surprising if logic 
were important to the idealist reception of his thought. Presumably, the idealists’ interest would 
be less in logic itself than in philosophical questions about logic. In any case, it is from this post-
 Although it is not my aim to intervene in contemporary debates, I here remark on an intriguing discrepancy 15
between the solutions advocated by these figures and those that I will argue the idealists embrace. The solutions 
preferred in this more recent literature are closer to the first family of responses, even if they do not all fit perfectly 
there. Appeals to “default justification,” pragmatic entitlement, and virtuous circularity are by no means all best 
characterized as appeals to brute fact, let alone crude ones. However, they are alternatives to inferential justification 
of rules of inference. As we will soon see, the idealists’ favored solutions belong to this second family of inference-
based solutions. They are therefore in a certain sense more ambitious — but also perhaps less likely to succeed. 
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Kantian perspective that I will approach the idealists’ interest in the topic. As I hope to show, 
there was one philosophical question about logic in particular which was central to the idealist 
reception of Kant. So far as I know, this question has been absent from treatments of German 
Idealism in recent years. Integrating it into discussions of this movement could therefore allow 
us to see it in a new light.  
 Here, it may be valuable to consult an observation on the philosophical scene in Germany 
c. 1800 by Benjamin Jäsche, a student of Kant best known for compiling his lectures on logic for 
publication.  As Jäsche observes in the preface to the first edition of these lectures from 1800, a 16
rift appeared to have opened between Kant and his immediate followers in their attitude towards 
the laws of logic, such as the laws of identity and non-contradiction. Kant's idealist followers 
found themselves confronted with the dilemma just considered, which arises when we consider 
the question of what justifies a law of logic. When we do find we must either treat such laws as 
brute, or else as justified in a way that seems destined to be circular. 
…there is no doubt about Kant's judgment on this point. He frequently explained, 
determinately and expressly, that logic is to be regarded as a separate science, 
existing for itself and grounded in itself, and hence that from its origin and first 
development with Aristotle, right down to. our times, it could not really gain 
anything in scientific grounding. In conformity with this claim, Kant did not think 
either about grounding the logical principles of identity and contradiction on a 
higher principle, or about deducing the logical forms of judgment. He recognized 
and treated the principle of contradiction as a proposition that has its evidence in 
itself and requires no derivation from a higher principle.  But now whether the 
logical principle of identity and of contradiction is really incapable of or does not 
need any further deduction, in itself and without qualification, that is of course a 
different question, which leads to the highly significant question of whether there 
is in general an absolutely first principle of all cognition and science, whether 
such a thing is possible and can be found. [Fichte’s] doctrine of science believes 
that it has discovered such a principle in the pure, absolute I, and hence that it has 
 See also Lu-Adler (2018) who cites and discusses this remark. 16
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grounded all philosophical knowledge perfectly, not merely as to form but also as 
to content. And having presupposed the possibility and the apodeictic validity of 
this absolutely one and unconditioned principle, it then proceeds completely 
consistently when it does not allow the logical principles of identity and of 
contradiction, the propositions A=A and -A =-A, to hold unconditionally, but 
instead declares them to be subaltern. principles, which can and must be 
established and determined only through it and its highest proposition: I am. (JL 
523-4/7-8) 
Once more, we run across Kant’s (in-)famous remark that logic had attained early completion 
and had not had to take a single step since Aristotle. Yet what is more interesting than the remark 
itself are the implications Jäsche and other idealists drew from it for understanding the role of 
logic in the first critique. Usually the passage is cited to as evidence of Kant’s backwardness in 
the area of logic.  Here, however, it serves a different, more constructive role. In particular, it is 17
meant to be a clue to understanding the role of logic in the first critique. At least according to 
Jäsche, Kant’s conviction that logic is fundamentally in order informs Kant’s decision not to 
present any type of rational argument for logic’s basic laws and principles, such as the laws of 
identity and non-contradiction. Certainly Kant had not sought anything as ambitious as a non-
circular argument, one which would show that these logical laws could be derived from some 
more fundamental principle that did not already rely upon them.  As Jäsche tells us, this had 18
become especially clear in Kant’s Metaphysical Deduction of the categories. There, logic’s table 
of forms of judgment is appealed to for a very important purpose of identifying the categories. 
Yet very little explicit indication as to how this table might itself be argued for was given.  
 See Russell (2015: 463).17
 I here follow Hanna (1986) and, more recently, Tolley (2017) who argue that Hegel saw logic as a problem for 18
Kant’s critical philosophy, a problem that only an anti-Kantian form of traditional metaphysics could solve.
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 By contrast, Kant’s immediate followers were dissatisfied with his attitude towards logic, 
which they thought of as complacent.  As Jäsche explains, they took the opposing view that 19
logic’s laws and materials would have to be derived from a more fundamental principle. Here, 
Jäsche alludes to Fichte’s own first principle, a version of the Cogito: “I am.” Yet there is an 
obstacle standing in the way of any such attempt. Would not the argument that takes us from 
philosophy’s first principle to a law of logic have to rely on that law, and thus be circular? Fichte 
himself had taken up this question in the opening argument of his Science of Knowledge 
[Wissenschaftslehre], the argument Jäsche alludes to when he mentions the Fichtean principle 
I=I: 
The laws of (common) logic…have not yet been proved valid, but are tacitly 
assumed to be familiar and established. Only at a later point will they be derived 
from that proposition whose assertion is warranted only if they are also. This is a 
circle though an unavoidable one…(WL 92/SK 93-4) 
 Here, Fichte brings up the problem of circularity that we have seen dogs any attempt to argue for 
the laws of logic. Yet as we will soon see, it was a problem others would seek to surmount as 
well. 
 My basic proposal in response to Jäsche’s observation is that the rift that had opened up 
between Kant and his idealist followers could be seen as a version of the very dilemma in the 
history and philosophy of logic we have been discussing. In Jäsche’s portrayal, the idealists 
choose the way of rational argument with its attendant risk of circularity, Kant the way of self-
evidence with its risk of complacency. Yet if this is so, it raises a difficult historical question. 
Why would the German idealists, who proclaimed themselves Kant’s followers, depart from him 
 S. Maimon is among the most important idealist critics of Kant’s logic. See Beiser (1987) as well as M.Wolff 19
(2012: 98 n. 18).
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on such a fundamental question? The answer, I think, can only be that they believed the fate of 
the critical philosophy itself depended on a fundamentally revised view of the role of logic in 
philosophy. 
iv. Marburg Neo-Kantianism v. German Idealism 
 Although somewhat arcane, the topic of the role of logic in the first Critique nearly 
always emerges as important for figures seeking to understand that work’s argumentative 
structure.  Yet the way in which it became important for Kant’s idealist followers is unique. I 20
hope to illustrate this through a comparison of the idealists’ Kant-interpretation with that of 
another school, arguably more influential in the reception of Kant: the Marburg Neo-Kantians.  21
I will here focus on the specific issue of the relationship between general and transcendental 
logic. For the Marburgers it was wholly unacceptable that Kant’s table of categories should have 
been derived from the table of forms of judgment given in the logic of the day. They understood 
the fundamental premise of Kant’s system to be  “the fact of science,” i.e., the truth of 
Newtonian natural science. Hence, they saw the 12 categories of transcendental logic as 
“abstractions” from more fundamental set of 12 principles more immediately relevant to 
Newtonian natural science (Kant’s “system of principles” from the Analytic). They then saw the 
12 forms of judgment from general logic as further “abstractions” still.  In other words, pure 22
general logic was not fundamental, but in an important sense derivative. Indeed, it was at a two-
fold remove from what was genuinely fundamental in Kant’s thought, the principles from his 
theoretical philosophy which formed the basis for natural science. Although Cohen is a famous 
 See Reich (1992: 2ff.) for an overview of the history.20
 In this paragraph, I have benefited from the account of Cohen’s thought given in Edgar (2010) 21
 Cohen’s term is “scientific abstractions.” See the (partial) English translation (2015).22
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exponent of this approach, a more accessible example of such a reading can be found in 
Cassirer. A notable advantage of the Marburg interpretation is the anti-psychologistic 23
interpretation of Kant it makes possible. The ultimate foundation of Kant’s claims is not faculty 
psychology but scientific knowledge “printed in books,” as Cohen famously says. Yet the 
interpretation also has a serious flaw. It ignores Kant’s fairly clear insistence that relying on “the 
fact of science” is merely an expedient for use in the more popular presentation of his views 
given in the Prolegomena (P 4:274-5/25-6).  The Critique itself does not rely on this 24
presupposition, even if the Prolegomena does. Guarding against this error is the point of Kant’s 
distinction between the “analytic/regressive” and “synthetic/progressive” methods of these two 
different works. Yet this is a distinction the Marburgers appear to elide. Some are even led to 
claim (implausibly) that it is the Prolegomena rather than the first Critique which provides the 
more accurate representation of Kant’s considered view. Given the problem with the Marburg 
approach, there is reason to consider an alternative. More specifically, there is reason to consider 
an alternative account of the role of logic in the critical philosophy. Here, the German idealists 
provide a contrasting perspective. For the Marburgers, as we have seen, the problem posed by 
logic for the critical philosophy is the overconfidence it seems to reflect on Kant’s part in 
 “Whatever complaints may be raised against this form of the deduction, however, in general all the polemics 23
directed against the systematic relation between category and judgment fall short. For they ignore the true sense of 
the central and fundamental transcendental question; they overlook the fact that the significant and preeminent place 
that Kant allots to judgment is of necessity already rooted in the initial presuppositions of his way of putting the 
problem. Judgment is the natural, factually demanded correlate of the object, since it expresses in the most general 
sense the consummation of and demand for that combination to which the concept of the object has been reduced for 
us….however, when expressed in exact logical notation, the types and forms of synthetic unity are precisely what 
yield the forms of judgment… An analysis that is nothing but analysis, that does not in any way relate indirectly to 
and rest on an underlying synthesis is impossible, "for where the understanding has not previously combined, it 
cannot dissolve, since only as having been combined by the understanding can anything that allows of analysis be 
given to the faculty of representation." Thus general logic is concerned with "analysis of the concepts which we 
already have of objects," and explicates the judgments which result from presupposing such objects as a readymade 
substrate, so to speak, of a proposition.” (Cassirer 1981: 172)
 I discuss this at greater length below in chapter 2.24
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philosophy and what it can achieve. For the German idealists, the problem is if anything the 
opposite. 
 The German idealists, like the Marburgers, were preoccupied with Kant’s decision to 
derive the laws and materials of transcendental logic (categories, ideas) from those of ordinary 
logic (judgments, inferences). In a way, it is unsurprising that they too would have been led to 
this topic. These figures were doubtful that the order of exposition in the first critique reflected 
the order of the argument. They sought to discover in it a fundamental “first principle” from 
which the whole of Kant’s critical philosophy could be derived. This project, which began as 
merely reconstructive, quickly took on a revisionary aspect. Particularly vulnerable to criticism 
were those doctrines Kant had laid down as self-evident, but apparently not argued for in any 
sustained way. Among them were the following: the sensibility-understanding distinction; the 
finitude of our knowledge as contrasted with that of an infinite knower God; the dualism 
between subjects of knowledge and the objects they know; the doctrine that these objects affect 
us not just in the empirical world but also from a transcendental standpoint as well; the 
inherently apperceptive character of the mind; and others.  
 Although not itself one of the most prominent examples of a possible point of 
vulnerability in the critical system, Kant’s commitment to the logic of the day quickly attracted a 
similar sort of scrutiny. Here too this scrutiny based on the suspicion that logic was both 
fundamental to the argument and insufficiently well-defended. The idealists argued that closer 
attention to this logic would reveal that it lacked the integrity to bear the weight Kant placed 
upon it in his critical system. For example, it was important to Kant to demonstrate that his table 
of the categories was complete. Yet Kant was less explicit than he might have been about why it 
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was so important  to him to achieve this goal. Given the paucity of explanation Kant provides, 
some readers doubt that it can have been central to his project as he suggests. Yet the German 
idealists did not share this view. I will later attempt to provide an explanation which does justice 
to the idealists’ conviction that the fate of the critical philosophy itself turns on this issue. As is 
well known, the idealists regard Kant’s attempt to prove completeness as a failure. In their view, 
it fails because of the role of the logic of the day in it. In my retelling, this will be the most 
important place that logic enters into the dispute between Kant and his idealist followers. 
 To the idealists, this failure was symptomatic of a deeper problem in the Critical 
philosophy, Kant’s uncritical attitude towards the logic of the day. Kant had declared that all 
sciences justify themselves at the bar of the critical philosophy, but apparently made an 
exception of logic. It was, after all, complete, and had been for millennia. Yet despite drawing on 
logic’s findings at crucial junctures in his own argument, he had comparatively little to say about 
the reasons for its success. Certainly, Kant had not done for logic what he had done for 
mathematical and natural scientific knowledge. He had not provided the same type of probing 
account of the nature and sources of the knowledge claims made in it.  In fairness to Kant, logic 25
seemed to him to be much less mysterious in this regard, and he had good reasons for thinking it 
unproblematic. Yet as we will soon see, this was thought by the idealists to be incompatible with 
the spirit of his philosophical project. Was this uncharacteristically complacent attitude towards 
logic not a betrayal of the critical philosophy’s basic aspiration to subject all knowledge claims 
to critical scrutiny? Did this lapse in critical scrutiny not also constitute a lapse in self-scrutiny, 
 See Lu-Adler (2018 ch. 5) for a version of this criticism. Although not herself a defender of the German idealist 25
project, she nevertheless arrives independently at a criticism of Kant’s logic that is broadly similar to Hegel’s own as 
I present it here.
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inasmuch as the logic of the day formed an important presupposition of the critical philosophy 
itself? Although this criticism has been made many times since, and in many different traditions, 
there is no more influential proponent of it than Hegel. Yet it is seldom asked what influence this 
may have had on the shape of Hegel’s own mature system, and the relationship between 
speculative logic and ordinary logic in it. In many prominent recent studies, it goes completely 
unmentioned. In the interpretation defended here, this criticism will be treated as central Hegel’s 
critique of Kant. 
v. Heidegger and Hegel: logic and “the question of Being”  
 In a lecture course from the ’30s on logic, Heidegger poses for his students a simple but 
disarming question: What does logic have to do with philosophy?  After considering and 26
discarding various influential answers, Heidegger introduces his own. Logic, he tells us, 
concerns “the question of being.” Heidegger anticipates that this will sound surprising. Yet he 
claims that this is only because the connection has been occluded in modern mathematical logic, 
a technical discipline which has lost touch with the traditional concerns of metaphysics. In 
outlining his aims for the course, Heidegger proposes to uncover the traditional historical 
association between logic and what he maintains is the central question of metaphysics, “the 
question being.” Yet as a clue to the discovery of this connection Heidegger cites the logical 
copula “is” without which judgment would be possible. Here in the logical form of judgment 
itself, we find ourselves confronted with the notion of being. This is to say that we find ourselves 
confronted with the question of what this little word, pervasive in our language, could mean. 
What is it for anything, a number, a planet, a person, a state, to be at all? What definition could 
 Heidegger, Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (1984)26
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we possibly give of something so ordinary and pervasive? In the ensuing lectures, Heidegger 
endeavors to show that previous figures always bore the connection between logic and 
metaphysics in mind. Leibniz is his main example. Yet he also insists that it is a connection 
modern logicians have never been able to completely sever, even in modern logic. In another 
such course, Heidegger defends this provocative claim by examining the Platonistic metaphysics 
that the new crop of mathematical logicians were led to invoke in their struggle against 
psychologism. Resisting the reduction of logic to empirical psychology would require placing 
logic’s laws and materials in a realm not unlike Plato’s intelligible world: 
Therefore we could say that although this critique of psychologism is from the 
outset utterly clear on the guiding distinction between empirical and ideal being…
These are questions that did not surface first of all in the nineteenth or twentieth 
centuries, but that already engaged Greek philosophy, especially Plato. This 
distinction is the same as the Platonic one between sensible being…and the being 
that is accessible through reason…(2010: 44) 
Elsewhere Heidegger makes clear that his preferred way of relating logic to the question of being 
is somewhat different from that of the tradition. It is less to relate logic to metaphysics as the 
tradition knew it than to what Heidegger calls fundamental ontology/the existential analytic of 
Dasein. Swiftly and crudely summarized, this means situating the subject-matter of logic in 
ordinary, lived experience (specifically, our behavioral and linguistic comportment towards the 
world and towards others).  Yet I want here to focus on the more traditional way of relating 27
logic to metaphysics which Heidegger describes. As I hope to show, it is found not just in figures 
like Leibniz and the mathematical logicians but in Hegel as well.  
 This alternative is most clearly defended in yet another course from the same period. See (2009) 27
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 The main claim I will defend concerning the metaphysical foundations of logic in Hegel’s 
thought requires that we recall the dilemma from earlier. In the face of a challenge to justify 
logic, we find ourselves confronted by a choice between an appeal to brute fact, on the one hand, 
and a viciously circular argument, on the other. In order to resolve this dilemma, Hegel takes the 
innovative step of treating logic, in this narrower sense, as a subordinate and dependent part of 
ontology, the branch of traditional metaphysics concerned with the nature of being. This makes 
possible a type of non-circular argument for logic. The key is that laws and materials that seem 
primitive from a logical point of view are not so from the perspective of ontology.  28
Characteristic features of logic’s laws and materials can better be accounted for in ontological 
than in psychological terms: for example, their formality, universality, and necessity. If some 
concept is legitimately what was known as a category within the Aristotelian tradition, then it 
applies to any being or entity (or at least any full-fledged one). By contrast, attempts to ground it 
in invariant features of the mind simply push the problem back a level, where it is less easily 
resolved. Why suppose these features are themselves universal and necessary? Importantly, 
Hegel has the resources to develop an ontological basis for logic that does not itself already rely 
on logic. It relies, instead, on proto-logical principles less rich in structure than their logical 
counterparts. 
 An important outcome of this investigation will be greater insight into why Hegel accords 
categories such a preeminent status in his speculative logic. This is something many of Hegel’s 
readers take for granted as unproblematic. Perhaps this is because Kant had given categories a 
central place in his transcendental logic. However, I believe this obscures one of Hegel’s more 
 Many have argued that Hegel’s Logic is best approached as ontology, but the interpretations most important for 28
my own are Houlgate (2006) and Doz (1987) as well as the more recent Martin (2012).
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important innovations over both Kant and the tradition. Today, the theory of the categories is not 
considered part of logic, as topics like substance, quantity and quality are substantive in a way 
the concerns of formal logic are not. Even traditionally, however, the theory of the categories  
had an ambiguous status between logic and metaphysics. It was considered both a study of the 
fundamental types of predicate and of the fundamental forms of being. Through its treatment in 
the Categories, it was considered part of the organon containing Aristotle’s logical writings. Yet 
it was clearly also a topic in the central books his Metaphysics, where the material from the 
Categories resurfaces. In this new context, the categories are said to describe properties of every 
being or entity considered as such, i.e. being-qua-being. What is more, category theory was not 
only ambiguous, but marginal in both of the fields to which it was thought to belong. It was 
upstaged by special metaphysics, on the one hand, and syllogistic, on the other. How, then, did 
Hegel come to accord category theory such an important role?  
 As I hope to show, Hegel’s approach differs from that of Kant, who sought to claim 
category theory for a new transcendental logic. Kant’s new transcendental logic was to be 
distinct from the earlier general logic, but also compatible with it. Indeed, the former would rely 
on the latter in numerous respects. By contrast, Hegel will incorporate category theory into his 
Logic in a way that leaves no room for this type of rapprochement. Hegel will first resolve the 
ambiguity concerning category theory as either a metaphysical or logical discipline. He will do 
so decisively in favor of metaphysics: more specifically, general metaphysics (ontology). Then 
he will argue for the unorthodox thesis that all of logic’s other traditional branches (the laws of 
logic, concept, judgment and syllogism) have their foundation in his ontological theory of the 
!25
categories.  On this basis, then, Hegel will justify subsuming the whole of logic under a 29
traditional type of metaphysics, as well as reforming that logic in whatever way this change 
requires. Seen in relation to the traditional logic, then, Hegel’s approach to category theory is 
both more radical and less Kantian in its aims than it has often seemed. 
vi. Overview of the argument 
 I begin in chapter 1 with an overview of Hegel’s relationship to the logic of the 
Aristotelian tradition. This is the logic Kant had praised in the famous remark from the preface, 
the remark that Hegel ridicules. As I hope to show, Hegel finds in the logic of Aristotle and his 
Scholastic followers, as well as in that of Kant, an inadequate response to the dilemma just 
considered. In this tradition, principles of logic are treated as constitutive norms of a certain 
psychological faculty we possess: the faculty of thinking (as distinct from those of sensing, 
willing, imagining and so on). This means they are the laws this faculty naturally does obey 
when nothing interferes, the usual source of interference being another faculty. Hence, they are 
the laws the faculty of thought ought to obey if it is to act in accordance with its nature. The laws 
in question can be discovered when we reflect on the operations of this faculty in abstraction 
from the deliverances of the senses. They are empirical, though the experience that yields them is 
intellectual, rather than sensible, and a form of self-knowledge, rather than knowledge of objects. 
 As I see it, the interest of Hegel’s objection to Kant’s logic is that it differs from the now 
more familiar, and also (very likely) false, accusation of “psychologism” Frege would later level 
at similar approaches to logic, and at Kant’s in particular: more specifically, the accusation that 
 I here follow Varzi (2009), who defends a similar view of logic. More broadly I am informed by Peacocke’s 29
“metaphysics-first” view (2014) (forthcoming 2019). The view is that in any given domain of philosophy, the 
metaphysics of the entities in that domain is prior to the theory of meaning or intentional content for that domain.
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any approach to logic based on psychology will fail to capture the normative character of logic, 
reducing claims about how we ought to think to claims about how people, in fact, do think.  30
Instead, Hegel’s criticism is that the approach in question threatens to render the justification for 
the laws of logic a brute fact. For Hegel, this betrays an aspiration inherent to logic and 
philosophy themselves. As Hegel sees it, logic is committed to the superiority of justification 
though rational argument. It confronts other areas of philosophy and the sciences with the 
demand that they justify themselves in this way. Hence, logic itself ought to be able to show how 
its principles follow necessarily from others, rather than treat them as brute. It ought to be able to 
provide a rational argument for the principles on which rational argument depends, a logically 
rigorous justification for logical justification itself. Even so, Hegel’s ambitious attempt to give a 
rational argument for the principles on which all rational argument depends confronts a 
significant obstacle: the threat of vicious circularity considered earlier.  
 For Hegel, the lesson of this tradition’s failures is clear. Hegel will not rely in his Logic 
on any presupposition concerning the nature of our cognitive power, least of all that we have a 
faculty of thought which operates according to self-given laws. At the outset, the Logic is about 
being, nothing, quantity, quality, and so on, themselves, rather than about the concepts we form 
of these phenomena. It is only at the close of the Logic that we have the theoretical resources to 
even draw this distinction between concept and object, let alone grasp the nature of the type of 
conceptual thought we have been engaged in all along. The starting point of Hegel’s Logic is 
innocent of any such idea. Ultimately, then, it would be a mistake to treat the logic as being 
about thought-determinations from the outset. It is only revealed to be so at the close.  
 Responses can be found in Conant (1991), Tolley (2006), Boyle (forthcoming), Lu-Adler (2014), and others.30
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 In Chapter 2, I turn to Hegel’s critique of Kant’s “transcendental logic,” attempting to 
show that it builds on his earlier critique of logic in the Aristotelian tradition. I approach this 
critique as part of the post-Kantian project of meta-critique.  By this, I mean the attempt to 31
confront Kant’s own critical philosophy with the type of demand for justification it had itself 
made of all other areas of philosophy and the sciences. This strategy is embodied in Hegel’s 
famous “swimming objection,” which accuses the critical philosophy of an incoherence 
comparable to wanting to learn to swim before getting wet. I attempt to go beyond existing 
treatments of this objection by showing both that it is directed specifically at Kant’s derivation of 
the categories in the first critique: more specifically, it implicates his reliance on the logic of the 
Aristotelian tradition in his theory of the categories. In this way, I (re-)unite Hegel’s swimming 
objection and his other most famous objection to Kant’s theoretical philosophy, the critique of 
Kant’s derivation of the categories. I argue that the two function together to confront Kant with a 
dilemma. Unable to non-circularly self-justify, the critical philosophy must appeal to a more 
ultimate source of justification. In the Critique itself, that more ultimate source is the logic of the 
day. To rebut this approach, Hegel draws on his earlier criticism of this logic as empirical. 
Having considered this criticism of Aristotle earlier will put us in a good position to understand 
how it functions here as an objection to Kant. 
 As Hegel is well aware, this objection to Kant’s version of transcendental philosophy 
does not apply to all possible versions. In response, others had developed reconstituted versions 
of the critical philosophy. Hegel is most impressed with Fichte’s attempt to derive the categories 
from  a version of Descartes’ Cogito, amended so as to be compatible with Kant’s critique of 
 See Habermas (1971)31
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rational psychology. Yet Hegel maintains the categories can only be derived from a new first 
principle that he associates with the monisms of Parmenides and Spinoza: Being. For complex 
reasons, this is considered by Hegel to be equivalent to rehabilitating the ontological argument 
for the existence of God. Ultimately, Hegel will argue that a reconstituted version of the critical 
philosophy requires recourse to an argument Kant himself rejected as the epitome of pre-critical 
dogmatic metaphysics. 
 In the third and fourth chapters I turn to Hegel’s relationship to traditional metaphysics. 
Hegel concedes that pre-critical metaphysics gave rise to the impasses Kant identifies, but denies 
that any form of realist metaphysics would have to do so. This he will show by demonstrating 
that Kant has misdiagnosed the problem with pre-critical metaphysics, and therefore failed to 
make the case for his preferred alternative: transcendental idealism. In Hegel’s view, the errors 
Kant identifies (paralogisms, antinomies, and so on) are not the result of transcendental realism, 
the claim that pure reason can know the unconditioned. Instead, they result from the use of a 
crude set of logical tools to achieve this otherwise legitimate aim. These are tools furnished by 
the traditional Aristotelian logic: for example, the judgment of subject-predicate form, but also 
the syllogism. This opens up the possibility of arguing that a realist form of metaphysics remains 
a possibility for us, provided we use a different set of logical tools. This would be a distinctly 
post-critical metaphysics, traditional in its aspiration to know the unconditioned if not in the 
means it employs in attempting to achieve that end. 
 Having considered Hegel’s defense of metaphysics, I turn in a fifth chapter to his attempt 
to develop a reconstituted logic based on it. I begin with Hegel’s treatment in the opening 
sections of the Doctrine of Essence of the laws of logic recognized in the Leibniz-Wolff 
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tradition: identity, identity of indiscernibles, non-contradiction, excluded middle, and sufficient 
ground. As we have seen, Hegel opposes this tradition’s broader conception of a law of logic as a 
constitutive norm of thinking. For Hegel, no such strategy can ground the universality and 
necessity of a law of logic. On Hegel’s alternative view, these laws are treated ontologically, not 
psychologically. The key to this approach is that each such law derives from a category in 
Aristotle’s sense of the term, a predicate of any being or entity. More specifically, each such law 
is a category “put in the form of a proposition.” For example, the logical law of identity is the 
ontological category of identity put in form of a proposition “everything is identical with itself.” 
In this way, universality and necessity are accommodated, but there is a further benefit. Because 
the categories are systematically interconnected, deriving from one another, treating the laws of 
logic as deriving from them allows us to construct a system of them as well, a feat that eluded the 
tradition. Drawing on this account, I offer a sympathetic treatment of Hegel’s notorious doctrine 
of the reality of contradiction. The rationale for this doctrine is simply that it is entailed by the 
correct ontology or category theory: more specifically, this is an account on which reality is 
pervaded by what Hegel calls opposition. 
 In a sixth and final chapter, I consider Hegel’s perspective on three remaining topics of 
traditional formal logic: concept, judgment and syllogism. For Kant, the central topics of formal 
logic are prior to those of category theory, conceived of by him as part of transcendental logic. In 
this way, he attempts to derive the laws and materials of his transcendental logic from those of 
general. Yet as we have seen Hegel regards this project as a failure. As we saw earlier, Hegel 
rejects this prioritization, but only now do we see that he proposes to completely invert it. A 
well-known Marxist trope applies here: having found Kant standing on his head, Hegel turns him 
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right side up, arriving at a radically non-Kantian form of metaphysics. The alternative Hegel will 
defend draws on an ontological or general-metaphysical theory of the categories, developed on a 
logic-independent basis. This then forms the foundation for a new logic of concept, judgment 
and syllogism, contentful in a way the older variety is not.  
vii. “Logic and metaphysics coincide” (Pippin) 
 In recent decades, Anglophone Hegel scholarship has for the most part centered around a 
single question: How could Hegel reconcile a robustly metaphysical project like his own with his 
profound debt to the Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant?  Earlier generations of 32
commentators had mostly shirked the question, endorsing overly simplistic interpretations of 
Hegel on which it never arose. One such interpretation, associated with Charles Taylor, treats 
Hegel as a “spirit-monist,”  a thinker for whom the whole of reality is a cosmic subject, God.  33
On this view, Hegel appears to be an unrepentant pre-critical metaphysician, unconcerned with 
Kant’s warnings against overstepping the limits of human knowledge. Another such 
interpretation, associated with Klaus Hartmann, treats Hegel as a category theorist, engaged in 
the more modest project of examining our conceptual scheme.  If metaphysics is the attempt to 34
know objects considered apart from our concepts, then Hartmann denies Hegel is a 
metaphysician  at all. Nearly all commentators writing today would agree that both of these 
approaches are one-sided, perhaps untenably so. Yet in spite of this, Anglophone Hegel 
scholarship remains divided along broadly similar lines.  The labels often used for these two 35
 Helpful overviews of the debate include Redding (1997), Kreines (2006) and Moyar (2017)32
 Taylor (1975)33
 Hartmann (1972). See Rosen (1988) for a response.34
 Post-Kantian (sometimes called non-metaphysical) interpretations include Pippin (1989) Pinkard (1994). In 35
addition to other authors I discuss below, Beiser (2005) is an important example of a metaphysical interpretation. 
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camps (“non-metaphysical” and “metaphysical”) are unsatisfactory, since they can suggest a 
regression to the type of one-sided position Hegel scholarship has sought to leave behind. “Non-
metaphysical” interpreters, in particular, are uncomfortable with the label, preferring to be called 
“post-Kantian.” These interpreters have occasionally suggested that the entire debate relies on a 
caricature of their position, and they are not alone in thinking it must rest on a confusion. Many 
are understandably weary of what has often been an unproductive debate. The recent generation 
scholars frequently begin their dissertations and monographs with bold proposals for how we 
might get beyond the metaphysical/non-metaphysical debate. However, these proposals, though 
interesting, may have to wait. A recent and more prominent contribution to the literature by a 
figure who has been at its center since the beginning suggests that the debate may not be over 
just yet.   
 In his recent study, The Realm of Shadows (2018) Robert Pippin expands upon his 
influential earlier interpretation of Hegel to provide a more sustained and in-depth account of the 
metaphysics of Hegel’s Logic-project. Pippin defends an interpretation of the Logic based on 
Hegel’s famous remark that logic and metaphysics coincide (EL § 24 A). For Pippin, this remark 
announces a break with pre-Kantian metaphysics, the use of empirically unaided thought to 
know the natures of things.  In this new post-Kantian form of metaphysics, logic is understood 36
as yielding the type of insight metaphysics traditionally provided. Hegel’s alternative approach is 
based on the following thought, which Pippin expresses in language drawn from A.W. Moore’s 
recent work.  On this approach, our different ways of making sense of things or rendering them 37
 Pippin (2018: 42)36
 Ibid. p. 65. Pinkard (2017) Does History Make Sense? defends a similar interpretation.37
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intelligible to ourselves (the usual subject-matter of logic), just are the different ways things can 
be (the usual subject-matter of metaphysics). Or: “to be is to be intelligible.” 
 According to Pippin, Hegel finds such a project anticipated in Kant himself, but 
maintains it was not successfully carried out by him. “Critical philosophy,” Hegel tell us, 
“already turned metaphysics into logic” (WdL 21:35/SoL 30).  Pursuing this suggestion, Pippin 38
suggests that Hegel may have found inspiration for his own project in Kant’s Metaphysical 
Deduction of the categories.  There, it is shown that the forms of judgment examined by logic 39
are systematically correlated with the categories of traditional metaphysics. For example, 
judgments of the form “ground-consequent” are correlated with the category “cause-effect,” 
those of the form “subject-predicate” with “substance-accident.” Yet, as Hegel proceeds to argue, 
Kant was hindered from pursuing this project by another commitment of his.  In particular, Kant 40
is hindered by a flawed account of the relationship between intuition and concept, sensibility and 
understanding. Here, Pippin draws on decades of his own important work on the topic, but I will 
simplify a more complex story. In Pippin’s retelling, Hegel rejects Kant’s account of the division 
of cognitive labor between the two, with intuition putting us in touch with particulars, and 
concepts allowing us to subsume them under universals. According to Hegel, Kant’s account 
vastly overstates the role of intuition, leaving conceptual thought on its own incapable of putting 
us in objects. The result is that logic is rendered incapable of realizing its metaphysical potential. 
 Once Kant’s mistaken account of the sensibility-understanding distinction is jettisoned, 
logic can realize its metaphysical potential. In clarifying the nature of Hegel’s metaphysics, 
 Quoted in Pippin (2018: 3)38
 Ibid. 64.39
 Ibid. 74 ff.40
!33
Pippin distances it from rationalist varieties. He describes it instead as Aristotelian, which he 
understands to be a metaphysics defined at least in part by its focus on the teleological structure 
of artifacts and living beings, rather than the super-sensible world of the neo-Platonist, Medieval, 
or rationalist metaphysician. For Pippin, Hegel’s metaphysics differs from any that would treat 
the essences of things as entities in the world in the way that the conceptual realist interpretation 
of Hegel does.  At a broader level, Pippin denies that Hegel’s metaphysics is concerned with the 41
existence or causal origins of things in our world. Instead, it is intended to provide insight into 
how things ought to be “rendered intelligible” or “made sense of” by us. Pippin compares the 
position of the Hegelian speculative-logician to that of someone wondering whether a computer 
that plays chess can genuinely be said to think or whether a certain practice, e.g. peyote smoking, 
counts as religion.  In such cases, the empirical (causal) facts are known, but there is a doubt 42
about what significance should be attributed to them. Would not Hegel’s decision to treat logic as 
metaphysics succumb to the very form of “subjectivism” for which he criticized Kant? For 
Pippin, it would not, since the main threat to the objectivity of our knowledge is that posed by 
Kant’s account of intuition and its forms. On Pippin’s view, Hegel has neutralized this threat by 
adopting another such account.            
 In this dissertation, I defend a metaphysical interpretation of Hegel like those developed 
by Pippin’s critics in response to his earlier work. I draw on this interpretation to offer an account 
of Hegel’s views in logic that differs from Pippin’s. The difference between Pippin’s account and 
my own stands out most clearly against the backdrop of Pippin’s distinctive account of the place 
 Ibid. 53. 41
 Ibid. 8442
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Kant and Hegel occupy in the history and philosophy of logic. In Pippin’s retelling of that 
history, Kant’s great achievement is to have seen that logic has something of an intermediate 
status relative to the two main ways it was traditionally conceived of in philosophy before him.  43
More specifically, Kant denies that logic can be assimilated to a form of psychology as it was in 
Port-Royal or to a form of traditional metaphysics as it was in the Leibniz-Wolff tradition. Logic 
concerns the separate topic of what Pippin calls “sense-making” or “intelligibility,” “the 
conditions on any possible sense.”  According to Pippin, Hegel inherits this conception of logic 44
from Kant, if not the further account of sensibility and its forms that originally accompanied it. 
This approach to logic reminds one of Frege, who thought of logic as neither part of psychology 
nor of metaphysics but as concerned with a different subject-matter. Its topic was neither mental 
nor physical, belonging to a “third realm.” Pippin is careful to differentiate the idealists from 
Frege, observing that Kant’s and Hegel’s logic is one of acts and of judgments, rather than of 
propositions.  Yet this only serves to underscore how close Pippin’s idealists already are to 45
Frege. Idealist logic is already on the threshold of the “third realm” if not yet comfortably inside. 
It also situates Kant and Hegel closer to one another than might have been expected, the issue of 
sensibility and its forms aside. Seen in this light, the Kant-Hegel relationship can no longer be 
described in many of the ways that were once standard in the literature, e.g., as a shift from 
philosophical psychology to ontology.  
 Ibid. 43.43
 This account of Kantian logic as a logic of sense and therefore occupying an intermediate position between two 44
unpalatable alternatives was a slightly more pronounced theme in earlier versions of the material from the book. See 
Pippin (2017)
 Pippin (2018: 44).45
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 If Pippin is right, then the debate in which I see Kant and Hegel involved in will seem 
unworthy of their interest.  After all, I understand Kant to be defending a (broadly) 46
psychological conception of logic, if not one indebted to empirical psychology, whereas Hegel is 
defending an ontological one. Were these not the very alternatives these figures helped us to get 
beyond? In responding to this concern, I want to suggest there is a broader spectrum of views 
here than Pippin seems to acknowledge. I will not myself be exploring the topic of sense-making 
or intelligibility at all in what follows, since I am not a partisan of this program. Briefly, my 
reason for skepticism is that these notions seem to me either anachronistic or uninformative. Is 
sense Frege’s notion, or else the one present in Wittgenstein’s ideas about nonsense? If so, then I 
doubt it could be relevant to German idealism. Is it instead or in addition the colloquial everyday 
one at work when we tell someone that he or she is not making sense? If so, then I doubt it is 
especially informative. It is difficult to see how sense, all on its own, could be a topic for 
philosophy. Usually, something makes sense (or fails to) for a reason. Hence, principles in some 
other domain explain why something makes sense (or fails to do so). Sense, or failures of sense, 
may be explained by semantics, psychology, logic or metaphysics. But then, it seems to me, we 
are back where we started, asking: which of these areas, if any, best accommodates Hegel’s 
Logic?  I am not, then, among the friends of sense. Still, they might be interested in what I have 47
 Here, Pippin might be seen as arguing for Hegel’s inclusion in a tradition of thinking about logic reconstructed by 46
Jim Conant in his now classic paper, “The Possibility of Logically Alien Thought,” (1992). There, Conant claimed 
that the laws of logic have a distinctive status for Kant. They are distinct from both the findings of empirical 
psychology about how we do, in fact, think, as well as those of Scholastic ontology about the way thing-in-
themselves is fundamentally constituted. For Conant, this paves the way for Frege’s “anti-psychologistic” claim that 
logic’s laws are those of truth itself, and, in a different way, the early Wittgenstein’s treatment of them as meta-
linguistic. Kant therefore emerges somewhat improbably as a forerunner of early analytic philosophy, a movement 
in which his own views in logic were criticized as unduly psychological. 
 A similar dilemma, I think, arises for appeals to that other notion, intelligibility. It too has many technical 47
meanings from more recent philosophy, which would make it irrelevant to Hegel, e.g. Heidegger’s “skillfully 
engaged coping.” It too has a non-technical meaning, which is not likely to be informative for philosophers. I am, 
then, wary of appeals to either sense-making or intelligibility in Hegel-interpretation.
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to say. If the case for the “third way” they advocate is to succeed, then it had better not be based 
on an uncharitable and implausible characterization of the possible alternatives. As I hope to 
show, there are more and better versions of these alternatives, ontological or psychological, than 
the friends of sense would have us believe. Certainly, the Cartesianism of Port-Royal and the 
dogmatism of Wolffian metaphysics are not the only options. 
 One such psychological view of logic appears to have been held by Kant himself, 
Pippin’s alternative portrayal notwithstanding. In my view, there is a much closer connection 
between logic and psychology in Kant’s thought than Pippin acknowledges.  Certainly, Kant 48
distinguished logic from empirical psychology. For Kant, the laws of logic are normative 
principles dictating how we ought to think, not empirical ones stating how we do. What is more 
they abstract from the representations of sensibility or intuition, and are in that sense non-
empirical. Still, Kant’s conception of logic is inseparable from a form of philosophical 
psychology (‘faculty psychology’). Kant defines the laws of logic as those governing certain 
psychological faculties we possess, the understanding and reason.  For Kant, the laws are 49
normative, but in a way compatible with them also being descriptive.  They describe what it is 50
in the nature of our cognitive faculties to do when nothing interferes. (In this regard, there is a 
parallel between logical laws and moral ones, inasmuch as both describe laws we would be 
incapable of disobeying if we were not finite beings, diverted from doing so by sensibility.) Once 
again, there are important differences between this type of teleologically-inspired faculty 
 The portrayal of Kant’s views in this paragraph is not intended to be original.48
 A typical example of how Kant defines logic is the following: “…science of the correct use of the understanding 49
and of reason in general” (Jäsche Logic, 16/530-1)
 I here follow Tolley (2006), and Boyle (forthcoming) especially for the parallel with the holy will. 50
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psychology and empirical psychology. It is a form of self-knowledge, rather than knowledge of 
objects, meaning it is spontaneous rather than receptive. Unlike empirical psychology, it does not 
take into account the concrete conditions under which the faculties of understanding and reason 
are exercised, conditions introduced by sensibility (fatigue, distraction, unwillingness and so on). 
Finally, there is no serious concern that the laws of logic should, on this conception, be at all 
parochial. To be sure, Kant takes himself to have discovered something that would have to be 
true not just of human or finite knowers, but of any thinking being as such. Yet there are more 
ways in which a position can be subjective beyond being parochial. What is centrally at issue for 
me in the dispute between Hegel and Kant is a question that does not arise for Pippin. This is the 
question of why an approach like Kant’s might still be objectionably subjectivist, even apart 
from the issues raised by sensibility and its forms, e.g. “species-specificity.” Answering this 
question will require me to consider in a more sustained way Hegel’s objection to Kant’s account 
of the understanding and its forms. The main place I will focus is Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s 
Metaphysical Deduction, a criticism of Kant’s derivation of the categories from the logical forms 
of judgment. I argue that this criticism is radically anti-Kantian, rather than superficially so. 
 If the interpretation defended here differs from Pippin’s in treating Kant’s ‘logic’ as 
broadly psychological in character, then it also does so in treating Hegel’s metaphysics as much 
more traditional. I think Hegel remains committed to the enterprise of traditional metaphysics, 
even as Pippin himself characterizes it. By this, I mean the use of empirically unaided thought to 
know the ultimate nature of reality. To be sure, Hegel’s claim that logic and metaphysics coincide 
is central to his project. However, I differ from Pippin over how this claim ought to be 
understood. As I see it, the main question dividing Pippin and myself is the order of priority 
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between the two,  though there is also a subsidiary issue of just what, exactly, each term means. 51
I understand Hegel’s remark as a proposal to subsume (formal) logic under a broadly traditional 
form of (realist) metaphysics, rather than the reverse.  For me, Hegel’s innovation is less a 52
fundamentally new form of metaphysics, then it is the extension of it into previously unfamiliar 
territory. What is more, the dictum does not concern the nature of speculative logic or logic in 
Hegel’s broad sense of the term. It concerns formal logic, logic in a narrower and more 
traditional sense of the term. More specifically, it is about what role formal logic’s traditional 
topics of concept, judgment and syllogism, will have in relation to the rest of the Logic. It is for 
this reason, I think, that Hegel describes his topic in the remark as “the relationship of forms as 
concept, judgment, and syllogism to others, e.g. causality and so forth” (EL § 24A). What role, 
then, will they have? Part of the answer, I think, is that Hegel is engaged in a rather dramatic 
repurposing of logic’s principles, e.g. concept, judgment, and syllogism.  In Hegel’s thought, 53
these principles are cast in a fundamentally new role. They appear here as “definitions of the 
Absolute,” ultimate reality, God. Extracting them from the “species-specific” forms of intuition, 
may be an important first step. It realizes their potential for objective thought, rather than some 
more parochial variety. Yet objectivity does not even begin to capture Hegel’s ambition. I mean 
 I here follow Peacocke, a defender of what he calls the “metaphysics-first” view (forthcoming 2019) (2014). This 51
is the view that in any given domain of philosophy, the metaphysics of entities in that domain is prior to the theory 
of meaning or intentional content for that domain. It is meant to contrast with the opposite “meaning-first” view 
defended in Dummett’s Logical Basis of Metaphysics. For Peacocke, McDowell has a no-priority view. This is 
perhaps pertinent to the present debate, given the extensive parallels many of the protagonists in it see between 
Hegel and McDowell. 
 Harrelson “Logic and Ontology in Hegel,” offers a qualified defense of this view, and a helpful overview of its 52
history. Evidently, it is the neo-Kantian Zeller who is the figure most responsible for the negative portrayal of Hegel 
as a figure who conflated logic and metaphysics. As Harrelson also points, a contemporary defense of a position like 
Hegel’s on the relations between logic and metaphysics can be found in Varzi (2009). 
 This is a point stressed especially by conceptual realist interpreters, e.g. Stern (1989) (2009), Kreines (2015), 53
Knappik (2016) (2017).
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his aim of achieving insight into the fundamental nature of reality in the way metaphysicians 
have historically done. This is something that many forms of thought which are perfectly 
objective fail to achieve. More broadly, the intellectual universe of Hegel’s thought as I present it 
here differs. It includes figures like the neo-Platonists, Spinoza, Schelling, Bradley, Whitehead 
and Deleuze, but not at all the pragmatists, Wittgenstein, Sellars, McDowell and Brandom.  54
 It will be important to confront the chief philosophical problem Pippin raises for any 
approach like mine that treats Hegel as wedded to a more traditional form of metaphysics. This is 
the problem of naively imagining that conceptual thought can, all on its own, know things-in-
themselves, a feat which would seem to require a non-sensible form of intuition finite knowers 
like ourselves lack. My response is simply that the starting point of Hegel’s Logic is innocent of 
the distinction between subject and object, and therefore of any problem concerning how they 
might cooperate in knowledge. The distinction between subject and object may be natural 
enough in everyday life and natural science, but it cannot be taken for granted in philosophy 
where monism is always an option. Admittedly, there are different ways of overcoming subject-
object dualism than embracing a realist form of metaphysics. Some are more compatible with 
Pippin’s outlook than others. Idealism without externality, the given or the thing-it-itself would 
be one example (“the unboundedness of the conceptual” as McDowell says). However, I believe 
the way Hegel chooses differs. It is the way of metaphysical monism. Philosophy starts with pure 
Being, the principle of Eleatic monism, which Hegel also describes as Spinoza’s substance. 
Admittedly, the thought of pure Being, as Hegel calls it, will turn out to be incoherent. Yet Hegel 
will, as I have said, make a virtue of a necessity. Resolving the incoherence yields a new form of 
 Others who interpret Hegel’s “logic and metaphysics coincide” remark include Inwood (1983), Rödl (2012), 54
Burbidge (2014) Martin (2015), Ficara (2015). Of these, I am closest to Inwood. 
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Being (a “sublated” version of its predecessor) at which point the process repeats. This means 
that Hegel has a strategy for deriving the categories or fundamental forms of Being which the 
Scholastic-Aristotelian tradition did not. As I have said, it will turn out that these categories are 
products of self-determining thinking, but this realization cannot take place until we have the 
conceptual resources to describe such a thinker: more specifically, categories describing the 
knowing subject itself. Yet we have no such categories at the outset of the logic, Hegel’s many 
anticipations of the theory of subjectivity he will go on to develop notwithstanding. 
 Although I have expressed disagreement with Pippin’s interpretation, I want to conclude 
by exploring the possibility that his and my own might be compatible — and in a way that cedes 
a certain priority to his. As I have said, Pippin and I approach Hegel’s “logic and metaphysics” 
remark differently. For Pippin, logic here means logic in the broad Hegelian sense of the term 
(“speculative logic”). The remark therefore concerns the project of Hegel’s Logic as a whole. It 
tells us specifically that this work is one in which logic attains the status of a metaphysics. In 
doing so, it effects a Kantian-style break with traditional metaphysics, which lacked this logical 
basis. For me, by contrast, logic is used here in a narrower more traditional sense (“formal 
logic”). Hence, the remark concerns the relationship of one small part of Hegel’s Logic to the 
rest. It tells us that Hegel nests (formal) logic within a recognizably traditional form of 
metaphysics (general, special). Traditional metaphysics, then, remains salient. Yet there is more 
to the story. If Pippin is right, then this “traditional” metaphysics is not what it seems. It is logic 
again, this time understood in the broad Hegelian sense that interests Pippin. I differ from Pippin 
over the significance of this unmasking. In particular, I doubt it alters the nature of Hegel’s 
project. Still, I concede the possibility of bringing our interpretations closer together in this way. 
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I.    Hegel and the Logic of the Aristotelian Tradition 
 As we saw earlier, Hegel shares Kant’s view that logic has remained largely unchanged 
since Aristotle, certain Scholastic amendments notwithstanding. Yet Hegel does not himself 
endorse this logic as it stands. He objects to the complacent attitude of his contemporaries 
towards this logic. What is more, Hegel describes his Logic as one of the first and only attempts 
ever to propose a radical alternative to traditional logic. In this chapter, I consider Hegel’s case 
against “the former logic,” mostly postponing for future chapters the question of what Hegel’s 
alternative is meant to be.   
 Hegel objects to the broadly psychological approach to logic taken in the tradition, 
though he is well aware it does not involve the reduction of logic to empirical psychology. For 
this reason, Hegel’s objection should not be confused with the accusation of psychologism Frege 
would later level at earlier logicians. In particular, Hegel’s concerns have nothing to do with the 
reduction of the normative to the descriptive. A large part of the reason for this is that the 
tradition relies on a teleological faculty psychology, not an empirical psychology in any modern 
sense. This means it is better able to accommodate the normative character of logic than the later 
programs that Frege criticized.  
  Instead, Hegel’s objection is that this psychological approach precludes the tradition 
from a satisfying response to the dilemma from the history and philosophy of logic considered 
earlier. In particular, this approach threatens to render the justification of logic brute in a way that 
is complacent. As I hope to show, Hegel considers this objection an immanent critique of formal 
logic. In his view, this logic is based on the supreme value of justifying ourselves through 
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rational argument. It prescribes to other areas of philosophy and the sciences the norms they 
must observe in order to construct rational arguments. However, it has no such argument for its 
own most basic principles, treating them instead as justified, as it were, by default. Indeed, it 
cannot do otherwise. These principles are so fundamental that any argument for them would 
likely already use them, and in so doing risk circularity. Even so, Hegel regards the traditional 
approach as betraying an aspiration basic to logic and philosophy themselves. Honoring this 
aspiration requires a rethinking of the role of logic in philosophy. Yet this will also demand a 
solution to the problem of circularity.  
i. Presuppositionless knowing: natural science, mathematics, formal logic and religion  55
 In the very first line of the very first paragraph of his Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel declares 
that philosophy differs from all other sciences in two crucial respects. It cannot presuppose an 
object, nor can it presupposes a specific method of coming to understand that object.  
Philosophy lacks the advantage from which the other sciences benefit, namely the 
ability to presuppose both its objects as immediately endorsed by representation 
of them and an acknowledged method of knowing, which would determine its 
starting-point and progression. (EL § 1) 
For Hegel, each of the sciences is defined by the type of object that is its subject-matter. 
Mathematics studies numbers, geometry space, physics material bodies, biology living 
organisms, and so on. If the sciences are to give us knowledge of the world around us, then 
presumably they are committed to the belief that objects of these types exist. What, though, is the 
status of that belief or claim? In Hegel’s view, its status is that it is taken for granted as 
 In this section, I follow others who interpret Hegel’s Logic as presuppositionless, primarily Houlgate (2006), but 55
also Martin (2012). I have also benefited from consulting Hösl (1988) Wandschneider (1995) Koch (2000) and Rödl 
(2007), all cited in Martin. I have benefited from the similarly “presuppositionless” interpretation of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology in Bristow (2007), and, in a different way, from the critique of a “presuppositionless” reading in 
Sedgwick (2012).
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unproblematic. This is not because the claim in question has no justification, as if it were little 
more than an arbitrary stipulation the relevant science required in order to proceed. It is because 
the claim, made at the outset of the science in question, has a fundamentally different and much 
simpler type of justification than the more rigorous kind the science will go on to provide for 
subsequent claims it makes. The justification for the initial assumption is characteristically 
direct, or, in Hegel’s terms, “immediate.” In other words, we are supposed to simply be presented 
with the relevant fact, if it is one, straightaway in a certain type of experience (“representation”). 
Hegel calls such objects “presupposed objects” because, from the perspective of the sciences, it 
is a brute inexplicable fact of our experience that different types of objects exist. The task of 
science is to construct a body of knowledge about a given type of object, on the natural 
assumption that this type of object exists. It is not to address skeptical anxieties about whether 
objects of that type do, in fact, exist. The mathematician tells us about numbers, but not whether 
there are such things, the biologist about living things, but not whether there are any as opposed 
to mere automata, and so on.  56
  According to Hegel, philosophy does not have a “presupposed object” in the way the 
sciences do. It does not regard as settled the question of whether some type of object exists or 
not. Certainly, it does not regard experience as the final word on this issue. This is not 
necessarily to say that philosophy rejects the presuppositions of the sciences, as if its only 
possible role were to undercut assumptions on which our knowledge depends. Philosophy can 
adopt that role, which is why skepticism is a permanent possibility for it. However, it need not do 
so. This is not just because philosophy may concur with the presuppositions of the sciences, but 
 In the case of biology, this is illustrated well by Thompson’s discussion of the way standard college textbooks in 56
the field begin. See his (2007).
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for a more fundamental reason. Even where philosophy does concur it will characteristically 
attempt to go beyond the type of  justification experience provides.  
 Instead of the “immediate” or direct justification experience provides, philosophy seeks a 
“mediated” or indirect one. Instead of an experience that presents us with the object, philosophy 
offer us an argument proceeding though a series of steps to the conclusion that there is such a 
thing as an object of this kind.  Why proceed by this more indirect route?  It certainly seems 
much more demanding, so much so that one could be forgiven for wondering if it is worth the 
trouble. The answer, I think, is that the latter approach allows us to achieve a new type of insight 
into the same fact. The type of “immediate” experiential justification that we rely upon in the 
sciences and ordinary life can only tell us that something is the case. It simply presents us with 
the relevant fact. Yet a type of “mediated” justification through argument we construct in 
philosophy will tell us why it is the case. Here, the same fact will appear in a new guise as a 
consequence of some further fact or set of facts. 
 We now come to the second part of Hegel’s claim. This part concerns not the 
presupposed object, but rather the presupposed method. Hegel also denies that philosophy may 
presuppose a method in the way the sciences do. Once a science has its subject-matter, it must 
then decide how to proceed in studying it. In claiming that the method of a science gives us a 
“starting point,” Hegel may be thinking of methods of proof which have us begin from a set of 
axioms about the subject-matter we are studying. This is the method followed in geometry, 
where we start with definitions, axioms and postulates, all concerning space, and all meant to be 
intuitively obvious from our perceptual experience. We then proceed to prove all propositions in 
the system on the basis of them. As Hegel correctly observes, this method of beginning had long 
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been emulated in other sciences as well. Even in the sciences, this method is not yet sufficient. It 
only tells us about the “starting point,” rather than the “progression.” Even given the truth of the 
axioms, definitions and postulates, how is it that the proof of the propositions that make up the 
science will proceed? One natural answer is that it will do so through a type of rational inference 
in which the propositions making up the science are inferred from these axioms, postulates and 
definitions. For this reason, then, one particular science would become important to all the 
others, provided they were interested in proving their claims true: formal logic. As the source of 
the forms of valid inference, logic was presupposed by all other sciences, and, in particular, the 
proofs they contained. Of course, it was not itself sufficient for the construction of any scientific 
proof, but it was necessary. 
 Yet Hegel also rejects reliance on a presupposed method. Part of the reason concerns the 
broadly Euclidean strategy of appealing to axioms, definitions and postulates at the outset as the 
unproven basis on which everything else in the system will be proven. For Hegel, philosophy 
cannot rest content with the stipulation that certain axioms, postulates, and definitions are true. If 
they cannot be proven to be so through rational argument, then they are nothing to the 
philosopher. Nor even will a justification based on experience suffice, since this will land us in 
the same problem as before. Once we move beyond axioms, definitions and postulates to the 
propositions of the science itself and their logical interrelations, further problems arise. Here, the 
interrelations are meant to be at least partly spelled out by formal logic. Yet for Hegel, 
philosophy cannot simply defer to formal logic, as if it were not just as appropriate an object of 
criticism as any other science. Here too, then, philosophy is entitled to ask after the justification 
of this science’s foundational presuppositions. However, the stakes are even higher than before. 
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After all, logic is fundamental in a way the other sciences are not. All other sciences have turned 
out to justify themselves not only on the basis of their choice of object taken from the sphere of 
“representation,” but also on the basis of a method provided by this science, logic. If we ask for 
logic’s justification, both in terms of its object and method, then we are asking for a type of 
justification on which all other sciences indirectly depend. If the stakes are higher, the challenge 
is also greater. After all, logic will not be able to justify its method of argument in the way the 
other sciences had. It cannot claim that method is vindicated by logic, on pain of vicious 
circularity. Yet if it cannot do so it is unclear how it might defend itself.  
 Hegel’s presuppositionless approach, which relies neither on a presupposed object nor on 
a presupposed method, informs his views on the relationship of philosophy to religion. Because 
philosophy and religion concern the same subject-matter, namely God, we are likely to come to 
philosophy with a received set of views about the topic:   
It is true that philosophy initially shares its objects with religion. Both have the 
truth for their object, and more precisely the truth in the highest sense, in the 
sense God and God alone is the truth. Moreover, both treat the sphere of finite 
things, the sphere of nature and the human spirit, their relation to each other and 
to God as their truth. (EL § 1A) 
In fact, it is inevitable that we will come to philosophy with pre-conceptions. That is because the 
“representations” we acquire from experience are always prior to the type of contemplative 
thinking that we engage in when we do philosophy. Here, Hegel is doubtless thinking of 
“representations” like the metaphorical ones of God found in religious stories, works of art, 
songs, and so on. If that is so, then it is very likely impossible to begin doing philosophy without 
pre-conceptions drawn from experience: 
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Philosophy thus may definitely presuppose a familiarity with its objects indeed it 
must do so as well as an interest in them from the outset, if only because 
chronologically speaking consciousness produces for itself representations of 
objects prior to generating concepts of them. What is more, only by passing 
through the process of representing and by turning towards it, does thinking spirit 
progress to knowing by way of thinking [denkendes Erkennen] and to 
comprehending [Begreifen]. (Ibid.) 
In spite of this, philosophical thinking does demand that we not simply rely on these 
presuppositions in establishing the truth of the claims we wish to defend. Instead, we must 
present a type of argument. This is an alternative to the type of appeal to experience. Why prefer 
the former to the latter? The answer, Hegel tell us, concerns “necessity.” 
While engaged in thoughtful contemplation, however, it soon becomes apparent 
that such activity includes the requirement to demonstrate the necessity of its 
content, and to prove not only its being but, even more so, the determinations of 
its objects. The aforementioned familiarity with this content thus turns out to be 
insufficient, and to make or accept presuppositions or assurances regarding it 
appears illegitimate: of making a beginning, however, arises at once, since a 
beginning is something immediate and as such makes a presupposition, or rather 
it is itself just that. (Ibid.) 
An argument characteristically tell us us why a certain claim is true. It does so by showing that 
the claim follows “necessarily” from some other claim. By contrast, the appeal to experience 
merely tell us that it is true. Even when experience is trustworthy as to whether a truth holds 
good it tells us little about why. Hence, Hegel concludes that we must aspire to more than the 
“immediate” justification that experience affords and consider a “mediated” one. Yet if we are to 
construct this type of argument, we must not treat the presuppositions we have made as premises 
in it. Otherwise, the argument would be viciously circular. This is the entire point of a 
presuppositionless approach. By avoiding merely presupposing that something is true, we put 
ourselves in a position to prove (non-circularly) that it is.  
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ii. Hegel and the logic of the Aristotelian tradition  
  In this section, I consider Hegel’s account of the logic of his day, the logic of the 
Aristotelian tradition. Crucially, this account is informed throughout by Hegel’s ideal of 
philosophy as a form of presuppositionless knowing. As we will later see, Hegel reproaches the 
logic of his day for failing to live up to this ideal. Indeed, as Hegel tells us here, this logic 
defined itself in terms of a presupposed object, on the one hand, and a presupposed method, on 
the other. This suggests Hegel regards it as insufficiently presuppositionless to qualify as true 
philosophy. The discussion I focus on can be found in the following addition, which I quote at 
length: 
When we speak of thinking, it appears initially to be a subjective activity, one of 
several faculties possessed by us, such as memory, representation, volition, and 
the like. If thinking were a merely subjective activity and as such the object of 
logic, this science like any other would have its specific object. It could then 
appear to be arbitrary to make thinking and not also the will, imagination and so 
forth the object of a particular science. That thinking should receive this honour 
may well be due to the fact that we grant it a certain authority and that we regard 
it as what is truly human, distinguishing humans from animals. To become 
familiar with thinking even as a merely subjective activity is not without interest. 
Its more specific determinations would be the rules and laws with which one 
becomes acquainted through experience. Thinking viewed in this way as 
determined by laws makes up what usually otherwise constituted the content of 
logic. Aristotle is the founder of this science. He possessed the strength to assign 
to thinking what belongs to it per se. Our thinking is very concrete, but with 
respect to its manifold content we need to sort out what belongs to thinking or the 
abstract form of the activity. The activity of thinking, acting as a subtle spiritual 
bond, connects all this content. It is this bond, this form itself, which Aristotle 
highlighted and defined. To this day, the logic of Aristotle represents the logical 
[sphere], which has merely been made more elaborate, primarily by the 
Scholastics of the Middle Ages. The Scholastics did not add to the material, but 
merely developed it further. The work of more recent times with respect to logic 
consists primarily in omitting many of the logical determinations spun out further 
by Aristotle and the Scholastics, on the one hand, and in superimposing a lot of 
psychological material [on the other]. The interest in this science lies with 
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becoming acquainted with the procedures of finite thinking, and the science is 
correct when it corresponds to its presupposed object. (EL § 20  Z) 
 Hegel describes the former logic as a science defined by its “presupposed object.” This 
object was a certain mental activity, thinking. What is more, thinking in this sense was defined as 
the activity of a certain psychological faculty we possess, the faculty of thought. Here, Hegel 
uses the term “thought” in a narrower sense than is common. He means making judgments and 
drawing inferences. Understood in this narrow sense, thought is to be distinguished from other 
mental activities like sense-perception, desire, imagination, memory and will. For Hegel, thought 
is abstract in a way these other activities, which he calls concrete, are not. Unlike thought, all of 
the others have an inherent connection to sensible representations, on the one hand, and 
inclinations or desires, on the other. Moreover, thought is formal in the sense that it applies itself 
to the material these other activities present to it. We judge and infer about what we sense, 
imagine, wish, will, and so on. For Hegel, this science (logic) presupposes as self-evident the fact 
that we think, understood in this narrower and more technical sense of the term. Hegel does not 
deny the plausibility of this claim. Clearly, we do engage in this type of intellectual activity, often 
without engaging in any of the others. If this activity is to originate somewhere, then presumably 
it does so in a faculty distinct from that responsible for the others.   57
 Here, Hegel notes that this common-sense belief hardly justifies giving thinking the importance we give it in 57
logic. If thinking genuinely were just one mental activity alongside others, it would be arbitrary to base our science 
on it. Psychology does so, but philosophy requires a deeper justification for its choice of topic. Hegel alludes in 
passing to a traditional justification. This is the fact, if it is one, that we alone among the animals can think, and that 
thinking is presided over by a faculty of thought. Yet as Hegel adds, this is another “presupposition.” Significantly, 
Hegel describes this assumption as merely probable. This is not evidence that Hegel took seriously the proposal that 
animals think. Rather, it is a strong indication that he did not consider the fact that they do not a secure enough 
starting point for logic. Evidently, the justification for basing our science on thinking will need to come from 
somewhere else.
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 As Hegel proceeds to explain, this logic also had a presupposed method of discovering 
the laws or rules of thinking: “abstraction.” In attending to the acts of thinking performed by the 
faculty of thought, it would abstract from all of the concrete material contributed by the other 
faculties, especially sensibility. In this way, it would discover the formal rules this faculty 
necessarily obeys, at least when other faculties do not interfere. For example: the law of non-
contradiction, thought by many in this tradition to be impossible to deny under conditions of 
reflective clarity. This is not to deny that we can affirm a contradiction, but merely to offer a 
distinctive explanation of what has happened when we do. The explanation is that another faculty 
has interfered, a faculty like the will, desire, or imagination. Yet the laws something obeys when 
nothing else interferes have a special significance for this tradition. They articulate the nature of 
that type of entity. As a result these laws represent an especially deep form of insight into 
thinking, articulating what thinking as such is. For this reason, these laws were meant to apply to 
any thinker as such, even a divine one. However, the laws discovered also have an additional 
normative significance for beings like ourselves. They also explain what good thinking is.  58
  Why, though, should understanding what thinking is help explain what it is to think well? 
The answer, I think, reflects the constitutivism of the Aristotelian tradition. In the background is 
the assumption that many norms, perhaps all norms, are constitutive norms: for a thing (state, 
process) to be good is for it to be a good instance of its kind. The laws of logic are therefore of 
greater relevance to our ordinary lives than they might have at first seemed. They not only 
explain how we do think when no other faculty interferes, but also how we ought to think, even 
under conditions when interference can happen. These laws therefore place us under a certain 
 For a a different account of the role in Hegel’s Logic-project of this constitutivist idea see Pippin (2018).58
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type of obligation to think well, and to avoid having our thinking interfered with in this way. This 
is a presupposed method because it (more or less) follows directly from the presupposed object. 
If there is such a thing as thinking in this sense, one activity or faculty among others, then 
“abstraction” from the contribution of the others is the obvious way to study its laws. 
 This puts us in a position to understand why thinkers in the Aristotelian tradition 
understood logic to have considerable authority over the other sciences. Logic’s formal 
principles belong to the form of thinking as such. Logic is not just about what it is to think well, 
but what it is to think at all. Hence, we can be confident that its rules apply to our thinking in any 
area. The form of our thinking may apply itself to any number of different types of matter 
furnished by our other faculties like sensibility. However, the form remains invariant in all these 
cases. This means that logic is foundational for the other sciences. Logic’s laws are presupposed 
by all of them. After all, the mere fact that thinking is applying itself to one broad type of object 
rather than another is of little consequence to logic. It does not fundamentally change what it 
means to think (well).  
 This is not to say that the laws of logic are the only laws that there are, since there will be 
laws of the special sciences as well. In addition to the laws of thinking well, there may be laws 
concerning how to think well about some particular type of object or other. Nor is it even to say 
that the laws of logic are sufficient to yield the laws of any given special science. The laws of 
thinking well can never by themselves tell us what it is to think well about any given object-type. 
However, it is to insist that logic’s laws will be presupposed by all the laws of the other sciences. 
A principle of our thinking as fundamental as the law of non-contradiction will never be 
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overturned by one that merely concerns the way planets in our solar system orbit the sun. Still, 
logic does have a somewhat ambivalent status. It is both prior to all other sciences, as well as 
radically insufficient in comparison to them. This is perhaps reflected in the name given to the 
section of Aristotle’s corpus containing his logic: the “Organon” (tool or instrument). Logic is an 
“organon” because it is a tool or instrument necessary to construct bodies of scientific 
knowledge. Yet it is not a “canon,” not a body of scientific knowledge itself.  59
 Before proceeding, Hegel must address a point of obscurity in his account of the older 
logic. Hegel describes this logic as grounding itself in experience, but if any science were non-
empirical then logic would seem to be. However, Hegel’s characterization is apt. Unlike the other 
sciences, logic does not appeal to sense experience, the type of experience we have when the 
world affects our sense-organs. Precisely not.  As we have seen, knowledge of logic is only 60
acquired when we abstract from the concrete content thinking acquires through sense-experience. 
In spite of this, logic relies on a type of intellectual experience. The justification for logic’s 
claims rests on a type of experience we have of finding them incontrovertible. Again, this is an 
experience we have when we focus exclusively on thinking’s abstract form and leave aside its 
sensibly given matter. This is why Hegel frequently describes logic as proceeding empirically, 
even though he nowhere maintains the absurd view that it relies on sense experience. Moreover, 
it also explains why Hegel frequently compares Aristotle’s approach to logic with his empirical 
approach to the study of nature: 
 Hegel discusses this grouping in VGP “Aristotle: Logic”59
 I here follow Houlgate (2006: 14-16), though he is discussing the Hegel-Kant relation in logic, not the Hegel-60
Aristotle one. Later, I argue that these come to the same thing.
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Aristotle proceeded from observation, summoning forth the entire universe in a 
parade before his mind.  He went through the general principles [of nature]. He 
gave The physiology of the animals-regarding their walking, their waking, their 
sleeping-as well as the human mind and spirit-regarding sensation, seeing, 
hearing, memory, fantasy, the nature of the state and of the will: in all this he went 
observingly to work, speculatively treating everything he observed. He laid down 
experience as the foundation, and then passed over from it to the thinking 
concept. He observed and classified the forms of thought in the same manner as 
he classified the species forms of nature. (VL 3, italics mine) 
Different as they are from one another, both logic and natural science, e.g. biology, involve 
observing and classifying what is discovered in the course of experience: 
 Like other critics of logic in the Aristotelian tradition, Hegel complains that not all its 
topics were in any obvious way relevant to logic per se as opposed to rhetoric, oratory or even a 
certain type of intellectual self-discipline or hygiene. As he writes, “[t]he additions of 
psychological, pedagogical, and even physiological material which logic was at one time given, 
have later been almost universally recognized as disfigurations” (WdL 21:36/SoL 31) What, 
then, belongs in logic, and what does not? Hegel is less explicit on this point than he might be, 
but the answer implicit in his account seems to be the following. Hegel describes the Aristotelian 
logic’s rules as of three basic types: concept, judgment and syllogism, all terms of later coinage. 
He also describes a fourth area, concerned with an even more general set of rules that apply in 
the other three: “laws of thought.”  
 i.  The forms of inference/syllogism 
 ii. The forms of judgment 
 iii. The forms of concept/category* 
 iv. The laws of thought 
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I have said that logic is a source of rules for arguing validly. However, logic also sought to 
identify the more basic types of materials from which valid arguments could be constructed. 
These included the forms of judgment, the most basic types of statements that could legitimately 
figure in the premises and conclusions of valid arguments. More controversially, the categories 
were also occasionally considered to be among these building blocks. Categories can be 
understood here as the most basic types of concept that could legitimately figure as the subject 
and predicate in the different forms of judgment. As we will see however they had an ambiguous 
status, having been considered part of both logic and metaphysics. Hegel is well aware of this, 
and notes it explicitly in the lecture.  Finally, logic sought to identify certain more general rules: 61
for example, the laws of non-contradiction, identity, and excluded middle. These were the laws 
one would potentially violate by not judging or inferring in accordance with the forms 
identified.  It is an interesting question whether one would commit a similar violation by 62
misusing the categories: for example, claiming whiteness is Socratic, rather than that Socrates is 
white. Perhaps this is an error, but is it a logical one? The answer, I think, is no - and this only 
further underscores category theory’s ambiguous status.  This ambiguous status will be deeply 63
important to my argument later. 
 “The Logic of Aristotle is contained in five books, which are collected together under the name Organon. a.  61
The Categories… of which the first work treats, are the universal determinations, that which is predicated of existent 
things…: as well that which we call conceptions of the understanding, as the simple realities of things. This may be 
called an ontology, as pertaining to metaphysics; hence these determinations also appear in Aristotle’s Metaphysics.” 
(VHP “Aristotle: Logic”)
 Not everyone agrees that the syllogistic presupposes the PNC. The Polish Logician and Aristotle interpreter Jan 62
Łukasiewicz is a well known dissenter. See Joray (2014).
 It would be better be thought of as a “category mistake.”63
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iii. Two forms of finitude 
 In consequence of its approach, traditional logic can offer us an account of only a certain 
specific type of thinking: “finite thinking.”  Although “finite” is a well known term of abuse in 64
Hegel, it soon becomes clear that Hegel understands logic to be finite in a very specific sense, 
one which is not necessarily pejorative. Indeed, and as I hope to explain, a proponent of this 
logic would not likely deny the accusation of finitude. This means there is something of a 
mystery about why Hegel regards the finitude of the former logic as a problem. For Hegel, a 
form of thinking is “finite” (literally: limited) because its principles are “finite” in two respects: 
…the finitude of the thought-determinations is to be construed in this double 
sense: the one, that they are merely subjective and are in permanent opposition to 
the objective; the other, that due to their limited content generally they persist in 
opposition to each other and even more so to the absolute. (EL § 25) 
 The first sense in which these principles are limited is that they are “subjective” rather 
than “objective.” As is well known, Hegel distinguishes between numerous different senses of 
these terms (EL § 41 Z2). Here, however, Hegel’s meaning seems to be relatively 
straightforward. These laws are present and operative “in” the subject, rather than “in” the world 
of objects. As Hegel will sometimes put it, logic pre-supposes “the standpoint of consciousness,” 
a standpoint defined by a type of dichotomy between the thinking subject and the object of her 
knowledge. After all, we only discover these principles by abstracting from all that we 
experience of the objects through the senses. For this reason, we understand these laws to 
articulate the form of thought. Indeed, the laws we discover are internal to a psychological 
faculty we subjects possess. How, then, could they be anything but subjective? They are not just 
 See also Bowman (2013), though the form of finitude he discusses differs.64
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in us. They are us. To be sure, the principles of logic are “objective,” rather than “subjective” in 
one important sense. They are universally and necessarily valid, meaning that they apply to any 
thinker as such, rather than just to me. Yet that is compatible with their being subjective in the 
sense that interests Hegel.           
 In many contexts, Hegel claims to be siding with common sense when he rejects the 
“subjectivism” of his Kantian opponent. Yet there is little in common sense that speaks in favor 
of regarding, e.g., a form of inference as in any way present in the world. To be sure, such a form 
of inference can be used to reason about states of affairs in the world, but that does not mean it is 
present there. The inference “All men are mortal, Socrates is a man…” is not in the world in the 
way that the men, the mortals and Socrates are. 
 Moreover, there are good philosophical reasons for holding the view that logic is 
subjective. The fact that there are men, mortals, and so on, may be an empirical fact about 
objects in the world, learned when those very objects affect my sense-organs in a certain way. By 
contrast, the fact that a given form of inference is valid is known a priori, simply through 
thinking. To be sure, there are comparably abstract principles to those of logic which are 
regarded as present in the “objective world.” For example, laws of nature earn this status, even 
though they too require us to go beyond much that has been directly observed. Yet these laws 
have a different significance entirely. They are posited to explain the behavior of objects in the 
world. They are said to be present and operative in a type of necessary connection among those 
objects. But, at least in the tradition as Hegel represents it, the laws of logic were never supposed 
to do anything other than be present and operative in our thinking, insofar as we think correctly. 
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 Moreover, this logic is a science in which the principles employed are “finite” or limited 
not only when considered in relation to the objective world but also when considered in relation 
to one another.  Here, the literal rather than evaluative meaning of finite (limited) becomes 
particularly important. Hegel’s meaning is simply that each such principle runs up against a limit 
in another treated as separate from it. But separate how?   65
 Although these principles are themselves logical, a certain type of logical relationship 
between them is absent. More specifically, a deductive relationship, such that each derives its 
justification from the others. This is a somewhat odd complaint, inasmuch as we are used to 
thinking of a deductive order obtaining within an argument between its premises and its 
conclusion. We rarely imagine that it must obtain between the forms of valid argument 
themselves. Deduction we expect, but not this type of (meta-)deduction, a deduction of the 
principles deduction presupposes. Even so, Hegel regards the omission of this type of 
(meta-)deduction as a form of hypocrisy on logic’s part. The complaint is extremely common in 
Hegel’s writings. We will consider a more famous instance of it presently, but the following one 
is representative: 
Such a logic considers it its vocation to talk about the necessity of deducing 
concepts and truths from principles; however, of what they call method, there is 
not the shadow of a deduction. (WdL 33:29/SoL 24 ) 
 Another way to approach the issue Hegel raises of an absence of deductive order in 
traditional logic is by contrasting deduction in Hegel’s strong sense with the type of empirical 
 A representative passage: “We must all familiarize ourselves with such forms of the understanding as Aristotle 65
brings forth-they are forms of thinking, abstract forms and one-sided laws. Yet if they are to be of service to true 
thinking, we must not interpret them so separately from one another, [as Aristotle does,] since they would then be 
only forms of untruth, finite forms.” (VL/LL 4)
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procedure this logic uses. The principles of logic, or at least, the most fundamental ones, derive 
their justification from experience. They are arrived at through the method of abstraction. This 
means we have simply found them to be true. We have done so when we reflected from a 
specific instance in which they were operative. The point here is that the method of abstraction is 
an alternative to that of deduction. Deriving these principles from experience means not deriving 
them from other.  66
 Hegel concedes this logic did draw certain types of connections between its principles, 
but holds that these connections do not merit being called deductive. He compares logic’s 
activity of drawing such connections to a children’s game: 
Since in judgments and syllogisms the operations are mostly reduced to, and 
founded upon, the quantitative aspect of the determinations, everything rests on 
external differentiation, on mere comparison, and becomes a completely 
analytical procedure and a calculus void of concept. The deduction of the so-
called rules and laws, of inference especially, is no better than the manipulation of 
rods of unequal lengths for sorting them out in groups according to size – than a 
children’s game of fitting together the pieces of a colored picture puzzle. Not 
incorrectly, therefore, has this thinking been equated with reckoning, and 
reckoning again with this thinking. (WdL 21:36-7/SoL 32) 
Hegel’s meaning here is difficult to make out precisely, but it seems to be that such proofs do not 
so much eliminate the need for the appeal to experience as postpone it. Consider a proof by 
contradiction that a given form of inference is valid. This would be a proof that proceeds by 
assuming the relevant form is invalid and showing that this would yield a contradiction. To be 
sure, the proof shows that one rule holds by appealing to another its rejection would violate, the 
law of non-contradiction. In the example, the form of valid inference may have been proven, 
 Houlgate (2006: 22-3) also draws this connection between the “finding” of the forms of judgment and their 66
“finitude” vis-a-vis one another, though he is once again discussing the Hegel-Kant relation and the implications for 
the theory of the categories.
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rather than arrived at through the method of abstraction. Eventually, though, we reach a principle 
which will have been arrived at through an appeal to experience. 
 It may seem that this objection is little more than a technicality, but I believe it reflects a 
reaction we can often have to proofs in logic and mathematics. Especially in the case of the most 
fundamental principles, the proofs do not actually seem to convince us of anything we could not 
already have known intuitively. Does it actually help in justifying the form of inference from our 
example to know that refusing to conclude “Caius is mortal,” would be to contradict oneself, as 
if the absurdity of refusing to do so were not already evident without being identified as a 
violation of some logical law? Of course, this leaves completely mysterious what an alternative 
type of proof might be. 
 There may be a certain type of logical relation between the principles of formal logic, but 
it is not deductive in Hegel’s strong sense. It still leaves it a brute fact that we are justified in 
using these forms of concept, judgment, and inference, these laws, and no others. It is a brute fact 
about thinking, or about us and our cognitive faculties. What is more, there are not only no true 
deductive relationships between the specific elements, but also none between the broader 
element types. It is just a brute fact that we are justified in recognizing three types of element 
(concept, judgment, syllogism) and no others, a brute fact about our thinking. We could always 
conceive of elements or element types being added or taken away. Hegel will conclude that 
Aristotle’s formal logic is an aggregate rather than a system. This is something Hegel finds 
intolerable, as we will soon see. We should be able to expect systematic rigor and deductive 
interconnection from logic if we can expect it anywhere. Yet this expectation is disappointed.  
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iv. “Irrational cognition of the rational”: Hegel’s critique of Aristotelian logic 
 Hegel accuses the formal logic of his day of a type of inconsistency which fatally 
undermines it. He argues that this logic cannot meet the very type of demand for justification 
which it makes of all other areas of philosophy and the sciences. As we have seen, logic justifies 
its principles empirically, but in so doing it exempts its own principles from the very type of 
justification through rational argument it rightly insists is necessary in other areas of philosophy 
and the sciences. Hegel expresses this objection in the following passage where he proposes a 
new logic in which 
….the usual subject matter, the kinds of concepts, judgments, and syllogisms, 
would no longer simply be taken up from observation and thus gathered up 
merely empirically, but…derived from thinking itself. If thinking is to be capable 
of proving anything, if logic must demand that proof be given, and if it wants to 
teach how to give proofs, then it should be capable above all of proving the 
content most proper to it and seeing its necessity. (EL § 42A) 
Hegel’s claim is not that the empirical approach is illegitimate per se. It is simply that logic is 
committed to regarding rational argument as superior. He has a point. Notoriously, inductive 
inference is logically invalid. At a broader level, however, logic is part of philosophy, and as 
Hegel has already said, philosophy itself shares this view. In philosophy, we are interested to 
know not just that a fact obtains but why. The special sciences place limits on how far this 
“why?” question can be pressed. Yet philosophy recognizes no such limits. 
 Hegel extends this criticism beyond logic’s treatment of particular principles to its 
treatment of the general classes of principles. He not only argues that traditional logic has no 
deductive argument for the principles that make up this science, but also for the types of 
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principles which form the different divisions of the science’s subfields: concept, judgment, 
syllogism, law. In other words, it has no rigorous justification for why these topics belong within 
its purview, and also why these and only these do so (WdL 21:39/SoL 34). For Hegel, this is a 
distinctly logical form of hypocrisy in the treatment of logic’s principles, and the broader 
divisions into which they can be classified. It is, as he memorably puts it, “irrational cognition of 
the rational.” 
In the customary treatment of logic, a variety of classifications and species of 
concepts are adduced. It immediately strikes one as inconsequential that the 
species are introduced in this way: “There are, as regards quality, quantity, etc., 
the following concepts.” The “there are” conveys no other justification than that 
we find the named species and that they show up in experience. What we have in 
this manner is an empirical logic – an odd science indeed, an irrational cognition 
of the rational. In this the logic sets a very bad precedent for compliance to its 
own teaching; it allows itself to do the opposite of what it prescribes as a rule, 
namely, that concepts should be derived, and scientific propositions (therefore 
also the proposition: “There are such and such species of concepts”) 
demonstrated. (WdL 12:43/SoL 541)  67
In spite of this, the prospect of deriving the laws and materials of logic by arguing for them, 
rather than treating them as brute, confronts a significant obstacle: vicious circularity. Put in the 
most general way, the problem is that it seems impossible to justify these laws and materials 
without already relying on them: 
 Hegel only describes how this obstacle would work in the case of the first and most basic 
of logic’s formal principles: concepts. However, the argument easily generalizes to other cases: 
judgment, inference, and law. Admittedly, we are not often tempted to think of an account of 
concepts as laying down a norm of thought. Yet this was true in the older logic, and for a fairly 
 See also the more brief discussion of this passage in K. Reich (1992: 2)67
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straightforward reason. This logic regarded other sciences as beholden to its account of concepts 
because of the importance of definition in these sciences. These sciences had to rely on logic’s 
account of concepts both when they defined the subject matter that made them the sciences they 
were, and when they defined the more specific phenomena within their purview. After all, a 
definition given in these sciences could be correct only if it respected logic’s account of a 
concept: for example, as a principle citing a characteristic all things falling under it share in 
common. This is not sufficient for scientific truth, since a logically well-formed definition could 
be incorrect. Yet it is necessary, in that any correct definition must at least be logically well-
formed.  
 The problem that interests Hegel arises when we are no longer satisfied to simply ask 
what ultimately legitimates a special science’s concepts, and be told that logic’s concept of a 
concept does so. We now ask what ultimately legitimates logic’s concept of a concept itself, and 
encounter a unique difficulty. Unfortunately, the mode of justification just used will not suffice in 
this one special case. After all, logic cannot define its own subject-matter in this way. Indeed, it 
seems that doing so would be circular. To do so would be to appeal to the very concept of a 
concept whose credentials are in question. Accordingly, it must treat such a definition as a brute 
fact. There may be a number of different ways to invoke bruteness, but as we have seen Hegel 
thinks the logic of his day did it in a specific way. It argued that the nature and role of concepts is 
a brute fact of our experience. More specifically, it is a fact arrived at by abstracting from the 
empirical content of our thought and language, and discovering therein certain formal principles 
(concepts). As we have repeatedly seen, Hegel regards this appeal to brute fact as hypocrisy, at 
least when it comes from logic. However, this approach is understandable in light of the 
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difficulty confronting any alternative. How are we supposed to argue for a certain law of thought, 
or legitimate a certain set of materials that thinking requires without already assuming what we 
want to prove?  
 Once again, the problem generalizes. It is not just the problem of legitimating concepts 
without relying on concepts, but also that of legitimating judgment without relying on judgment, 
inference without inference, laws without relying on those very laws. Given the plurality of 
principles, and types of principle, it is perhaps possible that each could do the other’s washing in 
some complicated way. Yet this would only postpone rather than eliminate circularity. Sooner or 
later the circle has to close, and we are back where we started with the problem of relying on the 
very principles whose credentials are in question. If Hegel is to advocate an alternative approach 
to defining concepts, he will need to overcome the problem of circularity. 
v. From formal to speculative logic 
 Ultimately, then, Hegel’s objection to traditional logic is that this science, like so many 
others, is non-presuppositionless, meaning it presupposes both an object and a method. Its object 
is the faculty of thought, and its method abstraction. In order to avoid the inconsistency in which 
he maintains traditional Scholastic-Aristotelian logic found itself caught as a result, Hegel 
proposes a new approach to logic in which neither an object nor a method are presupposed.   
As far as the beginning that philosophy has to make is concerned, in general it 
seems to start like the other sciences with a subjective presupposition, namely a 
particular object, such as space, number, etc., except that here thinking would 
have to be made the object of thinking. And yet, it is thinking's free act of placing 
itself at that standpoint where it is for itself and thus generates and provides its 
own object for itself. Furthermore, this standpoint, which thus appears to be an 
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immediate one, must transform itself into a result within the science itself, and 
indeed into its final result in which the science recaptures its beginning and 
returns to itself. In this way, philosophy shows itself to be a sphere that circles 
back into itself and has no beginning in the sense that other sciences do. Hence, 
its beginning has a relationship merely to the subject who resolves to 
philosophize, but not to the science as such. Or, which comes to the same thing, 
the concept of the science and hence its first concept - which because it is the first 
contains the separation whereby thinking is the object for a seemingly external, 
philosophizing subject - must be grasped by the science itself. (EL § 17) 
This logic will not define itself as a science that studies a certain “presupposed object,” thinking. 
In other words, Hegel’s logic will not presuppose that thinking exists and has the characteristics 
it seems to us to have. In particular, it will not presuppose that this is one mental activity among 
others or that the mind has distinct capacities for (conceptual) thought and for sensibility, 
imagination, will and so on. Nor will it be able to presuppose that there is a legitimate area of 
philosophical or scientific inquiry that studies thinking. As Hegel tells us, this is the main 
difference between his own philosophy and the special science of psychology. Both centrally 
concern thinking, but only the latter “presupposes” thinking as its ‘object.’ 
 Admittedly, certain claims about the mind must hold true if we are to have the capacity to 
read and understand the Logic.  Yet this is just to say that we must be equipped with a certain 68
psychological capacity if we are to understand the Logic’s arguments. It is not to say that these 
arguments themselves rely on the premise that we are so equipped. As Hegel puts it, the fact that 
human beings have such a capacity matters for the philosopher who embarks upon the logic 
project, but not to the logic itself: “[it] has a relationship merely to the subject who resolves to 
philosophize, but not to the science as such.” Here, it may be useful to distinguish between a 
 Others who defend Hegel’s presuppositionless method make versions of this point: Houlgate (2006) and Martin 68
(2012), who also cites Fulda (2001) and Koch (2000). 
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presupposition and a pre-condition. A presupposition is a type of premise we must accept as true 
if the argument for a philosopher’s conclusion is to succeed. A pre-condition is a fact that must 
obtain if some type of causal prerequisite for reading or writing philosophy is to be fulfilled. As I 
interpret him, Hegel is denying that thinking is a presupposition, but conceding it is a pre-
condition. Why, though, would Hegel want to avoid presupposing all of these claims? What 
could possibly be the harm in doing so? What is gained when we avoid presupposing the truth of 
such claims about the mind? 
 Hegel avoids presupposing the truth of such claims concerning thinking and its necessary 
“determinations,” so that he will be in a position to prove them in a more satisfying way, and on 
an independent basis. As he writes, “this standpoint, which thus appears to be an immediate one, 
must transform itself into a result within the science itself.” Hegel explains that these claims are 
to be found not just in the course of his philosophy, but at its very conclusion: “…and indeed into 
its final result.” Importantly, this will occur not just in Hegel’s system as a whole (logic, nature 
and spirit), though it will also occur there. As it happens, the philosophy of spirit does make good 
on the philosophical psychology that the Logic presupposes. However, this will also occur in the 
Logic itself, which ends with an account of theoretical cognition, including the form of it 
achieved in the Logic. As Hegel says, this circular self-comprehending structure is found not 
only in the system as a whole but also in each of the system’s three subdivisions. That is why the 
system is “a circle of circles” as opposed to just “a circle” (EL § 15) In this way, philosophy 
shows itself to be “the science [that] recaptures its beginning and returns to itself.”  This is a 69
 This is not to deny that there are certain forms of ex-post justification which Hegel would be forced to reject. See 69
Rosen (1982) for a fuller discussion.
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familiar claim about Hegel’s Logic, but we are here in a position to see it in an unfamiliar light. It 
is an outcome of his confrontation with traditional logic. 
 At the close of the Logic, we will be in a position to obtain a superior type of justification 
for these claims than we would if we had treated them as first premises of the argument. Instead, 
we draw the relevant conclusions about the mind from a different set of premises that do not 
directly concern the mind. This is true of the claim that there is such a thing as conceptual 
thought, distinct from sensible representation. By not presupposing that there is a faculty of 
thinking, we will be in a position to (non-circularly) prove it. Yet because we are ourselves 
thinkers, the knowledge we acquire is a type of self-knowledge. This is what Hegel means when 
he speaks of “thinking's free act of placing itself at that standpoint where it is for itself and thus 
generates and provides its own object for itself.”  
 Similarly, we have not presupposed that there is a science of thinking because this gives 
us the opportunity to prove that there is. This we do not do by being told what such a science 
would be and how it would proceed. Rather we arrive at this conclusion by realizing that such a 
science is none other than the one in which we have already been engaged, and which is now 
coming to a close. Hegel explains this as equivalent to the thought that the science “recaptures its 
beginning.” As we have already seen, the conclusion that there is such a thing as thinking and 
that it has a set of laws and rules, as well as the conclusion that there is a science of thinking, is 
not a presupposition of the Logic. However, it is a precondition. The claims in question must be 
true if we are to embark on the path of such a science, even if the science itself need not treat 
them as such. If that is so, then we can finally understand why Hegel does not want his science to 
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begin in the way others do. It is so that it can end in the way no other ever has, i.e. by 
comprehending itself. This self-comprehension, the self-comprehension of Hegel’s Science of 
Logic, will be the topic of the final chapter. 
 Because of this aspiration to achieve a self-comprehending science, Hegel’s many well 
known claims to the effect that his Logic is the science of thinking or of thought determinations 
cannot be taken at face value. As Hegel makes clear, these claims rely on a merely provisional 
justification that is less rigorous than the one he ultimately hopes to provide. Specifically, they 
rely on “facts of consciousness,” whereas they will later be upheld by a “proof” or “derivation.” 
The determinations offered here and in the following sections are not to be taken 
as assertions and as my opinions about thinking. Since, however, in this 
preliminary exposition no derivation or proof can be given, they may be regarded 
as facts such that in the consciousness of anyone who has and contemplates 
thoughts it is found empirically to be the case that the character of universality 
and likewise the subsequent determinations are on hand in them. To be sure, for 
the observation of the facts of one's consciousness and representations, it is 
prerequisite that one be already educated in the tasks of paying attention and 
engaging in abstraction. (EL § 20A) 
vi. Conclusion: Kant as minor post-Aristotelian?  70
 In this chapter, I have reconstructed Hegel’s critique of the formal logic of his day. This 
logic’s psychological approach threatens to render the laws of logic brute in a way Hegel claims 
is objectionable. Given the obsolescence of Aristotelian logic, the interest of this critique may 
seem limited. However, it is clear from Hegel’s characterization of this logic that his critique of it 
can serve another function. It can double as a critique of Kant’s (pure) general logic. 
 The allusion is to a famous remark of Paul Samuelson’s deriding Marx as a “minor post-Ricardian.” 70
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 As I have said, I am opposed to importing into my discussion of Hegel a conception of 
the history of logic occasionally favored by Kantian-idealist interpreters. This is one on which 
Kant’s great innovation over a tradition of thinking about logic going back to Aristotle is to have 
distinguished more sharply between logic and ontology than was done in philosophy before him, 
especially in the Leibniz-Wolff school. Given Kant’s persistent criticisms of figures in this 
tradition for trying to obtain metaphysical knowledge through mere conceptual analysis, this 
conception of his role in the history of philosophy is understandable. This aspect of Kant’s. 
thought is on full display in sections like the Amphiboly, where he unmasks metaphysical 
principles like the PII as abuses of more modest logical ones. 
 Yet there is another tendency in Kant’s thinking about logic that this received view does 
not accommodate well. This is his belief that logic is fundamentally in order, and has been for 
more than two millennia since its founding by Aristotle. This is also reflected in Kant’s 
allegiance to a form of logic centered around the judgment and the syllogism, and believed to be 
derived from Aristotle’s logical writings. It is also, more controversially, reflected in Kant’s 
appeal to a teleological form of faculty psychology in which logical laws are constitutive norms, 
those it is in the nature of the faculty to obey. As Hegel tells us, this was common in the tradition, 
particularly among the Scholastics. Yet if that is so, we face a quandary. Is Kant breaking with an 
ontological approach to logic? Or continuing a broadly psychological one?  
 Although the correct answer would have to take both innovation and continuity into 
account, I will stress the latter for the following reason. It is actually the continuity with 
Aristotelian logic which predominates in the Kant-interpretation of Hegel and other post-Kantian 
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idealists. As I have said, the conception of logic’s history that Hegel himself endorses is one on 
which there is fundamental continuity between Kant and the Aristotelian tradition. Again, this is 
a conception of the history of logic suggested to Hegel and other German idealists by Kant’s 
remark that logic had been complete since Aristotle. They infer from this remark that “(pure) 
general logic” is not an area of his own critical philosophy at all, but rather a separate science. It 
is less the province of any distinctly Kantian doctrines than it is of the figures Kant calls “the 
logicians.” It is less a part of the critical philosophy itself, than it is a separate body of 
knowledge, drawn on at various points in the argument but independent. It is less a part of the 
revolution in philosophy Kant hoped to effect with his Copernican turn than it is of philosophy’s 
heritage going back two millennia. For this reason, the idealists often speak of Kant as having 
“borrowed” the table of forms of judgment and other resources from this tradition. Passages like 
the following are representative:  
In this context, the Kantian philosophy incurs a further inconsequence by 
borrowing the categories for the transcendental logic, as so-called root concepts, 
from the subjective logic where they were assumed empirically. Since the Kantian 
philosophy admits the latter fact, it is hard to see why transcendental logic resorts 
to borrowing from such a science rather than directly helping itself from 
experience. (WdL 12:44/SoL 541)  
As we have seen throughout this chapter, Hegel regards the former logic as empirical in 
character, and he here reprises this claim in his critique of Kant. Here, Hegel argues that the 
critical philosophy’s reliance on the logic of the day introduced an empirical component into its 
foundation. As Hegel remarks somewhat acidly, Kant might have saved himself time and trouble 
by simply consulting experience directly rather than relying on an empirical form of logic.  
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 We have already seen why Hegel regards an empirical logic like that of the tradition as 
inadequate, even considered on its own terms. For Hegel, an empirical approach to logic betrays 
its commitment and that of philosophy more generally to the superiority of deductive argument. 
Yet we now confront the different question of why such a logic would be inadequate for the 
purposes of transcendental philosophy. In Kantian terms, we have already considered Hegel’s 
critique of general logic, and not only in the area of judgment but in others as well. Why, though, 
would general logic of this type be an insecure foundation on which to erect the edifice of 
transcendental logic? To make this more precise, we should recall the tables of forms of 
judgment and inference from which Kant’s tables of categories and Ideas are drawn. 
Accordingly, the basic principles of general logic are those from which the basic principles of 
transcendental logic derive, in some way that is difficult to specify. Why, though, should 
principles derived in this way be suspect?  It is to this question that we now turn. 
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II.     Hegel and Transcendental Logic 
 In the previous chapter, I considered Hegel’s critique of the formal logic of his day: the 
logic of the Scholastic-Aristotelian tradition. I argued that Hegel mounts an immanent critique of 
this logic, accusing it of failing to satisfy its own internal standards of adequacy. This logic 
advocates that we justify ourselves through rational argument, and provides us with the formal 
principles we must rely on to do so. Yet this logic does not itself employ rational argument in 
defending its principles, since doing so would be circular. Instead, it treats them as self-evident, a 
strategy of justification that is sub-optimal even by its own lights. Hegel diagnoses this impasse 
as the result of a broader conception of logic’s principles. On this psychological conception, they 
are inherent to thought’s form in contrast to its externally given sensible matter. Hence, Hegel 
proposes to break with this psychological (though perhaps not “psychologistic”) conception. As 
we will later see, Hegel embraces an ontological alternative. He does so in an effort to see if 
logic can be justified through some type of non-circular argument, rather than through an appeal 
to brute fact. Yet it will turn out that this requires grounding logic in ontology, rather than 
psychology. 
 I now turn to Hegel’s critique of Kant’s transcendental logic, which builds on his earlier 
critique of formal logic. Here, Hegel pursues a parallel strategy, mounting an immanent critique 
of Kant’s transcendental logic. In Kant’s transcendental philosophy, a knowledge claim is 
legitimate only if it can be shown to be consistent with the nature and limits of our faculty of 
knowledge. However, the knowledge claims Kant himself makes in offering his account of the 
nature and limits of this faculty cannot be proven to be legitimate in this way, since this would be 
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question-begging or circular. This does not necessarily mean that the critical philosophy’s claims 
to knowledge are false, but it does mean that they are vulnerable. To defend them, it must appeal 
to some more ultimate source of justification. In key instances, this more ultimate source is the 
logic of the day. Here, Hegel’s discussion of this logic from the previous chapter becomes 
important to clarifying why Hegel thinks Kant’s appeals to this logic do not succeed. 
 Hegel considers the attempts by Reinhold and Fichte to offer a reconstituted version of 
Kant’s critical philosophy which will surmount this objection. However, he finds these attempts 
wanting. In particular, he rejects Fichte’s attempt to derive the categories from an indubitably 
certain first principle, a version of Descartes’ Cogito. In place of Fichte’s approach, Hegel 
proposes a derivation of the categories from a type of monist principle: Being. Oddly enough, 
Hegel takes this derivation to be equivalent to a Spinozist version of the ontological argument. 
Hegel’s provocative suggestion is that the critical philosophy’s foundational project of deriving 
the categories can only be carried out on the basis of an argument that Kant rejected as the 
apotheosis of dogmatic, pre-critical metaphysics: the ontological argument. This explains 
Hegel’s insistence that the ontological argument is the true critique of pure reason, and I 
conclude with a fuller explanation of this striking claim. 
i. Kant’s Analytic: Marburg Neo-Kantian v. German Idealist readings 
 I begin with a broad overview of Kant’s project in the first Critique. The account I will 
give of Kant’s project is by no means the authoritative one. Yet it is the one I believe is most 
helpful for understanding post-Kantian idealism. On the proto-idealist interpretation of Kant that 
I will defend here, his first critique aspires to a form of systematic rigor highly valued by 
subsequent idealists like Fichte and Hegel. More specifically, it attempts to exhibit all of our 
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knowledge as following with strict necessity from a securely grounded first principle. That 
principle concerns the nature of the mind, though, as we will see, there is some difficulty in 
determining which of Kant’s claims it is meant to be (apperception? Reason? discursivity? the 
imagination? judgment? the will? something else?). On this interpretation, Kant means to present 
an anti-skeptical argument, rather than ignore skeptical challenges. Moreover, this interpretation 
has Kant reject methodological naturalism, the claim that philosophy should presuppose the truth 
of natural-scientific and mathematical knowledge. This is, of course, consistent with the 
possibility that it will ultimately endorse these enterprises. More controversially, this 
interpretation denies that putatively uncontroversial claims about the character of our experience 
are a sufficiently sturdy foundation on which to erect the Kantian critical edifice. There will be a 
very limited role for such claims, whether they be phenomenological, introspective, or analytical/
conceptual. As I will explain, this reading is almost the exact inverse of the one advanced by 
another much better known school: the Marburg neo-Kantians. Their interpretation is therefore a 
useful foil for the proto-idealist one I develop here.   
 Kant’s broad aim in the first critique is to explain how a certain distinctive type of 
knowledge is possible, “synthetic a priori knowledge.” This type of knowledge is both non-
trivial and universally and necessarily valid. Kant accepts Hume’s claim that sense-experience 
alone is incapable of providing us with the justification for this type of knowledge. It only ever 
tells us that things are thus-and-so, not that they must be. However, Kant claims that this type of 
knowledge can be justified if we follow him in breaking radically with the received view of 
knowledge. Kant effects a Copernican revolution in philosophy with his claim that it is not our 
knowledge which must conform to the objects, but the objects which must conform to our 
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knowledge (B xvi). Essentially, the proposal is that our faculty of knowledge might itself be the 
source of certain “conditions” objects must meet in order to be cognized by us. The faculty 
would impose these conditions on any object encountered in experience. If that were so, then we 
could be assured these conditions would always apply to the objects of our knowledge. What, 
though, can Kant mean by “conditions” on the objects?  
 The answer lies in Kant’s notion of form. For Kant, we are not wholly responsible for the 
existence of the objects we experience. That would perhaps be true of God, an infinite knower, 
but we are not knowers of this type. Instead, we are dependent on independently existing objects 
which must affect us if we are to have knowledge of them. We are, in this regard, finite knowers 
who do not wholly create the objects we know. As Kant concedes to the empiricist tradition, 
objects must affect our faculty of sensibility and provide us with sensible representations.  71
Hence, objects furnish the “matter” of all knowledge. However, Kant holds that there is one 
respect in which we might be productive of the objects. It is possible that we should contribute 
their form. This would be the form that all matter provided by sensible intuition would 
necessarily have to bear. If this were so, then synthetic a priori knowledge would be possible. We 
would be able to know in advance of experience that all its objects must be subject to the 
conditions that our faculty of knowledge imposes on them, that all must bear reason’s “form.” 
However, this strategy, even if successful, would be subject to a certain limitation or restriction 
which is the other main component of Kant’s transcendental idealism. We would only be able to 
have synthetic a priori knowledge of what Kant calls appearances or objects of possible 
experience, those which are subject to the conditions our faculty of knowledge imposes on them. 
 Locke, rather than Berkeley or Hume, would likely be the relevant empiricist. Of the three, it is Locke who most 71
obviously preserves a role for a mind-independent world of objects that affect us. The other two are more solipsistic. 
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We could not have such knowledge of what Kant calls “things-in-themselves,” objects 
considered apart from these conditions.  
 If we are to understand how Kant proceeds in the Critique itself, as opposed to the 
Preface, we must briefly rehearse his strategy of argument. Kant is clear that, in the Preface, he 
has merely proceeded “hypothetically,” whereas in the Critique itself he will proceed 
“apodictically.”  
In this Preface I propose the transformation in our way of thinking presented in 
criticism merely as a hypothesis, analogous to that other hypothesis, only in order 
to draw our notice to the first attempts at such a transformation, which are always 
hypothetical, even though in the treatise itself it will be proved not hypothetically 
but rather apodictically from the constitution of our representations of space and 
and from the elementary concepts of the understanding. (B xxii) 
Here, I attempt to explain the distinction Kant draws. In the Preface, Kant defends a merely 
hypothetical claim which runs as follows. If transcendental idealism were true, then synthetic a 
priori knowledge would be possible. Equivalently, Kant will say he is proposing a type of 
(thought-) experiment. We are invited to consider the possibility that transcendental idealism is 
true, and then reflect on the way in which this would help explain the possibility of synthetic a 
priori knowledge. However, Kant will pursue a different method of argument in the body of the 
Critique itself. His motivation for doing so is that the argument of the Preface has, in fact, 
accomplished very little. At most, this argument shows that transcendental idealism, if true, 
would explain much. Yet it does not follow from this that transcendental idealism actually is true 
or that it has explained anything. In my view, it would be a mistake to assume that Kant already 
regards the issue as settled at this early stage. Transcendental idealism and the Copernican 
revolution may hold out the promise of explaining the possibility of synthetic a priori 
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knowledge. Still, more is required if we are to prove that these doctrines are true. Hence, Kant’s 
arguments in the Critique itself will proceed not hypothetically but apodictically. They will seek 
to demonstrate for certain that transcendental idealism and the associated Copernican view of our 
relation to objects is true.  
 Many of Kant’s successors, like the Marburg neo-Kantians, embraced a different reading 
of the argument-structure of Kant’s critical philosophy, a reading based on the following 
considerations. For Kant, synthetic a priori knowledge is not just possible for us. Kant is 
convinced that we do, in fact, have this type of knowledge. Moreover, Kant did not just accept 
this fact himself, as an avid observer of the (then) recent successes of the new science. He made 
it the first premise in the Critique’s argument. According to these readers, then, Kant’s theoretical 
philosophy in the first critique starts from the “fact of science” just as his practical philosophy in 
the second starts from the “fact of reason” (moral obligation). Yet if that is so, then Kant cannot 
be agnostic about the truth of transcendental idealism when he moves beyond the Preface to the 
body of the work. The Preface has shown that we could only have natural-scientific knowledge if 
transcendental idealism were true and not otherwise. However, we do, in fact, have such 
knowledge. Therefore, transcendental idealism must be true. Of course, there is much more work 
for Kant to do going forward. He must determine how, exactly, our faculty of knowledge 
imposes conditions on the objects. He must explain, how, exactly, this grounds the possibility of 
the scientific and mathematical knowledge we in fact possess. That idealism is true, however, 
cannot be in doubt, even if we are not yet sure how it can be.  
 Yet the Marburg interpretation faces a well known obstacle. There is an important 
difference between the argument-structure of the Critique and that of the Prolegomena, a 
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difference that the Marburg neo-Kantians often elided. As Kant explains, these works adhere to 
two different methods in seeking an answer the question, “How is metaphysics possible?” The 
first is the “synthetic/progressive” method, and the second the “analytic/regressive” method. 
Kant writes: 
In the Critique of Pure Reason I worked on this question synthetically, namely by 
inquiring within pure reason itself, and seeking to determine within this source 
both the elements and the laws of its pure use, according to principles. This work 
is difficult and requires a resolute reader to think himself little by little into a 
system that takes no foundation as given except reason itself, and that 
therefore tries to develop cognition [synthetic a priori knowledge within 
mathematics and the sciences - JM] out of its original seeds without relying 
on any fact whatever.  
Prolegomena should by contrast be preparatory exercises; they ought more to 
indicate what needs to be done in order to bring a science into existence if 
possible, than to present the science itself. They must therefore rely on something 
already known to be dependable, from which we can go forward with confidence 
and ascend to the sources, which are not yet known, and whose discovery not only 
will explain what is known already, but will also exhibit an area with many 
cognitions that all arise from these same sources. The methodological procedure 
of prolegomena, and especially of those that are to prepare for a future 
metaphysics, will therefore be analytic.  
…[In the Prolegomena] we can confidently say that some pure synthetic 
cognition a priori is actual and given, namely, pure mathematics and pure 
natural science; for both contain propositions that are fully acknowledged…
We have therefore some at least uncontested synthetic cognition a priori, and we 
do not need to ask whether it is possible (for it is actual), but only: how it is 
possible, in order to be able to derive, from the principle of the possibility of the 
given cognition, the possibility of all other synthetic cognition a priori. (P 
4:274-5/25-6) 
In the Prolegomena, Kant pursues an Analytic or “regressive” method of argument. He begins 
from a “fact.” This is the widely agreed upon premise that we do, in fact, have synthetic a priori 
knowledge in mathematics and the sciences. He then “regresses” to the conclusion that 
transcendental idealism and the Copernican view of the relationship between our faculties and 
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the objects must be true. Only this conclusion could explain the possibility of the knowledge we 
do, in fact, have. Of course, there is an intriguing discrepancy between the chapters on 
mathematics and natural science and the final one on metaphysics. Kant will presuppose that we 
do, in fact, have synthetic a priori knowledge in mathematics and natural science, asking “How is 
mathematics possible?” However, he will not do so for metaphysics, asking only “Is metaphysics 
possible?” However, it still remains the case that the Prolegomena employs this regressive 
strategy of argument, at least in its first two sections. Why, though, did Kant employ this strategy 
argument in only the shorter and more accessible version of his book, intended for a wider 
audience?  
 Kant himself is less explicit than he might be, but the reason must be that the analytic/
regressive strategy of argument has significant limitations. Chief among them, I think, would be 
the way its starting point, the presupposition that we do in fact have synthetic a priori knowledge 
in natural science and mathematics, begs the question against an important opponent of Kant’s 
critical project: the Humean skeptic. Here, we should recall that the main form synthetic a priori 
knowledge in natural science takes is knowledge of the causal laws of nature, which hold 
universally and necessarily. Yet this was precisely the type of knowledge whose possibility 
Hume called into question with his skeptical critique of received views of causation. Whether 
because the idea of necessary connection has no corresponding impression, or because the 
validity of the inductive inference from “all instances observed so far” to “all instances” cannot 
be justified non-circularly, the presupposition that we have the type of knowledge Kant claims 
we do is by no means uncontroversial. In the Critique, then, Kant pursues a “synthetic/
progressive” method, arguing for transcendental idealism on independent grounds. In particular, 
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Kant will begin by defending an idealist account of the relevant part of our faculty of knowledge, 
and its relationship to the objects on which it imposes its form. He will then “progress” to the 
conclusion, if it is even available, that synthetic a priori knowledge of a certain broad type is 
possible for us. Admittedly, this means reading the critique as pursuing an anti-skeptical project, 
rather than some more modest non-skeptical one. Yet for our purposes the obstacles confronting 
such a reading are irrelevant. It is clear that it is the reading endorsed by Kant’s idealist 
followers, many of whom were positively obsessed by the project of refuting the skeptic once 
and for all. Plausibly or not, they claimed to find the seeds for such a refutation in Kant. 
 If one is clear on the argumentative strategy of the Critique, then the challenge 
confronting it is obvious. What, exactly, justifies the account of the faculty of knowledge that 
provides the foundational first premise of the entire argument? This is the tough critical question 
nearly all of Kant’s immediate followers in the idealist tradition would pose for him.  It is the 72
question which I believe is the basis for Hegel’s entire critique of Kant. It is also one that I think 
is too often ignored in more recent discussions. We now turn to the question of how Kant 
proceeds to show that our faculty of knowledge imposes certain conditions on the objects of 
experience.             
 Kant maintains that our faculty of knowledge has “two stems,” sensibility and 
understanding, each of which employs two different types of representation, intuition and 
concept (A15/B29). As he later writes, “Objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it 
alone yields us intuitions; they are thought through the understanding, and from the 
understanding arise concepts” (A19/B33).  Hence, Kant will argue that the conditions our 
 It is posed in a different way by Strawson in The Bounds of Sense where Kant’s reliance on an “imaginary” 72
transcendental psychology is lamented.
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cognitive power imposes upon the objects would have to be of two fundamentally different 
kinds: sensible and intelligible (conceptual). He considers these two broad types of condition in 
the two broad divisions of the Critique, Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Logic. In 
his mature critique of Kant, at least, Hegel focuses predominantly on the Logic, not the 
Aesthetic. Clearly, he maintains that this is where the real interest of Kant’s project lies, as well 
as its most problematic features. It would be an interesting question to ask why Hegel holds this 
view. The answer may reside in a belief about the Aesthetic, voiced much earlier in his career. In 
the early essay “Faith and Knowledge” [Glauben und Wissen], Hegel had argued, as would many 
after him, that the forms of sensible intuition identified in the Aesthetic (space and time) cannot 
be understood in isolation from the categories of the understanding described in the Logic. In 
particular, they cannot have a non-derivative unity. Hegel claimed to be following Kant himself, 
who had indicated as much in a notorious footnote to the Deduction. In any case, it seems clear 
that the mature Hegel no longer devotes much attention to the Aesthetic at all, possibly because 
he is drawing on his earlier belief that it can be collapsed into the Transcendental Logic. 
Whatever the reason, we will follow him in focusing primarily on the Logic. 
 In the Transcendental Logic’s first division, Transcendental Analytic, Kant offers a “logic 
of truth” explaining how the type of synthetic a priori knowledge claimed by natural science is 
possible. Just as we might have been led to expect, Kant offers an idealist or Copernican 
explanation of its possibility. Natural scientific knowledge is made possible by the intelligible or 
(conceptual) conditions which the understanding imposes on objects of experience. Kant defends 
this position of the Analytic in two large steps. In the Metaphysical Deduction, Kant takes the 
preliminary step of identifying what the intelligible (conceptual) conditions our faculty of 
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knowledge imposes on the objects of experience would have to be, assuming there even were 
any. In the Transcendental Deduction, Kant proceeds to show that the intelligible (conceptual) 
conditions he has just identified must, in fact, be imposed on the objects of experience by us. 
 In the Metaphysical Deduction, Kant attempts to identify what the intelligible 
(conceptual) conditions on objects would have to be. They could not be empirical concepts, 
derived from sense-experience. If they were, then we could never know that all objects must 
necessarily conform to them. The most we could know, Hume showed, is that all objects 
observed so far have done so, but not that all must. Hence, these concepts would have to be a 
priori, contributed by the understanding itself. Kant takes the further step of anticipating the role 
these concepts would have to have. Hume had further argued that the non-empirical concepts 
central to the sciences, such as cause, substance, and so on, could not be derived from 
experience. However, Kant raises  the “Copernican” possibility that experience might derive 
from them. In other words, these concepts might already be operative in the constitution of the 
objects of our experience or appearances. Kant therefore suggests the possibility that the a priori 
concepts he will identify could confer on the objects of our experience their form. More 
specifically, these concepts could serve as rules guiding the understanding in its activity of 
“synthesizing” or unifying the manifold which it is given in sensible-intuition. If that were so, it 
would not even be so much as possible for us to be presented with an object of experience that 
was not already subject to these concepts. This would allow us to uphold the possibility of 
synthetic a priori knowledge of nature. How, though, can these a priori concepts or categories 
even be identified? 
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 As Kant makes clear, there is an important condition of adequacy on any table of 
categories: “completeness.” (A81/B106-7) We must be able to prove that the table contains all 
(and only) the categories that there are. One reason for this is that Kant maintains there are 
certain “usurpatory” concepts which must be excluded from the status of categories: for example, 
fate and fortune (B116). Another becomes clear in the course of Kant’s critique of Aristotle’s 
theory of the categories. 
It has not arisen rhapsodically, as the result of a haphazard search after pure 
concepts, the complete enumeration of which as based on induction only, could 
never be guaranteed. Nor could we, if this were our procedure, discover why just 
these concepts, and no others, have their seat in the pure understanding. It was an 
enterprise worthy of an acute thinker like Aristotle to make search for these 
fundamental concepts. But as he did so on no principle, he merely picked them up 
as they came his way…his table still remained defective. (A81/B106-7) 
   
Kant accuses Aristotle of failing to arrive at a complete table of categories. His table includes 
many empirical concepts, and not enough a priori ones. Kant maintains that Aristotle failed to 
achieve completeness because he relied on an inductive methods. Aristotle took up the categories 
as he discovered them in the thought and speech of himself and his contemporaries. Notoriously, 
however, inductive methods cannot yield completeness. At best, they can tell us that these are the 
categories that have been discovered so far. They cannot tell us that they are all the categories 
that there are. 
 Why does the “completeness” or lack thereof of Kant’s table matter? What, exactly, is at 
stake? The issue, I think, cannot be the incompleteness of Kant’s table of the categories per se. 
True, there might turn out to be a 13th or 14th or 15th category — but what of it? Perhaps the 
reason Kant wants to ward off “incompleteness” is that “incompleteness” is in fact a symptom of 
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a deeper problem. This is the problem that, if it were incomplete, then Kant’s category theory, his 
theory of the most basic concepts any human knower can employ, would express a kind of truth 
that is insufficient for Kant’s purposes. More specifically, it would express a merely contingent 
truth about us, rather than the type of necessary truth that the argument of the Analytic requires. 
 In order to achieve completeness, Kant proposes an alternative deductive approach. This 
approach will begin from a “principle.” It will then proceed to deduce a “complete” table of 
categories used by the understanding. Kant will derive his table of categories from the table of 
forms of judgment provided by the logic of the day. The categories synthesize the manifold of 
sensible intuition, so as to render it knowable. Knowing is a matter of forming judgments, 
however. Hence, the different types of category should be capable of being derived from the 
different forms of judgment recognized in logic. Yet the deeper reason for the parallel between 
the two tables is that one and the same faculty underlies both: “[t]he same function which gives 
unity to the various representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of 
various representations in an intuition…” (A 79/B104-5). 
 In any case, Kant believes that a deduction of the categories proceeding from this 
“principle” furnished by logic would be complete. As Kant famously declares in the preface, 
logic is itself complete and has not had to take a single step since Aristotle (B viii). However, it is 
only in this section of the Analytic (the Metaphysical Deduction) that we find out just how 
important this claim is to Kant’s own project. Here, Kant tells us that logic’s table of forms of 
judgment is compete. More fundamentally, the account of the understanding’s judging activities 
that it represents its itself exhaustive and complete. Hence, Kant’s own table of categories, and 
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his account of the understanding’s synthesizing activities in it must be as well. The completeness 
of transcendental logic is vouchsafed by that of general (formal) logic. 
In this manner there arise precisely the same number of pure concepts of the 
understanding which apply a priori to objects of intuition in general, as, in the 
preceding table, there have been found to be logical functions in all possible 
judgments. For these functions specify the understanding completely, and yield an 
exhaustive inventory of its powers. (A79/B105) 
 Some readers of Kant have denied that his transcendental logic is based on general logic, 
but maintained that the reverse is the case. Most famously, the Marburg neo-Kantians did so, 
basing this belief primarily on Kant’s claim that there could be no analysis without a prior 
synthesis.  In other words, Kant denies that the analytical truths of general logic concerning 73
what the contents of our concepts are presuppose synthetic a priori, or even merely empirical, 
truths from transcendental logic, which invest those concepts with content in the first place. 
Another piece of evidence lies in Kant’s claim that the categories determine the manifold in 
respect of the logical forms of judgment. For example, substance-accident determines which part 
of the intuitively given manifold can be judged of as the subject and which as the predicate, 
something logic alone cannot tell us. 
But first I shall introduce a word of explanation in regard to the categories. They 
are concepts of an object in general, by means of which the intuition of an object 
is regarded as determined in respect of one of the logical functions of judgment. 
Thus the function of the categorical judgment is that of the relation of subject to 
predicate; for example, 'All bodies are divisible'...But when the concept of body is 
brought under the category of substance, it is thereby determined that its empirical 
intuition in experience must always be considered as subject and never as mere 
predicate. Similarly with all the other categories. (B 128) 
 Cassirer refers to this claim in his defense of Kant’s MD (1981: 172)73
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 However, it seems to me that neither of these claims undermines the priority of pure general 
logic over transcendental logic. They just remind us that general logic is in certain important 
respects deficient, because of its emptiness and formality. Moreover, it is clear that the 
Marburgers’ insistence on the priority of transcendental logic over general logic reflects their 
dubious interpretative assumption that Kant presupposes the “fact of science.” In their view, 
Kant is proceeding analytically or “regressing” from the synthetic a priori principles of natural 
science to its conditions of possibility in transcendental logic. He then regresses further to 
transcendental logic’s conditions of possibility in general logic. This is an interesting reading of 
Kant but it is not, I think, a reading the German idealists share.  74
 Although I limit myself to Hegel’s critique of Kant’s Metaphysical Deduction in what 
follows, I here briefly summarize Kant’s Transcendental Deduction so that we have the 
conclusion of the Analytic’s argument in view. Given the notorious difficulty of Kant’s 
Transcendental Deduction, the idea that it can be briefly summarized will undoubtedly raise 
eyebrows. Yet at least for the purposes of reconstructing Hegel’s critique of Kant, this approach 
is appropriate. Hegel himself strongly suspects that the Transcendental Deduction is simpler than 
it is often taken to be. A remark like the following is typical: 
It is one of the profoundest and truest insights to be found in 
the Critique of Reason that the unity which constitutes the essence of the 
concept is recognized as the original synthetic unity of apperception, the 
unity of the “I think,” or of self-consciousness.This proposition is all that there is 
to the so-called transcendental deduction of the categories which, from the 
beginning, has however been regarded as the most difficult piece of Kantian 
philosophy (WdL 12:17-18, SoL 515) 
 Other Hegel interpreters and even some neo-Hegelians disagree. See Rödl (2012) who regards Kant’s general 74
logic as already informed by his transcendental logic, as well as by the role of sensibility and its forms in it. 
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 Having identified the categories in the Metaphysical Deduction, Kant then proceeds to 
show, in the Transcendental Deduction, that they must apply to all (possible) objects of 
experience.  Kant’s fundamental premise is in that argument is given in the following famous 75
passage: 
The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise 
something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as 
much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or else at least 
would be nothing for me. (B131-2) 
If some representations are to be mine, then I must (be able to) ascribe them to myself. Since that 
is just what it means for representations to be mine, this is an analytic truth. This is the so-called 
“analytic unity of apperception.” As Kant says, it is itself trivial like other analytic truths, but it 
has a further implication which is not so. It implies the “synthetic unity of apperception,” which 
is as follows. If these representations are all to be mine, Kant argues, then it follows that they 
must all be brought together or combined with one another by me, “synthesized,” as it were. The 
analytic unity of apperception implies its synthetic unity. Yet the different modes of combination 
can be none other than the 12 categories from Kant’s table. Here Kant refers us back to a 
previous part of the argument. In the Metaphysical Deduction, it was shown that if the 
understanding did combine the sensible manifold, then it would do so in these 12 ways. Here, we 
learn that the understanding does, in fact, combine the manifold, simply in virtue of being self-
conscious. Therefore, we can conclude on the basis of what we have now learned, together with 
the earlier premise from the Metaphysical Deduction, that it must do so in these 12 ways. 
 Here I defer to Hegel’s own understanding of the argument.75
!87
Ultimately, I can be certain that the manifold of sensible intuition, just by virtue of being self-
conscious, must stand under the categories. 
 Ultimately, then, the outcome of the Analytic is the realization that synthetic a priori 
knowledge of nature is possible because there are intelligible conditions to which any object of 
our experience must conform: the categories. The Analytic is by no means at an end, and there is 
much further work to be done. Summarizing crudely, the work of these sections is to explain in 
greater detail how it is that the categories apply to the sensibly given manifold for beings like 
ourselves whose forms of intuition are space and time. For example, the System of Principles 
will give spatio-temporal definitions of each of the categories. It would be interesting to ask why 
Kant’s idealist followers are so uninterested in these parts of his project. It may reflect their 
commitment to a “conceptualist” interpretation, on which the most important work of the 
Analytic is accomplished well before the forms of intuition are taken into account.  
 In any case, the most important takeaway for the idealists is that, even at this early stage, 
Kant has provided us with an assurance that the categories must apply to the given manifold of 
intuition. We have no comparable assurance that such knowledge is possible in the case of 
things-in-themselves, however, since they are not (necessarily) subject to these conditions. 
Already in the Analytic, then, Kant’s “logic of truth,” we have a powerful reason for believing 
that we we can only know appearances and not things-in-themselves.  Yet the most important 76
part of Kant’s case against transcendent metaphysics will only come in a subsequent division, the 
 If this argument from the Analytic exhausted Kant’s critique of metaphysics, then he would be guilty of what 76
Ameriks calls a “short argument” for idealism. Yet it is, in my view, meant to be supplemented by the argument of 
the Dialectic. Still, it would be a mistake to conclude from this that the Analytic does not contain a distinct critique 
of metaphysics, even if this critique is inadequate on its own. For a similar view of the Analytic as serving an anti-
metaphysical purpose, see Hatfield (2003).
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Dialectic, Kant’s “logic of illusion.” We will postpone a closer consideration of it for the next 
two chapters. 
ii. Hegel’s swimming objection reconsidered: defending a logical interpretation 
 In the opening sections of his Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel presents his “swimming 
objection” to Kant’s Critical Philosophy. 
It is one of the main viewpoints of the Critical philosophy that, prior to setting out 
to acquire knowledge of God, the essence of things, etc., the faculty of knowing 
itself would have to be examined first in order to see whether it is capable of 
achieving this; that one must first come to know the instrument, before one 
undertakes the work that is to be produced by means of it. For should the 
instrument be insufficient, all the effort would then have been expended in vain. - 
This thought has seemed so plausible that it has elicited the greatest admiration 
and acclaim and drawn knowing away from its interest in the objects and work on 
them and drawn it back to itself, i.e. to the formal aspect. If, however, we do not 
delude ourselves with words, it is easy to see that other tools may very well be 
examined and evaluated in ways other than undertaking the actual work for which 
they are determined. But the examination of knowing cannot take place other than 
by way of knowing. With this so-called instrument, examining it means nothing 
other than acquiring knowledge of it. But to want to know before one knows is as 
incoherent as the Scholastic's wise resolution to learn to swim, before he ventured 
into the water. (EL § 10A) 
I first offer a general summary of the objection, not intended to be in any way controversial.  77
Only then will I be in a position to introduce what I consider to be a new interpretation of it. 
Kant’s critical philosophy confronts the enterprise of traditional metaphysics with a challenge. 
Traditional metaphysics claims a certain distinctive type of knowledge: “knowledge of God, the 
essences of things etc.” Kant therefore confronts its proponents with the critical question of 
whether such knowledge is even possible for beings like ourselves, and, if so, how its possibility 
can be explained. The question, it seems, can only be answered through a preliminary 
 I here follow Habermas (1971), Ameriks (1985), Guyer (1993), Bristow (2007) Stern (2009), McCumber (2013) 77
and Kreines (2015) among many others.
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examination of the faculty we employ to attain knowledge: “the faculty of knowledge.” It is as if 
the faculty is a tool or instrument, and we must conduct a preliminary examination of it to 
determine what it can and cannot be used to do. At this point, however, a serious problem arises 
for the Critical Philosophy, at least according to Hegel. The problem is that Kant himself 
confronts a version of the very same challenge with which his Critical Philosophy confronted 
metaphysics. No less than metaphysics, the Critical Philosophy also attempts to acquire a 
distinctive form of knowledge: in this case, knowledge of the faculty of knowledge itself. The 
critical philosophy can therefore also be confronted with the question of whether this type of 
knowledge is possible for us, and, if so, how its possibility can be explained. The question is no 
less apt here than in it is in the case of metaphysics.  
 According to Hegel, however, the critical philosophy is incapable of providing a 
satisfactory answer to the question. Kant cannot argue here as he ordinarily would. In other 
words, he cannot argue that knowledge of the faculty of knowledge is possible on the grounds 
that this is completely consistent with the critical philosophy’s own account of the nature and 
limits of that faculty. To do so would be to invoke the very form of knowledge whose possibility 
is in question. Hegel explains the problem by returning to his metaphor of the tool or instrument. 
If the critical philosophy is to examine the tool or instrument we use to attain knowledge, then it 
must use that very tool or instrument. However, this is to risk the very misuse we wanted to 
prevent by examining it in the first place. Hence, the critical philosophy reaches an impasse. If it 
is to offer an account of the faculty of knowledge, it must itself claim knowledge. Yet according 
to the critical philosophy, no such claim is legitimate until an account of the faculty has been 
given. Wanting to know before one can know is like wanting to swim before getting wet. 
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 Here, it is important to note a limitation of the swimming” objection which is not often 
appreciated in the literature. The limitation concerns its conclusion that the critical philosophy 
cannot demonstrate the legitimacy of its own claims to knowledge. This conclusion is completely 
consistent with the possibility that these claims’ legitimacy can be demonstrated in some other 
way. In particular, it allows for the possibility that there is some more ultimate source of 
justification for the critical philosophy’s account of the nature and limits of the faculty of 
knowledge. Moreover, it allows for the possibility of a source which might uphold the legitimacy 
of the type of claim to knowledge made here. Even so, the objection, if successful, would 
displace the critical philosophy as the ultimate arbiter of which claims to knowledge are 
legitimate. Henceforth, the critical philosophy, if it is to be justified at all, would have to derive 
its legitimacy from that more ultimate source. However, this means that the critical philosophy is 
more vulnerable than it might have initially appeared, since its claims could either be upheld by 
that more ultimate source or not. Ultimately, then, Hegel’s swimming objection is best posed in 
the form of a dilemma for the critical philosophy. It must either concede that its basic 
presuppositions are unjustified or else renounce its status as ultimate arbiter of whether they are 
justified. 
 Although it is seldom realized in the literature, the swimming objection is primarily 
directed at a specific part of the Critical Philosophy.  As Hegel’s subsequent remarks make 78
clear, it is meant to apply to Kant’s treatment of the categories in the Transcendental Analytic of 
 Most commentators do not relate Hegel’s swimming objection to his objection to Kant’s metaphysical deduction, 78
despite the clear connection Hegel himself draws in the text. This is true of Habermas (1971), Ameriks (1985), 
Bristow (2007), Stern (2009), and Kreines (2015) from the one direction, and Horstmann (1995) and Houlgate 
(2006) from the other. An exception is McCumber (2013: Ch. 2) whom I follow here.
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the first Critique. Here we should recall that Hegel cites this as the main instance in which Kant 
succumbed to the temptation to “know before we know,” or swim before getting wet.  
No doubt a very important step was taken by subjecting the determinations of the 
old metaphysics to scrutiny. Naive thinking moved innocently among those 
determinations, which produced themselves straightaway and of own accord. No 
thought was given to the question to what extent these determinations have value 
and validity for themselves. It has already been remarked earlier that free thinking 
is one that has no presuppositions. The thinking of the old metaphysics was not 
free, because it allowed its determinations to count without further ado as 
something pre-existing, as an a priori which reflection did not itself examine. By 
contrast, the Critical philosophy made it its to to what extent the forms of thinking 
were capable of being of assistance in knowing the truth at all. More specifically, 
the faculty of knowledge was now supposed to be investigated prior to knowing. 
In this there is contained the correct thought that the forms of thought themselves 
must indeed be made the object of knowing. However, the misunderstanding of 
wanting already to know prior to knowing or of wanting not to set foot in the 
water before one has learned to swim, very quickly creeps into the process. To be 
sure, the forms of thought should not be employed unexamined, but examining 
them is already itself a process of knowing. (EL § 41  Z) 
  
Kant asks whether the type of knowledge claimed in metaphysics is possible for us, and, if so, 
how. In answering this question, he claims that our faculty of knowledge is the source of certain 
non-empirical concepts, or categories, which he will ultimately show can only be used to know 
appearances but not things-in-themselves. Yet we can now turn this question on Kant’s own 
project. Is such knowledge possible for us, and, if so, can Kant explain how it is possible?  
 Let us simply consider the first and most elementary step in Kant’s argument. This is his 
claim that the intelligible (conceptual) conditions on objects, if there even were any, would have 
to be (all and only) the 12 categories in his table. It is a preliminary to Kant’s subsequent claim 
that there are, in fact, such conditions, and that they must be imposed on all objects of possible 
experience by our faculty of knowledge. Though a preliminary, this section is regarded by Hegel 
as an important achievement, and it may be for this reason that he focuses on it. As he writes “…
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the Critical philosophy subjects to scrutiny the value of the concepts of the understanding as they 
are employed in metaphysics…” (EL § 41). How, then, can Kant make even this preliminary 
claim to knowledge? Ordinarily, Kant explains the possibility of a certain form of knowledge in 
the following way. He invokes the claim that our faculty of knowledge is the source of a certain 
set of (intelligible) conditions to which the objects must necessarily conform. However, Kant 
cannot justify the claim(s) before us in this way, since doing so would beg the question. After all, 
we do not yet even know what these (intelligible) conditions would be, let alone that they are, in 
fact, imposed on the objects by us. This claim is not yet available to be appealed to in the 
argument, especially at this early stage. Kant wants to make a claim to knowledge, but is doing 
so before knowledge is possible. That is like wanting to swim before getting wet. 
 As we have seen, however, the swimming objection is consistent with the possibility that 
the critical philosophy’s account of the nature and limits of our faculty of knowledge has some 
more ultimate source of justification. As Hegel concedes, Kant himself even appears to exploit 
this possibility. After all, he does not claim that his transcendental logic alone can justify the 
claim in question, but, rather, appeals to general (formal) logic. Kant bases his table of categories 
on logic’s table of forms of judgment.  This does not necessarily mean that Kant’s claim is false, 
but it does mean that it is vulnerable. It is beholden for its justification to a source more ultimate 
than the critical philosophy: logic. This source might uphold its claims, but it might also reveal 
them to be baseless. However, Hegel gives us a powerful reason for doubting that Kant’s attempt 
to derive a complete table of categories from the logic of the day can succeed. For Hegel, this 
logic is “empirical.” 
!93
It is well known that the Kantian philosophy made it very easy for locate the 
categories. The the unity of self-consciousness is quite abstract and entirely 
indeterminate. How is one then to arrive at the categories? Fortunately, the forms 
of judgment are already listed empirically in ordinary logic. Now to judge is to 
think a determinate object. The various forms of judgment that had already been 
enumerated thus provide the various determinations of thought. (EL § 42 A, italics 
mine) 
What can Hegel possibly mean in describing this logic as empirical? If ever there were an area of 
philosophy that was not empirical, logic would seem to be it. Guyer speaks for many in 
expressing his bewilderment at the suggestion: 
Hegel’s charge that Kant's list of categories is merely empirically derived is also 
peculiar…To be sure, he may not have made the method of his logical derivation 
of the several aspects and forms of judgment terribly clear, but there can be no 
doubt that Kant intended his derivation of the categories to proceed by entirely a 
priori means from the underlying insight into the judgmental nature of knowledge 
or even consciousness itself. (1993: 187) 
Here, the account of Hegel’s relation to traditional logic from the last chapter becomes important 
to understanding his critique of Kant. As we saw in the last chapter, Hegel acknowledges that 
this logic does not appeal to sense-experience.  However, he reminds us that it does appeal to a 79
type of intellectual experience. This is the type of intellectual experience we have when we 
abstract from the sensibly given content of our thinking and focus only on the formal principles 
discovered therein. We then find they are incontrovertible for us. This is meant to establish that 
these principles are constitutive norms of the faculty of thought. However, this does not solve the 
problem. Knowledge from intellectual experience is no less vulnerable to the problem of 
induction than knowledge acquired from sense-experience. Hence, the table of forms of 
judgment is incomplete. So too is the account of the understanding’s activities it represents. Kant 
 Once again, see Houlgate (2006:15). 79
!94
himself is aware of the centrality of the method of abstraction to logic, in general, and to its 
treatment of the forms of judgement, in particular. He cites the method of abstraction from 
sensible content as the source of the table of logical forms of judgment: “If we abstract from all 
content of a judgment, and consider only the mere form…we find that the function of thought in 
judgment can be brought under four heads, each of which contains three moments…” (A70/
B95)  Yet from Hegel’s perspective, Kant does not realize that this method is unable to yield 80
completeness. 
 This idealist objection to Kant’s table of categories has been seen by generations of 
interpreters as based on an uncharitable and oversimplified understanding of his project. Clearly 
there are more resources in Kant’s text than the idealists appear to appreciate. Unsurprisingly, 
then, there is a long tradition of efforts to defend from this idealist objection, including those of 
Klaus Reich, Michael Wolff and others.  I here restrict myself to a brief remark in response. It 81
seems to me that, in attempting to give Kant his due, this project misses the deeper import of the 
idealist objection to Kant’s deduction of the categories. The deeper import of this objection only 
becomes clear when we realize that it is meant to work in concert with the swimming objection. 
Ultimately, the objection does not simply claim that no such proof could be given. This would 
just be one horn of the dilemma. It also proposes that any such proof would have to rely on 
claims about the nature of our cognitive faculties in a way that is un-self-uncritical. This is the 
other horn. Far from refuting Hegel’s objection, the success of these projects might conceivably 
 See also Cohen’s defense of Kant against a similar accusation from Herbart. Their dispute centers around this 80
passage (1885: Chapter 7)
 Reich (1992) Wolff (1995), and, more recently, Lu-Adler (2016)81
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confirm it. This it would do by relying dogmatically or uncritically on claims about our cognitive 
faculties, as well as their judging and inferring activity. 
iii. Surmounting the swimming objection 1: Reinhold, Fichte 
 Although the swimming objection is sometimes taken to show that Kant’s Critical project 
is untenable and traditional metaphysics legitimate, it does not in and of itself establish any 
conclusion as dramatic as this one.  In a way this is unsurprising since, as Hegel himself 82
reminds us, the objection originates with Reinhold, a figure who would never have embraced 
such a radically anti-Kantian conclusion. In this section, I will turn to Hegel’s account of how 
Kant’s immediate followers, especially Reinhold and Fichte attempt to respond on his behalf to 
the swimming objection. They do so by attempting to reform the critical philosophy, rather than 
by rejecting  it in favor of a more traditional form of metaphysics as Hegel will later do. I will 
then examine why Hegel does not find their proposals convincing. 
 Reinhold’s proposal for how to avoid attempting to know before we can legitimately be 
said to know is his hypothetical method. In this method, the claim to knowledge with which one 
begins is proposed as a hypothesis or “problematic” claim.  In other words, we are endorsing it 83
only provisionally. Proceeding on the basis of this claim, we then arrive at a more fundamental 
(“primordial”) truth. On the basis of this truth, we could then potentially vindicate the hypothesis 
with which we began. Provisional endorsement would then be converted into full or unqualified 
endorsement. Yet Hegel is unimpressed with Reinhold’s proposal: 
Reinhold who recognized the confusion that prevails in beginning in this way, 
proposed as a remedy that one make a preliminary start with a hypothetical and 
 See Kreines (2015) and Stern (2009)82
 See Habermas (1971: 7-8), who also discusses Reinhold’s “problematic method” as well as its afterlife in 83
Germany.
!96
problematic kind of philosophizing and continue in this vein Heaven knows how 
[man weiss nicht wie] - until somehow at some point along the line it would 
emerge that in this way one had arrived at the primordial truth. Looked at more 
closely, this would come down to the usual procedure, namely analysis of an 
empirical foundation or a provisional assumption that has been put into a 
definition. (EL § 10A) 
Hegel’s objection to this approach is that it is self-defeating. He confronts it with a dilemma.  
Either the hypothetical claim with which we begin (“if x, then y”) is a premise in the argument 
for the conclusion we want to reach or it is not. If it is a premise, then its hypothetical character 
will prevent us from reaching a conclusion that holds with necessity. If is not a premise in the 
argument, however, then it is a mere heuristic device that can be dismissed. The real first premise 
in the argument is the first categorical statement made in our science. Yet this merely raises anew 
the problem of finding an adequate foundation for philosophy. Should it be some empirical fact? 
definition? something else? We are back where we started. As we saw, Kant himself confronts a 
version of this problem when he proposes the Copernican revolution in the form of a 
hypothetical claim (“If it were true that the objects had to conform to our knowledge, then.…).  
Yet unlike Reinhold, Kant correctly sees that if the hypothetical claim is meant to be first 
premise, then anything it was used to establish would only have a conditional status. It is likely 
for this reason that Kant acknowledges the need to establish it apodictically in the Critique itself.  
 For Hegel, Fichte’s approach is much more promising, and also more immediately 
relevant to the project of deriving the categories: 
The the unity of self-consciousness, is quite abstract and entirely indeterminate. 
How is one then to arrive at the of the categories? …It remains the Fichtean 
philosophy's profound contribution…to have reminded us that the thought-
determinations must be exhibited in their necessity and that it is essential that they 
be derived. (EL § 42A) 
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As with Reinhold, Fichte’s approach has us begin with a putative claim to knowledge, rather than 
attempting to abstain from making any such claims until we are in a position to show they are 
consistent with the nature and limits of our knowledge. How, then, can we know whether the 
claim is legitimate or not? Is there not the risk that we will endorse a claim that will turn out later 
to be illegitimate? The answer is that we begin with a claim that is indubitably certain. There can 
be no question as to whether it is true or false, let alone whether it is a legitimate claim to 
knowledge or not. We then proceed to show that this indubitably certain principle entails others 
no less certain than it. 
 The indubitably certain principle with which Fichte begins is a version of Descartes’ 
Cogito, “I am” or “I exist,” adapted so as to incorporate Kant’s theory of apperception in the 
deduction and his critique of rational psychology. Fichte records the debt to Descartes himself, 
although it is clear that he understands it to extend more widely:  
That our proposition is the absolutely basic principle of all knowledge, was 
pointed out by Kant, in his deduction of the categories. But he did not it down as 
the basic principle. Descartes, before him, put forward a similar proposition: 
cogito, ergo sum - which need not have been merely the minor premise and 
conclusion of a syllogism (WL 1:98-9/SK 100 ) 
For Descartes, it is impossible to doubt my existence as a thinker. Just in virtue of doubting it, I 
would be thinking. This thought, however, must come from a thinker, me. So far, so Cartesian. 
Here the parallels end, however. For Fichte, all that follows from the Cogito argument is that I, 
the thinker of this thought, am. However, I cannot know anything further about myself on this 
basis. Indeed, it does not even follow from the Cogito argument that the self whose existence I 
learn of existed before or will exist after. “What was I then before I came to self-consciousness? 
The natural reply is: I did not exist at all for I was not a self” (WL 1:97/SoK 98). It follows from 
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this that self-consciousness is not a matter of becoming conscious of a pre-existing object. 
Rather, it is only in the act of being reflected upon that the self is first of all constituted as a 
self.  For Fichte, this makes the self different from any object, material or otherwise. For an 84
object to exist and to be reflected upon in an act of thinking are distinct. For example, a table can 
exist without being reflected upon by me. Yet in the case of subjects, these coincide: “To posit 
oneself and to be are, as applied to the self, perfectly Identical” (WL 1: 98, 99). By treating the 
self as a distinctive type of object, rationalist or Cartesian metaphysics of soul-substance fails to 
respect this point. So too in a different way do empiricist bundle views of the self, as well as 
eliminative materialist views. According to Fichte, all of these positions, different as they are 
from one another, share a common error. All illicitly assimilate consciousness of self to 
consciousness of objects. Yet according to Fichte, Kant’s “I think” gives us a way of thinking 
about the self that respects both the truth of the cogito argument, as well as the limits of what it 
can establish.  We can know little more about the “I think” than that it is present in a certain act 85
of accompanying my representations: “I think A, B, and C.” It has no characteristics beyond its 
ability to do so. 
 Fichte claims to be both following Kant’s lead, as well as departing from him in a fairly 
crucial respect (WL 1:475ff./SK 48ff.). For Kant, the paradigmatic form of self-consciousness is 
the consciousness I have of my own representations (“The “I think” must be able to accompany 
my representations…”) Fichte disagrees. Before I can become conscious of my representations 
as mine, he argues, there must be someone whose representations they are: me. This condition is 
 See my (2016) for a fuller exposition of this idea.84
 I here follow Longuenesse (2008) (2017), who argues that Kant is committed to a version of the Cogito, despite 85
his official position from the Paralogisms, which is that the Cogito-argument is invalid.
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only fulfilled in a distinct form of self-consciousness achieved in the Cogito. This is not 
consciousness of my representations, but consciousness of me. Indeed, Fichte claims that the 
former presupposes the latter. To reverse them, Fichte maintains, would be to render the 
necessary unity of consciousness contingent: more specifically, contingent on given sensible 
representations. Admittedly, this worry can seem overblown from a Kantian perspective. Here, 
Fichte is evidently unsympathetic to Kant’s claims to the effect that self-knowledge and 
knowledge of objects are co-constitutive. In any case, Fichte believes that Kant is wrong to resist 
the idea that there is a form of self-knowledge prior to knowledge of objects. What resistance 
there is to this idea in Kant is based on the mistaken belief that it is a form of rationalist 
metaphysics. Once we break that association, as Fichte does with his Cogito-argument, we are 
free to appeal to consciousness of self in the context of a post-Kantian project.   
 However, Fichte is breaking with Kant in other more profound ways. For Kant, concepts 
without intuitions are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. Yet Fichte is claiming that the 
I-concept is necessarily non-empty, or object-related all on its own. This is so even when no 
sensible representation is present. The Cogito is possible in a sensory deprivation tank, as 
Anscombe memorably claims in her essay on the first person.  For Fichte, this counter-example 86
to Kant’s “emptiness” thesis has more dramatic implications. One of Kant’s most foundational 
commitments is that we human beings are finite knowers. We do not create the objects we know. 
They must exist independently of the act in which they are thought of using concepts. They must 
affect us in the relevant way and produce intuitions in us. Perhaps a divine knower would not 
operate under this constraint, but we are not such a knower. This divine knower would enjoy 
 Anscombe (1975), but see also Peacocke (2014)86
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intellectual intuition, whereas our intuition is discursive. Yet Fichte holds that we human 
knowers do partake of the intellectual intuition of a divine knower. Indeed, we do so in the most 
ordinary act of thinking: the use of the I-concept. As soon as the I-concept is used by the subject, 
the particular object it describes is always already present: the subject herself. In this modest 
respect then, we finite human knowers are infinite knowers. In performing the “I think” we have 
a type of knowledge that is not dependent on any externally given object, a fortiori, any object of 
sensible intuition. Instead, we have an intellectual intuition of ourselves. Dramatic as these 
departure from Kant are, however, they are in the service of a recognizably Kantian aim. 
Although this is a larger topic than I can discuss here, Fichte believes his amendments are 
required to defend the freedom of the Kantian subject, even in its capacity as a theoretical 
knower.  
 For Fichte, the first and most important step philosophy must take after laying down its 
first principle, the I, is to deduce the not-I, a world independent from the I. Here, Fichte has a 
version of Descartes’ problem. Descartes, once he was certain of his own existence, needed to 
prove that of the “external world.”  Here, the Cartesian heritage gives Fichte a problem Kant 
does not have. That is because in Kant the self-consciousness of the subject and its consciousness 
of objects presuppose one another. An abstract version of this point is made in Kant’s 
Transcendental Deduction, and a more concrete one later in the Refutation of Idealism. Yet as we 
have seen Fichte has a different understanding of self-consciousness that blocks this type of 
move. For Fichte, self-consciousness is a prior phenomenon in which the subject is to itself an 
object. Hence, he must advance beyond this first stage to one in which the external world makes 
its presence known. For Fichte, however, the problem posed by the not-I differs from the type of 
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“external world” skepticism dramatized in Descartes. In Descartes, the problem is that the 
external world might differ radically from the way I perceive it to be, like in the evil-demon or 
dreaming scenarios. In Fichte, by contrast, the problem is that there might be no mind-
independent world at all. Fichte’s interest in addressing this problem may have been provoked by 
the early and influential criticisms of Kant’s idealism as a form of Berkeleyan “subjective” 
idealism. It is likely that these discussions gave him an appreciation of the difference between 
Berkeleyan idealism and the distinct threat that Cartesian skeptical scenarios imply.  
 Yet there is an additional reason that advancing from the first to the second step is so 
important for Fichte. In attempting to deduce the not-I from the I, Fichte also means to refute a 
type of eliminative materialism, at this time closely associated with Spinoza. This form of 
materialism represents another path open to systematic philosophers of the period, though not to 
idealists. In taking this path, one begins with the not-I, a non-thinking substance. One then 
attempts to explain away the existence of self-consciousnesses on this basis. In other words, the 
project is not the idealist one of explaining the not-I by appealing to the I, but the materialist one 
of explaining the I by appealing to the not-I. If the aim is to explain away the existence of the I 
by appealing to the not-I, then the project becomes a form of eliminative materialism. It would 
be legitimate to wonder if this position could fairly be attributed to Spinoza. After all, Spinoza 
himself treats thought as an attribute of substance, alongside extension. This means mind and 
body exhibit a parallel, but it is not tantamount to a reduction of the former to the latter. As we 
will soon see, German idealist followers would soon move beyond this one-sided portrayal of 
Spinoza. Indeed, a more charitable attitude towards his views on precisely this issue, i.e. the 
issue of of mind and body, is an important part of the transition from the subjective idealisms of 
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Kant and Fichte to the objective idealisms of Schelling and Hegel. Yet this is getting ahead of 
ourselves. Regardless of whether this type of eliminative materialist project is Spinoza’s own, 
Fichte must address it given the threat it poses to his idealist system. Fichte aims to do so by 
precluding the materialist alternative. If the not-I can be deduced from the I, Fichte argues, then 
the ground is cut from under the materialist. There can be no beginning a philosophical system 
with the not-I and explaining (away) the I. Yet if Fichte’s project fails, then eliminative 
materialism is a possibility. 
 At least in the early Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte’s argument for advancing from the I to the 
not-I invokes logic. For Hegel, this suggests a further instance in which transcendental 
philosophy’s inability to non-circularly self-justify requires it to dogmatically rely on the formal 
logic of the day. In this tradition, the most basic law of logic is the law of identity: A is A, or 
A=A.  This is the law which explains why analytic truths are always true. The reason is that 87
they can all be reduced to identities through a method of substituting equivalent concepts. For 
example: the analytic truth a bachelor is an unmarried men can be reduced to the identity an 
unmarried man is an unmarried men through this method of substitution. 
 As Fichte formulates it, the first principle of philosophy (“I am I”) is just the first and 
most basic instance of the logical law of identity (A=A) obtained when we apply that law to the 
cogito (I am). It is the “material” version of this “formal principle. The law of identity simply 
says that if anything exists then it is self-identical, but it does not imply that anything exists. It is 
a hypothetical, rather than an apodictic statement. Yet the Cogito differs, since it states that I, the 
thinker of this thought, am. Hence, the Cogito can be used as a foundation on which the logical 
 See Leibniz “Primary Truths”87
!103
law of identity rests. Without the Cogito, the law would simply have the form of a conditional: if 
A, then A. Yet with the addition of the Cogito, it is a categorical: A is A. Put another way, the I-
concept furnishes the first and the first and most basic instance of the logical law, A=A. That is 
why Fichte combines them in a statement of his system’s first principle: I=I. How, then, do we 
deduce the not-I? Fichte appeals to the next most basic law of logic, non-contradiction, A ≠ -A, 
which he regards as equivalent to the law of identity (its “negative version”). If it is equivalent, 
then the I am I implies that the I ≠ -I. In other words, it entails a form of subject-object dualism. 
This may be a successful strategy, but it suggests that the foundational principles of Fichte’s 
philosophy stand in some type of complex relation of interdependence with the laws of formal 
logic. At one point, Fichte suggests that there is a non-vicious circle between them. 
 Hegel holds that there is no clear, compelling reason that the I entails the not-I, none 
given by Fichte anyway (WdL:21:64/SoL 54). In particular, Fichte’s “logical” reason is not a 
valid one. It relies uncritically on the logic of the day, something Hegel maintains critical 
philosophers should not do. Hegel suspects that the true source of Fichte’s conviction that this 
second step follows the first is not what he claimed it is. Fichte relied instead on the empirical 
fact that we are confronted with a world of objects distinct from us which affect our sense-
organs. Yet if the second step of the deduction is an empirical principle, then Fichte’s ambitious 
strategy of argument fails. Recall that this strategy involved beginning with a principle 
indubitably certain, and then showing that it entailed others no less certain than it. However, no 
such entailment has been shown to hold between the I and the not-I. If there is a not-I, then this is 
a type of empirical fact of which I am aware. It is a contingent truth, rather than a necessary one. 
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It is not certain, even if highly probable. Hence, its ability to render all subsequent principles 
certain is undermined.  
iv. Surmounting the swimming objection 2: Hegel 
 Hegel will break with Fichte’s Cartesian conviction that philosophy ought to begin with a 
claim to certain knowledge, and defend an alternative that aligns him much more closely with the 
figure Fichte thought of as idealism’s main opponent: the dogmatist Spinoza. Yet it is no part of 
Hegel’s Fichte-critique to deny that the Fichtean version of the Cogito (I am I) is genuinely 
certain or indubitable. On the contrary, Hegel concedes this: “In the need to begin with 
something absolutely certain, i.e. the certainty of oneself…these and other similar forms can be 
regarded as what must be the first” (EL § 86A). As we saw, however, the problem with Fichte’s 
approach was not that its starting point was uncertain, but that it was unable to advance a single 
step beyond this starting point. Hence, Hegel will propose a different first principle, Being, one 
whose claim on our attention differs. Far from being especially secure, such a principle is 
insecure. It would not be quite right to say that Being is uncertain. It lacks the form of a 
proposition, so it cannot be affirmed or denied. Yet we could say that, no sooner has it been 
introduced, it is overturned and its opposite adopted: nothing. As long as we bear in mind that 
these are pseudo-propositions, we could say that the claim, the Absolute is Being, has been 
replaced by the counter-claim, the Absolute is Nothing. Admittedly, we do not yet know what 
either even means, let alone what argument would take us from the first to the second. However, 
it should be clear that the argument in which they figure has a different structure than Fichte’s 
does. In this structure of argument, the inadequacy of our first principle is not a hindrance, as it 
might be in Fichte’s more Cartesian system. On the contrary, it is what allows us to advance to 
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the second step, from Being to Nothing, something Fichte could not do. Why, though, beyond the 
ability to advance in this way, would we want to begin with a first principle that is vulnerable to 
being overturned in this way?  
 Another reason is that this principle is more primitive, conceptually speaking: “the 
absolutely first, most abstract…” (EL § 86 A) Being is presupposed by the Fichtean starting 
point of I am I, the Schellingian principle of identity, the law of identity A is A, and so on. All are 
concepts of beings or entities of some type, and so presuppose some understanding of the 
concept of what it is to be anything at all. In the case of Fichte’s first principle, the priority of 
being is especially clear. To say that I am I or that A is A is just to employ the identity relation, 
itself the relational version of the non-relational category of being.  What though is it for 88
anything to be at all? This is a prior question. If our aim is certainty, Fichte’s I=I must be 
philosophy’s first principle. Yet if it is conceptual primitiveness, then Hegel’s Being deserves that 
title. Evidently, Hegel holds that certainty is less important than conceptual primitiveness, and it 
is not difficult to imagine what his argument for this might have been. We can only be certain of 
some proposition if we know what it means, and therefore what the concepts deployed in it 
mean. Yet the only theory which can settle our doubts about meaning, especially the meanings of 
a priori concepts or categories, is one that starts from a primitive concept and explains all others 
in terms of it. This is precisely what Hegel’s theory of the categories is meant to provide, and it is 
why he breaks with the more Cartesian starting point of Fichte’s system.  
 Yet there is an additional reason that Being has a claim to be philosophy’s first principle, 
beyond the fact that it is conceptually primitive. Being is not only the most fundamental concept 
 This is likely inspired by Hölderlin’s critique of Fichte in the fragment Urteil und Sein (1962). I owe the reference 88
to Wolfgang Mann. For fuller discussions see Henrich (1978) (1997) and (2001)
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that there is but also the most comprehensive. Being, and other concepts like it, purport to 
comprehend everything that there is. Outside of them, we are told, there is nothing at all. 
Everything is a being or entity. Anything that was not would not exist. In other words, it is not 
just the German Idealist search for a foundational “first principle” that informs Hegel’s choice of 
Being, but also the Spinozistic ideal of a form of philosophy comprehends the whole of what is 
(the Hen-kai-pan, “one and all”).  89
When being is expressed as a predicate of the absolute, this provides the first 
definition of the latter: the absolute is being…It is the definition of the Eleatics, 
but at the same time also the familiar one that God is the sum total [Inbegriff] of 
all realities. The point is that one is supposed to abstract from the limitedness 
inherent in every reality, so that God is nothing but the real in all reality, the 
supremely real. Insofar as reality already contains a reflection, this idea is 
expressed more immediately in what Jacobi says about the God of Spinoza, 
namely that he is the principium of being in all existence. (EL § 86A) 
 Here, it is significant that Hegel not only cites Eleatic monists like Parmenides, and modern 
ones like Spinoza, but also the pre-critical Kant. Hegel here refers to the omnitudo realitatis, or 
sum total of all realities, which Kant identified with the divine in the pre-critical period.   90
 Finally, a concept like Being is not only the most fundamental as well as the most 
comprehensive, but also one that could not possibly fail to be instantiated. If any concept is 
instantiated in the world, then the concept of Being must be.  Everything is a being or entity. In 91
this regard, Being has something in common with the I-concept as Fichte understood it in his 
 For an overview of the history of this idea, which goes back to the Stoics, see Henrich (2001).89
 Most others writing on the ontological argument in Hegel ignore this. See the otherwise excellent Williams 90
(2017). An exception is Harrelson (2007) whom I follow here.
 Redding and Bubbio (2014) also make this point, though they are much more dismissive than I am of the 91
suggestion that Being could constitute a legitimate definition of the Absolute or God.
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Cogito argument. Both are concepts that are necessarily non-empty.  However, this is for a 92
different reason in each case. In the case of Being, it is because of the relationship between Being 
and beings or entities. The former is what the latter all have in common. In the case of the I-
concept, it is because the act of its use in thought or speech of the knowing subject automatically 
secures for it an object. As is so often the case in Hegel, we have a similar structure of argument 
to those employed by Kant and Fichte, but with a crucial difference. Hegel has stripped it of any 
psychological association.  
 Hegel himself was well aware of the analogy between these two classic arguments from 
Early Modern philosophy, the cogito and ontological argument. He draws a parallel between 
himself in the Encyclopedia in the section entitled “Third Position of thought towards 
Objectivity: Jacobi.” There, Hegel argues against Jacobi, a figure who maintained that it is faith 
rather than reason which justifies our belief in the most fundamental truths. It would be easy to 
dismiss the Jacobian approach as unworthy of serious consideration, and Hegel’s own 
discussions of it occasionally create this impression (he describes it as opening the door to 
relativism, irrationalism, subjectivism and so on). Yet this would be overhasty.  By faith, Jacobi 
simply means any form of justification that is non-inferential. Seen in this light, Humean 
empiricism is a defense of faith. Humean empiricism shows us that our beliefs about causal 
connection are products of custom, rather than reason (“more properly felt than judged of”). Yet 
in a way, this improves their standing rather than undermining it. It shows that they are subject to 
a fundamentally different set of standards from those of reason, standards they may be more 
 Redding and Bubbio (2014) also draw this parallel, though their Austinian reading of Fichte differs from my more 92
Cartesian one.   
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successful in meeting. It is therefore unsurprising that, after Spinoza, Hume is the philosopher 
about whom Jacobi wrote the most. 
 In this context, Jacobi’s significance for Hegel is in leading him to appreciate a 
connection between the cogito and the ontological argument. Jacobi identifies a wide range of 
beliefs that he claims can only be upheld by faith, because they cannot be justified inferentially. 
Among them are our belief in our own existence as well as our belief in God, those which earlier 
rationalist philosophers had attempted to prove through argument. Here, Jacobi follows Kant, 
who had shown that the Wolffian versions of these arguments based on syllogistic inference fail. 
Hegel appreciates the connection Jacobi has drawn between these beliefs, and also regards them 
as closely related. Still, he responds by attempting to show that these beliefs, though not 
supported by syllogistic inference, are based on more than faith. In part, Hegel is here siding 
with Descartes himself and against his disciples in the Leibniz-Wolff school. True, the Cogito is 
not a syllogistic inference, as Hegel himself points out in this discussion (EL § 64A). If it were, it 
would not be sound. The major premise, anything that thinks exists, is not indubitable in the way 
that the claim “I think, I am” is (Ibid.). Nevertheless, this claim is upheld by more than faith, 
because it involves a transition in thought which is rationally necessary. This is the transition 
from the presence of a thought to that of a thinker who is its author. Regardless of whether the 
argument is ultimately successful, the important point is that it is an argument and not a brute 
assertion. Hegel argues that something broadly similar is true of the ontological argument (EL § 
76). Here too Hegel concedes that the argument is not syllogistic, but he is unwilling to regard it 
as a product of faith. It involves a rationally necessary transition in thought from the idea of 
something whose essence is to exist to the impossibility of its non-existence. In this way, Hegel 
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hopes to win over his romantic anti-rationalist opponents by showing that traditional rationalist 
forms of philosophy have more resources than they appreciate. 
 We might expect Hegel to uphold the claim of an infinite category like Being to 
encompass the whole of what is. Precisely not. Nearly always, Hegel will argue that the claim 
cannot be upheld. The claim gives rise to a type of incoherence that renders it unacceptable. 
Famously, Hegel argues that this is true of the first such definition of the Absolute. In order for 
Being to be everything that there is, it would have to be devoid of any determinate [specific, 
particular] properties. Yet if that were so, then it would effectively be nothing at all. However, 
this does not mean that Hegel simply abandons the aspiration to know the Absolute 
comprehensively. Famously, the incoherence we are confronted with is of a certain specific type 
that allows us to move forward, rather than simply abandoning the search. The discovery we 
make is that if the concept were all-encompassing in the way it claims to be, it could not be all-
encompassing in that way. In each case, however, Hegel will attempt to resolve the paradox so 
that the claim to comprehensiveness can be upheld. In the case before us, the result will be a 
better definition of the Absolute which combines Being and Nothing in a non-incoherent or 
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paradoxical way: Becoming. This is a concept defined as a type of transition from non-Being to 
Being, e.g., from not being an adult to being one.  93
 In claiming that the concept of Being has these distinctive properties, fundamental, 
comprehensive and necessarily instantiated, Hegel takes himself to have revived an older 
argument from the history of philosophy: the ontological argument. Like the proponent of the 
ontological argument, Hegel has claimed there is something whose definition entails its 
existence. Needless to say, this does not imply that Hegel endorses all versions of the argument, 
let alone those made by traditional theists. Hegel’s version assumes a non-traditional God, closer 
to Parmenidean Being or Spinoza’s substance. Although not often remarked upon in the 
literature, there are many signs of this in Hegel’s discussion of Being. In the Encyclopedia, he 
equates it with the omnitudo realitatis, the Spinozist deity whom the pre-critical Kant thought 
would furnish “the only possible proof for the existence of God.” In the Science of Logic, he also 
appends to the main discussion of this first category, Being, one of his most in-depth discussions 
of the ontological argument. In it, he claims that if Kant had employed the example of something 
infinite like Parmenidean Being and not that of something finite like 100 thalers he would have 
never have rejected the ontological argument (WdL 21:75-76/SoL 65). Being may not be a real 
 The concept of Being is instantiated in the world, if anything is. But what if nothing is? This is a problem for any 93
thinker who argues for the existence of God via the conditional: “If anything exists, then God does.” The possibility 
that nothing exists is considered by Hegel. It is the one he raises immediately after considering Being and turns to an 
alternative definition of the Absolute as Nothing. Hegel claims that this is a standpoint like that occupied by the 
Buddhists for whom none of the objects we take to exist in our ordinary lives does, in fact, exist. Understanding how 
Hegel rebuts this view requires us to take account a less well known aspect of a well known view of his. Famously, 
Hegel claims that Being and nothing are the same, but it is too seldom realized that this claim is a biconditional. It is 
not merely that Being, devoid of all determinate properties, cannot be distinguished from Nothing. The reverse is 
also true, though the reason is harder to state. I understand it to be a variation on “the problem of Plato’s beard.” 
This is the problem of how we can deny that something fictional or imaginary exists: for example, Plato’s beard or 
Pegasus. If there really is no such thing, then there is nothing of which we would deny existence. Yet if there is such 
a thing, denying its existence is ruled out from the outset. I take Hegel’s claim that Nothing is being to be of this 
broad type. Being is indistinguishable from nothing, but the reverse is also true. Nothing is indistinguishable from 
being. That is why Hegel rejects nihilism, the belief that nothing exists. It is no less a non-starter than the monism of 
Being.
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predicate in the case of ordinary entities, like a hundred dollars. Yet matters are different in the 
case of those like Being itself. This is a claim I will consider in greater depth in a subsequent 
chapter. However, the important point for our purposes is the way in which things have come full 
circle. A reconstituted version of Kant’s project has turned out to require the rehabilitation of a 
deeply un-Kantian argument closely associated with dogmatic metaphysics. 
 How does this opening argument of the Logic relate to the opening argument of Fichte’s 
Wissenschaftslehre? Hegel has effectively taken the first step in Fichte’s argument (I to not-I, I 
am to it is not me) which he finds unconvincing, and altered it decisively. He has offered a more 
abstract version of it (Being to Nothing or non-being, is to is not), a version divested of any 
reference to the self. If that is so, then we can see that the insecure status of the Logic’s “first 
principle” is a help rather than a hindrance.  It allows Hegel to take a version of the step that 94
Fichte could not. 
 In the final analysis, Hegel’s response to the swimming objection differs dramatically 
from that of his predecessors Reinhold and Fichte. It will decouple category theory from the idea 
of an investigation into our faculty of knowledge. This is reflected in the passage in which Hegel 
presents his response. The response discusses how a theory of the categories can be given that 
avoids the swimming objection. However, it omits entirely any mention of how the faculty of 
knowledge will figure in the theory: 
Consequently, the activity of the forms of thought and their critique must be 
joined in knowing. The forms of thought must be considered in and of themselves 
[an und for sich]. They are themselves the object as well as the activity of the 
 If Hegel’s argument succeeds where Fichte’s failed, then he will be in a position to confront Fichte with a 94
dilemma. Either Fichte “succeeds” in taking his argument’s first step from the I to the not-I, in which case he has 
actually taken the first step in Hegel’s argument from Being to Nothing. Or, alternatively, he does not succeed, in 
which case we have additional reason to consider an alternative. 
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object. They themselves examine themselves and they must determine for 
themselves their limits and point up their deficiency in themselves. This is the 
activity of thinking that will soon be specifically considered under the name of 
dialectic, about which a preliminary remark must here suffice, namely that it is to 
be regarded not as something brought to bear on thought-determinations from 
outside of them, but instead as immanent in them. (EL § 41  Z1) 
As it is described here, Hegel’s theory of the categories will adhere to a method of argument that 
divorces category theory from faculty psychology. It does not in any obvious way require 
recourse to the prior claim that we are investigating the faculty of knowledge, or any account of 
what that faculty would be. We simply begin with the first category: Being. We then proceed by 
using this category and each one subsequently, as both the object of evaluation and the standard 
of evaluation. We will consider a category, along with its definition, asking whether there could 
even be such a category as the one before us, whether this definition is coherent or not. Is the 
idea of simply Being, as opposed to being this or that thing, coherent? Hegel’s answer is that it is 
not, since anything which existed in this way would be so devoid of determinate properties as to 
be indistinguishable from nothing. When we find that it does give rise to an incoherence, the 
incoherence, will, as it were, be internal to the category or definition itself. Once it is resolved, 
we will have a new category, along with its definition. At which point the process repeats. At no 
point would it have helped to have a philosophical psychology in the background. From the 
perspective of Hegel’s category theory, Kant’s faculty psychology is superfluous. If 
transcendental philosophy consists in the conviction that philosophy must begin with an account 
of our faculty of knowledge, then Hegel has left transcendental philosophy behind. Yet if Hegel’s 
theory of the categories is not pursued under the head of some form of faculty psychology, then 
what area of philosophy does it concern? 
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 Here, I follow other commentators in arguing that Hegel’s theory of the categories is a 
contribution to general metaphysics (ontology). This is the area of traditional philosophy tasked 
with examining what can be said of any being or entity insofar as it is one. Yet if Hegel’s theory 
of the categories is traditional in its basic aspirations, it is not in the methods it uses. Hegel 
makes clear that all subsequent definitions of the Absolute are refined version of the first. They 
are “sublations,” canceling, but also preserving and improving upon their predecessor. I take this 
to mean that we are simply at work refining our conception of what it is for anything to be at 
all.  As Houlgate and Doz before him pointed out, this is fairly obvious in the definitions of the 95
categories themselves, all of which incorporate the first. There is indeterminate being, 
determinate being (quantity, quality), Identity, which Hegel tells us is simply being in the form of 
a relation (A “is” A), judgment, which he tells us is simply being in the form of the copula, and 
so on.
As Hegel himself makes clear, his is intended to be a distinctly post-Critical form of 
ontology which will avoid the impasses of earlier varieties (EL § 30). However, Hegel dissents 
from Kant’s diagnosis of the flaw in earlier approaches. For Hegel, the problem with pre- Critical 
ontology was that it rested its account of the fundamental forms of being on an uncritical appeal 
to ordinary language and common sense. It lacked a more systematic way of deducing these 
categories like that which Hegel’s presuppositionless method provides:
In its well-ordered form, the first part of this metaphysics was constituted 
by ontology…[but] a principle was lacking for these 
determinations. For this reason, they had to be enumerated empirically 
and contingently and their more precise content can be based only on the 
representation, on the assurance that in thinking one associates precisely this 
 I here follow Houlgate (2006: 116) as well as Doz (1987: 23-4) whom Houlgate cites. See also Martin (2012). For 95
these authors, all further categories “sublate” Being.
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particular content with a given word, or perhaps on etymology as well. In 
all this, it can be a matter merely of the correctness of the analysis (agreeing 
with linguistic usage) and of empirical completeness, not the truth and the 
necessity of such determinations in and of themselves. (EL § 35) 
Significantly, Hegel does not here follow Kant in claiming that the older ontology erred because 
of its transcendental realism, the naive belief that we can know things as they are in themselves. 
Indeed, this seems to be the one error he does not accuse it of making. 
 Hegel, then, embraces a form of general metaphysics (ontology). This is the attempt to 
use empirically unaided thought to understand the nature of Being, being-qua-being. Its topic is 
beings or entities just insofar as they are beings or entities, and not beings or entities of a 
particular (sub-)type. At the end of the Analytic, Kant will conclude that this enterprise is 
moribund. “The proud name of ontology” must yield its place to Kant’s more modest analytic of 
the understanding. Kant’s Analytic has shown that (synthetic a priori) knowledge is possible for 
us only if we restrict our attention to appearances. We know that the concepts employed in pure 
thinking, the categories must apply to any object of possible experience. Yet we have no 
comparable assurance in the case of things-in-themselves. Ontology is a type of attempt to know 
things as they are-in-themselves, and therefore goes beyond the bounds of what can reasonably 
be known. In Hegel's view, Kant has not earned the right to reject ontology in the way that he 
does. The only justification for restricting our knowledge to appearances is that this is the only 
way to guarantee universality and necessity. If there were some other away to guarantee this, 
then there would be no need. Contra Kant, Hegel puts forward this system as one which will 
give us categories that ground the possibility of non-trivial, universally and necessarily valid 
knowledge. These categories are the forms of being-qua-being, rather than the forms of self-
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consciousness unity, forms of unifying a sensibly given manifold. Ultimately, then there is no 
reason they need be restricted to appearances, rather than things-in-themselves. 
 Although I have only reconstructed Hegel’s critique of Kant’s Metaphysical Deduction, 
his critique of the Transcendental Deduction requires brief comment as well. Notoriously, the 
young Hegel dismisses it as “shallow” in his treatment of Kant in the early essay Faith and 
Knowledge. This is a shocking claim, though Hegel would later have more favorable things to 
say about the deduction. In any case, I would like to propose an explanation of why he might 
have made such a dismissive claim in the first place. My point of departure is an addition from 
the 1831 Encyclopedia:   
This, then, is what Kant calls pure apperception…With this, the nature of all 
consciousness has, to be sure, been correctly articulated. Human beings’ striving is 
directed generally at knowing the world, appropriating and submitting it to their 
will, and towards this end the reality of the world must, so to speak, be crushed, 
that is, idealized. At the same time, however, it needs to be noted that it is not the 
subjective activity of self-consciousness that introduces absolute unity into the 
manifoldness. This identity is, rather, the absolute, the true itself. (EL 42 Z1).  96
For Hegel, as we have seen, Kant’s project in the Metaphysical Deduction must yield its place to 
a more traditional theory of the categories, a form of general metaphysics (ontology). Hegel can 
therefore concede the correctness of Kant’s subsequent analysis from the Transcendental 
Deduction of the manner in which the mind unifies sensible representations into a coherent 
experience of a world structured by categories like cause and substance. Still, Hegel would be 
justified in arguing that the importance of this analysis is severely diminished once we reject the 
Metaphysical Deduction. For Hegel, Kant’s Transcendental Deduction no longer explains how 
the world acquires its categorial structure. The task of doing so now falls to general metaphysics 
 This passage is also important to Stern (1990), whose interpretation of it resembles my own here.96
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(ontology) which will explain why every being as such must necessarily fall under certain 
categories. At most, then, claims like those from Kant’s deduction concerning the imagination, 
synthesis, and so on, supplement ontology’s account of reality’s categorial structure. They do so 
by explaining the precise cognitive mechanism by which beings with minds like our own retrace 
the world’s ontological structure in thought. They cannot, however, serve the role they did in 
Kant’s philosophy of explaining how the world (of experience) acquires that structure in the first 
place. 
 In the Transcendental Deduction, Kant asks: what gives us the right to apply the 
categories to the manifold of sense-experience? He calls this the quid juris as opposed to the quid 
facti. Yet for Hegel, this question only makes sense in relation to finite categories. It therefore 
only makes sense to treat that question as fundamental if we assume that finite categories are the 
only (or the most important) categories that there are. Ordinarily, it would make sense to ask 
whether a concept the thinking subject employs actually has instances in the objective world or 
not. The definitions of most ordinary concepts leave the question open as to whether they have 
instances or not. Assuming their definitions are even so much as coherent or non-contradictory, 
then it is an open question whether these concepts apply, and if so how widely. However, 
“infinite” categories differ. The definitions of these concepts do not leave this question open, but 
rather settle it. Assuming their definition is even coherent, then they have instances. Indeed, they 
apply in every instance. For example: the sum-total-of-all-realities is instantiated not just in some 
real thing, but in every real thing. 
           *      *      * 
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 Is there, then, no place at all in Hegel’s Logic for a theory of the categories like that found 
in Kant’s transcendental logic? To be sure, Hegel’s categories are products of thinking as well, 
but the reason this is so differs profoundly from why it is so in the Critical Philosophy. As I 
argued in the last chapter, Hegel does not begin from the premise that the categories are products 
of our thinking, as opposed to deriving from sensibility or some other source. That is what they 
are, and this is a fact which must obtain if we are to do Hegelian philosophical logic. However, 
this fact is not the first premise in the argument. As Hegel says, it matters a great deal to us as 
readers if the categories are products of thinking, but not at all to the Logic, at least not at the 
outset. Instead, Hegel will simply begin with the first category, Being, and proceed to refine it.  
 The reason Hegel does not want to presuppose that the categories are forms of thinking is 
that he wants to be in a position to prove this. It is not a premise of the argument, but its 
conclusion. However, this does imply a fundamentally anti-Kantian conception of why, and in 
what sense, the categories are products of thinking. Originally, the categories are necessary forms 
of being. Eventually, however, we discover that thinking is among being’s necessary forms. 
Indeed, this is true of the type of thinking in which we were engaged when we discovered 
being’s necessary forms: self-determining thinking. Ultimately, then, we do eventually arrive at 
an epistemological explanation of how the knowledge we claimed in the preceding metaphysics 
is possible for us. We do not arrive at an account which would explain its possibility away, 
however, as if Hegel’s metaphysics were always epistemology in disguise, and this is what we 
learn at the close of the book. If that were the case, then Hegel would have effectively cut away 
the ground beneath his own feet. That is so because the metaphysics of the first part is necessary 
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to give the account of subjectivity in the second. There is a turn towards the subject at the close 
of the logic — but it is not Kant’s Copernican turn. 
v. Conclusion: The ontological argument as “the true critique of the categories and reason” 
  It should be clear that Hegel’s objection is extremely provocative from a Kantian 
perspective. On the one hand, Hegel has effectively proposed to out-do the Critical Philosophy at 
the project which lay at its very foundation: providing a derivation of the categories. On the 
other, Hegel proposes to rest his derivation of the categories on an argument that it was the 
culminating gesture of the Critical Philosophy to rebut: the ontological argument. The unfinished 
business of the positive part of the critique, Kant’s Analytic or Logic of Truth, can only be dealt 
with if we reject its negative part, the Dialectic or Logic of illusion. Hegel has claimed that a 
derivation of the categories of the type that is undertaken by Kant at the very beginning of the 
Transcendental Logic, the Analytic, can only be successfully carried out on the basis of an 
argument rejected at its very end in the Dialectic. He has claimed that the first principle from 
which the categories will be unfolded will be one with the very feature the concept of God was 
said to have in that it (purports to) contain its own existence within itself. Hegel himself presents 
his project in exactly this way with the bold declaration that the ontological argument is “the true 
critique of the categories.” 
It is the definition of finite things that in them concept and being are different… 
The abstract definition of God, on the contrary, is precisely that his concept and 
his being are unseparated and inseparable. The true critique of the categories and 
of reason
 
is just this: to acquaint cognition with this distinction and to prevent it 
from applying to God the determinations and the relations of the finite. (WdL 
21:77/SoL 66) 
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Hegel’s theory of the categories embraces a certain version of the ontological argument, an 
argument that Kant will later reject in the Transcendent Ideal of the Dialectic. At first the parallel 
to the ontological argument may seem slight. To be sure, Hegel claims there are certain concepts 
which, by definition, must have instances: for example, Being, the omnitudo realitatis. Thus far, 
however, we have only considered the potential of such concepts to figure in a type of theory of 
the categories. We have not as yet said anything about mounting a defense of theism, either of an 
orthodox or heterodox variety. In spite of this, it seems clear that this is where Hegel’s account is 
headed. In addition to drawing on a version of the ontological argument, the categories he will 
consider raise a distinctive type of claim to comprehensiveness: “definitions of the Absolute.” 
Famously, Hegel himself does not shy away from describing them as attempts to know “God as 
he was before the creation of nature and spirit.” At one point, he suggests that the religious 
notion of God is merely a metaphorical description for what his own definitions of the Absolute 
describe in a literal way. This suggests that if we were to reflect sufficiently on such definitions, 
we would find that they not only resembled the God of the philosophers, whose essence is to 
exist, but also that of ordinary religious believers as well.    
 Kant himself will explicitly reject this type of project in the Transcendental Ideal. He will 
deny that a concept could be defined as containing its own existence within itself. He will even 
deny this of the omnitudo realitatis, the very conception of God Hegel singles out as his first 
definition of the Absolute. “Existence is not a real predicate” as Kant famously declares, and his 
more exact meaning is that it is not one of the realities that the omnitudo realitatis includes. This 
is Kant’s most famous argument, but there are numerous others. Another such argument is that 
asserting the existence of Being, or any other monist principle, can reflect a type of confusion 
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between the distributive and the collective. Just as the sum of all dogs is not a further dog, the 
sum of all existing things is not a further existing thing. The point here is not to delve into a 
discussion of whether Kant’s critique of the ontological argument succeeds. It is merely to note 
that he does have such a critique, meaning that Hegel cannot help himself to a version of the 
ontological argument in his critique of Kant without at least taking account of how Kant would 
respond. 
 For now, Hegel should simply postpone responding to Kant’s objections. The question of 
whether Hegel is justified in embracing some version of the ontological argument is premature at 
this stage. Hegel has only sought to respond to Kant’s Analytic, not the Dialectic. He has argued 
that a derivation of the categories superior to Kant’s own is possible. However, it can be given by 
beginning with “infinite” categories, such as Being, categories of which some version of the 
ontological argument is true. If Hegel has succeeded in this endeavor, then has already won a 
significant victory over Kant. At the very least, he is raising the stakes of rejecting the 
ontological argument. Hegel’s proposal is that a complete derivation of the categories of the type 
Kant himself and his immediate followers sought is only possible through the ontological 
argument. Hence, embracing Kant’s critique of it will be more costly than previously anticipated.  
Clearly, a definitive verdict on the question of whether Hegel’s version of the ontological 
argument succeeds will have to await his treatment of Kant’s critique of metaphysics in the 
Dialectic.  
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III.     Hegel’s Critique of Metaphysics 
 In this brief preliminary section, I introduce the project of the next two chapters: 
responding to Kant’s critique of traditional metaphysics on Hegel’s behalf. Perhaps surprisingly, 
this requires us to take account of Hegel’s own critique of metaphysics, which differs from 
Kant’s own (hence the title of this first chapter). Hegel a critic of metaphysics? This calls for 
clarification. In my view, Hegel and Kant do not disagree over whether traditional metaphysics 
succeeds or not. For both, it is a failure. Yet they do disagree over why, exactly, it failed and what 
lesson we should draw from its failure. Kant’s view suggests the need for a radical break with the 
tradition, whereas Hegel’s (I believe) does not. In this chapter, I reconstruct Hegel’s own answer 
to this question, and discuss in a general way how it differs from Kant’s own. In the next, I 
consider in greater detail Hegel’s reasons for rejecting Kant’s answer to this question. 
i. Introduction: Hegel and Kant on the problem of dogmatism 
 Hegel’s position on metaphysics is complex. On the one hand, Hegel fully admits that 
pre-critical metaphysics gave rise to the impasses Kant identifies. In particular, he agrees that 
this tradition found itself plagued by intractable controversies. On the other hand, he denies that 
any form of realist metaphysics would have to do so. He therefore rejects Kant’s ultimate 
conclusion that we must reject transcendental realism in favor of idealism. Hegel hopes to 
demonstrate that Kant has misdiagnosed the problem with pre-critical metaphysics. In Hegel’s 
view, the errors Kant identifies (paralogisms, antinomies, and so on) are by no means the result 
of transcendental realism, the assumption that we can know reality as it is in itself. Instead, they 
result from the use of a crude set of logical tools to achieve this otherwise legitimate aim, tools 
furnished by the traditional Aristotelian logic: for example, the judgment of subject-predicate 
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form. The broader point is that this alternative diagnosis opens up the possibility of arguing that a 
realist form of metaphysics remains a possibility for us, provided it uses a different set of logical 
tools. This would be a distinctly post-critical metaphysics, traditional in its aspiration to know 
the unconditioned if not in the logical means it employs in attempting to achieve that end. If Kant 
overlooked the true source of the problem with pre-critical metaphysics, locating this source in 
its realism rather than its logic then this is unsurprising. After all, Kant was no less indebted to 
traditional logic than the figures he criticized. What, then, were the crude logical tools that 
hindered the tradition, and prevented Kant as well from accurately diagnosing its failings? As it 
will turn out, there are many, but I will here focus on the particular apparatus of claim and 
argument on which the tradition relied. As we will see, Hegel’s case for his most famous 
innovation, the dialectical method, emerges from his confrontation with the formal logic 
undergirding pre-critical metaphysics.  
ii. The role of formal logic in pre-critical metaphysics 
 a) Predicative judgment 
 The first of these logical tools I will consider is the tradition’s reliance on judgments of 
subject-predicate form, “S is P.” In pre-critical metaphysics, it was assumed that the judgment is 
the primary vehicle of “truth.” As Hegel writes, “There was [in the tradition - JM] no 
investigation as to whether…the form of judgment is capable of being the form of truth (EL 
§28)”  In order to see why the form of judgment was so important to the tradition, we should 97
recall the following. Like any science, traditional metaphysics defines itself by its subject-matter: 
God, the soul, and the world. Hence, it must begin with definitions of these items. Only in this 
 Houlgate (1986) provides a similar account of Hegel’s criticisms of “the former metaphysics,” especially 97
concerning the role of judgment and of religion. See also Lakebrink (1979) and Stern (2017)
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way can it secure a subject-matter for the science, which would otherwise be empty. Once these 
definitions are in place, we can certainly pose and answer questions about God, the soul, and the 
world. In logical terms, we can do so using judgments of subject-predicate form. More 
specifically, we can ask of a subject concept whose definition has now been secured whether a 
certain predicate concept applies to it or not. Does God, on some widely accepted definition, 
exist or not? Is the soul, as it is commonly understood, mortal or immortal? The world-whole, as 
we usually understand it, finite or infinite in its age or size? In order to adjudicate these disputes, 
these figures would then construct syllogistic arguments for the thesis and antithesis claims. 
Admittedly, relying on judgment and syllogistic inference may seem innocuous. However, Hegel 
will argue that this logical apparatus is inherently dogmatic, at least when it is considered from 
the point of view of his own theory of the categories.  
  For Hegel, the tradition’s ability to raise questions of this kind and explore them in depth 
required ignoring others. To judge of some subject-concept that a further one can be predicated 
of it, we must either treat as settled, or not treat as settled, the question of the subject concept’s 
meaning. If we treat it as settled, then we are being dogmatic—positing meaning as self-evident. 
Pre-Critical metaphysicians may have been content to defer to, for example, the Christian 
religion’s definitions of terms like God, the soul, and the world. Hegel is not. That leaves the 
alternative of not treating the question as settled. If we do this, however, then we are not 
employing a judgment in the logical sense at all. This is so even if, grammatically speaking, our 
claim seems to have the form of a judgment. A judgment asserts a connection between two 
concepts. Yet in such an instance, we are only asking about the definition of one, and deriving 
the meaning of the second concept from it. If we decide not to treat the question of the meaning 
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of our concepts as settled, as it seems we must if we are to avoid dogmatism, then we are no 
longer employing a judgment in the logical sense. In this way, Hegel’s objection that judgment is 
inherently dogmatic is effectively conceded.  
Even admitting that a non-judgment based inquiry into our concepts would avoid 
dogmatism, it is far from clear what form such an inquiry would take. Yet Hegel thinks there are 
clear cases of this from the history of philosophy. Inquiring into the meanings of our concepts 
without relying on the form of judgment is what Hegel thinks the characters are doing in Plato’s 
dialogues when they pose and answer the question “What is X?” Here, the aim is not to assert a 
connection between two concepts, as a judgment in the logical sense does, but only to inquire 
into the content of one. It is also why Hegel denies that Plato is a dogmatic metaphysician, 
something that must sound very strange to Kantian ears.  The following passage is 98
representative: 
 This kind of metaphysics was not a free and objective thinking, since it did not 
allow the object [Objekt] to determine itself out of itself but presupposed it as 
something ready made. As concerns Greek philosophy, it thought freely, but not 
scholasticism, since the latter  likewise took up its content as something given 
and, indeed, given by the Church. We moderns, through our entire way of 
education, have been initiated into representations [of things)…which it is 
exceptionally difficult to overcome… (EL §31 + Z) 
 Earlier philosophers and notably the Scholastics provided the material for this 
metaphysics…Plato is not this kind of metaphysician, and Aristotle even less so, 
although it is usually believed that the opposite is the case.  (EL § 36  Z) 
 Although a less clear case of the approach Hegel favors, Spinoza is meant to be doing 
something similar. Hegel believes that Spinoza’s system contains the seeds of a profound logical 
innovation, though one concerning judgment rather than the law of non-contradiction. It is an 
!125
innovation Hegel calls “the speculative proposition.” This is a larger topic then I can discuss 
here, but I do want to draw attention to its Spinozistic provenance and its non-judgmental, non-
formal-logical and therefore anti-dogmatic character. When Spinoza claims that God is nature, he 
is not making a judgment in the logical sense. He is not asserting a connection between two 
separate concepts whose received definitions are assumed as unproblematic: for example, 
definitions of God and nature as creator and created. Instead, Spinoza is thinking freely, which 
for Hegel means interrogating the meanings of our concepts. Accordingly, Spinoza is proposing a 
new concept, with a new definition. It is a hybrid concept, compounded out of two old ones: God 
or nature [deus sive natura]. If this is right, then Spinoza may not be a dogmatist either, at least 
when judged according to this logical criterion. I will return to this issue subsequently, arguing 
that it is a mistake to classify Spinoza alongside other rationalist metaphysicians as pre-critical, 
dogmatic metaphysicians. Once again, this will sound strange from a Kantian point of view, 
especially Kantian-idealist interpreters of Hegel. 
 b) Syllogistic inference 
 As we have seen, dogmatic metaphysicians not only rely on judgment as the primary 
vehicle of truth but also on syllogistic arguments as the primary means of proving true. Since 
giving an argument for something is an alternative to dogmatically asserting it this might seem to 
mitigate the problem of dogmatism. Yet far from resolving the problem posed by the dogmatism 
inherent to the form of judgment, syllogistic argument preserves it. This becomes clear when we 
bear in mind the following. We are apt to think of such arguments as containing two or more 
judgments which are treated as premises from which some a conclusion can be validly drawn. 
For example: consider the following syllogistic for God’s existence. God is all perfect, existence 
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is a perfection, therefore…It should already be clear that a syllogistic argument like this relies on 
the meanings of our concepts, rather than calling their received meanings into question. For that 
reason, it does not resolve the problem that concerns Hegel. However, the point becomes clearer 
still when we consider a further component of Hegel's conception of the syllogism. Rather than 
think of syllogistic arguments as connecting two or more judgments of subject-predicate form, it 
would be better to think of them as connecting three or more concepts. A judgment simply 
introduces a further concept, beyond the original two, whose role will be to mediate between the 
subject and predicate concepts connected in a judgment. For example: take the judgment God 
exists, and the syllogistic argument for it just given. All the syllogism does is introduce a third 
concept <perfection> meant to mediate between two others connected in the judgment, the 
concepts of <God> and <existence>. On this view, judgments are simply two-place relations 
between concepts, and syllogisms the exact same relation, extended to three or more places. That 
is why Hegel always represents the syllogistic figures using a notation made up of a middle term 
and two extremes: U-P-I etc. The details of Hegel’s analysis are complex, but the upshot is not. 
Since all that a syllogism does is further extend a connection between concepts already made in a 
judgment of subject predicate form, it cannot help us transcend the limitations of this logical 
structure. At best, it postpones the task of interrogating the meanings of the subject-concepts 
used in the judgments themselves themselves. At worst, it forecloses or even exacerbates it. To 
the dogmatically assumed meanings of the first two concepts deployed in the judgment, we now 
add a third as soon as we construct a syllogism. 
 For Hegel, it is no coincidence that Scholasticism, the main form of pre-critical, dogmatic 
metaphysics, relied on the logic of the Aristotelian tradition. According to him, it is the two main 
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tools of logicians in this tradition, judgment and syllogism, which, at least in part, explain the 
metaphysical tradition’s dogmatism (as we will see in a moment, Christianity also has a role). By 
contrast, Kant, who has a more favorable attitude towards the traditional logic, does not 
implicate it in the shortcomings of metaphysics. He praises this science as an example 
metaphysics should emulate. Yet from Hegel’s perspective, Kant does not attend sufficiently to 
the way pre-critical metaphysics everywhere relies on the older logic. Since Kant relies on this 
logic as well, it is not at all surprising from a Hegelian perspective that he should have mis-
diagnosed the problem.  99
iii. The role of religion (Christianity) 
 As we have seen, Hegel believes that the traditional logic confronted pre-critical 
metaphysicians with a dilemma: either meaning as self-evident in a way that is dogmatic, or else 
abandon this logic entirely. Hegel believes that pre-critical metaphysicians attempted to resolve 
the dilemma in a way that involved an appeal to the Christian religion. Ultimately, Christianity 
was the source of these metaphysicians’ conceptions of the meanings of terms like God, the soul, 
and the world. However, Hegel argues that the appeal is in the final analysis dogmatic. In order 
to understand why, we must consider Hegel’s claim that this approach required earlier figures to 
employ resources drawn from the sphere of representation [Vorstellung]. Representation is a well 
known term of art from Hegel’s philosophical psychology. There, Hegel distinguishes between 
representation, a mode of thought in some way informed by sense-experience, and conceptual 
thought [Begriff], which has been completely purified of any association with that form of 
 See Bowman (2013: Introduction: “A Totally Transformed view of Logic”) for the claim that Kant and pre-critical 99
metaphysics are on the wrong side of Hegel’s revolution in logic. I discuss Bowman in greater depth below in the 
conclusion to this chapter.
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experience. Importantly for our purposes, Hegel believes that representation is the medium of 
religion, whereas conceptual thought is that of philosophy. Explaining this adequately would 
require a more extensive detour through into Hegel’s philosophy of religion as well as his 
philosophical psychology than is possible here. However, I offer the following in the way of 
background. 
 As I interpret him, Hegel thinks that traditional religious teachings on the nature of God, 
the soul, and the world are not literally true. However, he concedes the possibility that they might 
be so in a different way, figuratively. On this view, religion expresses in a figurative way truths 
that philosophy can state literally. Religion does so using imagery, whether this is verbal, 
pictorial or some other type. Images represent ideas that can be conveyed more directly and 
literally using concepts or words. Still this confronts us with the question of what the literal 
content of these religious metaphors might be? What, exactly, do the metaphors of traditional 
religion stand for? Unless we confront this question concerning traditional religion, Hegel thinks, 
we will not make progress in philosophy. Part of the reason is that Hegel believes the content of 
these metaphors to be none other than his own speculative philosophy. For example, he thinks 
his definition of the Absolute as the Concept, a tripartite structure, is reflected in the doctrine of 
the Trinity. However, our topic here is Hegel’s diagnosis of the problem with pre-critical 
metaphysics, rather than the prescription he recommends. How, then, does the metaphorical 
content of traditional religion explain the impasses of traditional metaphysics? 
 Specifically at fault are the metaphorical representations of God, the soul and the world 
and the the logical form of judgment. Lacking any clear understanding of the literal truth these 
metaphors express, people will vary widely in their assessments of what consequences for 
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philosophy follow from them. In logical terms, each will begin with a subject-concept, defined in 
an idiosyncratic way, and then reach divergent views about which predicate-concepts can be 
attached. In the background is Hegel’s belief that the medium of sensible intuition lends itself to 
content that is private and incommunicable in a way that of the conceptual does not inasmuch as 
it allows for expression in a public language:  
The representations of soul, world, God seem at first to offer thinking a firm hold. 
However…the character of particular subjectivity is blended in with them and…
on account of this, they can have very different meanings, [meaning that] they 
first need to receive their firm determination through thinking. (EL §31). 
The end result is a conflict between opposed answers to some metaphysical question, a conflict 
made particularly intractable by the fact that the root of the disagreement is necessarily obscure 
to the parties involved.  
      * * * 
 Returning to the main stream of the argument, we can now combine Hegel’s account of 
the role of formal logic in pre-critical metaphysics with his account of the role of religion. Our 
aim is to understand why they give rise to dogmatism. In Hegel’s retelling, traditional logic and 
an uncritical appeal to religion combine to wreak havoc for pre-critical metaphysics. If the 
judgment or inference based logic of the tradition discourages a critical interrogation of the 
subject-concepts in metaphysical claims, then religion only does so further. The former 
encourages us to look at a higher level of logical complexity, and therefore in the wrong place. 
The latter ensures that, even if we did examine the concepts themselves, we would not discover 
their true content. This, then, is Hegel’s alternative diagnosis of the tradition’s impasses. What is 
needed is not further research into the questions of traditional metaphysics, but a critical 
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interrogation of the basic concepts metaphysicians deploy unthinkingly: God, the soul, and the 
world. In logical terms, we must abandon the question of which predicates attach to a given 
subject, and turn to the prior one of how those subject terms ought to be defined. Yet this will 
require abandoning the medium of representation and embracing that of conceptual thought. 
 In proposing a critical interrogation of the concepts of God, the soul, and the world,  
Hegel is arguably more radical a critic of metaphysics than Kant. At least in this dispute, Hegel is 
disappointed to find that Kant is on the side of pre-critical metaphysics. According to Kant, the 
three objects of special metaphysics (God, the soul, and the world-whole) are a priori Ideas of 
reason itself. This means pre-critical metaphysicians were justified in their decision to promote 
them to such an important place. To be sure, Kant is critical of attempts by earlier 
metaphysicians to employ these Ideas uncritically. For Kant, they can only be used to regulate 
our pursuit of scientific knowledge, not to yield a distinct type of metaphysical (theoretical) 
knowledge. From Hegel’s perspective, however, Kant is still too charitable towards the tradition. 
His critique concerns the specific use that is made of these concepts, rather than the concepts 
themselves. As regards traditional religion’s influence on philosophy, both pre-critical 
metaphysicians and Kant are insufficiently wary, at least according to Hegel.  
 Worse still, Kant’s attempt to show that these Ideas spring from reason itself only re-
entrenches the recurrent problem of his uncritical reliance on the logic of the day. In other words, 
Kant’s attempt to avoid one form of pre-critical dogmatism, the religious, lands him in another, 
the logical. As with his deduction of the Categories from the Analytic, Kant’s deduction of the 
Ideas of reason in the Dialectic appeals to the logic of the day, this time the table of forms of 
inference.  
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The transcendental analytic gave us an example of how the mere logical form of 
our cognition can contain the origin of pure concepts a priori, which represent 
objects prior to all experience, or rather which  indicate the synthetic that alone 
makes possible an cognition of objects. The of judgments (transformed into a 
concept of the synthesis of intuitions) brought forth categories that direct all use 
of the understanding in experience. In the same way, we can expect that the form 
of the syllogisms, if applied to the synthetic of intuitions under the authority of 
the categories, will contain the origin special concepts a priori  that we may call 
pure concepts of reason or transcendental ideas, they will determine the use of the 
understanding according to principles  in the whole of an entire experience. (A 
321/B378) 
The representations of metaphysics are Ideas of reason, after all. Yet the logical, as opposed to 
the real, use of reason is to form syllogistic inferences. Hence, each of reason’s three Ideas can 
be traced back to a different form of syllogism: the soul from the categorical syllogism, the world 
from the hypothetical, God from the disjunctive. As before, the strategy of argument is based on 
Kant’s conviction that this logic is complete. If these are all the syllogistic forms that there are, 
then these Ideas must be all that there are as well. As before, Hegel rejects this claim. He denies 
that the table of forms of inference is itself complete. Here too as before he does on the grounds 
that the logic from which it derives is empirical. Odd as it may sound, this claim is a constant 
refrain in Hegel’s critique of Kant. It becomes slightly less odd-seeming if we recall its meaning. 
This is merely that this logic is based on intellectual experience, not the sensible variety.  
 …these Ideas are again derived from experience, from formal logic, according to 
which there are various forms of the syllogism. Because, says Kant, there are 
three forms of the syllogism, categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive, the 
Unconditioned is also threefold in its nature. (VGP Kant: “Critique of Pure 
Reason” italics mine) 
Kant’s failure to prove completeness at the outset of the Dialectic is a point of vulnerability 
Hegel will exploit. It leaves open a possibility Kant must rule out if his critique of metaphysics is 
to succeed. I mean the possibility that a distinct set of concepts, beyond those Kant considers, 
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which could allow for a new, superior form of metaphysics. If that were so, then there would be 
no need to reject realist metaphysics in the name of transcendental idealism. 
iv. Truth in formal and speculative logic 
 Ultimately, then, Hegel traces the dogmatism of the tradition to a logical source. The 
tradition (and Kant) rely uncritically on the form of judgment, assuming that it is the sole 
“vehicle of truth,” (as well as the form of inference which they regard as the primary means of 
proving true). Hegel’s alternative proposal is that concepts are themselves vehicles of truth, and 
admit of being used on their own in philosophy. For Hegel, we should no longer ask, as both pre-
critical metaphysics and Kant did, whether a certain judgment is true, i.e. whether the connection 
it asserts between a subject concept and the predicate concept in fact holds good. Nor should we 
pursue an answer to this question through the less direct route of constructing syllogistic 
arguments from which such a judgment can be drawn as the conclusion from a prior set of 
premises. We should, instead, ask the more fundamental question of whether the concepts 
themselves are true, in some sense of the term. This is a question the tradition did not ask, though 
this is perhaps understandable. Hegel recognizes that we are not accustomed to treating 
individual concepts as truth bearers. What, though, can Hegel mean in suggesting that they are? 
The question whether being, existence or finitude, simplicity, compositeness, and 
so on are in and of themselves true concepts must seem odd to someone who 
believes that there can be talk only of the truth of a sentence. The only question 
can be whether a concept is being truthfully attributed (as it is called) to a subject 
or not, and that [form or variety of -JM] untruth depended on the contradiction 
that might be found to exist between the subject of the representation and the 
concept to be predicated of it.  But the concept as something concrete (and every 
determinacy in general) is essentially in itself a unity of diverse determinations. 
Hence, if truth were nothing more than the lack of contradiction, the first thing 
that would have to be considered for every concept is whether it did not of itself 
contain such an internal contradiction. (EL §33A) 
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Minimally, truth requires the absence of contradiction, and Hegel’s conception of truth is 
usefully approached with this condition in mind. The condition is reflected in a traditional 
definition of truth which Hegel will alter in a decisive respect. On that traditional definition, 
truth, whatever else it may be, requires at the very least the absence of contradiction between the 
subject and predicate concepts united in a judgment. For Hegel, truth can pertain to a single 
concept, since it is possible for individual concepts to contradict themselves. This is true of the 
very first concepts Hegel considers in the logic. Being, we learn, can only be defined in terms of 
its lack of any determinate [specific, particular] quality. Yet this means it is identical with its 
opposite, Nothing, defined in the same way. Hence, Being, the simplest concept that there is, 
contradicts itself. Yet it is especially so once we move beyond the first few concepts of the Logic, 
and encounter others with a more complex internal structure. As Hegel says, these subsequent 
concepts are “unities of opposed determinations.” Hence, these concepts can contradict 
themselves when the determinations they contain contradict each-other. For example, consider 
the concept of an infinite quantity, an instance of what Hegel calls “the bad infinite.” For Hegel, 
the definition of a quantity is that it always admits of increase or decrease. As an infinite 
quantity, however, the quantity before us is meant to be the greatest quantity of all.  Yet 100
because it can always be increased, such a quantity cannot be the greatest. So it both is and is not 
the greatest. Hence, the contradiction.   
 I remark in passing that this idea concerning the ways in which individual concepts can 
be untrue reflects a broader Hegelian conception of truth. On this conception, truth is not a 
 This is a very old argument. It can be found in Locke as well as in Leibniz (1989: 25), who speaks of “the fastest 100
motion, which is an absurdity.” An overview of its long history, can be found in Priest (1995).
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matter of correspondence between our representations and a reality independent of them. Hegel 
denounces this as mere correctness, rather truth in the full-fledged sense. Instead, truth is a 
specific type of correspondence that reality exhibits with itself.  
Correctness and truth are very frequently considered to mean the same thing in 
ordinary life and one accordingly speaks of the truth of some content where it is a 
matter of mere correctness. Correctness generally affects merely the formal 
agreement of our representation with its content; however this content may be 
otherwise constituted. The truth consists, by contrast, in the agreement of the 
object with itself, i.e. with its concept. (EL § 172  Z) 
This conception of truth as something “in the world” rather than a relation of language or thought 
to the world goes back to Plato, and can be found throughout the history of philosophy. Yet 
Hegel gives it an unfamiliar twist. He argues that the type of self-correspondence he calls truth 
obtains when a thing satisfies its constitutive norm.  Hegel finds traces of this use of the term 101
truth in expressions like “a true friend,” “a true work of art.” If that is so, then there is no reason 
to ascribe truth to judgments but withhold it from concepts. A judgment asserts a connection (of 
identity or prediction) between subject and predicate, so it is true when that connection obtains. 
Similarly, a concept, though it does not assert anything, is meant to have a content. A concept is 
true when it has a coherent content, and un-true when it does not. 
v. Overcoming dogmatism: the dialectic 
 This notion of truth gives Hegel the basis for a new method of philosophical reflection on 
our concepts, the dialectic, which will enable him to avoid the dogmatism of pre-critical 
 See Alznauer (2016), who also cites Wolff (1981).101
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metaphysics. This is Hegel’s dialectic, which employs the twin strategies of immanent critique 
and determinate negation.  I consider these in turn: 102
  In a first step, immanent critique, a concept is used as both the object and standard of 
evaluation. It is shown to be un-true in Hegel’s sense of the term, self-contradictory. Part of the 
reason that the concept itself must be used as the standard is that any other would beg the 
question. We would face the question of what justifies the application of any “external” standard. 
Yet in the case of an internal one, this question does not arise.  
 Then, in a second step, determinate negation, we find some way to resolve the 
contradiction. If we do, we will be left with a new concept which is contradiction-free and 
therefore an improvement upon the old. At the same time, this new concept is a refined version 
of the old. After all, it is the product of performing a certain operation on the old. Yet the mere 
fact that it is free of the contradiction that afflicted its predecessor does not mean it is wholly 
unproblematic. It will give rise to a contradiction of its own, at which point the process iterates. 
We know we have concluded it only when we return to the beginning. This requires that the last 
category be one which returns us to the first. 
 Admittedly, it is less often individual concepts than it is more complex structures that are 
subject to dialectical criticism in Hegel’s writings. Here, we might think of the “configurations of 
consciousness” from the Phenomenology, each of which involves a knowing subject, an object 
known, and a relation between them, knowledge. A conception of philosophy as the immanent 
critique of such “configurations of consciousness” was Hegel’s earliest response to the 
 The idea that the dialectic involves these twin strategies is particularly important to Rosen, whose discussion I 102
follow here. See his (1982: “2. Determinate Negation and Immanent Critique”). 
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swimming objection.  As we saw in the last chapter, the objection was that evaluating claims to 103
know by appealing to an account of the nature and limits of our cognitive faculties is question-
begging or circular. We have already considered the mature Hegel’s solution in the Logic, but the 
young Hegel’s solution differs. It is that we can evaluate a claim to know with reference to an 
account of the nature and limits of our faculties implicit in that very claim, rather than one 
imported by the philosopher from elsewhere. For example: the protagonist of sense-certainty 
makes a claim to know “this, here, now,” but implicit in this claim is a corresponding conception 
of the knowing faculty as a form of sensibility, defined as immediately related to the singular 
object that is given to it. Unlike the Logic, then, the Phenomenology does not completely 
renounce an earlier subjective-idealist conception of critique as based in (some form of) 
philosophical psychology. It only renounces a particular version of this project, a version based 
on “external” rather than “internal” critique.  
 Beyond the opening arguments of the Phenomenology and the configurations of 
consciousness it considers, we encounter other structures that are more complex still. We might 
also think of the “shapes of spirit” from that work, each of which is a different social and 
historical world (Ancient Greece, Rome, the Enlightenment, and so on). Hegel’s influential 
critiques of these forms of life only serve to distance his famed strategy of immanent critique 
further from the more austere subject-matter of the Logic: quantity, quality, and so on. The 
subsequent reception of Hegel’s approach has done so as well. Certainly the most influential 
legacy of Hegel’s idea of immanent critique is not its application to individual concepts, as in the 
 See Habermas (1971) for an account of how Hegel’s swimming objection to Kant’s critical philosophy issues in a 103
defense of the project of the Phenomenology. A more recent account is Bristow (2007)
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logic,  but to social institutions. This is the role it plays in the Marxist tradition, where 104
capitalism is criticized in terms of ideals and aspirations internal to it: for example, maximal 
productivity. Be that is as it may, I wish to suggest that, in this foundational portion of Hegel’s 
system, immanent critique operates at a more primitive level. 
 At least in the Logic, Hegel’s dialectic is not just defined by a certain mode of 
progression, but by a starting point. As we saw in the last chapter, Being is the “first principle" of 
Hegel’s philosophical system. Certainly it is not the only concept, or proposition, which has been 
proposed for that role. Yet Hegel defends his choice on the grounds that this concept is more 
fundamental than any other. Every concept is the concept of a being or entity. This includes other 
candidate first principles like the I, identity, the One, and so on. To employ any other would be to 
beg the question. In particular, it would be to assume that we already understand the concept all 
these further ones presuppose: Being. That is why there can be no skipping the first step, and 
moving on to some other.  
 What is most important for our purposes is how the dialectical method, understood in this 
way, allows Hegel to avoid the form of dogmatism he finds in pre-critical metaphysics. The 
crucial point is that the dialectic, understood in this way, gives us a justification for defining our 
concepts in the way we do. In each case, the justification is always that this is the definition 
required to resolve a contradiction in the predecessor concept. Here, it should be noted that this 
justification is an a priori philosophical argument. The argument itself is not based on any appeal 
to ordinary usage, philosophical tradition, or any other external source. (It is possible these have 
 Commentators vary widely in whether and to what extent the social and historical dimensions of human existence 104
are a significant topic in the logic. See Zambrana (2015), Redding (1996) for interpretations that stress these themes 
more than mine.
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some less significant role to play in the argument, such as making it comprehensible or relating it 
to other pertinent material). The argument is strengthened considerably when we realize that its 
starting point is Being, the most fundamental concept that there is. Every other concept is the 
concept of a being. If a concept purports to be a priori or a category but cannot be extracted from 
this first one using the procedure Hegel suggests, then it fails to secure this status. In a way, this 
is the fate suffered by traditional religious concepts of God, the soul and the world. They do not 
appear in the dialectical procession. Unlike the One, Being, Substance, Actuality, the Concept, 
and so on, their fate is to be unmasked as pseudo-concepts. In certain ways, Hegel could not have 
less in common with logical positivism/empiricism and ordinary language philosophy. Yet his 
criticism of rival philosophers and metaphysicians as effectively talking nonsense does seem to 
anticipate these developments. The difference of course is that Hegel mounts this assault on 
traditional metaphysics from the direction of a bold new form of it. He does not do so from an 
anti-metaphysical direction.  
 Moreover, a dialectical theory of concepts gives us a further standard by which to judge 
their use in philosophy, a standard pre-critical metaphysics lacked. This theory articulates a type 
of hierarchical order between these concepts which must be respected. If each solves a problem 
its predecessor could not, then this implies an order of rank between them. Criticisms of 
opponents for misusing concepts, using them out of their proper order or in ways that fail to 
respect the hierarchy between them, are extremely common in Hegel.  This is certainly an odd 105
mode of engaging with one’s opponents, inasmuch as it does not directly involve criticizing 
 See, for example, Hegel’s criticism of a traditional conception of concepts as part of the form of thought, rather 105
than its sensibly given matter (EL § 160 Z1). His criticism is that, by the time we reach the standpoint of the 
Concept, the contrast between form and matter has been overcome. 
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claims or the arguments for them. Yet this does explain why Hegel’s chosen mode of engagement 
is so often this unusual one. 
vi. A pre-predicative Absolute? 
 In closing, I would like to explore the possibility that the dialectic is a radical alternative 
to a received view of philosophical discourse found in formal logic. This possibility is suggested 
by the following considerations. Unlike formal logic, Hegel’s Logic operates wholly at the level 
of individual concepts rather than at the level of judgments. It occupies a pre-predicative 
standpoint rarely taken up in philosophy.  It takes up this more logically primitive standpoint to 106
avoid the dogmatism of pre-critical metaphysics. Yet if that is so, then there is a further respect in 
which it differs from philosophy as traditionally practiced. Concepts combine into judgments, 
judgments into syllogistic inferences. By operating at this more primitive standpoint, Hegel’s 
Logic is also non-inferential. Especially in passages where he explains his dialectical method of 
argument, Hegel is scornful of what has usually passed for argument in philosophy: the 
syllogism. Whatever exactly the famed opening argument of Hegel’s Logic is supposed to be, the 
argument taking us from Being to Nothing to Becoming, it should be fairly clear that it is not a 
syllogistic inference. This means that the dialectic is not only non-judgmental, but non-
inferential as well. It is at two levels of remove from the logical standpoint of pre-critical 
metaphysics, so as to more effectively avoid dogmatism. Hegel’s Logic is therefore that rare 
thing, a work of philosophy entirely free of the type of claim and argument traditionally 
considered the philosopher’s stock in trade, judgment and inference. The uncanniness of this 
approach is lessened somewhat when we realize that judgment and inference are not the only 
 Here I differ from Houlgate (2006) on the question of the role of judgment. Mine is the “empty-place-holder” 106
view Houlgate rejects in favor of another. I suspect the two are compatible. 
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type of claim and argument in philosophy. Nor does every stretch of written language that has the 
superficial appearance of a judgment or inference have the underlying logical structure. Hegel 
undeniably has a version of the distinction between surface grammar and logical form so 
important to later analytic philosophy. This would be one way of understanding his repeated 
insistence that not every fact-stating proposition [Satz] is a judgment [Urteil] in the logical sense. 
 There is an important caveat to this, however. For Hegel, each concept that is considered 
in the Logic can be treated as a definition of the Absolute, and, therefore, as a judgment of 
subject-predicate form. “Being” becomes “the Absolute is Being,” “Nothing” “the Absolute is 
Nothing,” “Becoming” “the Absolute is Becoming,” and so on and so forth. Yet as Hegel makes 
clear, these are not judgments in the logical sense, claims asserting a connection between two 
distinct concepts. They are mere pseudo-judgments, since they in fact only involve one concept. 
In these pseudo judgments, the Absolute is little more than an empty place-holder. After all, it is 
only in the predicate that we learn what the definition of the subject is supposed to be. 
Being itself as well as the subsequent determinations, not only those of being but 
also the logical determinations in general, can be regarded as the definitions of the 
absolute, as metaphysical definitions of God…[but] if the form of definitions were 
used, this would entail envisaging a representational substratum. For even the 
absolute, what is supposed to express God in the sense and in the form of thought, 
remains merely an intended thought, i.e. a substratum that as such is 
indeterminate, relative to its predicate as the determinate and actual expression in 
thought. Because the thought, the basic matter solely at issue here, is contained 
only in the predicate, the form of a proposition, like that subject, is something 
completely superfluous. (EL §85A) 
Why, though, does Hegel take this approach? Here, Hegel’s reference to a “representational 
substratum” is crucial. As we saw earlier, representation is the medium in which religion moves. 
It is also the medium in which the religious concepts like God, the soul and the world are found. 
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Finally, it is also the source of the subject-matter of pre-critical metaphysics. Logically speaking, 
God, the soul and the world are the representations that pre-critical metaphysics relied upon to 
invest the subject-terms of its judgments with meaning. Here, Hegel’s claim is that if we were to 
treat the subject-term as anything else than an empty placeholder, we would have no choice but 
to rely on representation for its meaning. Yet we would then find ourselves in the impasses of 
pre-critical metaphysics. Hence, the Absolute must be an empty placeholder. This is all that the 
subject-term, the Absolute, can be if we are to avoid the dogmatism of pre-critical metaphysics.  
 In addition to its non-judgmental, non-inferential character there is a third respect in 
which the dialectic is non-logical. The laws it adheres to in moving from one step to the next are 
not those of logic. They cannot be if Hegel is to later deduce those laws. Those laws are not 
available to be appealed to at this early stage. If they were invoked, this would beg the question. 
It would make any deduction offered later circular. This is especially true in the opening 
argument of the Logic, the Doctrine of Being. The laws of logic enter at a later point in the 
Logic, the Doctrine of Essence. As we later discuss in greater depth, the Doctrine of Being 
concerns of non-relational concepts rather than relational ones, or concept pairs. In the Doctrine 
of Being, we do not yet have access to the “determinations of reflection” like contradiction and 
identity that become relevant at a later point in the Doctrine of Essence. Yet if that is so, we 
confront an obvious difficulty. The dialectic, as we have seen, does operate by identifying and 
then resolving contradictions. How, then, can it be independent of logic? Surely, it relies on at 
least one law of logic: the law of non-contradiction. Otherwise, there would be nothing that the 
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contradictions which arise offended against. There would be no reason to resolve them in the 
way the Dialectic does.   107
 The answer implicit in Hegel’s argument is that contradictions in the logical sense and 
those which arise in his dialectic differ. A logical contradiction is richer in structure, and 
therefore in a sense downstream of those which interest Hegel — proto-contradictions, as we 
might call them. For Hegel, the distinctly logical notion of contradiction pertains to judgments of 
the form S is P. This means that logical contradiction presupposes a certain structure with three 
components. A subject concept, a predicate concept, and the copula that relates them. It is the 
connection between one and two asserted by three that gives rise to the contradiction. Yet the 
conflicts in which Hegel is interested arise before any of these components is available We never 
get so far as even defining one concept, let alone two, or one in terms of the other. Indeed, we do 
not get as far as asserting a connection between them by means of the copula. In the case we 
have considered, the particular concept whose definition eludes us just is the one from which the 
copula “is” derives: the concept of being. Finally, I think it worth noting that there is nothing 
formal about these inconsistencies in the way there is for logical contradictions. Each arises 
because of the unique content they treat, not because of the form of statement made about it. 
Similarly, each is sui generis, rather than a token instance of some general type. I therefore think 
Hegel has good grounds to claim that the line he draws between dialectical contradictions and 
those of formal logic is non-arbitrary.  108
 This problem is related to the a more well-known one Henrich discusses in his essay “Anfang und 107
Method” (1971). In both cases, the worry is that Hegel will have helped himself to conceptual resources he is not yet 
entitled to. See also Wieland (1973).
 However, I think a more definitive verdict would have to be based on whether this line is one we draw today. 108
Certainly logicians of Hegel’s time are not alone in claiming that judgment is the most basic truth bearer. This view 
is expressed Frege’s context principle, as well as in his idea of concepts as unsaturated expressions.
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 A final respect in which Hegel’s dialectic is non-logical is that it does not fit the 
traditional scheme in which all truths are of two broad types: analytic and synthetic. For Hegel, 
the knowledge that the dialectic gives us is both analytic and synthetic at once.   109
 The philosophical method is as much analytic as it is synthetic, yet not in the 
sense of a mere juxtaposition or a mere oscillation of these two methods of finite 
knowing. It is instead such that it contains them as sublated in itself and 
accordingly behaves in each of its movements both analytically and synthetically 
at the same time. (EL § 238 Z) 
This is a point we are well placed to understand. Analysis of one concept does not simply 
demonstrate what it contains or what its definition is. It also gives rise to another concept distinct 
from and, indeed, in contradiction with the first. In Kant’s terms, it is both explicative and 
ampliative, rather than either/or. Finally, the resolution of this contradiction leads to their 
synthesis in a new concept. At which point the process repeats. We have, then, a necessary 
connection between two distinct concepts. Yet it is, as it were, a product of these two concepts 
themselves rather than of the knowing subject. One produces the other, conflicts with it, and then 
resolves the conflict by uniting with its opposite.  
 This suggests that Hegel’s answer to Kant’s great question, “How is synthetic a priori 
knowledge possible?” must differ from Kant’s own. For Kant, the synthetic a priori truths are 
possible because of the categories and space and time. Since the subject-concept does not contain 
the predicate concept, a “third thing”, X, is necessary to unite them. We later learn that this third 
thing is the forms of intuition and the categories. Moreover, this third thing is contributed by the 
subject. However, no such “third thing” is required in Hegel’s dialectic, at least not in the same 
sense. The first concept contains the second, but they contradict one another. They are then 
 I here follow two others who have made versions of this point: Rosen (1988) and, more recently, Werner (2018).109
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brought together with the resolution of the contradiction, though not through the addition of any 
other element. Therefore not through the addition of one by the subject, as transcendental 
idealism maintains. 
viii. Conclusion: Bowman’s Hegel 
 As Brady Bowman observes in his recent study of Hegel’s metaphysics, it is largely 
unsurprising that Hegel rejects both Kant’s transcendental idealism and pre-critical 
metaphysics.  Different as they are from one another, both are on the wrong side of the 110
revolution in logic Hegel hoped to effect. This suggests to me exactly the right way to view 
Hegel’s relationship to his predecessors, as well as why it would be a grave error to view the 
history from a Kantian perspective. From that perspective, Hegel has often seemed pre-Kantian 
in his overly favorable attitude towards traditional metaphysics. Yet from Hegel’s perspective, it 
is Kant and earlier metaphysicians who are pre-Hegelian in their relationship to logic. Once we 
see that this is so, we are free to revisit the question of metaphysics in light of subsequent logical 
developments. The outcome Hegel anticipates is a less negative verdict than the one Kant 
reached. Here, I have focused on different logical topics than Bowman does. My focus has been 
on the more classically logical topics of judgment and inference rather than that of the categories, 
(a topic of somewhat ambiguous status). Yet I hope to have offered an account of Hegel’s views 
broadly consonant with Bowman’s analysis. 
 I have sought to show that, for Hegel, the problem with pre-critical metaphysics is not its 
realism but its dogmatism, understood in the broad sense rather than in the narrow one Kant and 
his followers often give to it. Moreover, this dogmatism has a distinctly logical source in the then 
 Once more, see Bowman (2013: Introduction: “A Totally Transformed view of Logic”)110
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current consensus that the apparatus of judgment and syllogism are philosophy’s main logical 
tools. What weaknesses there were in this approach were compensated for by reliance on 
representations of religious origin, a tactic that only compounded this tradition’s dogmatism and 
made the prospect for a resolution of its intractable controversies even more remote than it 
already was. Once this logical apparatus is discarded, we can avoid the dogmatism of the 
tradition. Yet this requires embracing a pre-predicative standpoint not only unfamiliar from the 
perspective of Kant and pre-critical metaphysics, but also in philosophy more generally.  
 Eccentric as this approach to metaphysics might be, Hegel denies that it is at odds with 
all metaphysics preceding him. Although it may depart from the metaphysics of the schools, it 
has an affinity with the thought of Plato. There, at philosophy’s ancient origin, thinking exists in 
its boldest and purest form. It is not yet subject to the strictures of medieval Scholastic-
Aristotelian logic (or Christian dogma). Yet we have only considered Hegel’s relationship to the 
metaphysical tradition in general. In the next chapter, I focus on the three branches of (special) 
metaphysics: psychology, cosmology, and Ideal.  
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IV.    Hegel’s Response to Kant’s Critique of Metaphysics 
 In this chapter, I consider Hegel’s responses to the three separate parts of Kant’s critique 
of metaphysics. Hegel responds to Kant’s critique of rational cosmology (Antinomies), 
psychology (Paralogisms), and theology (the Ideal). As before, Hegel’s attitude towards the 
Kantian critique of metaphysics is complex. Hegel agrees with Kant that pre-critical metaphysics 
is a failed enterprise, but not that transcendental idealism is the best alternative. Instead, Hegel 
advocates a new form of realist metaphysics that employs different logical resources. Here, I will 
focus on another of the crude logical tools Hegel thinks hindered the pre-critical tradition: finite 
categories.  Hegel claims that the impasses of pre-critical metaphysics arose from this logical 111
source rather than from transcendental realism. If that is so, then they will not be resolved by 
Kant’s idealism. 
 Characterized at the broadest possible level, my main interpretive claim will be that there 
is a complex division of labor between the three different parts of Hegel’s response to the 
Kantian critique of metaphysics. In order to see this, it is important to realize that there are two 
distinct ways in which a category can be finite (or fail to be): finite vis-a-vis-other categories, 
and finite vis-a-vis the world. Once we realize this, we will see that overcoming one form of 
finitude (vis-a-vis other categories) is the task of the first two parts of Hegel’s discussion 
concerning the Antinomies and Paralogisms. Overcoming the other form of finitude (vis-a-vis-
the world) is the task of the third, the Ideal. For complex reasons, seeing how these parts of 
Hegel’s account work in concert will be crucial to appreciating the power of his argument against 
 I am by no means the first to do so. See also Sedgwick (2012), Bowman (2013), Houlgate (2016). However, I 111
differ from all of these commentators in my understanding of Hegel’s notion of an infinite category. Unlike them, I 
connect this notion closely with Hegel’s version of the ontological argument. 
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Kant, which can often appear uncharitable and even simple-minded. Again, Hegel’s broad aim is 
to show that the problems Kant raises for pre-critical metaphysics (antinomies, paralogisms, and 
those posed by the proofs of God’s existence) need not arise for any variety of realist 
metaphysics. A realist form of metaphysics that relies on infinite categories would not succumb 
to Kant’s critique. 
i. Finite and infinite categories 
 Hegel claims that the Kantian critique of metaphysics overlooks the possibility of infinite 
categories, focusing only on the finite variety. In this regard, Kant shares the same logical 
blindspot as the tradition he rejected. But what exactly are finite and infinite categories? Without 
a clear answer to this question, Hegel’s critique of Kant will seem unconvincing. To be sure, the 
categories that Kant considers in the Analytic are finite (limited) in a certain sense of that term. 
As it turns out, they only yield knowledge of appearances, and not of things in themselves. Yet it 
is unfair to claim that Kant overlooked the possibility of categories that are free of this limitation. 
Clearly, Kant has not committed a simple oversight here. Rather, he has a principled reason for 
doubting there are any such categories. It is that only categories which are limited in the way 
Kant describes (“finite”) can yield synthetic a priori knowledge. The Analytic aside, Hegel’s 
criticism seems even less persuasive when it is directed at Kant’s Dialectic. After all, categories 
which are, in some sense, infinite figure prominently there. For example, consider Kant’s critique 
of rational cosmology in the antinomies section. There Kant does consider the possibility that the 
world is infinite in age or size, but denies we can know this. Pace Hegel, Kant does not overlook 
but carefully considers and then rejects the possibility that we could acquire theoretical 
knowledge by means of infinite concepts, or as Kant would call them “Ideas of reason.” Hegel’s 
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criticism can therefore appear to be based on a simple misunderstanding. As I hope to show, 
however, Hegel means something very different than Kant does by finite and infinite. In fact, 
none of the different senses of the terms finite and infinite that are at work in Kant’s first Critique 
can prepare us for what Hegel has in mind. To this extent, Hegel is right that the possibility he 
explores is one Kant never adequately considered.  
 a) Finitude vis-a-vis other categories 
  A category is finite vis-a-vis another if it has an opposite. Finite categories come in pairs, 
each member of which is defined as what the other is not: 
Predicates such as these are, for example, existence, as in the sentence ‘God 
possesses existence; finitude or infinity, as in the question whether the world is 
finite or infinite; simple or composite, as in the sentence 'the soul is simple'; also 
'the thing is one, a whole', and so on. (EL § 28)  112
The simple is a finite category because it has its opposite in the category of the complex, and the 
same is true of the free and the determined, the finite and the (bad) infinite. These finite 
categories are the categories used by pre-critical metaphysicians such as those of the Leibniz-
Wolff school, a tradition which Hegel agrees reached certain impasses. By contrast, Being, the 
One, the (true) infinite, and so on are not finite categories in Hegel’s sense because they do not 
have opposites, or, at least, are not meant to do so. They could not possibly have opposites, since 
they exhaust the entirety of what there is. Outside of them there is nothing, and therefore nothing 
left for an opposed concept (or even just a distinct one) to comprehend. Often enough, infinite 
categories are the ones favored by metaphysical monists like Parmenides, Spinoza, and, as we 
 The following count, above all, as absolute opposites: contingency and necessity; external and internal necessity; 112
efficient and final causes, or causality in general and purpose; essence or substance and appearance; form and 
matter; freedom and necessity; happiness and pain; good and evil. (EL § 35A) 
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will also see, the pre-critical Kant of the Beweisgrund essay (who re-appears in Kant’s later 
critique of the ontological argument). More broadly, these infinite categories tend to be embraced 
by figures outside the mainstream of Western philosophy: pre-Socratics, heretics, mystics and so 
on.   113
 It is important to realize that not all infinite categories are singular concepts in the way 
that Being and the One are. This is just one type of infinite category considered in the Doctrine 
of Being, the first and most basic type. Yet there is another way for a category to be infinite. It 
can be one of a pair of concepts which are together meant to all-encompassing, even if neither 
would be alone. These are the category-pairs of the Doctrine of Essence. Infinite in this latter 
way are the category pairs form/matter, essence/appearance, substance/accident, and so on. 
 Overcoming finitude of this first type is valuable for the purpose of resolving the 
impasses of pre-critical metaphysics. That is because it removes the possibility of confronting a 
claim with its opposite in the way the disputants in traditional metaphysical controversies do.  
 This metaphysics became dogmatism because, due to the nature of the finite   
 determinations, it had to assume that of two opposite assertions (which is what    
 those sentences were) one had to be true while the other was false.  
 (EL §32, some italics mine) 
In logical terms, we could explain this in the following way. Let us suppose we are given pairs of 
finite categories, opposed categories, each of which is defined as what the other is not. If that is 
so, then there will be the possibility of formulating pairs of opposed claims, each of which denies 
 Since some of these categories appear on both our list of finite and of infinite categories, an important caveat is 113
needed here. One and the same category may admit of being understood in either of these two ways, finite or 
infinite. For example: Oneness or unity is a finite category when it is used by the Scholastics to describe the soul, 
which is a unity in contrast to material objects, which are pluralities. Yet this category is infinite when it is used by 
Parmenides to describe the whole of reality, outside of which everything else (plurality, motion, change, and so on) 
is completely illusory. 
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what the other affirms. For example, it is only because a concept like simplicity is finite, only 
because it has an opposite in the complex, that metaphysicians can debate whether the soul is 
simple or complex. Yet if we employed infinite categories, then these debates might not arise. 
Both of the competing views could conceivably be subsumed under a more comprehensive 
perspective. Not the either/or of understanding, Hegel says, supplying Kierkegaard with his 
famous turn of phrase, but the both/and of reason.  
 Unfortunately, this line of argument suffers from a significant limitation. By arguing in 
this way, the most that Hegel could show is that a certain concept would resolve the impasses of 
metaphysics, if it had application to reality. Yet unless it does, in fact, apply, this is a hollow 
victory. Metaphysics is concerned with the ultimate nature of reality. It would not be content to 
exchange its concepts for others that are mere “figments of the brain.” Put another way, 
overcoming finitude vis-a-vis other categories is only the first step. It remains necessary to 
overcome their finitude vis-a-vis the world. 
 b) Finitude vis-a-vis the world 
 I explain this second variety of finitude more briefly. A concept is finite vis-a-vis the 
world if it is possible that it should fail to be instantiated in the world. Possible in what sense? 
Here our concern is with the definition of the concept, and whether or not it allows for this 
possibility.  By contrast, a concept is infinite vis-a-vis- the world if it is necessary that it be 114
instantiated, impossible that it fail to be so. It is part of its definition to exist, and therefore 
 This is not just true of empirical concepts, but even of others like causality, substance and so on. Hume and Kant 114
may disagree about whether these concepts, in fact, apply, but presumably not about whether their definitions are 
such that they could possibly fail to do so. This Hume argued was a possibility worth taking seriously, and Kant 
agrees even if he doubts it is in fact the case. In spite of their close association with the infinite, Kant’s Ideas of 
reason, such as the world as a whole, are finite in Hegel’s sense. There is nothing conceptually impossible in their 
failure to be instantiated.  
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impossible that it should fail to do so. As should be clear, Hegel’s appeal to categories that are 
infinite in this second sense reflects his endorsement of the ontological argument for the 
existence of God. Kant, its most famous critic, responds: “existence is not a real predicate.” It is 
not the type of property that can belong to a thing by definition at all. Later, I will consider 
Hegel’s response to this Kantian counterargument, but for now the important point is simply the 
following. 
 If there are categories which are finite not only in the first sense but in the second as well, 
then they can be used to rehabilitate a form of realist metaphysics. In the first place, they would 
allow us to resolve the impasses reached by rational psychology and cosmology. Infinite 
categories should allow us to show that the true view incorporates both of the competing 
perspectives in the age old controversies of metaphysics. Yet we could also revive a form of 
rational theology as well. The infinite categories, which resolve these impasses, also describe a 
necessary being. 
 A caveat is that we should not be surprised if Hegel emphasizes different infinite 
categories at different times for different purposes. At one time, he will invoke life, at another 
being, at a third, the Concept, and so on. It would therefore be legitimate to worry that the 
different good-making features Hegel claims for his own preferred definition of the Absolute are, 
in fact, parceled out among many such definitions. They are nowhere found in any one 
definition, though we can grant Hegel that it would be nice if they were. Yet Hegel has a 
response to this worry. Because each category is a refined or “sublated” version of the others, 
Hegel believes that the advantageous aspects of any of them will ultimately be shared by all of 
them. Just as there is a division of labor between Hegel’s different defenses of metaphysics 
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against various forms of attack from without, so too is there such a division within Hegel’s 
metaphysics itself.   
 Ultimately, Hegel’s idea of an infinite category gives him a different conception of the 
task of philosophy than Kant held. For Hegel, philosophy’s task is simply to attempt to identify 
an infinite category whose definition is coherent. As we have seen this is more difficult than it 
might at first seem since nearly all fail to meet this standard. In any case, nearly all further 
philosophical tasks can be subsumed under this one. This can be clarified by recalling an oft 
remarked upon and unusual feature of Hegel’s project. This is Hegel’s conviction that the task of 
deducing the categories, in Kant’s Critique a mere preliminary carried out in the Metaphysical 
Deduction, can take over virtually all of the other tasks of Kant saw for philosophy. There is no 
separate step needed to show such categories apply to the sensibly given manifold, or the world 
of appearances, the step Kant took in the Transcendental Deduction. Nor is there a need for a 
critical examination of reason’s efforts in metaphysics to apply them to a world that goes beyond 
that of our experience, the step taken in  the Dialectic. All of these tasks are collapsed into one, 
and, as we will soon see, in such a way that reason’s claim to know the unconditioned is upheld, 
rather than denied.   115
 The main respect in which my portrayal of Hegel’s position diverges from those in the 
literature is that it treats Hegel as a monist, even a Spinozist. It is overcoming these two varieties 
of finitude that leads Hegel in a monist direction. It encourages him to organize his metaphysics 
around the concept of something that is both all-encompassing, as well as necessarily 
 I here follow others like Rödl (2007) McDowell (2009) and Pippin (2018) who claim that Hegel collapses Kant’s 115
Transcendental Deduction into the Metaphysical Deduction. Yet I differ from these mostly Kantian-idealist 
interpreters in a significant respect. For them the reason Hegel can make this innovation over Kant is that he avoids 
a “subjectivist” conception of the given, the forms of intuition, as well as the need for a thing in itself. Whereas for 
me the reason has to do with his rehabilitation of general metaphysics and the ontological argument. 
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instantiated. In broad strokes, this is also true of Spinoza, who combines substance monism with 
a version of the ontological argument. There are, of course, differences between Hegel’s 
conception of the Absolute as “subject” and Spinoza’s conception of it as “substance.” Yet I think 
it would be a mistake to exaggerate these differences, as is sometimes done in the literature. At 
least for the purposes of understanding how Hegel’s position withstands Kant’s critique of 
metaphysics, the differences do not matter very much. Since overcoming both forms of finitude 
is tantamount to avoiding the impasses of traditional metaphysics, as they were diagnosed by 
Kant, this Spinozist interpretation has an intriguing implication. It suggests that, at least from 
Hegel’s point of view, Spinoza’s substance monism is the form of realist metaphysics least likely 
to succumb to Kant’s critique.  As some of the best recent scholarship shows, this was an 116
extremely characteristic view of the period.  Many German idealists differentiated sharply 117
between the metaphysics of the Leibniz-Wolff tradition, a mostly orthodox school of thought, 
and that of Spinoza, a free-thinker and heretic.  Because it is controversial to deem Hegel a 118
Spinozist, I will return to this issue in the conclusion. 
ii. Responding to Kant’s critique of Rational Psychology: the Paralogisms 
 According to Kant, paralogisms are flawed inferences, though the flaw is not merely 
logical. Certainly, it cannot be accounted for in the way ordinary logical errors can. Simply 
attending to the form of the argument and finding invalidity therein is not a possibility here. 
Instead, a paralogism is an error arising from the subject-matter of the argument, or its content. 
 I here follow Franks (2005) in making this point. However, I extend his account of the role of Spinozism in post-116
Kantian German Idealism to include Hegel’s Logic, a later work often left out of histories of this movement.
 Ibid.117
 The classic account is Beiser (1987), who also interprets Hegel in a Spinozistic way (2003).118
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More specifically, there is an equivocation between the way a certain term is used in the 
premises and in the conclusion. Here is an example of a paralogism: 
P1. That the representation of which is the absolute subject of our judgments and 
cannot be employed as determination of any other thing, is substance. 
P2. I, as thinking being, am the absolute subject of all my possible judgments and 
this representation of myself cannot be employed as determination of any other 
thing. 
C. Therefore, I, as thinking being (soul), am substance. (A349) 
In the premises, we are told that the self has some characteristic in a merely logical respect. For 
example, being the implicit subject of all its judgments. However, a metaphysical conclusion is 
then said to follow from this merely logical premise. For example, a conclusion like that drawn 
by the Cartesian dualist, for whom I am a type of substance in which accidental properties 
inhere. Admittedly, Kant describes the errors of rational psychology as being of several different 
kinds. However, the conflation of logical and metaphysical aspects of the knowing subject will 
be our focus.  119
 Often, the error is said to be that the rational psychologist wants knowledge of the self as a thing in itself. The 119
rational psychologist therefore attempts to use conceptual thought alone to achieve this knowledge, rather than 
relying on sensible intuitions. After all, the prospects of achieving this type of self-knowledge through sensibility 
alone are dim, as Hume memorably showed. Kant agrees that can have self-knowledge, but insists that this be 
understood as knowledge of the self as an appearance. This, in turn, requires not only the use of the categories, but 
also the sensible intuitions of inner sense. What is more, Kant maintains we can achieve some less than than full-
fledged knowledge when we abstracting from sensibility entirely and reflect on logical features of subjectivity. At 
others, the error seems to consist in attempting to know in a third-person way, and in all cases, what can only be 
known first-personally in my own. 
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 Although Hegel is in broad agreement with Kant’s critique of rational psychology, he 
maintains that the project of a metaphysics of subjectivity remains a viable one. For Hegel, the 
failure of pre-Kantian rational psychology does not entail that of any metaphysics of subjectivity. 
This would only follow if the finite categories which rational psychologists employ and which 
Kant focuses on in his critique of this tradition were the only ones there were. Yet this is not so, 
according to Hegel. There are other categories, infinite categories, and they are much better 
suited to the task. As Hegel says, Kant speaks as if his categories were “too high” to comprehend 
the knowing subject, but in reality they are “too poor and mean.” 
The form which Kant accordingly bestows on Being, thing, substance, would 
seem to indicate that these categories of the understanding were too high for the 
subject, too high to be capable of being predicated of it. But really such 
determinations are too poor and too mean for what possesses life is not a thing, 
nor can the soul, the spirit, the ego, be called a thing. Being is the least or lowest 
quality that one can assign to spirit, its abstract, immediate identity with itself; 
Being thus no doubt pertains to spirit, but it must be considered as a determination 
scarcely worth applying to it. (VGP “Kant: Critique of Pure Reason’)  120
As this last quotation indicates, Hegel will understand the soul in a broader sense than rational 
psychology does. For him, the soul pertains not only to the mind, but also to organic life and 
what Hegel calls “spirit.” Both life and spirit are infinite categories. 
  Two other passages which say the same are as follows:  “In any case, it should be deemed a good result of the 120
Kantian critique that philosophizing about spirit has been freed from the soul-thing,  from the categories and thus 
from the questions concerning the simplicity  or compositeness,  the materiality,  and so forth, of the soul. - 
However, the true viewpoint regarding the illegitimacy  of such forms, even for ordinary human understanding, will 
surely not be that they are thoughts,  but that such thoughts in and of themselves hold no truth.” (EL § 47A) 
“It is quite correct, moreover, that predicates such as simplicity, immutability, and so on, are not to be attributed to 
the soul, yet not for the reason given by Kant, namely reason would then overstep the limit set for it, but because 
abstract determinations of the understanding such as the simple are too poor for the soul and because It IS something 
quite different from what is simple, immutable, and so ,on, for instance, the soul is indeed simple identity with itself, 
but qua active it is at the same time distinguishing itself from itself within itself” (EL § 47 Z)
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 It is because of its reliance on finite categories that rational psychology remains plagued 
by insoluble controversies. Each thesis, framed in terms of one such category, can always be met 
by the antithesis, framed in terms of its contrary. Is the soul simple or complex? Mortal or 
immortal?  By contrast, infinite categories, if legitimate, would reveal both sides of the dispute 121
to be equally right, insofar as each captures an important facet of a multi-faceted phenomenon. 
They would also reveal both to be equally wrong, insofar as they assume the alternatives on offer 
are mutually exclusive. Here, the relevant infinite categories are not so much those from the 
Doctrine of Being, but rather from the Doctrine of Essence and the Doctrine of the Concept. I 
mean especially the category pairs like form-matter from Hegel’s engagement with Aristotle, as 
well as the later version of it, body-soul from Hegel’s discussion of the Idea of life.  122
 In contrast to the rational-psychologist’s idea of a soul substance, the Aristotelian 
conception of soul as the form of the living body can only be understood using infinite 
categories. Body and soul, understood as form and matter, are inseparable. Form is always the 
form of some matter, matter that of some form. Descartes’ concepts body and soul differ from the 
older Aristotelian ones. They are only contingently related and could exist apart from one 
another. If we re-organized discussion of the soul and subjectivity around infinite categories, then 
 Here, Hegel is less scrupulous than he might be about distinguishing between the problems afflicting rational 121
psychology, paralogisms, and those afflicting cosmology, antinomies. The two appear to be bleeding into one 
another in his presentation, inasmuch as he seems to be suggesting that the problem Kant saw with rational 
psychology was a type of antinomy. One reason this is worrying is that Hegel may be addressing his “solution to the 
wrong problem. Even granting that infinite categories would resolve the impasses of rational psychology, there 
remains the other problems with this tradition. I regard this is as a blind spot in Hegel’s account. 
 In addition to these two, Hegel invokes his category of spirit here, which is also an infinite category. Because it is 122
defined by its fundamentally non-alienated relationship to the natural world, including sensible impressions and 
desires, spirit infinite vis-a-vis nature in a way that the Cartesian soul, being only contingently related to matter, can 
never be.
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we could reframe each of the opposing positions in rational psychology as capturing only one 
side of a more complex two-sided phenomenon. 
 For Kant, the solution lies in recognizing that metaphysical claims about the subject only 
hold good if they are recast as more modest logical ones. Hegel rejects Kant’s solution, but the 
reason he gives is perplexing. He does so on the grounds that these logical claims would be 
“empirical” — perhaps in a way that would prevent them from being satisfying replacements for 
those of rational psychology (EL § 47). Why, though, does Hegel hold this view? Clearly, Kant 
intended to weaken the claims of rational psychology, but not by replacing them with claims 
from empirical psychology. Yet Hegel seems to equate Kant’s appeal to logic with a Humean or 
empiricist perspective on the self: 
As  can be seen, this critique expresses nothing but the Humean observation 
mentioned above in § 39 that the thought-determinations in general, namely 
universality and necessity, are not to be found in perception and that the empirical 
is different, in terms of content as in terms of its form, from the thought-
determination. (EL § 47) 
That Kant’s Critical Philosophy is an unsatisfying half-way house between metaphysics and 
empiricism is a common trope in Hegel’s Kant-critique. Yet it is also one that has frequently 
seemed both uncharitable to Kant and unpersuasive as a criticism. 
 Here, I argue that Hegel’s claim can be approached in terms of a recurrent theme in his 
critique of Kant as I have reconstructed it here. I mean Hegel’s conviction that many of Kant’s 
claims about the knowing subject are drawn from the logic of the day,  and that this logic is 
empirical in a way that creates problems for Kant’s account. From a Hegelian perspective at 
least, Kant’s logical alternative to rational psychology may be logical in a much more 
straightforward sense than is often realized. On this Hegel view, the term logic as it is used by 
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Kant in this context does not simply mean abstract, formal, conceptual, and so on. Rather, it 
refers to the area of philosophy that has gone by the name, logic. At first, we might balk the idea 
that this field could have anything to tell us about the traditional topics of rational psychology: 
for example, the nature of the soul. However, Kant’s logic is by no means independent of every 
form of psychology, even if it is independent of the empirical variety. This does not mean logic is 
tantamount to rationalist metaphysics, but it does mean they share a similar topic: the self, 
broadly construed. That is why Kant is able to present rationalist metaphysics of the soul as logic 
taken one step too far.  
 Why, though, would a logic of subjectivity, in this sense, be objectionably empirical? As 
we have seen, Hegel often denounces the logic on which Kant relies as empirical, and the 
criticism is no less apt here in the paralogisms. To be sure, logic’s claims about the subject do not 
rely on sense-experience.  Yet they do rely for their justification on a type of intellectual 123
experience that we have when we abstract in the relevant way. This empiricist tendency may not 
imperil all of Kant’s objectives, but there is one it does threaten. This is his aim of making claims 
about the mind that remain universally and necessarily valid, even they are not metaphysical in 
the way those of rational psychology were meant to be. Unfortunately, and as we have seen 
before, the problem of induction arises for all empirical claims, not just those based on sense 
experience. Hence, it arises here as well. Logic cannot be a satisfying surrogate for rational 
psychology. For Hegel, the paralogisms reflect Kant’s overestimation of the logic of the day, and 
underestimation of the metaphysical tradition.  
 Once again, I here follow Houlgate (2006: 15)123
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iii. Responding to Kant’s critique of Rational Cosmology: the Antinomies  
 For Kant, the errors found in the field of rational cosmology are unique. Only in 
cosmology do reason’s attempts to know the unconditioned lead it into conflicts with itself that 
Kant calls antinomies. The reason for this concerns the particular variant of the Idea of the 
unconditioned that is relevant in this sphere, the Idea of the world as a whole. The Idea of the 
world as a whole is unique in being “pseudo-empirical.” Unlike the others, this Idea pertains to 
the empirical world or the world of experience. At the same time, it encourages us to think about 
the empirical world in a manner that goes beyond the bounds of possible experience.   124
 As a result of its pseudo-empirical character, this Idea draws two faculties into operation 
whose conflicting demands give rise to antinomy: reason and the understanding. The antinomial 
conflicts between reason and the understanding arise in the following way. Kant holds that the 
faculty of reason is driven by the principle: “If the condition is given, then the whole sum of 
conditions is given, and hence the ultimate unconditioned is given” (A 409/B 436). Yet reason 
can conceive of the unconditioned in only two ways, a constraint that gives rise to the antinomies 
(A 417-18/B445-6). It can consider the unconditioned to be the entire series of conditions itself, 
or else consider it to be a particular unconditioned condition.  Ultimately, then, antinomies will 125
 For the explanation of why the antinomies arise only in the field of rational cosmology, and also for other points 124
given as background here, I am substantially indebted to the discussion in Grier (2001)
 Antinomies require two further conditions: 1) a series, rather than a mere aggregate 2) a regressive series, rather 125
than a progressive one (A 409-13/B436-B440). Concerning the first condition, the time-line is a series, since 
moments in time are sequentially ordered. Parts of space, however, only form an aggregate because they are not 
sequentially ordered, but are all given simultaneously. However, as Kant explains, space may give rise to an 
antinomy since we “finite” knowers must always think of its parts sequentially. In addition to requiring series, rather 
than an aggregate, antinomies also require a specific kind of series. They require one in which it is possible to 
regress from conditioned to its condition, rather than one in which we progress from condition to conditioned. That 
is why the past gives rise to an antinomy, but the future does not. For this reason, there can be no future-directed 
analogue of the 1st antinomy. In other words, there can be no antinomy concerning whether the world has a future 
ending, or will continue indefinitely. 
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arise when reason’s idea of the unconditioned proves “too big” for the understanding, yet the 
understanding’s prove “too small” for reason (A 487-88, B515-516). The antinomies oppose a 
“Platonic” “dogmatism” that strays beyond the bounds of possible experience to an “Epicurean” 
“empiricism,” that insists nothing lies beyond these bounds.  126
 As Michelle Grier helpfully explains, Kant regards the “mathematical antinomies” as the 
result of a flawed inference (Grier 2001: 175 ff.). This inference involves an equivocation, or 
“ambiguous middle.” It is as follows: 
 P14. If a condition is given, the wholes series of conditions is given, and therefore the  
 unconditioned is given. 
 P15. Objects of the senses are given as conditioned. 
 C5. Consequently the entire series of all conditions of objects of the senses is already  
 given.  
 (P14, P15) 
The “ambiguous middle” results because the conditioned referred to in the first premise is not the 
same as the conditioned referred to in the second. In the first premise, the conditioned is used as 
a pure rather than as an empirical concept, meaning it refers to things in themselves rather than 
appearances. In the second premise, however, the conditioned is used as an empirical concept, 
referring to appearances. As a result, the conclusion reached is false, and for the following 
reason. In the realm of appearances, the givenness of the conditioned does not entail that of the 
unconditioned. The reason has to do with the nature of human cognition. Knowers like ourselves 
 Of course, it might be tempting to assume that Kant would endorse “empiricism” over “Platonism.” Yet 126
“empiricism’s” denial that anything lies beyond the bounds of experience will turn out to be no less dogmatic and 
opposed to Kant’s Critical Philosophy than “Platonism’s” opposing claim. (A 471-B449).
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must engage in the successive synthesis of the elements in a series. We cannot comprehend the 
whole series at one stroke.  
 For Kant, however, the conflict only arises if we assume the truth of transcendental 
realism. Once we give up this assumption, the conflict is dissolved. If transcendental realism 
were true, then we would not be presented with spatio-temporal appearances but, rather, things in 
themselves. Since things-in-themselves are not part of the empirical world, it can be said of them 
that a given condition entails that the whole series of conditions, and therefore that the 
unconditioned is given. Were transcendental realism true, we would face a genuine conflict over 
whether the unconditioned should be conceived of as the whole series, or a single unconditioned 
condition. Yet once we abandon transcendental realism and embrace transcendental idealism, the 
conflict is averted. This is because transcendental idealism reveals the inference upon which the 
thesis and antithesis are based to be faulty. As we saw, thesis and antithesis are based on the 
following inference: given the conditioned, the unconditioned is also given. Yet as we saw, this 
inference only holds when the conditioned is a thing-in-itself, and does not hold when it is an 
appearance. However, transcendental idealism requires that the conditioned that is given to us as 
knowers is an appearance, meaning the inference is based on an equivocation. Hence, both the 
thesis and antithesis that are based upon it are false. 
 By contrast, Hegel maintains that the antinomies arise from the use of certain flawed 
categories. Compared to Hegel’s simpler diagnosis, Kant’s can seem positively baroque. 
Accordingly, Hegel will attempt to show that all of the additional materials that go into the 
construction of Kant’s antinomies are superfluous. For Hegel, the antinomies are little more than 
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the guise in which other conflicts appear. In order to illustrate this strategy, I will focus on the 
2nd antinomy.  
 Typically, Hegel reframes the conflict in terms of the abstract concepts he calls 
categories, rather than the subject-matter it appears to concern. In this case, he does so by 
arguing that the 2nd antinomy only appears to be a disagreement concerning the divisibility and 
indivisibility of material substances. It is, in fact, little more than a disguised version of the more 
fundamental conflict between two opposed conceptions of quantity as either continuous or 
discrete.  
The dispute or the antinomy of the infinite divisibility of space, time, matter, and 
so on, has its origin in the nature of quantity, that it is this simple unity of 
discreteness and continuity. This antinomy consists solely in the fact that 
discreteness must be maintained just as much as continuity. (WdL 21: 179/SoL 
157, ) 
Hegel’s rationale is as follows. Whether something admits of being divided or not is always a 
reflection of whether it is continuous or discrete. The continuum is the as-yet-undivided and 
therefore the divisible. The discrete is the already divided and therefore indivisible. Hence, 
continuity and discreteness are prior to divisibility or indivisibility. When we argue about 
whether something is divisible or indivisible we are actually arguing about whether it is present 
in a continuous or discrete quantity.   
 Hegel criticizes Kant’s involvement of Idea of the world as a whole in the framing of the 
antinomy, arguing that this Idea is irrelevant to what is genuinely at issue. The conflict between 
the two, continuity and discreteness would arise in any realm in which the category in question, 
quantity, applied. Hence, the problem of whether matter existing in space and time is infinitely 
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divisible constitutes little more than a specific, concrete instance of a more general, abstract 
problem. For Hegel, this is the problem of whether the continuity or discreteness is definitive of 
quantity itself: 
Further, Kant did not pick the antinomy from the concepts themselves, but from 
the already concrete form of cosmological determinations. To capture it pure, and 
to deal with it in its simple concept, the thought determinations must not be taken 
as applied to, and entangled in, the representation of the world, space, time, 
matter, and so on, but must rather be considered purely in themselves, without this 
concrete material which has no force or authority here, for the thought 
determinations alone make up the essence and the ground of the antinomies. 
(WdL 21:180/SoL 158) 
 In Hegel’s view, the argument about whether “something” is divisible or indivisible, continuous 
or discrete, remains unaffected by what, exactly, that something happens to be: “The substrate 
given to these abstractions, namely these substances in the world…bears no influence on the 
antinomy itself” (WdL 21:181/SoL 159). 
 This dispute also has a logical dimension. Hegel must first show that the real conflict 
arises at the sub-propositional level, within individual concepts rather than between pairs of 
judgments. For Hegel, the appearance that there is a conflict between two opposed judgments is 
also misleading. To be sure, we appear to be confronted with two judgments connecting some 
subject concept with a distinct predicate concept. Indeed, connecting two or more concepts in 
this way is the mark of a judgment in the logical sense, as opposed to something that merely 
seems to have that form because of grammatical or psychological considerations. However, 
Hegel argues, these Kantian theses and antitheses are not judgments in the true sense at all. In 
fact, they simply repeat the same concept again, rather than connect two distinct ones. In this 
case, they simply assert the existence of the continuous or the discrete, not of finitely or infinitely 
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divisible material substances. Here, Hegel tries to argue that the thesis and antithesis claims, seen 
in light of his earlier analysis, are tautologies. For example, it is tautologous to claim that a 
composite substance is made up of indivisible atoms, because this is just true by definition of 
composites.  
That the composite is not one thing in and for itself but is something only 
externally put together, that it consists of something other, is its immediate 
determination. But this something other than the composite is the simple. It is 
therefore a tautology to say that the composite is made up of the simple. (WdL 
21:181/SoL 159) 
Having denied that these conflicts arise between opposed judgments, Hegel attempts to rule out 
the further possibility that they inherently involve something of greater logical complexity still: 
syllogistic arguments. Here, Hegel’s strategy is to attempt to show that the arguments themselves 
are superfluous. This he does by attempting to show in each case that they are circular, 
presupposing what they set out to prove. I will here refrain from a discussing a specific example, 
since this is fairly well trod ground.   127
 Diagnosing the true source of the problem by descending to this more logically primitive 
level is only the beginning. Remaining there to provide a more satisfying solution than Kant’s 
own is the goal.  Here, I differ from two broad approaches found in the literature. Some 
commentators, like Winegar, approach Hegel’s argument as if his main concern was resolving 
the antinomies themselves.  Others, like Sedgwick, Ameriks and Rosen, argue that he was 128
unconcerned with doing so — though this could either be deliberate on his part or the result of 
 Sedgwick (2012), as well as (1991) provide in-depth and convincing accounts of Hegel’s attempts to show that 127
Kant’s arguments are circular.
 Winegar (2016)128
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some type of mistake.  In my view, these two broad approaches can be reconciled. On the one 129
hand, Hegel’s main concern was, indeed, resolving simpler problems lying at the basis of the 
antinomies, rather than the antinomies themselves. To this extent, those who think he was not 
directly concerned with resolving the antinomies are right. On the other hand, it is by no means 
true that Hegel was completely uninterested in resolving the antinomies either, even if he did not 
attempt to do so directly. Rather, I wish to suggest, Hegel’s approach to resolving them is 
indirect. After all, the simpler problems that interest Hegel lie at the very basis of the antinomies. 
In resolving the former, he will resolve the latter as well. 
 Preliminarily, we should note Hegel’s reservations about Kant’s solution, before turning 
to the alternative he favors. Hegel does not accept Kant’s solution to the mathematical 
antinomies, denying that it succeeds in resolving the contradiction. Let us suppose Hegel is right 
that the true source of the problem is a contradiction inherent to the category, e.g. of quantity. If 
that is so, then the problem should arise anywhere that this contradictory category is applied 
(WdL 21:189/SoL 165). Therefore, the problem will remain, even if we accept that material 
substances are appearances, rather than things-in-themselves, phenomena rather than noumena. 
In other words, it will arise just as much in the realm of appearances as in that of things-in-
themselves. 
 For Hegel, then, the true solution to the antinomies is to seek a refined version of the 
category in question that resolves the contradiction, rather than to renounce transcendental 
realism in favor of idealism. As we have seen, Hegel maintains that we ought to abstract not only 
from matter, but also from space and time. We must focus on the concepts of the continuous and 
 Sedgwick (2012), Ameriks (1987), Rosen (1982)129
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the discrete themselves, which are more basic then their instances. Hegel’s solution is modal in 
that it involves a distinction between possibility and actuality.  
From the standpoint of continuity…[there] remains the possibility of parting, as 
possibility, without actually coming to the atom. Now, even if we stay with these 
oppositions as just defined, we see that the moment of atomicity lies in continuity 
itself, for continuity is the possibility of parting. (WdL 21:187/SoL 164) 
Hegel argues that the continuous always implies the possibility of the discrete, since dividing the 
continuous produces the discrete. It therefore implies the possibility of an infinite quantity of 
discrete units. Yet it does not follow from this that the continuous actually does contain this 
infinite quantity of discrete units already. The fallacy consists in conflating the possibility of 
infinite divisions with the actuality of an infinite number of divided things. This would only 
follow if the continuous depended on the discrete, as if it were by summing discrete units that 
one achieves a continuous quantities. Yet for Hegel this is not so. Indeed, the reverse is the case, 
since its is only by dividing the continuous that one arrives at the discrete. 
 Once the solution is stated in its full generality, it can be applied to Kant’s 2nd antinomy. 
Matter is infinitely divisible, but not actually divided into infinite parts. In this way, there is no 
contradiction between thesis and antithesis. However, this is not a because we have renounced 
realism in favor of idealism. In particular, it is not because we have introduced a distinction 
between things as they appear to us and things as they are in themselves. Rather, it is because we 
have introduced a metaphysical distinction between the potential and the actual into reality itself. 
Especially in its traditional Aristotelian guise, but also in Hegel, ours is a distinction pertaining 
directly to the object, rather than one pertaining to the standpoint of the knowing subject. 
Ultimately, then, Hegel’s solution is fully compatible with realist metaphysics, and in no way 
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Kantian-idealist. If that is so, then the antinomies give us no reason to abandon that form of 
metaphysics — and certainly not to do so in favor of transcendental idealism.  
 A striking feature of Hegel’s engagement with Kant’s 2nd Antinomy, seldom mentioned 
in the literature on this topic, lies in Hegel’s repeated comparisons between Kant’s Dialectic and 
the positions of certain ancient philosophers. For example, Hegel regards Zeno’s paradox of 
motion as the true problem at the root of Kant’s Antinomies. For failing to recognize this Kant 
himself comes in for criticism. More surprising still, Hegel regards Aristotle’s solutions to Zeno’s 
paradoxes as the true solution to Kant’s Antinomies. 
 As Hegel writes, both the 2nd antinomy and Zeno’s paradox concern a contradiction 
within our concept of quantity, a contradiction between the continuous and the discrete. 
Infinitely more meaningful and more profound than this Kantian antinomy 
just considered are the dialectical examples of the ancient Eleatic 
school, especially those dealing with movement, which are likewise based 
on, and find their solution in, the concept of quantity. (WdL  21:187/SoL 164) 
Hegel is even more emphatic on this point in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy: 
This is the dialectic of Zeno; he had a knowledge of the determinations which our 
ideas of space and time contain, and showed in them their contradiction; Kant’s 
antinomies do no more than Zeno did here. (VGP “Zeno”) 
In the Logic, Hegel does not explain the relationship between Kant’s antinomy and Zeno’s 
paradox.  However, he notes that the task of doing so should be left for the distinct discipline of 
the history of Philosophy.  
To consider them here also would take us too far afield; they have to do with the 
concepts of space and time and can be dealt with in the history of philosophy in 
connection with them. – These examples do the greatest honor to the reason of 
their discoverers. (WdL 21:187/SoL 164, ) 
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Presumably, Hegel is referring to the history of philosophy as told by Hegel himself. It therefore 
seems warranted to examine Hegel’s posthumously published Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy for clarification.  The approach gains further support from the many striking 130
parallels between the two discussions which draw on many of the same ideas.  Most 131
importantly, the Lectures seem to repeat the claims from Hegel’s Logic concerning the 
relationship between Zeno’s paradoxes and Kant’s antinomies.  
This is the dialectic of Zeno; he had a knowledge of the determinations which our 
ideas of space and time contain, and showed in them their contradiction; Kant’s 
antinomies do no more than Zeno did here. (VGP “Zeno”) 
 Although Hegel considers four paradoxes, I will confine myself to one very well known 
one, concerning motion. As summarized by Aristotle, whom Hegel quotes, this paradox of Zeno 
runs as follows “[m]ovement has no truth, because what is in motion must first reach the middle 
of the space before arriving at the end.”  The paradox may be illustrated by means of a thought-132
experiment. To move from its resting place to a destination, an object must move half the 
distance to the destination. In order to move from its resting place to this new half-destination, 
the object must move halfway to that, and so on.  The paradoxical conclusion seems to be that 
the object can never arrive at its original destination. In one version of the paradox, doing so is 
impossible because it would require the object to travel an infinite distance. That is, it would 
 Although mere lecture transcripts, rather than published writings, these sources are often consulted by scholars 130
interested in Hegel’s debts to various ancient figures. Forster (1989) gives them an important place in his account of 
Hegel on skepticism. 
 In both, Hegel discusses Aristotle’s solution. In both, he quotes the rejection of Aristotle’s solution as “pitoyable” 131
from Bayle’s dictionary. In both, he discusses, and rejects, the response of Diogenes Laertes, who proves motion to 
be real by simply getting up and moving. 
 “The first asserts the non-existence of motion on the ground that that which is in locomotion must arrive at the 132
half-way stage before it arrives at the goal.” (Aristotle Physics, 239b11)
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need to travel a distance equal to the sum of the infinite half distances, and halves of half 
distances, and halves of half distances. 
  Hegel has his own idiosyncratic analysis of Zeno’s argument for the paradox inherent in 
motion, however. He claims it results from the contradiction between two different candidate 
definitions of the concept of quantity: continuity and discreteness. At the outset of the thought-
experiment, Hegel argues, we must assume space is continuous, rather than discrete. Space must 
be treated as divisible into parts, though not yet actually divided. As Hegel writes, “That what is 
in motion must reach the half is the assertion of continuity, i.e. the possibility of division as mere 
possibility” (Ibid.) Were it divided, it would already be partitioned into units. Once it is actually 
divided, however, we assume space to be discrete. More specifically, we now have discrete 
quantities of space: the new region of space is half the length of its predecessor; these regions are 
also two in number. Put differently, space, once divided, is discontinuous, since there is a break 
in it. As he writes, “…in the conception of a half, the interruption of continuity is 
involved” (Ibid.) However, the cycle can then repeat itself once more. Restricting ourselves to 
the new distance, we are led to assume continuity, since the new quantity of space, in being 
divisible, must not yet be viewed as divided or discontinuous. Once divided, however…The 
cycle repeats itself ad infinitum. 
 In both the Lectures on the History of Philosophy and the Logic, Hegel turns to Aristotle’s 
resolution of Zeno’s paradoxes to illustrate the nature of his favored solution.  He praises them 133
 Hegel does not refer specifically to one of Aristotle’s works. However, he is likely referring to Physics VI. 133
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as “genuinely speculative,” and attempts to defend them from the criticisms of Pierre Bayle.  In 134
essence, Aristotle’s solution is the same as Hegel’s own “modal” solution. Aristotle, it seems, 
drew on a central distinction of his ontology to resolve the apparent contradiction: the distinction 
between potentiality and actuality. Space is actually continuous, or divisible. However, it is 
therefore always potentially discrete, or divided into atoms for reasons we have already 
considered. 
The solution that Aristotle gives to these dialectical tropes is contained in his truly 
speculative concepts of space, time, and movement, and merits high praise. The 
most famous of his proofs rest on opposing infinite divisibility (imagined as if it 
were actually carried out and hence as equivalent. to infinite partition, the atoms) 
to continuity, which applies just as well to time as to space, so that the infinite, 
that is, abstract plurality is contained in this continuity only in itself, as possibility. 
The actual as contrasted to abstract plurality… (WdL 21:188/SoL 164-5) 
This solution implies a subordination of the discrete to the continuous. However, Hegel argues 
this is required.  The innovation enables Aristotle to resolve Zeno’s paradox. An object that 135
traverses the continuous distance in space has not, in fact, traveled an infinite distance. To be 
sure, there are infinite potential divisions in this region of space. There are not infinite actual 
divisions in it. Hence, the infinite divisions are merely potentially present in the distance 
traversed, not actually present therein. Put differently, this region of space is infinitely divisible, 
but not infinitely divided. Hegel writes: “The general explanation which Aristotle gives to this 
contradiction, is that space and time are not infinitely divided, but are only divisible.” As Hegel 
observes, critics of Aristotle (in particular, Bayle) often argue that this must mean there are 
 The solution with which most modern readers are likely to be familiar is that provided by the calculus, and, in 134
particular, the notion of a limit. For better or worse, this solution is unavailable to Hegel. He is a critic of  the 
calculus. He regards the infinite approximation as an instance of what he pejoratively calls “the bad infinite.”
 In subordinating the discrete to the continuous, Hegel also follows Spinoza, for whom discrete quantity is 135
merely “imaginary” whereas the continuous is alone what the intellect grasps as true quantity.  Hegel quotes this 
Spinozist doctrine at length and in the original Latin. (WdL 21:178/SoL 155)
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actually infinite divisions in space. Hence, Zeno’s paradox is not solved. An object that traverses 
a certain continuous distance has, in fact, traveled an infinite distance, composed of an infinite 
number of discrete divisions. As Hegel observes, however, Aristotle’s solution requires no such 
thing.  136
* * *
 As I indicated earlier, Hegel’s critique of Kant only goes so far in overcoming the 
problem posed by the Paralogisms. At most, it shows that Hegel is in possession of an alternative 
set of concepts which have a single promising feature. Specifically, these are concepts which are 
infinite in the first of the two senses we distinguished above. In other words, they are not limited 
by others distinct from or opposed to them. Once more, this is true of concepts like the 
Aristotelian idea of soul and the German idealist idea of spirit in a way it is not of the Cartesian 
concept of soul. It is also true of Hegel’s concepts of continuous and discrete quantity. Yet just 
because Hegel has overcome the dualism between each of these concepts and its opposite does 
not mean he has shown they apply. At most, Hegel would have shown that these concepts would, 
if applicable, solve certain problems. He would not have shown that they do, in fact apply, and 
that these problems are in fact as good as solved. In other words, Hegel has not yet shown that 
 Although the parallel is seldom, if ever, noted, Russell also treats Kant’s 2nd antinomy as a version of Zeno’s 136
paradox, and claims that modern solutions to the latter solve the former (Russell 2015: 359-60). He also argues, like 
Hegel, that these and other problems which have been thought to concern space and time are actually more abstract. 
Because he refers in other contexts to the pertinent parts of Hegel, Russell was probably aware of the parallel. 
Indeed, a striking facet of Principles is the frequency with which Hegelian opponents in the philosophy of 
mathematics crop up. Even Hegelians are often ignorant of Hegel’s philosophy of mathematics, but Russell knows it 
well — and not just in general outline. I therefore think it likely that Russell was aware of the delicious irony here. I 
mean that his argument, though anti-Hegelian in substance, was Hegelian in form. In the same work, Russell even 
mentions Hegel’s solution to the paradox/antinomy, the solution based on the inseparability of continuity and 
discreteness. Yet he does so only to ridicule it: “The  notion of continuity has been treated by philosophers, as a rule, 
as though it were incapable of analysis. They have said many things about it, including the Hegelian dictum that 
everything discrete is also continuous and vice versa. This remark, as being an exemplification of Hegel’s usual 
habit of combining opposites, has been tamely repeated by all his followers. But as to what they meant by continuity 
and discreteness, they preserved a discreet and continuous silence; only one thing was evident, that whatever they 
did mean could not be relevant…to the philosophy of space and time” (290). 
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these concepts are infinite in the other of these senses: infinite vis-a-vis the objective world. Yet 
for Hegel it is deeply important that the categories making up his Logic be infinite in both of 
these senses. 
iv. Responding to Kant’s critique of Rational Theology: the Ideal 
 For Kant, we are necessarily led to the Idea of a supreme Being (God) by our aspiration 
to achieve comprehensive knowledge of the object. Such a being would contain the “Because”. 
for every “why?” (A 585/B613).  Kant is concerned here with our aspiration to know the object 137
in its full determinateness [specificity, particularity]. In order to do so, we employ a certain 
standard or principle, the idea of the complete set of determinate [specific, particular] features or 
properties a thing could possibly have. This is the Idea of the omnitudo realitatis, the sum-of-all-
realities. We then imagine being able to compare any given object of our knowledge with this 
standard. This would involve determining in the case of each possible predicate that a thing 
could possibly have whether it in fact had or lacked that predicate. This is what it would be to 
know the object in its full determinateness. In a further and perhaps more questionable step, we 
then treat the omnitudo realitatis, the sum of all realities, as itself a further real thing, the ens 
realissimum. Indeed, it is so-called because it is not just a real thing, something over and above 
the sum of predicates, and irreducible to them. It is the most real thing, the vast store of 
predicates in which every other real thing only had a limited share: “every thing as deriv[es] its 
own possibility from the share it has in the whole of possibility” (A572/B600). For Kant, there is 
no harm at all in employing this notion for heuristic purposes as a standard that all scientific 
inquiry should strive to approximate. However, the rational theologian wants to go further. 
 Sometimes translated as the “therefore” for every “wherefore.”137
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 The rational theologian argues that the ens realissimum exists, and that we can have 
theoretical knowledge of this. That is because we have a valid argument for this conclusion: the 
ontological argument. The ontological argument begins from the premise that God, the most real 
being, would contain all real predicates. It then proceeds to draw the conclusion that God exists 
via the further premise that existence is among the real predicates God would include. Famously, 
Kant denies that this is so (“existence is not a real predicate”). Whether a thing exists or not 
cannot, in general, be inferred from its definition. Kant puts this in a number of different ways, 
but one is that existence claims are never analytic but always synthetic truths. Their denial is 
never a contradiction. Their affirmation is never based on conceptual containment. Put bluntly, I 
will not improve my finances by reflecting on my concept of 100 dollars. 
 Hegel’s response is the common one that Kant’s objection to the ontological argument is 
question-begging (WdL 21: 76/SoL 65-6). To be sure, the definitions of most of the ordinary 
things that we encounter in our everyday lives and their existences are distinct. Yet from this, we 
cannot necessarily conclude that there is nothing whose definition is to exist. There might be an 
exception to the rule, “existence is not a real predicate,” and the ontological argument, in effect, 
suggests this is true of God. One can, of course, reject this proposal, but not on the grounds that 
it is not in general true that existence can be extracted from a definition. Nobody is disputing that 
it is not in general true, just that it is in all cases — including the unusual one of God.  
 This is a common response to Kant’s critique of the ontological argument, but it has a 
significant limitation. It requires us to explain why, exactly, God is an exception to the rule, 
rather than just insisting that he is. Why should it be legitimate to treat existence as a real 
predicate in this case, if it is not in every other? We need a principled reason for exempting the 
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concept of God from the rules that usually apply to concepts. Here, Hegel proposes a “logical” 
solution to this recurrent problem. This solution invokes Hegel’s distinction between infinite 
categories and finite ones. 
 For Hegel, infinite categories improve the prospects for the claim that God, by definition, 
exists. They do so even if we concede that existence does not work this way for ordinary entities, 
those describable using finite categories. Which, though, of the many infinite categories making 
up Hegel’s Logic can we use to test this hypothesis? Clearly, Hegel understands nearly all of 
them to be relevant to the ontological argument. Each time a new set of categories is introduced, 
Hegel discusses how they promise to improve prospects for the ontological argument. In Hegel’s 
Logic there will be an ontological argument of Being, existence, reason (syllogism), objectivity, 
and so on. However, I will simply consider the very first of these categories from the Logic: 
Being. As we know, each such category doubles as a definition of the Absolute (God).  138
However, there is an additional reason Being is especially pertinent here. It is not just that Hegel 
refers to it as the omnitudo realitatis, a clear reference to Kant’s critique of the ontological 
argument. Nor is it that he also refers to it as the monist principle at the foundation of Spinoza’s 
system, at least as interpreted by Jacobi. It is that Hegel makes this connection himself in the 
greater Logic. There, he does so in the remark appended to the section on Being (WdL 21:70-7/
SoL 60-66). In that remark, Hegel suggests that if Kant had been aware of infinite categories like 
this one, he never would have rejected the ontological argument. As Hegel says, Kant ought to 
have focused on Parmenidean Being, not on his personal finances: 
 (Technically, this is only true of the first and third categories in each section, Hegel tells us. Yet this is a condition 138
Being meets). 
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…a “hundred dollars” is nothing self-referring but something alterable and 
perishable. This thinking or imagining which has before it only a determinate 
being, existence, must be referred back to the previously mentioned beginning of 
science which Parmenides made – the one who purified and elevated to pure 
thought, to being as such, his own otherwise pictorial representations and hence 
also those of posterity, thus ushering in the element of science. (WdL 21:75-76/
SoL 65)  
 As Hegel goes on to explain, notions like Being are counter-examples to Kant’s claim: 
existence is not a real predicate. The thought behind this proposal is the following. We can deny 
the existence of ordinary things, like Kant’s one hundred dollars. However, we cannot deny 
existence to the whole of existence itself, something described using infinite categories (Being, 
existence, the One, the infinite). The two cases are fundamentally different, and Kant has 
conflated them. Clearly, the version of the ontological proof that is taking shape will only work if 
we presuppose a Spinozistic conception God, rather than an orthodox one. Still, the argument has 
the advantage of seeming almost trivially true.  How could existence fail to exist? 139
Unfortunately, the argument does appear to rest on a questionable assumption. I mean the 
assumption that there is any such thing as the whole of existence. 
 In his own critique of the ontological argument, Kant questions this assumption in a way 
that will prove extremely prescient. He does so in a criticism of the ontological argument that 
appears before the more well known one (“existence is not a real predicate”). The criticism is 
directed at those versions of the ontological argument that presuppose a conception of God as the 
omnitudo realitatis. Kant describes such versions of the argument as resting on a fallacy. This is 
the fallacy of conflating merely distributive unity with collective unity (A582-3/B610-11). It 
 I here follow Redding and Bubbio (2014), though they see Hegel as more dismissive of the proposal to base the 139
ontological argument on Being.
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arises in the following way. Suppose we grant that each existing thing exists. Existence is 
distributed or dispersed among them, in that each has an existence of its own. However, it does 
not follow that all of them taken together are further existing thing. There is no collective 
existence in which all participate, no existence over and above that of each existing thing. The 
sum of all existing things is not a further existing thing. The omnitudo realitatis is not the ens 
realissimum. It is no more so than the sum of all dogs is itself a further dog.   
 Yet this objection is less fatal for Hegel’s version of the ontological argument then it 
might initially seem. Even Kant thought the problem could be partially overcome, a sign of his 
greater sympathy with Spinozist versions of the ontological argument. That may be why he does 
not make the error of conflating distributive and collective senses of existence his main objection 
to the ontological argument. It is a preliminary criticism which is dispatched early so that more 
threatening ones can be considered. As Kant correctly saw, all the rational theologian needed to 
do to overcome the problem was specify more clearly which kind of whole God was intended to 
be. It would need to be a whole that preceded its parts, rather than one which does not. 
 Fortunately, a model of the type of whole that this Spinozist God would have to be if we 
are to be able to run the ontological argument on it is near at hand. It may be found in Kant’s 
own conception of space from the Transcendental Aesthetic. Jacobi was the first to point out the 
connection when he accused Kant of Spinozism during the Pantheismusstreit. For Kant, the 
whole of space precedes its parts. Every region of space is derived from the whole of space by 
de-limiting the latter in a certain way. We begin with the whole of space, and then bound or limit 
some portion of it by drawing lines. In so doing, we are left with a part. Importantly, there is no 
way to define a part except in reference to the whole. For this reason, the whole of space could 
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not be derived from adding its parts together. Each of the parts is what it is by virtue of its 
relation to the whole. So we could not start with them and work up to the whole by constructing 
it out of them. 
 Kant proposes that the ens realissimum would have to be a whole of this kind, a whole 
prior to its parts. In explaining what such a whole would have to be, he invokes Spinoza’s dictum 
“all determination is negation.”  
If, therefore, reason employs in the complete determination of things a 
transcendental substrate that contains, as it were, the whole store of material from 
which all possible predicates of things must be taken, this substrate cannot be 
anything else than the idea of an omnitudo realitatis. All true negations are 
nothing but limitations -- a title which would be inapplicable, were they not thus 
based upon the unlimited, that is, upon “the All.” (A 576/B604) 
The analogy with Absolute space as Kant conceives of in the Aesthetic is helpful in illustrating 
the meaning for Kant of this dictum. We begin with the whole of space. Each specific 
(“determinate”) part of it can be understood as its “negation.” Each is simply a different way of 
not being the whole or failing to coincide with it, “negating” it. Only the whole truly is. Its parts 
are not it. Each is the result of partially “negating” the whole, discarding all in the whole which 
is not the particular part in question. Since the whole contains all of the parts, we could also say 
that each determinate part is the negation of all the others. Of course, Kant’s aim in bringing up 
the analogy with space is to shield the ontological argument from this particular criticism 
(conflating the distributive with the collective), not from every criticism. After all, Kant is a foe 
of the ontological argument.  
 In spite of this, Kant may have been overzealous in his effort to improve the prospects of 
the ontological argument, especially when we consider it from a Hegelian point of view. In 
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proposing this Spinozist amendment to traditional versions of the ontological argument Kant 
unwittingly makes a fatal concussion to his opponent. To be sure,  all Kant means to be doing is 
making a minor improvement to the argument, so that he can be sure he refutes the best version 
of it. Yet Hegel thinks that Kant has unwittingly strengthened the argument so greatly that it will 
now survive Kant’s own subsequent critique of it. That is because the Spinozist amendment to 
the ontological argument gives us a response to an objection Kant thought most fatal to it. I mean 
the objection that this argument treats existence as a real predicate.  
 For a Spinozist, like Hegel, God by definition exists, but this is not for the reason usually 
given by proponents of the ontological argument. It is not because existence is among the 
predicate concepts analytically contained in this subject concept, as in classical versions of the 
ontological argument. Rather, it is for a more fundamental reason that Hegel can claim as his 
original discovery, though it is anticipated by others. At least at the outset of Hegel’s Logic, God 
is being or existence itself. By contrast, all existing things have only some limited share in 
existence (“omnis determinatio…”). It could not exactly be said that Hegel has improved the 
prospects of this argument solely by embracing a different conception of God. This conception 
works together with a new conception of Being or existence, as well as its relationship to 
ordinary things. Since this is the load bearing feature of Hegel’s ontological argument, it would 
be an interesting question to ask what justifies it. It would also be worth returning to the issue of 
what resources Kant has to respond. Still, it seems to me that Hegel is well within his rights here. 
The only constraint on an ontological argument is that it have no empirical premise. Fortunately, 
a premise concerning the nature of Being itself, as well as its relationship to particular beings, 
need not be an empirical one.  
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 I here comment only briefly on Hegel’s responses to Kant’s critiques of the cosmological 
and physico -teleological arguments. Kant had already claimed that all three of the traditional 
proofs were interdependent. More specifically, Kant held that the cosmological and physico-
teleological arguments were dependent on the ontological argument. The main reason Kant gave 
was that no inference from an empirical state of affairs in the world to its cause could establish 
that this cause was of any particular kind, let alone that it was the God of traditional religion. 
Only with an independent line of argument that establishes the existence of a necessary being 
could we draw this inference. Yet an independent line of argument would be one which did not 
rely on empirical claims in the way these others do. In other words, it would have to be an a 
priori argument for the existence of God, i.e. the ontological argument. 
 Hegel must reject the cosmological argument, at least if this argument takes its traditional 
form. The cosmological argument would rule out Hegel’s own non-traditional version of the 
ontological argument. As Hegel explains, the problem with the traditional versions of the 
cosmological argument is to have inferred God’s existence from that of ordinary things (EL § 50 
Z). The existence of these things is contingent, rather than necessary. Hence, they must have 
some cause distinct from them. As we have seen, this line of reasoning, even if correct, would 
not establish the existence of any particular type of cause. However, Hegel has a distinct worry. 
This is that treating God as a type of cause would render it finite, limited. Inherently, a cause is 
something limited, since it is distinct from its effect. As we have seen, however, Hegel holds that 
only a definition of the Absolute as infinite will allow the ontological argument to go through. 
For Hegel, any definition of God as finite cannot not rule out the possibility that God should fail 
to exist. 
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 Yet if Hegel rejects the traditional version of the cosmological argument, he does not 
reject any version. Indeed, Hegel’s ontological argument as I have reconstructed it here already is 
a type of cosmological argument. In Kant, the three arguments are interdependent, though 
distinct. Yet in Hegel they blur into one another. Admittedly, Hegel’s argument does not progress 
from the effect to the cause, in the way traditional cosmological arguments do. Yet it does 
progress from grounded to ground, and this seems sufficient. More specifically, it infers from the 
existence of determinate things that of their indeterminate ground. Another difference between 
Hegel’s cosmological argument and earlier versions concerns the role of negation in each. 
Whereas the traditional version works by inferring God’s existence from that of ordinary things, 
Hegel’s works by inferring it from their non-existence. In Hegel’s revised version, we do not 
infer God’s existence from what Hegel calls determinate [specific] being. Rather, we argue that 
all determinate beings are negations or non-beings in comparison to the indeterminate, being. 
 As Hegel explains, the conviction that negativity is integral to rational theology is 
Spinozist in origin (EL § 50 + Z). Indeed, it is what makes Spinoza a pious thinker, rather than an 
atheist. The ordinary religious believer accepts the existence of God, but also that of the world in 
its separation from God. The atheist denies the existence of God, affirming that of the world. Yet 
Spinoza has the most pious position of all since he affirms the reality of God, and denies that of 
the world in its separation from God. He is the opposite of an atheist, an acosmist.     140
 In the recent literature, Hegel is credited with the “acosmism” objection to Spinoza. See Melamed (2010), 140
Newlands (2011). This is the criticism that Spinoza’s substance monism renders the particular objects of our 
ordinary everyday experience, in some sense, unreal. This is because he cannot explain why the one true substance 
should give rise to finite modes and attributes. Undoubtedly, this is an objection Hegel sometimes makes, but it is 
misleading to call it the “acosmism” objection. Whenever Hegel describes Spinoza as an acosmist, he is praising 
him. He is praising Spinoza’s piety by proclaiming him the very opposite of an atheist. This fits well with a tendency 
in Hegel’s own thinking to deny the reality of ordinary entities. See Stern 2009 and Bowman 2013, and, for a 
contrary perspective, Pippin (2018). It must then be that the disagreement between Hegel and Spinoza is less over 
whether finite entities are fully real, then of how best to capture the fact that they are not.    
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 Although Hegel only hints at it briefly, there are indications that the resultant argument is 
meant to be physico-teleological as well. This is not because it argues for an intelligent designer 
on the basis of teleological organization in nature. Kant considered that inference flawed, but 
Hegel has a different complaint. It is not that we could never know for certain whether there is 
such a designer, but that it would not help if we could. Living beings are self-organizing, 
meaning the analogy with products of design is necessarily incomplete. Of course, Kant thought 
this analogy was, more or less, the best we would do. Clearly, Hegel differs, but this is not 
relevant here. For our purposes, the important point is simply that one of Hegel’s own definitions 
of the Absolute is is life or internal purposiveness itself. This, I think, explains how Hegel can 
cite the argument from design as inspiration for his own. He is broadly sympathetic to the idea 
that organic life is relevant to proving the existence of God, even if not exactly in the way that 
pre-critical metaphysicians thought.  
 Up to this point, we have only considered a claim Hegel makes on behalf of his first 
definition of the Absolute: Being. Why, though, should this be thought to carry any implication 
for subsequent definitions? Here, I have claimed that Hegel’s decision to start with Being implies 
a broadly favorable attitude towards this definition of the Absolute. Yet on a more familiar 
interpretation, this decision underscores the impoverishment of Being in comparison to all 
subsequent definitions of the Absolute.  Be this is at may, Being is also the foundation for 141
everything that follows. The claim Being raises to be necessarily instantiated is one all 
subsequent definitions of the Absolute will inherit. Here, we should recall that life, cognition 
and, indeed, all definitions of the Absolute subsequent to the first, Being, are refined versions of 
 Some claim it is a “false start,” and the true beginning of the Logic should be found subsequently. See Redding 141
(1991).
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it (“sublations”).  Unsurprisingly then, Hegel will re-formulate the ontological argument every 142
time a new set of definitions is reached. There is an ontological argument for the categories of 
existence, because it is a refined and more advanced form of the category of being. There is one 
for the object for the exact same reason.  That is why Dieter Henrich was right to say that the 
whole of Hegel’s Logic can be interpreted as an extended version of the ontological argument.  143
v. Conclusion: post-Kantian metaphysics as Spinozism/monism 
 Reluctance to interpret Hegel as a Spinozist is mainly due to the belief that this would 
make him a pre-Kantian dogmatic metaphysician. This reluctance is found not only among 
Kantian-idealist interpreters, but also among metaphysical interpreters, many of whom prefer to 
stress Hegel’s affinities with Aristotle. However, I think this reluctance is unnecessary. As we 
have already seen, Hegel breaks with Kant in his refusal to condemn all pre-Kantian 
metaphysicians as dogmatists. He denies that Plato and Aristotle are dogmatic thinkers, though 
he agrees with Kant that Scholastic metaphysicians were. Although Hegel does not explicitly say 
so, it seems to me he would also object to characterizing Spinoza as a dogmatic metaphysician. It 
would certainly be a mistake to assimilate thought to that of the metaphysicians in the Leibniz-
Wolff school.  Spinoza and others like him anticipate Hegel himself in their willingness to 144
challenge religious orthodoxy. Whereas the Leibniz-Wolff school does not. In more technical 
terms, they consider the possibility of infinite categories like those that make up Hegel’s Logic. 
By contrast, the Leibniz-Wolff school relies exclusively on finite ones. From a Kantian 
 Once again, I follow Houlgate (2006) and Doz (1987) here.142
 (1960)143
 In the more recent literature, Spinoza’s influence is often explicitly disclaimed. Instead, it is Aristotle whose 144
influence on Hegel is stressed, even among so-called (neo-) “metaphysical” interpreters. 
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perspective, all of these figures are rationalist metaphysicians, and the differences between them 
matter little for the purposes of a critique of metaphysics. All can be tarred with the same brush. 
For Hegel, however, whose understanding of the history of philosophy is much richer than 
Kant’s own, this is an overgeneralization. What is more, Hegel is convinced that the 
rehabilitating these figures will help metaphysics withstand the Kantian critique of metaphysics. 
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V.      Hegel on the Laws of Logic 
 As I interpret him, Hegel is a thinker who seeks an answer one of the most fundamental 
questions in the philosophy of logic. I mean the question of how the laws of logic, presupposed 
by our attempts at justification in all other areas, may themselves be justified. As we have seen, 
there are two broad types of answer. There is the way of argument with its attendant risk of 
circularity, and the way of brute fact with its attendant risk of complacency. In my view, Hegel’s 
answer is of the former type, and appeals to his metaphysics. In proceeding in this way, however, 
Hegel breaks with the tradition, whose approach was of the latter type. More specifically, it 
sought to justify these laws by claiming that they would be intuitively obvious to anyone who 
reflected on them. What, then, is the type of argument Hegel favors over this traditional 
approach? Is it possible for him to avoid relying on the very laws he seeks to prove?  
 The answer I defend is that it is an argument drawn from his metaphysics. As I hope to 
show, Hegel proposes to ground the laws of logic in a general metaphysical (ontological) theory 
of the categories. By general metaphysics, I mean an inquiry into being qua being. This is an 
inquiry that adopts a maximally abstract perspective on beings or entities. It considers them 
simply insofar as they are beings or entities at all rather than ones of a particular type. To concern 
oneself with being-qua-being in the way the philosopher does is distinct from concerning oneself 
with beings-qua-numbered or qua-natural in the way mathematicians and natural scientists do. 
How, though, are categories relevant to this enterprise? The answer is that categories like 
quantity and quality are promising candidates for principles describing being-qua-being. As the 
etymology of the word suggests, a category is a concept can be predicated of every being or 
entity. Admittedly, it is far from clear what it would mean to ground logic in a theory of the 
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categories of this kind. My basic proposal will be that this project is possible because both logic 
and ontology share a certain generality that allows one to found the other. The result is that logic 
achieves a metaphysical status in the following sense. Its laws concerning what we are permitted 
to think are only valid on the condition that they reflect the correct metaphysical account of the 
way things fundamentally are. 
 There is precedent for this idea in the Metaphysics (IV, 3), where Aristotle acknowledges 
the existence of both psychological and metaphysical versions of the law of non-contradiction. 
The metaphysical version states that a substance cannot both have and lack the same property (at 
the same time and in the same respect). The psychological version states that we cannot think 
some subject both has and lacks the same predicate (at the same time and in the same respect). 
Aristotle further suggests that the psychological version derives from the metaphysical version. 
Swiftly and crudely summarized, his argument is that thoughts in the mind are themselves 
properties of a substance, so that the psychological version of the law can be treated as little 
more than a special case of the metaphysical version. Admittedly, Aristotle’s argument is 
unpopular,  but less important for our purposes than whether it succeeds is the broader strategy 145
of argument it involves. As I hope to show, the suggestion that a law of logic or law of thought 
might have some metaphysical basis is one Hegel will take up. 
 In defending this robustly metaphysical interpretation of Hegel’s conception of logic, I 
oppose a broadly anti-metaphysical interpretation prominent in the literature. On this 
 See Shields (2012) who refers to it as a “bad argument.” Kimhi (2018) and Rödl take up questions raised by 145
Aristotle’s discussion of the different versions of the PNC. Like a number of other authors we will consider, Kimhi 
dismisses the view I will defend here as unworthy of serious consideration. As Kimhi tells us, Aristotle was 
traditionally regarded the metaphysical version of PNC as prior to the others (psychological, semantic). Both as 
Aristotle interpretation and as philosophy, this is wrong, Kimhi argues. For Kimhi, the versions of PNC are all on a 
par, inseparable. Rödl argues for a version of the same position, denying that Aristotle can be interpreted in the 
standard way.
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interpretation, defended most prominently by Longuenesse, Hegel’s objection is that traditional 
logic goes too far in the direction of metaphysics, and in so doing fails to adequately ground the 
generality of logic. In my view, however, Hegel’s objection is the opposite. It is that traditional 
logic does not go far enough in the direction of metaphysics, and that this is why it failed to 
ground the generality of logic. I elaborate on the differences between these two readings in the 
first section below. 
 Before proceeding, however, there is a crucial caveat. Hegel’s approach to the laws of 
logic is marked by a certain ambivalence. Initially, it might seem that Hegel is simply attempting 
to come to the aid of the traditional logic. He is furnishing it with a new mode of justification for 
its findings, but leaving those findings unchallenged. Yet matters are more complex. Hegel is 
also mounting a type of challenge to traditional logic. How, though, can he coherently claim to 
do both? Certainly, Hegel will equip the tradition with a better strategy of justification, but this 
will actually render it vulnerable to criticism. Adopting this new strategy of justification requires 
us to admit the possibility that some of the traditional laws will not admit of being justified in 
this new way, and will therefore need to be abandoned. 
 Notoriously, Hegel seems to reject the law of non-contradiction, an unpopular move that 
even the most sympathetic commentators have found difficult to defend. In so doing, he 
embraces a view usually thought to be completely absurd on its face, the view that there are true 
contradictions. For some of Hegel’s critics, this is all the evidence necessary to convict him of 
not being a serious philosophical thinker. Yet even for those of us more friendly to Hegel’s 
philosophical project, his unorthodox views on contradiction are puzzling. Why would a thinker 
of Hegel’s stature have held what seems to be such an apparently absurd position? A common 
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approach to answering this question is simply to deny that Hegel did, in fact, hold as extreme a 
view as he is often thought to have held. If it seems that he did so, then this can only be because 
we are misinterpreting the relevant texts. It is easy to sympathize with this approach, since Hegel 
has so often been the victim of uncharitable interpretations at the hands of his critics. Even so, it 
seems to me that in their zeal to rescue Hegel from the embarrassment of denying the law of non-
contradiction interpreters have overlooked an interesting possibility. I simply mean the 
possibility that Hegel had a respectable argument of his own for why we ought to reject the law 
of non-contradiction. One reason to revisit Hegel’s perspective on this issue is that it appears to 
have entered the mainstream. In the analytic tradition, interest in non-classical logics is at an all 
time high. Evidently, certain analytic philosophers find Hegel’s views less embarrassing from a 
contemporary standpoint than many Hegel scholars. This motivates me to explore the possibility 
of a revival of the traditional view that Hegel denies the law of non-contradiction   
 An ancillary aim will be to argue that a metaphysical interpretation of Hegel’s views in 
logic helps clarify his argument for why we should reject the law of non-contradiction. Drawing 
on his conviction that every candidate law of logic must be given a metaphysical basis, Hegel 
rejects the law of non-contradiction on the grounds that it is incompatible with what he takes to 
be the correct metaphysical theory of the nature of reality. This is a metaphysics in which reality 
is thought to be pervasively characterized by the phenomenon Hegel calls opposition. We find it 
in any domain in which which there are what we would conventionally call opposites. Hegel 
gives examples from mathematics (positive and negative numbers), physics (especially 
electromagnet phenomena, like positive and negative charge, and forces), morality (virtue and 
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vice), geography (North and South), and finance (assets and debts).  Of course, the central 146
question to answer in evaluating Hegel’s argument is how he could have possibly thought that 
anything as exotic as true contradiction could be found in such a seemingly commonplace 
phenomenon as opposition. The crux of the issue is that these seem to be tensions, rather than 
contradictions in a strict logical sense.  147
 There is an interesting historical backstory to Hegel’s concept of opposition, which may 
help to clarify the larger interest of his broader position on the law of non-contradiction. This is a 
story that was first told Michael Wolff, but it is frequently repeated in the literature today.  148
Today, it is sometimes cited by commentators in the non-metaphysical camp who find in it 
evidence of Hegel’s debt to Kant’s critique of metaphysics. Yet I hope to show that it can be 
approached in an alternative way more consistent with the metaphysical interpretation developed 
here.  
 In a pre-critical essay, (“Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes in 
Philosophy”) Kant had given a theory of “real” opposition, citing many of the examples Hegel 
would later invoke.  For Kant, however, real opposition must be kept rigorously distinct from 149
the logician’s notion of contradiction. True, both involve a relationship of incompatibility or 
 The association between opposition and contradiction has a long afterlife in Marxism. See Lenin “On the 146
Question of Dialectics” (2003): “In mathematics: + and - . Differential and integral. In mechanics: action and 
reaction. In physics: positive and negative electricity. In chemistry: the combination and dissociation of atoms. In 
social science: the class struggle. The identity of opposites...is the recognition (discovery) of the 
contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including mind 
and society).” 
 I owe this formulation to Hahn (2007). A more technical version of this criticism is that Hegel conflates 147
contraries with contradictories. See Ficara (2015) for an excellent overview of the history of this objection, which 
includes Trandelenberg, Croce, Adorno and others.
 In addition to Wolff (1982) see Longuenesse (2007) and De Boer (2010) who go over the same material as I do in 148
this chapter.
 Kant (1992) 149
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exclusion. Yet the former is a real phenomenon in the world, whereas the latter concerns a 
relationship between judgments or propositions. In realizing that there is a distinction here, Kant 
takes an important step beyond rationalist metaphysics. He undermines their conviction that the 
mere analysis of concepts can yield insight into the fundamental nature of reality. As Kant has 
shown, this is false in at least one central case. There is no route from reflection on the logical 
law of non-contradiction to the reality of opposition. Later, these ideas will resurface in Kant’s 
critique of Leibniz from the section of the first critique called the Amphiboly. 
 Some commentators treat Hegel as taking over Kant’s position in the negative 
magnitudes essay more or less wholesale.  They do so because they regard Hegel as a critic of 150
traditional metaphysics in the way that Kant was before him. I disagree. On my view, Hegel 
agrees with Kant that logical contradiction and real opposition are distinct. However, he uses this 
insight to defend a novel form of metaphysics. This is one in which metaphysics is prior to logic, 
rather than the reverse. In our metaphysics, we recognize real opposition, and in our logic we 
adhere to the law of non-contradiction. So far, so Kantian. However, Hegel argues that 
metaphysics is prior to logic in the following sense. Every law of logic must, in the end, be 
reducible to the category-theoretic or ontological  principles that make up our metaphysics.  If 151
that is so, then, Hegel will argue, we must reject the logical law of non-contradiction. For reasons 
we will soon consider, Hegel thinks this law is in conflict with the metaphysical principle that 
there is real opposition in the world. In making this metaphysical claim, Hegel does not claim 
 See Longuenesse (2007)150
 I am here close to Bordignon (2017), as I explain in the next paragraph151
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non-sensible or intellectual intuition of things-in-themselves. Rather, he claims to have an 
argument for why opposition is a category, a predicate of any being or entity considered as such. 
 Yet if Kantian interpretations of Hegel are one-sided, it will be important to avoid a one-
sidedly ontological interpretation as well. In my view, Wolff provides an example of one such 
interpretation. For Wolff, the contradictions which interest Hegel are not logical contradictions at 
all, but are, instead, ontological.  Part of the reason is that the definition Hegel gives of 152
contradictions is not syntactic, e.g. “p and not-p.” It is, rather, ontological in that it defines 
contradiction in terms of the states of affairs in the world that it describes, e.g. the struggle 
between virtue and vice. Although I agree with Wolff that contradictions in Hegel have this 
ontological dimension, I join others in denying that this is the whole story.  Both the 153
ontological and the linguistic or syntactic definitions are important to Hegel, and once we see 
this we can also see that there is a definite order of priority between the two. As Bordignon 
convincingly argues, it is because of the ontological structure Hegel calls opposition that we find 
ourselves caught in logical contradictions.  The former have priority, but the latter remain 154
significant.  155
 See Wolff (1981: 31-4). Pippin (2018) discusses Wolff’s position, but draws from it the implication that Hegel 152
did not deny the logical law of non-contradiction. Whereas my aim is to show the opposite. Longuenesse (2007) and 
De Boer (2012) and Bordignon (2017) also respond to Wolff.  
 See Bordignon (2017)153
 As Bordignon (2017) writes“ to say that the world is inconsistent, that is, to say that there are true contradictions 154
in the world, is to say that there are true purely descriptive sentences about the world that are inconsistent. This 
means that the world verifies the inconsistencies of these sentences.”
 The idea that norms of valid reasoning should be responsive to metaphysical truths can also be found in Priest, a 155
logician, a critic of the law of non-contradiction and a Hegelian. See Ficara (forthcoming) for a discussion of this 
and other parallels. 
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i. Longuenesse’s Hegel  
 Although not discussed especially often in the scholarly literature of recent decades, 
Hegel’s views on the laws of logic have been the subject of a small number of remarkably in-
depth and sustained treatments. In my view, the most detailed, comprehensive and 
philosophically sophisticated of these remains that of Longuenesse in her book Hegel’s Critique 
of Metaphysics. Although decades old by now, Longuenesse’s interpretation remains influential, 
and also forms an interesting foil for the metaphysical interpretation presented here.  156
 As the title of her study indicates, Longuenesse approaches Hegel’s criticism of the 
traditional laws of logic as part of a broader critique of traditional metaphysics, one that is 
broadly Kantian in inspiration. In this regard, her interpretation resembles other so-called “non-
metaphysical” or Kantian-idealist ones prominent from the scholarly literature of that era, 
particularly that of Pippin (1989).  In more recent decades, this interpretation has been 157
criticized by proponents of an alternative “metaphysical” or “neo-metaphysical” interpretation. 
In the Preface to the new English edition, Longuenesse herself raises doubts about her earlier 
views on precisely this score. I will therefore propose that we revisit Longuenesse’s 
interpretation of Hegel’s views on the laws of logic in light of the recent metaphysical turn in 
Hegel scholarship. 
 As I have already indicated, Longuenesse holds that Hegel’s views on the laws of logic 
are influenced by Kant’s Copernican revolution and critique of dogmatic metaphysics. In 
 De Boer (2010) defends a broadly similar interpretation, though she is also concerned to emphasize certain 156
differences between hers and that of Longuenesse. The two most important similarities are the following. First, both 
Longuenesese and De Boer view Hegel’s treatment of the “determinations of reflection” as crucially indebted to the 
argument of the “Amphibology.” Second, both Longuenesse and De Boer draw on this Kantian-inspired reading to 
deny that Hegel regarded contradiction as existing in the world. 
 Longuenesse herself notes the parallel in a forward to the English translation. 157
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Longuenesse’s view, Hegel objects to the tradition’s pre-Copernican attitude towards the laws of 
logic. In particular, Hegel objects to its tendency to treat the laws of logic as pertaining 
exclusively or primarily to objects in the world. For example, Hegel objects to traditional logic’s 
formulation of the law of identity “Everything is identical to itself.” On his view, this 
formulation suggests that the law in question is nothing more than a statement about objects in 
the world. Hegel urges instead that the laws of logic should be seen in a post-Copernican way. In 
other words, he insists that they be seen as concerned primarily with the way we are constrained 
to think about objects in the world. For example, the law of identity could be treated as a norm of 
consistency, authoritative over all thinking. As Longuenesse writes:  
In short, we can summarize Hegel’s position in the following way: Hegel does not 
disagree with the principle of identity as a universal and minimal requirement for 
consistency in thought. We will see shortly that on the contrary, he tries to give an 
original ground to this principle. But in fact, identity is a principle of thought and 
not a structure of something ontologically given to which thought would have to 
conform. (45-6) 
For brevity’s sake, I will occasionally refer back to this as Hegel’s objection to the ontologizing 
tendency in traditional logic. 
 According to Longuenesse, Hegel’s main reason for objecting to the ontologizing 
approach of traditional logic is that he takes this approach to have been ruled out by the argument 
of a previous division of the Logic: the Doctrine of Being. In Longuenesse’s retelling, the 
Doctrine of Being is a cautionary tale about the insoluble problems likely to arise in traditional 
ontology when it is pursued in a pre-critical way that fails to heed the lesson of Kant’s 
Copernican revolution. Pre-critical ontology aspired to make claims that would be universally 
valid in a specific and distinctly metaphysical sense: they would hold true of every being or 
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entity. However, the categories that traditional ontology used to do so, like quality, proved 
incapable of this. Claims employing these categories, like the claim that everything has a quality, 
turned out not to be universally valid. More specifically, such claims were incomplete in that 
they always required supplementation by further claims using further categories. Longuenesse 
only offers a brief hint as to why this problem of incompleteness arose. She claims that, for 
Hegel, traditional ontology was covertly reliant on perception, even though it claimed to be 
thoroughly a priori. Presumably, then, its claims about objects were incomplete in the sense that 
they were provisional. Like all claims derived from sense-perception, they were liable to be 
supplemented in the wake of new experience.  
 Once we move to the Doctrine of Essence, however, we abandon the standpoint of 
traditional ontology and take the Copernican turn. We then arrive at a recognizably Kantian-
idealist standpoint that Hegel calls the standpoint of “reflection.” From this standpoint, we are 
able to make claims that are genuinely universal. However, they are universal in a distinctly 
idealist sense: they hold good of any possible object of experience. Hence, it is at this point that 
we earn the right to employ principles such as those employed in traditional logic: “Everything is 
identical with itself.” Only once we have abandoned traditional metaphysics and taken the 
Copernican turn can we ground the universality of laws of logic. Yet this has important 
implications for how we understand such a law. It must not be understood as concerning entities 
in the manner of traditional ontology. Instead, it is primarily and in the first instance about 
thought. 
     * * * 
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 It would be difficult to evaluate Longuenesse’s interpretation on purely exegetical 
grounds here. The relevant texts are too numerous and too difficult. Later, I will present an 
alternative interpretation of the transition from Being to Essence. Here, however, I leave 
exegetical concerns entirely to one side, and attempt to evaluate Longuenesse’s interpretation on 
philosophical grounds. 
 In my view, the critique of the tradition’s metaphysical approach to logic that 
Longuenesse finds in Hegel is unconvincing. As Longuenesse correctly explains, Hegel finds in 
the metaphysical tradition a problem called passing into another. This is a problem that arises 
when a statement predicating something of all objects, like the statement “all things have 
qualities,” turns out to stand in need of supplementation by another such statement, like the one 
all things (also) have quantities. So much is uncontroversial, but I question the next part in 
Longuenesse’s account. From the foregoing, Hegel is supposed to have inferred that the 
metaphysical tradition fails to secure universal validity for its claims. However, this is an 
inference Hegel should not have drawn. To be sure, the original statement, “all things have 
qualities,” may exhibit this problem, and therefore stand in need of supplementation. Yet it 
nevertheless remains universally valid, since it is still genuinely true of all objects that they have 
qualities. All the problem of passing into another means is that the original statement does not 
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yield a fully comprehensive account of each specific object. It does not mean that it fails to be 
true of all objects or universally true.  158
 Here, I will propose an alternative interpretation, an interpretation on which Hegel does 
not make the false accusation that traditional metaphysics fails to secure universal validity for its 
claims. On the contrary, Hegel is a thinker who (correctly) sees that traditional metaphysics 
succeeded in its aim of making universally valid claims, whatever its other failings might have 
been. Intuitively, this should not be at all surprising. If universally valid claims are to be found 
anywhere, then, one suspects, they would be found in a discipline tasked with studying being qua 
being. This is a discipline that studies every entity or being just insofar as it is an entity or being, 
rather than some sub-set of entities or beings, e.g. natural entities, numbered ones and so on.  
 Hegel’s own Doctrine of Being supplies us with what I take to be a broadly convincing 
account of how universal validity can be attained in traditional metaphysics. In reconstructing the 
categories of traditional ontology, Hegel begins with an initial category: Being. He then shows 
through a dialectical argument that this category entails several further ones. The initial category 
exhibits some type of internal contradiction that can only be resolved by the others. Crucially, the 
initial category is sublated, meaning it is not only cancelled but also retained and improved upon 
by the successor category. An important consequence of this is that all succeeding categories are 
just refined versions of the initial one: Being. In other words, Hegel has used the dialectic to 
 Admittedly, there is a further nuance to Hegel’s position which might be thought to speak against my 158
interpretation here. As Hegel explains, each successive statement is “sublated,” a term that has among its 
connotations cancellation. Does this not then mean that such statements as “every thing has qualities” do, in fact, 
fail to secure universal validity? Are they not eventually deemed false? The answer, I think, is no. As is extremely 
well known, “sublation” connotes not only cancellation, but also the preservation of the view taken in preceding 
stages — and even improvement on it. Even when they are surmounted by superior views, then, statements like 
“every thing has a qualities” remain at least partly true. 
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uphold a traditional Aristotelian view of the categories as just so many forms of being. All are 
just further specifications of what it means for anything to be at all. This is clearly reflected in 
the definitions Hegel gives to the categories, each of which is defined in terms of the first, being: 
qualities are those determinations that are identical with a thing’s being, quantities those 
determinations that are indifferent to it and so on. The upshot: Hegel’s category theory gives us 
grounds to make claims with universal validity. We can claim of anything that is or has being that 
it will be quantified, qualified, self-identical and so on. Doing so is just refining our initial claim 
that the object is or has being by specifying the distinctive form of being it has. Accordingly, 
Hegel’s category theory has no problem about attaining universal validity, at least if this is 
understood as making claims true of every entity or being. 
 I would therefore like to propose an alternative to Longuenesse’s interpretation of Hegel’s 
views on logic. On her view, Hegel argues that traditional logic can only claim universal validity 
for its laws if it breaks with pre-critical metaphysics and takes the Copernican turn. As we have 
seen, however, Longuenesse fails to convincingly show that this step is genuinely necessary if 
logic is to be set on a more secure footing. On my view, then, Hegel argues for what is 
effectively the opposite claim, holding that logic’s claim to universal validity depends on 
preserving rather than severing its connection to traditional metaphysics. As I hope to show, 
logical laws inherit their universal validity from a prior set of metaphysical claims about being. 
ii. Two methods of justifying the laws of logic  
 In his treatment of the laws of logic, Hegel rejects an approach to justifying them often 
taken in the philosophical tradition. At least according to Hegel, this traditional approach is based 
on a fairly straightforward strategy:  
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[these laws] were said to have the status of universal laws of thought that lie at the 
base of all thinking; to be inherently absolute and indemonstrable but immediately 
and indisputably recognized and accepted as true by all thought upon grasping 
their meaning. (WdL 11:258/SoL 354)  
Hegel’s treatment of the laws of logic is intended to comprise part of his critique of Scholastic-
Aristotelian logic which we considered in the first chapter. Since the laws of logic are laws of 
thinking, the tradition argued, these laws can be justified through a process of intellectual 
reflection. This would simply be a process in which the relevant laws are shown to govern our 
thinking. In this process, we begin with a judgment, inference, or some other such thing. For 
example, “All men are mortal, Socrates is a man…” We then focus on the contribution of 
thinking alone, abstracting completely from those of other faculties, such as sensible 
representation. In this way, we arrive at a formal principle, without sensibly given matter. In this 
case, “All As are Bs, C is an A…” We further find that this formal principle is impossible for us 
to deny. In this way, we discover the laws of how we necessarily do think when the faculty of 
sensibility does not interfere. We draw from these laws imperatives dictating how we ought to 
think, even under less optimal conditions. For the tradition, there is no need to argue for these 
laws, which is fortunate given that any argument would likely be circular. Instead, they are 
upheld simply by being reflected upon and found self-evident. In the method of abstraction, each 
principle is discovered on its own, apart from its connection to the others. Hence, the laws we 
discover will form an aggregate, rather than a system.  
 As we have repeatedly seen, the main problem Hegel identifies with this approach is that 
it is empirical, though the sense in which this is so requires clarification. The traditional approach 
may not rely on sense-experience, but it does rely on a form of intellectual experience. However, 
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this is irrelevant from the perspective of the Hegelian objection to traditional logic. As an 
empirical theory, its findings are no less vulnerable to the problem of induction than any other. 
Hegel believes that even the proponents of the traditional logic will have to concede this. None 
could seriously maintain that the findings of their science are universally and necessarily valid, 
given its status as empirical:  
As to the other confirmation of the absolute truth of the principle of 
identity, this is made to rest on experience…for anyone presented with this 
proposition, “A is A,” “a tree is a tree,” immediately grants it and is satisfied 
that the proposition is self-evident and in need of no further justification 
or demonstration. Nobody will want to say that the abstract proposition, “A is A,” 
has actually been tried out on every consciousness. The appeal to actual 
experience is therefore not in earnest but is rather only an assurance that, if the 
said experiment were made, universal acknowledgment of the proposition would 
be the result. (WdL 11:263/SoL 359) 
As Hegel points out, nobody seriously maintains that we could test the laws of logic on 
everyone, let alone that we have actually done so. Yet nobody appears to regard this as a problem 
for logic either. Hence, Hegel concludes, it must be that there is a different justification for these 
laws than the traditional logician thinks. What, then, might that alternative be? 
 Hegel’s alternative is to treat the laws of logic as deriving from the general-metaphysical 
(ontological) theory of the categories defended in his Science of Logic. The basic thought behind 
the deduction is as follows. A law of logic is a principle we must observe in all our thinking, 
regardless of its subject-matter. The metaphysical concepts called categories, however, are those 
which apply to any being or entity, regardless of what type of being or entity it is. Here, Hegel 
cites with approval Aristotle’s definition of a category: “A category, according to the etymology 
of the word and Aristotle’s definition of it, is what is said and asserted of every existent” (WdL 
11:259/SoL 355). If that is so, then the generality of a  law of logic can be grounded in the 
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corresponding generality of a category. Once we recognize this, we can formulate the law by 
using a certain formal strategy which Hegel later calls “express[ing]” a category in the form of a 
“proposition” (WdL 11:258-259/SoL 354). For example, Hegel maintains that we can formulate 
the law of identity, “Everything is identical (to itself),” by deploying the category of identity in 
this way. 
  That this is Hegel’s approach is suggested by a provocative claim he makes concerning 
traditional logic. Hegel claims that traditional logic erred in restricting its focus to a small 
number of basic laws (identity, non-contradiction, sufficient reason). Strictly speaking, all of the 
categories in the Doctrine of Being imply correlative laws, not just the determinations of 
reflection from Essence: 
On the face of it, it is difficult to see why only these simple determinations of 
reflection should be expressed in this particular form and not also the rest, such as 
the categories that belong to the sphere of being. We would then have, for 
instance, such propositions as, “Everything is,” “Everything has an existence,” 
etc.; or again, “Everything has a quality, a quantity, and so on. (WdL 11:258-259/
SoL 354) 
Once we take Hegel’s approach into account, we find that there are far more laws of logic than 
was traditionally thought. In principle, any category could be used to generate a logical law or 
law of thought of the form “Everything is X (= a category).” We would then be faced with far 
more logical laws than the tradition recognizes. This suggests an additional criticism of 
traditional logic to the effect that its focus on certain laws rather than others was arbitrary. As 
Hegel says, there should not only be a law of identity, but also one of being, existence, quality, 
quantity and the like. In the tradition, the laws of logic form a natural set, but no longer in Hegel 
where they have been assimilated to general metaphysics (ontology). 
!200
 At least in these more extreme moments, Hegel suggests that formal logic does not 
constitute a self-standing, independent domain of inquiry at all, but is simply metaphysics 
(category theory) in a different guise. Hegel’s position, then, can often seem to be not only 
reductionist but eliminativist. This can be seen in Hegel’s claim that the propositional form in 
which the laws of logic are expressed should be rejected entirely. Only in this way will the 
metaphysical categories from which the laws of formal derive receive their due. Hegel defends 
this eliminativist view by confronting the proponent of traditional logic with a dilemma: 
Now this propositional form is, for one thing, something superfluous; the 
determinations of reflection are to be regarded in and for themselves. Moreover, 
the propositions suffer from the drawback that they have “being,” “everything,” 
for subject. They thus bring being into play again, and enunciate the 
determinations of reflection (the identity, etc., of anything) 
as a quality which a something would have within – not in any speculative sense, 
but in the sense that the something, as subject, persists in such a quality as an 
existent, not that it has passed over into identity (etc.) as into its truth and essence. 
(WdL 11:259/SoL 355) 
Let us consider two possibilities. The first is that propositional form adds nothing over and above 
the metaphysical category from which the logical law derives. If that is so, then propositional 
form is “superfluous” and can be safely ignored. The second possibility is that it does add 
something. This seems to be closer to the truth After all, the statements of the traditional laws 
have subject-predicate form. All invoke at least one other concept beyond the relevant category. 
For example, in stating that “everything is self-identical” the law of identity invokes not only the 
concept of identity but that of every being. Yet if that is so then we are failing to respect the 
hierarchical order that obtains among the categories. In this case, we are neglecting the way in 
which a category like being is subordinate to one like identity. The reason for this is complex, 
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and is one we will only be in a position to clarify in a subsequent chapter. However, it can be 
crudely summarized in the following way. Being is a non-relational category of the Doctrine of 
Being, whereas the latter is a relational one of the Doctrine of Essence. The latter is more 
advanced than the former because it is free of a type of internal contradiction afflicting it. Using 
them together as if they were on a par is a mistake, a (partial) regression to a less advanced 
standpoint. 
 Yet Hegel’s most significant innovation over the tradition is the type of system his 
approach makes possible. Logical laws derive from metaphysical categories, not from the form 
of intellectual self-reflection advocated by the tradition. This has an important consequence, 
anticipated earlier. Because the categories form a system, rather than an aggregate, the laws 
which derive from them do as well. Much in the way that each category gives rise to an internal 
conflict which its successor resolves, so too will each law. Hence, there will be deductive 
relations between laws and other laws. Lacking insight into the category-theoretic basis of the 
laws of logic, the tradition saw no such relations. Hegel’s alternative approach has allowed him 
to achieve a deduction of the principles on which all deductive argument depends. My aim in this 
chapter is to chronicle Hegel’s ambitious attempt to derive the laws of logic from one another. 
Essentially, this will require considering the sequence of categories from which those laws 
derive, and the deductive interrelations among them.  
 Here, the metaphor of the rhizome (mushroom) used in more recent Continental 
philosophy may help clarify Hegel’s project. If the laws of traditional logic are like mushrooms 
dispersed across a field, then the categories of Hegel’s ontology are like their roots reaching 
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down into the soil.  Unlike the mushrooms, which appear to be distinct individuals, the roots 159
are everywhere interconnected. Whereas the traditional laws confront us as disconnected, 
Hegel’s categories derive from one another. It is by taking this subterranean point of view that 
we learn where the nourishment for these mushrooms actually comes from. Again, characteristic 
features of the laws will turn out to be dependent on the categories. Yet it is also at this 
subterranean level where we discover that some of the laws of logic lack the firm basis of 
support we thought that they had. Some of these mushrooms are languishing in ways not visible 
on the surface, and should be uprooted. For Hegel not only wants to preserve old laws, but reject 
others and introduce new ones. New and stronger ones will grow up in place of the old.    
iii. Hegel on the laws of logic in the Leibniz/Wolff tradition 
 The five laws recognized by the formal logic of Hegel’s day differ from those familiar to 
us today. Here, it is important to note that the form of Scholastic-Aristotelianism of Hegel’s time 
was heavily influenced by Leibniz. Its logic includes principles integral to Leibniz’s thought. 
This is worth noting, since some of the laws are not ones we would typically consider logical 
today: 
 i. Identity: Everything is identical to itself (self-identical). A = A or A is A. 
 ii. Diversity (Identity of Indiscernibles/Indiscernability of identicals): Nothing can be  
 completely identical with anything else. Everything is different.  
 iii. Non-Contradiction: Nothing both is and is not itself. A ≠ A and -A. 
 iv. Excluded middle: For every thing, A, and every pair of opposed predicates, F and non- 
 F, every thing has either one or  the other. A is either F or non-F 
 v. Sufficient ground: Everything has a sufficient ground. 
 I here adapt the metaphor of a rhizome (mushroom), familiar from some recent French philosophy. It is used by 159
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) for a different purpose. They use it as an alternative to the arboreal (tree-based) one that 
philosophers like Descartes have used for the structure of human knowledge
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In keeping with Hegel’s approach, understanding the basis of each of these laws will require that 
we examine the ontological categories from which they derive. Hegel will begin with the 
category of identity, which is the basis of the law of identity. He will then proceed to derive a 
new category from it and therewith a new logical law. This will come about through the 
identification of a type of deficiency in the old that can only be resolved by the new. In this case, 
the new category is difference, and the successor law is the identity of indiscernables. At this 
point the process repeats. One peculiar feature of Hegel’s method is its simultaneously 
constructive and destructive character. On the one hand, each law of logic receives from the 
Hegelian system a more rigorous justification than it could have in the tradition. On the other, 
each suffers a more bracing critique than would have been given in that tradition either. An 
analogue to this in non-Hegelian philosophy would be the practice of developing the best 
possible version of an opponent’s argument — before trying to rebut it. 
 It would be natural to wonder why the laws of logic become relevant at this point in 
Hegel’s dialectic and no earlier. The answer, I believe, concerns the status of propositional form 
in the logic. Unlike some philosophers, Hegel regards the form of the proposition [Satz] as 
derivative, rather than primitive. Like all other conceptual resources, propositional form must be 
justified. The justification is as follows.  
 Whatever else it might be, propositional form is a multi-place relation. With one term, we 
do not yet have a proposition. Yet we do with two or more we do. Unless it is elliptical for 
something more complex, “Aristotle” is not by itself a proposition. By contrast, “Aristotle was 
born in such-and-such year” is a proposition. In deference to this, Hegel refers to propositions as 
“reflected,” playing on the connotations this term has of duality. Accordingly, propositional form 
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can only emerge only mid-way in the Logic, in the Doctrine of Essence. For it is there that we 
first come upon relational categories, or category pairs: whole and parts, cause and effect, form 
and content, and so on. More specifically, propositional form can only emerge we have become 
convinced of the inadequacy of earlier non-relational categories like those from the Doctrine of 
Being. 
 Yet even if propositional form arises in this way, this does not yet explain why a specific 
set of propositions, the laws of logic, become relevant at this stage. Why are the first 
propositions we consider the law of identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle, sufficient 
reason, and so on?  The answer I favor requires us to appreciate an additional facet of Hegel’s 
approach. Hegel tells us that the Doctrine of Essence will treat the same material as the Doctrine 
of Being, though from a different point of view.  
Because the one  concept is the substantial element in everything, the same 
determinations surface in the development of the essence as in the development of 
being, but in reflected  form. Hence, instead of being  and nothing,  the forms of 
the positive and the negative  now enter in, the former initially corresponding to 
the opposition-less being as identity,  the latter (shining in itself) developed as the 
difference…(EL § 114A) 
More specifically, the Doctrine of Essence will consider relational versions of the non-relational 
categories from Being (“the same determinations…but in reflected form”). Next comes the 
crucial step. For Hegel, identity is simply the relational version of the non-relational category of 
being. Unlike most other writers who discuss the identity relation,  Hegel takes seriously the 160
way that identity statements, those of the form “A is A,” use a conjugated form of the verb “to 
be.” Identity is to the Doctrine of Essence what Being was to the Doctrine of Being. That is why 
the law of identity only becomes relevant at this later stage.  
 An exception is Heidegger Identity and Difference (1969)160
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 What, though, of the other laws, e.g. non-contradiction? As we saw in our discussion of 
Fichte, the law of non-contradiction was considered a “negative” version of the law of identity in 
this tradition. It states that A ≠ -A. With this in mind, we can understand why Hegel chooses to 
discuss non-contradiction at this point as well. Moreover, we should note that a version of the 
same point about the Doctrine of Being applies here as well. If Identity is simply Being in the 
form of a relation, then difference is Nothing in the same form. When two things are different, 
one is not the other. If that is so, then an intriguing possibility suggests itself. It is that Hegel’s 
famous argument for the opening of the Logic concerning Being and Nothing is repeated here, 
albeit in a slightly different form. Before, Hegel argued for the paradoxical claim that Being and 
Nothing, non-relational categories, are the same. Now, he will argue that Identity and Difference, 
the corresponding relations, are the same as well. It is to this latter argument that I now turn. As I 
hope to show, it is this argument that holds the key to unlocking Hegel’s critique of the laws of 
logic as they were traditionally understood. 
 a) The law of identity 
 Hegel holds that the logical law of identity is informed by a specific, and perhaps 
questionable, understanding of the category of identity: “the identity of the understanding.”  
 Such a thought will always have only abstract identity in mind, and…alongside it,  
 difference. In its opinion, reason is no more than a loom intertwining warp (say, identity)  
 and woof (say, difference), joining them externally; or, if it turns to analysis, now   
 specifically pulling out identity, and at the same time also obtaining difference alongside  
 it. (WdL 11:261/SoL 357)  
On this account, identity completely excludes difference. Examples of identity-without-
difference are cases like the following: “a planet is a planet,” “magnetism is magnetism” and 
“the spirit is a spirit.” We might call these examples cases of strict identity. In such cases, there is 
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no difference at all between what is identified and itself. Even the slightest Difference, such as 
the difference between an object at itself at a slightly later point in time, would be incompatible 
with Identity in this sense. So too would a merely notional Difference, like the Difference 
between the object considered from one perspective and the same object considered from 
another. On this view, Identity excludes Difference of any kind. 
 Since this is the identity of the understanding, we should also briefly recall what Hegel 
means by this term. The understanding is defined by its tendency to draw distinctions, separating 
things from one another that should not be confused. In this case, it does with so with identity 
and difference. Yet we should also recall that Hegel regards the understanding’s perspective as 
superficial. Reason will ultimately show the distinctions it draws turn out to be less stark than it 
supposed. This will turn out to be the case with identity and difference as well.    
 For Hegel, the identity of the understanding is ultimately nonsensical. Identity does not 
exclude difference, but presupposes it. In other words, there can be no identity without 
difference. Hegel’s argument for this is simple. Identity is a relation, and a relation presupposes 
two different things to relate. The difference can be very slight, or even merely notional. Yet 
without any difference at all, we could not identify the things with one another. There would not 
be different things to identify with one another, but just one thing. Matters are not helped if we 
speak of numerical identity. Numerical identity is a relation as well. It obtains between two 
things when they are identical. Yet if there are two of them, they are not identical. The same 
problem arises at a different level. The point is summarized well by two later philosophers, 
neither of whom is a Hegelian: 
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The question whether identity is or is not a relation, and even whether there is 
such a concept at all, is not easy to answer. For, it may be said, identity cannot be 
a relation, since, where it is truly asserted, we have only one term, whereas two 
terms are required for a relation. And indeed identity, an objector may urge, 
cannot be anything at all: two terms plainly are not identical, and one term cannot 
be, for what is it identical with? (Russell 2015: 63) 
5.5303 Roughly speaking: to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, 
and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing. 
(Wittgenstein 2005: 62) 
 Even the abstract formal principle which states the law of identity (A=A) is not truly an 
instance of the “identity of the understanding,” at least not in the way it is often thought to be: 
More is entailed, therefore, in the form of the proposition expressing identity 
than simple, abstract identity; entailed by it is this pure movement of 
reflection in the course of which there emerges the other, but only as reflective 
shine, as immediate disappearing; “A is” is a beginning that envisages a 
something different before it to which the “A is” would proceed; but the “A 
is” never gets to it. “A is . . . A”: the difference is only a disappearing and the 
movement goes back into itself. – The propositional form can be regarded 
as the hidden necessity of adding to abstract identity the extra factor of that 
movement. (WdL 11:264/SoL 360) 
For Hegel, even the formal representation of identity presupposes that of difference. The subject-
predicate structure of judgment itself provides for two different places in which the same concept 
can be placed (A is A). Hence, the ease of formalizing pure identity in this way is deceptive. We 
are, in fact, relying on a formal representation of difference. Difference has been moved 
elsewhere, but not eliminated. Indeed, it can never be eliminated as long as the identity relation 
holds. It is for this reason that Hegel focuses not on the apparent ease of formally representing 
identity, but on the very real difficulty of explaining the meaning of the notion itself. Without 
recourse to empty formulae like A is A the inherent difficulties in defining this notion become 
apparent. Notoriously, identity is difficult to define in a non-circular way. We might claim that 
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identity is that relation which something stands in only to itself and nothing else. But what is to 
count as “itself” and what as “something else”? This we can only determine with recourse to a 
notion of identity, the notion we hoped to define. However, the problem that interests Hegel 
differs, even if it is one that is also sometimes brought up in later discussions. It is that the notion 
of identity seems to be inherently self-contradictory, since one can only identify what is different. 
 Even using the questionable strategy of justification that the tradition favors, we cannot 
justify the law of identity. The relevant stock of judgments from which we might abstract to 
discover the law of identity simply does not exist. Nobody in ordinary life makes judgments of 
the form “a planet is a planet,” “magnetism is magnetism,” and so on. People may do so in 
philosophy, but that is only because they are already under the influence of the questionable 
logical theory whose credentials are here in question. For Hegel, then, there are no such 
judgments from everyday life from which one could “abstract” and discover the “formal” 
principal: A=A. Consequently, this principle cannot be deemed inherent to the form of thought as 
such, as opposed to its contingently given matter. It is not a law of thought in the weighty sense 
the tradition favors, but a kind of contrivance. Hegel elaborates: 
If one maintains that this sentence cannot be proven but that each consciousness 
proceeds in accord with it and experientially concurs with it as soon as it hears it, 
then it is necessary to note, in opposition to this alleged experience of the school, 
the general experience that no consciousness thinks, has representations, and so 
forth, or speaks according to this law, that no concrete existence of any sort exists 
according to this law. Speaking according to this alleged [seinsollenden] law of 
truth (‘a planet is a planet,’ ‘magnetism is - magnetism,’ ‘the spirit is a spirit’) is 
considered, quite correctly, to be silly; this is presumably a universal experience. 
The school in which alone such laws are valid has, along with its logic which 
seriously propounds them, long since been discredited in the eyes of healthy 
common sense and in the eyes of reason. (EL § 115A) 
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To be sure, a certain process of abstraction has occurred in order to yield this law, but it is a 
highly dubious one. It is less a form of abstraction intended to reveal the form of the judgments 
we make in ordinary life than one intended to conceal their true form. The true form of the 
judgment is not “the identity of the understanding,” or identity without difference, A=A, but 
rather a form of identity in difference. This is reflected in the subject-predicate form of the 
judgment which does not simply repeat the subject-concept (“a magnet is a magnet”) but 
predicates something different of it (“a magnet is charged”). Sometimes, it is suggested that 
Hegel’s objection is little more than the common sense one that we do not regularly think and 
judge in the way traditional logic suggests. This is correct, but misleading. It implies an attitude 
of deference towards common sense which is alien both to Hegel and to traditional logic. This 
objection only gains its force when we recall that traditional logic, though it did not simply defer 
to ordinary thought, did rely on it. More specifically, this logic employed a method of abstraction 
intended to elicit the underlying structure of ordinary thought. Yet Hegel is denying the existence 
of the original stock of judgments there would need to be for this law to be discovered (as 
opposed to merely being invented). Hegel elaborates on this, essentially accusing logicians of 
altering the facts to fit their theory rather than deriving their theory from the facts: 
Formal identity or identity of the understanding is this identity insofar as one 
fastens on it and abstracts from the difference. Or the abstraction is rather the 
positing of this formal identity, the transformation of something in itself concrete 
into this form of simplicity - be it that a part of the manifold on hand in what is 
concrete is omitted (through so-called analysing) and only one of the manifold 
parts is taken up or that, with the omission of its diversity, the manifold 
determinations are pulled together into one. (EL § 115A) 
 Hegel puts the point a different way when he denies that the laws of logic or of thought 
are analytic, something the tradition tended to affirm. As he writes, “From this it is clear that the 
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principle of identity itself, and still more the principle of contradiction, are not of merely 
analytical but of synthetic nature” (WdL 11:265/SoL 360) We can reconstruct Hegel’s argument 
for this claim as follows. It is not contained in the very concept of an entity that this entity be 
identical with itself. In order to arrive at that conclusion, we need a further concept not contained 
in the first one, namely, the relational concept of identity. Only with the addition of this further 
concept can we get to the law of identity. That law connects the non-relational concept of an 
entity with itself by means of a further relational concept, the concept of a relation of identity 
holding between an entity and itself. This allows us to approach Hegel’s point about identity and 
difference another way. Consider an actual state-of-affairs in which there were only a single 
thing which was in so sense plural or different from itself. For Hegel, this would be a state-of-
affairs in which the identity relation, self-identity, would not be possible. We would simply have 
the entity, A, rather than a relation of self-identity, A=A.  
	 Yet another argument Hegel runs is that his opponent’s view is self-undermining. The 
reason is that identity and difference are inter-defined.  On Hegel’s view, we cannot define 161
identity except by contrasting it with difference. If that is so, however, then identity is 
inseparable from difference: 
 They do not see that in saying, “Identity is different from difference,” they have 
thereby already said that identity is something different. And since this must also 
be conceded as the nature of identity, the implication is that to be different 
belongs to identity not externally, but within it, in its nature. (WdL 11:262-3/SoL 
358) 
 The argument goes back to the section of Locke’s Essay titled “Of Identity and Diversity” where Locke argues 161
that the two are interdefined. This argument is discussed in Etienne Balibar’s recently translated book on Locke, 
Identity and Difference: John Locke and the Invention of Consciousness (2013).
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There is a further nuance to Hegel’s argument which suggests the position he is arguing for is 
bolder than may at first have been apparent. Difference is required to define identity, but not just 
because identity can only be defined contrastively with difference. There is a further reason. 
Difference is required to define identity because the contrastive relation just invoked in the 
definition of identity is itself is a relation of difference. In other words, difference is not just one 
of the relata in the identity-difference dyad, but the entire relation itself. There is a relation of 
difference between identity and difference.  However, this relation is prior to its terms, in that it 162
is required to define their meanings. Hence, difference is not just bound up with identity, but, in 
an important sense, prior to it.  163
 In a further version of the argument, Hegel raises another problem for his opponent’s 
position (WdL 11:264-5/SoL 360). Crudely summarized, the problem is that the inherent 
generality of the law of identity requires us to acknowledge that identity implies difference. The 
law “everything is identical with itself” has a certain inherent generality because it is meant to 
apply to every particular that there is. Yet inherent in the universal-particular relationship 
 This could be evidence for Priest’s suggestion, made in passing in his (1989), that Hegel’s Logic involves a 162
distinct class of paradoxes of self-reference, e.g., the liar, Russell’s paradox etc. To develop this suggestion further, I 
would claim that Hegel’s Logic contains conceptual paradoxes of self-reference. Here, the form of self-reference 
would differ. It would not be the reference of a sentence to itself e.g. “this sentence is false.” Nor would it be the 
inclusion of a set in itself, e.g. “the set of all sets that are not members of themselves.” Rather, it would be the 
application of a concept to itself. Usually, it is the application of a concept-pair to that very concept pair. For 
example, and to take another case from the Logic, consider the concepts of the indeterminate and the determinate. 
The former is the lack of any distinguishing characteristic, the latter is the possession of one. The former is what the 
latter is not and vice versa. Yet if that is so, then the indeterminate is determinate vis-a-vis the determinate. The same 
is true of the infinite and the finite. The former is the lack of any limitations, the latter is the possession of one (or 
more). The former is what the latter is not and vice versa. So the infinite is finite vis-a-vis the finite. In much the 
same way that dialethists like Priest regard paradoxes as counterexamples to the law of non-contradiction in its 
classical form, we could do so with these conceptual paradoxes. They push us towards conceding that a pair of 
concepts can be both identical and different. 
 Here,Hegel’s position anticipates that of G. Deleuze in Difference and Repetition. Deleuze’s position is that there 163
is a form of difference that is prior to identity. According to Deleuze, the Western philosophical tradition from 
Aristotle on has assumed that difference is always derivative of identity. Apparently Hegel is also guilty of this error. 
Given what I have argued here, his position may anticipate Deleuze’s more than at first be apparent. Of course, more 
is at stake in the so-called “philosophy of difference” than metaphysical questions. It is as much political as 
metaphysical, and concerns the ability to tolerate otherness.  
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implicitly acknowledged by the law of identity is difference, namely, the difference between the 
universal law and the particular instances falling under fit. Put another way, one can only 
recognize the law of identity, everything is identical with itself, if one already acknowledges the 
non-identity between the law itself and the particular instances falling under it. That non-identity 
between a law and the instances falling under it is part of what makes a law the distinctive sort of 
thing that it is. Hence, Hegel’s broader strategy is to undermine the law of identity by showing 
that it is incompatible with a basic presupposition of the idea of a law itself, namely, the inherent 
difference between the abstract law and its concrete applications. At times, Hegel will even go 
further than this. He will not simply maintain that there is a difference between the abstract law 
(“Everything is identical with itself”) and its concrete instances (“A tree is a tree”). He also 
argues that there is a difference between these so-called concrete instances (“A tree is a tree,”) 
and others more concrete still. The so-called concrete instance states that entities falling under a 
certain concept are identical with themselves (“any tree is identical with itself”) Yet we want to 
apply this concrete instance to others more concrete still by claiming that some particular entity 
is identical with itself (“this tree is identical with itself,” “that tree is identical with itself” and so 
on). Hence, there is difference at this level too. The lump has just been pushed around the carpet.  
 It is, perhaps, surprising that Hegel should be so dogged in his insistence that identity 
cannot be held apart from difference. Who has ever held otherwise, besides some forgotten 
logicians? Hence it is worth noting that Hegel’s main opponent in his critique of the “identity of 
the understanding” or “abstract identity” is very likely Schelling. Schelling endorses “the identity 
of the understanding” because it is the form of identity his system requires. At least in one of its 
more influential versions, the Schellingian system accords identity a foundational role. It is the 
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“first principle” of this system, much like the “I” is the first principle of Fichte’s. By this, I 
simply mean that it is a principle from which all other claims in Schelling’s system derive. Yet if 
identity is to be the system’s first principle, then it cannot presuppose any other principle for the 
following straightforward reason. All other principles are meant to derive from it rather than the 
reverse. Hegel’s claim that identity presupposes difference would therefore be profoundly 
threatening to Schelling. 
 b) Indiscernibility of identicals (PII) 
 “The law of diversity” is a version of Leibniz’s PII, and, once it is seen in this way, we 
can appreciate why it would follow from the law of identity (EL § 117A, Z). The law of identity 
states that everything is self-identical: a planet is a planet, magnetism is magnetism and so on. 
However, it also implies that nothing is identical to anything distinct from it: a planet is not 
magnetism, and so on. Reformulated, then, the principal states that every individual thing is 
different (from every other). 
 Much as he argued that there can be no identity without difference, Hegel here argues that 
there can be no difference without identity. Preliminarily, Hegel argues that it is not possible for 
two things to simply be different. They would have to be different in at least one respect(s). The 
reason is that it is only by identifying the respect in which they are different that we can cite the 
properties that differentiate them. If they are different in color, then that is because this one is 
blue and that one is red. For Hegel, then, there is no such thing as difference tout court. If two 
things were simply different, rather than differing in some specific respect, then we would be 
unable to identify the properties in virtue of which they were different. We would simply be able 
to say that they were different — which is not an effective way of differentiating them at all. 
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Having established that difference is always determinate difference, Hegel proceeds to argue that 
this entails identity. For Hegel, the prior claim is equivalent to another. I mean the claim that 
difference in some specific respect implies identity in some more general respect. The differing 
properties of each thing will always be determinates of some determinable. If two things are 
different colors, blue and yellow, then they are identical in respect of being colored, and so on. If 
they are numerically different, then they are, at the very least, both numbered. In this way, Hegel 
completes his demonstration of the mutual implication of identity and difference. Just as there 
can be no identity without difference, there can be no difference without identity.  
 c) Non-contradiction (PNC) 
 Here, we should recall from our discussion of Fichte that, traditionally, the law of non-
contradiction has been considered a version of the law of identity.  Hegel undoubtedly shares 164
this traditional view. As he writes: “The other expression of the principle of identity, “A cannot 
be A and not-A at the same time,” is in a negative form; it is called the “principle of 
contradiction.”” (WdL 11:265/SoL 360). At least in its traditional form, this law simply states 
that nothing which is identical to itself can, at the same time, differ from itself.  It cannot be the 
case that A = A and also -A.  
 Yet if the law of non-contradiction and that of identity are equivalent, then Hegel has 
already taken the decisive step in his rejection of non-contradiction. That is because his critique 
of the law of identity can double as a critique of the law of non-contradiction. That something 
can be both identical with itself and different from itself is exactly what Hegel asserts there. This 
is what he means when he claims that identity presupposes difference. Before he draws this 
 See Leibniz “Primary Truths” (1989). See also the discussion of Fichte on the laws of identity and non-164
contradiction above, where it was clear that Fichte relied on this Leibnizian conception of the laws as equivalent. 
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conclusion, however, Hegel consolidates the results of his critique of the laws of identity and 
diversity. He does so by considering two additional sets of categories that respect the 
interdependence of identity and difference: likeness and unlikeness, and, more importantly, 
opposition.  
 For Hegel, a superior set of categories which reflects the lesson of the critique of identity 
is likeness/unlikeness.  Things are always alike in some particular respect(s), rather than in all 165
respects. Yet this is to acknowledge that they are unlike in other respects. Similarly, things are 
always unlike in some respect(s) rather than in all. Yet this is to acknowledge they are alike in 
others. To acknowledge this is to accept that identity and difference are inseparable. As Hegel 
writes: 
Likeness is an identity only of such as are not the same, not identical to one 
another, and unlikeness is a relation of what is not alike. Hence, neither falls 
indifferently outside the other into diverse sides or aspects; instead, each is a 
shining into the other [rein Scheinen in die andere]. Diversity is thus difference of 
reflection or difference in itself, determinate difference. (EL § 118)  
 However, the problem with the category pair like and unlike is a form of arbitrariness it 
introduces into our thinking. As Hegel explains, the standard relative to which the things are 
deemed like or unlike is distinct from the things themselves. This means that there are, in 
principle, any number of standards relative to which things could be deemed like or unlike. 
Relative to one basis of comparison, two things can be alike rather than unlike. Relative to 
another, they can be like, rather than unlike. Like and unlike, then, are too arbitrary and 
subjective to constitute a genuine “definition of the Absolute.” 
 In my treatment of likeness and unlikeness, I follow Pippin (2018)165
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 A new category, opposition, is supposed to eliminate the arbitrariness inherent in 
diversity. In order to see why this is so we must first define this new category by defining what 
opposites are. This proves more difficult than might at first be apparent. Hegel’s discussion is 
certainly not short on examples (the two poles of a magnet, those of the planet, acid and base, 
positive and negative charge, positive and negative number, virtue and vice, asset and debt, east 
and west, light and darkness, and so on). However, examples are not a definition. An initial way 
to acclimate oneself to Hegel’s idea of opposition is simply to realize that a great many things are 
different even though they are not opposites. As Hegel explains, moral innocence like that which 
very young children or certain animals possess and moral vice are different. Yet they are not 
opposites in the way moral virtue and moral vice are. Here, then, are a set of conditions some 
pair of things must meet to be opposites: 
1. They are different. 
2. They are inter-defined 
3. They are negatively inter-defined 
4. They cannot be combined without “cancellation”                                                                 
5. Each is one of only two possible determinates of some determinable.  
6.   The opposites are, in a certain sense compatible with (1), identical. 
 Let us illustrate these conditions by considering some of Hegel’s examples. A negative 
number and the positive number that is its opposite, e.g., + 6 and - 6, are different (1). Moreover, 
they are inter-defined, since each is defined in terms of the other (2). In particular, each is 
defined as not being the other (3). We can see that this is so when we recall that there is little 
more to define a positive number and its negative counterpart then the fact that each is not the 
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other. We may, of course, use different signs for them (+, -). We may, alternatively, represent one 
as 6 hash marks left of the number 0 on the number line, and the other as 6 hash marks to the 
right of it. Even so, these designations are arbitrary. All that distinguishes the two numbers is that 
each is not the other. In this case too, the opposites cannot be combined without cancelling one 
another. Their sum is 0. In other words, they oppose one another, perhaps in the sense in which 
two opponents in some sort of contest do. Hegel does not shy away from speaking of them as 
bent on mutual annihilation (4). In spite of the fact that these numbers are opposites, there is 
nevertheless some property they share in common. In this case, there is the quantity itself, 6, 
considered irrespective of whether it is positive or negative, the so-called “absolute value.” 
Moreover, the positive and negative number are (the only) two ways to realize this absolute 
value. They are the only two determinates of one and the same determinable (5). Finally, Hegel 
draws from the foregoing the striking implication that the opposites are identical (6). He simply 
means the following. When we realize that each entails the other, we will realize that there is just 
one thing here comprised of two distinct parts. It is as if we are speaking imprecisely when we 
refer to a positive number or a negative one in isolation, since the existence of each always 
implies that of the other.  
 Another example: magnetism. The two poles of a magnet are different (1). Yet each is 
defined in terms of the other, since part of what it is to be a pole is to be one of a pair (2). In fact, 
each is only the particular pole that it is because it is not the other (3). One is called North and 
the other South because they correspond to the earth’s poles. However, these designations are 
ultimately arbitrary. Although they are distinct parts of one and the same entity, the magnet, the 
two poles are opposed. They cannot be combined further. There is no mixing or blending of them 
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together in the way there are of colors (4). Moreover, each pole, north and south, instantiates 
differently the same overarching property, e.g., polarity (5). They are the two possible 
determinates of a single determinable. Ultimately, the two poles are identical in a specific sense. 
Neither can exist without the other, so it makes sense to speak of one entity of which they are 
each distinct parts: the magnet.  
 Like diversity, opposition unites identity and difference, but it avoids the objectionable 
features of the latter.  
However, to say that the positive and the negative exist in themselves essentially 
implies that to be opposed is not a mere moment, nor that it is just a matter of 
comparison, but that it is the determination of the sides themselves of the 
opposition. (WdL 11:275/SoL 370) 
Let us briefly recall why diversity left us with the problem of subjectivism, arbitrariness and 
relativism so as to better understand how opposition resolves this problem. In diversity, two 
different things could be compared on any basis whatsoever. As a result, they could be identical 
or different, depending on which basis was selected. Yet no basis seemed significantly better than 
any other. Which basis was selected seemed to be a matter of the whims of an external observer. 
Yet once we move to the standpoint of opposition, the arbitrariness is removed. Henceforth, there 
is only one possible basis of comparison possible. For example, two opposite numbers are to be 
compared with respect to the two different ways in which the realize the same absolute value, 
two poles of a magnet with respect to the different ways in which they are charged, and so on. In 
this standpoint, then, there is an objective fact of the matter about whether and to what extent the 
two are identical and different. It is not relativized to the subjective standpoint of any particular 
observer.  
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 We are now in a position to understand Hegel’s rationale for what is undoubtedly among 
his most controversial positions, his rejection of the law of non-contradiction. As I hope to show, 
the need for this rejection is a consequence of Hegel’s definition of the Absolute as opposition. 
“Opposites entail contradiction…” (WdL 11:288/SoL 383). As we saw, each category (pair) can 
be reformulated as a definition of the Absolute. In this case, “the Absolute is opposition.” Once 
we recall that the Absolute is an empty placeholder, and that opposites are (inter-)defined as the 
negations of one another, however, we get a contradiction. The contradiction: X is F and not-F. 
 In its more familiar form, the law of non-contradiction includes a crucial caveat which 
Hegel appears to flagrantly disregard. It only forbids ascribing opposed properties to a thing at 
the same time and in the same respect. For this reason, it is necessary to distinguish between the 
mere appearance of contradiction and genuine contradiction. Presented with an apparent 
contradiction, we ought to apply this qualification so as to find out if the appearance can be 
explained away. If it can, there is no true contradiction. If not, then there is a contradiction. Yet 
Hegel appears not to do this.   166
 Here, I restrict myself to describing a few avenues of response I think worthy of being 
explored more than they have so far. 
 As we have seen, Hegel is part of a tradition that thinks of the law of non-contradiction as 
a version of the law of identity, A=A. The law of non-contradiction tells us that  A ≠ -A, or A ≠ A 
and -A. Moreover, Hegel’s rejection of the law of identity and therewith non-contradiction is 
reached through reflection on a type of paradox. This is the paradox that one only identify what 
is different. In this regard, Hegel resembles other critics of the law of non-contradiction, even if 
 See Russell: “And as for Hegel, he cries wolf  so often that when he gives the alarm of a contradiction we finally 166
cease to be disturbed.” (2015: 61)
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the paradox that interests them differs. If that is so, then perhaps it is here with the topic of 
identity that a defense could begin.  
 Why, then, would Hegel disregard the qualification? One immediate difficulty is that the 
qualification is question-begging. In attempting to explain away the possibility of a true 
contradiction, it invokes identity (“…same time…same respect”). Yet identity is what gave rise 
to the appearance of contradiction in the first place. Far from eliminating an apparent 
contradiction, the qualification multiplies it. In attempting to specify what it means to describe 
one moment in time as the same as another, or one respect as the same as another, we will 
encounter the same problems that led Hegel to the notion of true contradiction. In other words, 
we will have taken a more elaborate detour to the same destination. 
 Another promising resource in Hegel’s account is the idea that opposites are inter-
defined. They cannot be separated from one another, since each entails the other (no plus without 
minus, no positive without negative, and so on). Once we realize that is so, we can discern a 
potential vulnerability in the proposed strategy for explaining away contradiction. This strategy 
effectively amounts to separating out the opposites from one another. They are either referred to 
separate perspectives or standpoints on the object, or else said to occupy separate parts of it. 
Whatever the details of how Hegel’s traditional opponent proposes to separate the relevant 
properties, that is effectively what her strategy entails. However, separating the relevant 
properties from one another is exactly what Hegel has argued cannot be done in his account of 
opposites. Admittedly, their inseparability is dictated by Hegel’s metaphysics. When this 
metaphysics conflicts with a law of classical logic, a proponent of this logic might argue that the 
former should give way to the latter. Yet Hegel’s metaphysics-first approach rules this out. Hegel 
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regards logic as answerable to metaphysics, rather than the reverse. So the proponent of the 
tradition cannot respond in this way without begging the question against Hegel.  
 d) Excluded middle 
 Hegel’s main argument against the excluded third simply invokes his category of 
opposition. For Hegel, it is possible for something to have both of two opposed properties. 
Indeed, Hegel’s claim is stronger. It is that things just are unities of opposed properties: 
Instead of speaking in terms of the principle of excluded middle (the principle of 
abstract understanding), one should rather say: everything is opposed. Indeed, 
neither in heaven nor on earth, neither in the spiritual nor in the natural world, is 
there any such abstract either/or of the sort that the understanding maintains. 
Everything that is some sort of thing is something concrete, something that is in 
itself thereby differentiated and opposed. The finitude of things consists then in 
the fact that their immediate existence [Daseinl does not correspond to what they 
are in themselves. Thus, for example, in inorganic nature, an acid is in itself at the 
same time a base, that is to say, its being is simply only this, to be related to its 
other. With this, however, an acid is also not something quietly perduring in 
opposition but instead is striving to posit itself as what it is in itself. Contradiction 
is what moves the world in general and it is ridiculous to say that contradiction 
cannot be thought. (EL 119 + Z2) 
Moreover, Hegel claims that in cases of opposition, A and -A, there is a third property which is 
neither. In other words, there is a third which we must not exclude. This third is the determinable 
of which each of the opposed properties is a determinate instance. For example: there are the 6 
dollars, as opposed to the 6 dollars in assets or 6 dollars in debts, the 6 miles, as opposed to the 6 
miles from the east and the 6 miles from the west, and so on. 
Difference in itself yields the principle: ‘Everything is something essentially 
differentiated' or, as it has also been expressed, Only one of two opposite 
predicates pertain to a particular something and there is no third.’ …The 
principle of the excluded third is the principle of the determinate understanding 
that wants to refrain from contradiction and, in doing so, contradicts itself. A is 
supposed to be +A or -A; but the third, the A, is thereby articulated, something 
which is neither + nor - and that is posited just as much as +A and as -A are. If 
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+W 6 means 6 miles in a westerly direction and - W 6 means 6 miles in an easterly 
direction, and + and - cancel one another [sich aufheben], then the 6 miles of the 
way or space remain what they were with and without the opposition. Even the 
mere plus and minus of the number or the abstract direction have, if one will, zero 
as their third. But it should not be denied that the empty opposition of the 
understanding, signaled by +and -, also has its place in the case of such 
abstractions as number, direction, and so forth. (EL § 119A) 
As is well known, the law of excluded middle does not apply to “contrary” properties (blue and 
not blue, where not blue entails being some other color). That is because, if it did, there would be 
clear counter-examples. Some things are neither of the contraries (they are neither blue nor some 
non-blue color for the simple reason that they are not colored at all). If that is so, then we must 
adjust the law so that it only applies to “contradictories” (blue and non-blue, where non-blue 
does not entail being any color). However, Hegel regards this new version as resulting in an 
incoherence of another kind. For Hegel, it is meaningless to describe something as non-blue. 
This is exactly the type of indeterminate difference Hegel rejects in the opening arguments of the 
logic when he denies that (indeterminate) Nothing is a legitimate definition of the Absolute. 
There is only ever determinate negation, never indeterminate: being some non-blue color is 
allowed, but simply being non-blue is not. More pertinently, and as we saw earlier, Hegel also 
denies that there is any such thing as (indeterminate) Difference, as opposed to difference in 
some respect. The upshot is the same in both the relational and non-relational case. Here, Hegel 
elaborates on this claim. From his point of view, it would be nonsensical to say that spirit and 
blue are, in some sense, different, but not specify in what respect they are different, such as 
different in color. Yet if something is no color at all, then we should simply refuse to attach any 
color predicate to it rather than claim that it has the color predicate non-blue. 
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 e) Sufficient reason (PSR) 
 Philosophers of the Leibniz Wolff school embraced the principle of sufficient reason or, 
as Hegel calls it, ground: every thing has a sufficient ground, reason or cause for its existence. 
Perhaps surprisingly, they viewed it as a principle of logic alongside those of identity and non-
contradiction. To some commentators, this would be yet another instance of the ontological 
tendency in traditional logic. This is a tendency they think Hegel must reject as inconsistent with 
Kant’s copernican revolution in philosophy. As I hope to show, Hegel does criticize the PSR, but 
not from a Kantian-idealist direction. Moreover, he does not reject it wholesale. He claims to 
have achieved deeper insight into why this law obtains, where it does. While for some of these 
figures the principle is brute or near enough so, Hegel disagrees. If the principle of sufficient 
reason holds, then this will be for the simple reason that is the legitimate successor to the 
preceding logical laws. Before turning to this point, I want to briefly explain the broader 
Hegelian perspective on the PSR it reflects.   167
 Hegel confronts an orthodox opponent of the PSR with a dilemma. This is a dilemma that 
arises when we ask: what justifies the PSR itself? Hegel calls this “the demand addressed to…
logic for a justification of the principle of the ground” (EL § 121 + Z). For Hegel, this is 
equivalent to asking if there is a sufficient reason for the principle of sufficient reason itself. Yet 
when we do, we confront two unpalatable alternatives. If there is a sufficient reason for it, then 
this implies that the principle of sufficient reason is not ultimate in the way it has often been 
thought to be. Rather, whatever explains it is ultimate. Alternatively, we may claim there is no 
sufficient reason for the principle of reason. This might allow it to remain ultimate. Yet its 
 I here follow Leukos, who describes this as Hegelian “meta-grounding,” i.e. grounding grounding itself.  167
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ultimacy would come at a serious cost. It would mean that the PSR was false. There would be 
brute facts for which no explanation could be given, and the PSR would be the main example of 
one. It would be a counter-example to itself. It would contradict itself. In spite of the drastic costs 
of this second avenue of response, Hegel thinks that it is the one most logicians of the day chose. 
They treated the PSR as a type of brute fact: 
This is then also the simple sense of the so-called principle [Denkgesetzl of 
sufficient reason…Formal logic, incidentally, provides the other sciences with a 
bad example, inasmuch as it demands that the sciences not allow their content to 
be immediately valid, and nonetheless sets up this principle without deriving it 
and pointing out its mediation. With the same reason that the logician maintains 
that our capacity of thinking is simply so constituted that we have to ask for a 
ground in every case, the physician, asked why someone who falls into the water 
drowns, could also answer that human beings are simply so constructed not to be 
able to live under water. So, too, a judge, if asked why a criminal is punished, 
could answer that civil society is simply so constituted that criminals are not 
allowed to go unpunished. But even if one is to set aside the demand addressed to 
the logic for a justification of the principle of the ground… (EL § 121 + Z) 
As he has so often before, Hegel accuses formal logic of hypocrisy. It omits an argument for the 
principles on which all rational argument depend, in this case the PSR. In so doing, logic 
exempts itself from the requirement it rightly insists all other sciences meet. Moreover, Hegel 
here alludes to what we have seen is the main source logicians appeal to when they invoke brute 
fact: (philosophical) psychology. In particular, Hegel describes traditional logic’s practice of 
maintaining that our faculties are just so constituted that we adhere to principles like the PSR in 
our thinking. 
 For Hegel, the PSR does hold good in certain spheres, but it is not a brute fact that it 
does. Rather, it is Hegel’s theory of the categories which explains why this principle holds good 
when it does. More specifically, the explanation takes the form of a deduction of the category of 
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ground itself from earlier categories. This deduction shows why ground is the necessary 
successor to the earlier ones. It therefore explains why the law of logic correlative with ground, 
the principle of sufficient ground, holds good when it does. More specifically, Hegel will show 
that ground provides the best resolution considered so far to the problem posed by the two 
preceding categories, identity and difference. This is the paradox that for two things to be 
identical they must be different and vice versa.  Somehow, ground will unite the two in a non-168
paradoxical way. As he writes, “The ground  is the unity of identity and difference; the truth of 
what the difference and the identity have turned out  to be” (EL § 121). 
 In order to understand why the category of ground should have this relationship to its 
predecessors, those of identity and difference, we need to rehearse its definition. A sufficient 
ground is not just any cause or reason, but one that is decisive. It is a cause that suffices for its 
effect. In short, a sufficient ground suffices to ground what it grounds. If a sufficient ground is in 
place, then no further supplementary ground is necessary for the outcome. Nor, it seems, can any 
other ground interfere to prevent the outcome. In short, it is logically or conceptually impossible 
that a sufficient ground should fail to suffice. How, though, can a sufficient ground be so reliably 
connected to what it grounds? After all, the causes or reasons with which we are familiar often 
seem not to be reliable in this way. 
 Enter identity-in-difference. For Hegel, the connection can only reliably obtain if there 
are not two distinct entities here at all, ground and grounded, but, rather, a single entity with two 
aspects. More specifically, Hegel proposes that ground and grounded are simply the same 
 In effect, this is to show that the category of ground derives from those of identity and difference, but it is also to 168
show something more important still. Here, we should recall that each category has its correlative law of logic, and 
that the deductive relations among categories imply corresponding ones among laws. This means that Hegel will 
have shown that the PSR derives from the law of identity and non-contradiction.  
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content in a different form. Only in this way can we explain why one should always accompany 
the other. Here, Hegel reprises his previous argument that identity and difference are inseparable. 
However, he applies it to the case of grounds. For example, consider the ground in question as a 
type of cause. A body strikes another, allowing it to gain momentum. If it is to be the sufficient 
ground of the gain in momentum, then it must itself have that same amount of momentum. The 
change, then, simply involves one body conveying its momentum to the other. One and the same 
content, two different forms. 
 For Hegel, the problem with sufficient ground is that it gives rise to a paradox of its own. 
Just because a certain ground is sufficient does not mean that no other would be. In general, a 
sufficient condition need not be necessary, and this is the case here as well. Nor does it even 
mean that there could not be a sufficient ground for the very opposite of what was to be 
grounded. That there is a sufficient ground for one thing does not rule out the possibility of a 
sufficient ground for the opposite. The paradoxical scenario that results is one in which there 
could be two grounds, each sufficient to ground the opposite outcome, each sufficient to ground 
an outcome incompatible with the other. If they are sufficient grounds, then both, in and of 
themselves, guarantee their outcome. Yet their two opposed outcomes cannot both occur. Indeed, 
this is as much a problem in the case of concurring sufficient grounds for a single event. This 
would seem to entail that the event occur twice, though many events cannot, e.g., death. I leave 
such cases of “overdetermination” aside.  
 Although it can sometimes seem like it, Hegel is not just making a commonplace 
observation about a type of scenario we are apt to encounter in our ordinary lives. I mean a 
situation in which we cannot ourselves identify a single sufficient ground for something, or even 
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a situation in which there does not seem to be one. The problem is not epistemic but logical or 
conceptual. In short, Hegel is identifying a paradox that is inherent to the notion of sufficient 
ground itself. This notion is defined in such a way that it allows for this paradoxical state of 
affairs to arise. Hegel believes the concern is particularly acute in the normative domain. That it 
is wrong to steal is a sufficient reason for not doing so. That it is necessary to preserve one’s life 
is a sufficient reason for doing so. Since a sufficient reason is decisive, the result is that both 
actions are necessary. Yet only one can be performed. 
 The possibility that there might be multiple, even opposed, sufficient grounds seems not 
to have been considered a particularly threatening one by rationalist metaphysicians. In all 
likelihood, they would agree that it leads to exactly the absurdities Hegel identifies. Yet Hegel 
and the rationalists draw different implications from the possibility of such absurd scenarios. For 
the rationalists, the implication is that we must stipulate from the outset that there can only ever 
be one sufficient cause, perhaps by laying down as axiomatic that God would not allow anything 
of the sort. For Hegel, this is ad-hoc, especially in the context of a theory of the categories. In 
this context, no such deus ex machina is permissible. Instead, the correct implication to draw is 
that we must proceed to consider a new category which solves the problems of the old. More 
specifically, we must embrace a new and different conception of a ground that ensures 
sufficiency while avoiding the problems of multiplicity or opposition discussed earlier.  
 Surprisingly, Hegel finds inspiration for this approach in Leibniz himself, who he was 
always careful to distinguish from the thinkers of the Leibniz-Wolff school. Hegel attributes to 
Leibniz the solution of that rejects efficient causes in favor of final causes: “…by “sufficient 
ground” Leibniz understood one that sufficed also for this unity and comprehended, therefore, 
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not just causes but final causes” (WdL 11:293/SoL 388) An efficient cause is the sufficient 
ground of some effect distinct from itself. This opens up the possibility of multiple, even of 
conflicting sufficient grounds. Yet (internal) teleology helps us avoid this problem.  Here, the 169
form of teleology in question is not the external form, which obtains when some entity has as its 
purpose the promotion of some other entity distinct from itself: for example, rain-fall for the sake 
of crop growth so that humans can have food to eat. Instead, we are here concerned with the 
internal variety of purposiveness, which is when something exists for the sake itself: for 
example, the constitution of an organism existing for the purpose of preserving the organism’s 
continued existence. The reason Hegel believes that internal teleology can resolve the problems 
with the PSR is that it allows us to see something (an organism) as its own sufficient ground. 
Since in the organic case a thing’s sufficient ground is not distinct from itself, there is no 
possibility of there being multiple grounds, or opposed ones. It is through allowing a type of self-
grounding characteristic of the living that we forestall the problem of multiple, conflicting 
grounds. Yet there is a sense in which any such solution would be premature at this stage. 
Teleology will not enter the argument until well after the Doctrine of Essence in the Doctrine of 
the Concept.  
iv. Conclusion: Dialetheism, Hylomorphism, Modality 
 Often, resistance to dialetheism is based on the suspicion that it is fundamentally anti-
intellectual, stymieing our most basic efforts to understand the world. Yet to Hegel and his 
followers, nothing could be further than the truth. Accepting true contradictions promises to 
enrich our understanding of the world immeasurably, and in nearly all its aspects. In this 
 Once again, I follow Leukos (unpublished), who also describes internal teleology as the solution. 169
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concluding section, I want to consider two additional areas in which Hegel thought rejecting 
traditional logic could yield results: hylomorphic metaphysics (form and matter) and modality 
(necessity, possibility and actuality). My discussion here in this concluding section is somewhat 
more speculative than in previous ones since the connection is mostly implicit in the text. 
 As we saw, Hegel maintains that traditional logic is ill-suited to metaphysics and must be 
overhauled if the latter is to make progress. This is reflected in Hegel’s Aristotle-interpretation. 
Hegel accuses Aristotle of lacking a logic sufficiently rigorous to accommodate his justly 
celebrated metaphysics. The following passages are representative: 
Aristotle is thus the originator of the logic of the understanding; its forms only 
concern the relationship of finite to finite, and in them the truth cannot be grasped. 
But it must be remarked that Aristotle’s philosophy is not by any means founded 
on this relationship of the understanding; thus it must not be thought that it is in 
accordance with these syllogisms that Aristotle has thought. If Aristotle did so, he 
would not be the speculative philosopher that we have recognized him to be; none 
of his propositions could have been laid down, and he could not have made any 
step forward, if he had kept to the forms of this ordinary logic. (VGP: “Aristotle 4. 
The Logic”) 
Although this accomplishment [in logic] brings Aristotle great honour, by no 
means is it the forms of syllogistic inference at the level of understanding or at the 
level generally of finite thinking that he employed in his genuine philosophical 
investigations (EL § 183  Z) 
In light of this peculiar feature of Hegel’s Aristotle-interpretation, it is noteworthy that the 
Doctrine of Essence includes not only Hegel’s most trenchant critique of traditional logic, but 
also his most extensive engagement with the figure he regards as the greatest metaphysician: 
Aristotle. What, though, might these two parts — one at the very beginning and the other at the 
end — have to do with one another? Hegel’s provocative suggestion seems to be the following. 
Rejecting the professedly Aristotelian logical theory of the tradition is a prerequisite to 
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appreciating what is most profound in Aristotle’s own metaphysics. In other words, the critique 
of the formal logic of the tradition given at the outset prepares the way for the re-appropriation of 
Aristotle’s metaphysics at the close. Why, though, might the traditional formal logic constitute an 
impediment to that metaphysics?  
 Here, I speculate that the law of non-contradiction in its traditional form is incompatible 
with central doctrines of Aristotelian metaphysics: for example, hylomorphism. In order to see 
that this so, consider form and matter, the central categories of Aristotle’s metaphysics and also 
ones treated by Hegel in the Doctrine of Essence.  It is easy to understand why Hegel would 170
have thought they require a rejection of the law of non-contradiction. Whatever else they might 
happen to be, the two are opposites in Hegel’s technical sense of the term. Where there is 
opposition, there is true contradiction. Let us now see why form and matter are opposites in this 
technical sense, and therefore counter-example to the law of non-contradiction. In the first place, 
each is defined as what the other is not. Yet they are also (logically, conceptually) inseparable 
from one another. If that is so, then there is an important sense in which they are identical, parts 
of a single structure. For Hegel, then, each is both itself and what it is not. It is therefore 
unsurprising that the Doctrine of Essence should begin by rejecting the laws of identity and non-
contradiction, and then proceed to consider form and matter. Aristotle’s hylomorphism is a 
position we can embrace when we pass beyond the law of non-contradiction Aristotle himself 
thought fundamental. 
 A similar line of argument is pursued by Priest (1979), though with an important difference. Priest claims that 170
there is a relation which explains the unity of an object’s parts. He calls this relation a gluon, and claims it has 
contradictory properties. However, he emphatically denies that Aristotelian substantial forms are gluons, even 
though they are meant to discharge a similar function.  
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 Similarly, consider energeia, the process of actualizing a form in matter: for example, an 
acorn maturing into an oak. As Hegel tells us in his lectures, Aristotle had arrived at this notion 
by making an amendment to the Heraclitian idea of becoming (VGP: “Aristotle: Physics”). 
Aristotle had argued that there is no such thing as a process of becoming-as-such, but only 
becoming some particular type of thing or other: for example, an oak. As a process of becoming, 
energeia is a unity of being and nothing, though of being and not-being some particular type of 
thing. Just as something coming to be or ceasing to be both is and is not, something coming to be 
or ceasing to be an oak tree both is or is not an oak tree. This aspect of Heraclitus’s view has 
survived the transition to Aristotle’s teleological framework, and remains one of the main 
examples of dialetheia or true-contradiction to this day. Again, the placement of actuality in the 
text is significant here, and for much the same reason as before.  
 In addition to treating the laws of logic, the Doctrine of Essence also treats modal notions 
(possibility, actuality, necessity), and I here want to suggest that these two areas of Hegel’s 
thought are also closely connected. Hegel’s most characteristic doctrine in the area of modality is 
his “actualism.”  This is the claim that all possible states of affairs are grounded in actual ones. 171
If it is possible for a plant to fall ill, then that is a possibility which is grounded in actual facts 
about the plant’s nature. Traditionally, the scope of possibilities was thought to be much broader, 
and not delimited in this way. Anything is possible that does not involve a logical contradiction, 
and this means there are many possibilities that are not grounded in actual states of affairs. It is 
technically possible that a plant should turn into an opera singer and perform an aria, even 
though this is a possibility in no way provided for by actual facts about the plant’s nature. 
 See Zambrana (2018) for a recent treatment of Hegel’s “actualism” and also Redding (2019). By “actualism” 171
Redding means something slightly different than I do.
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Whether we agree with Hegel’s actualism or not, it should be clear that it follows rather directly 
from his critique of traditional logic. For Hegel, the law of non-contradiction is just the negative 
version of the law of identity. Moreover, the law of identity is false. Nothing is self-identical in 
the strict sense, or non-contradictory. Everything is both self-identical and self-external. For this 
reason, Hegel denies that the logical criterion for being possible is ever met. He considers this a 
reductio of the traditional definition of possibility.  
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VI.     Hegel on Concept, Judgment and Syllogism 
     
 In this chapter, I reconstruct Hegel’s theory of concept, judgment and syllogism. These 
are topics traditionally treated in logic, but Hegel adopts a different approach to them. As we 
have seen, the tradition regarded these as forms of thinking, discoverable through a process of 
abstraction from thought’s sensibly given matter. Hegel objects that this approach renders the 
justification of these principles a brute fact, and in a way that is objectionable. For Hegel, we 
ought to be able to legitimate the use of these materials through some type of argument. Hegel 
will claim as he has before that this can only be achieved metaphysically. Concept, judgment and 
syllogism ought to figure in our thinking because they articulate the way that reality itself is 
structured. Here, these logical structures enter into Hegel’s account in a new and unprecedented 
role. Traditionally, these principles were subjective, meaning they were “in” the subject whose 
psychological faculties were the source from which they sprung. Yet in Hegel’s account they are 
objective, “in” the world.  More specifically, they are forms of being, refined versions of the 172
principle from which we began. In recent years, this thesis has come to be known as Hegel’s 
conceptual realism, and among (neo-) metaphysical interpreters it is the standard view. Yet I 
hope to go beyond existing treatments by clarifying the argument Hegel gives for this position, 
an argument I believe is more powerful than has been appreciated. Hegel’s argument for his 
account of reality’s structure is that all other accounts will necessarily self-undermine. That is 
because all other accounts will confront a type of problem that only a conception of the nature of 
reality as conceptual through and through resolves.  
 Tolley (2019) uses this language, and makes this point.172
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 Ultimately, then, Hegel’s argument for defining the Absolute as the Concept is simple. It 
is that this definition solves problems no other can. More specifically, Hegel will argue that there 
are three broad classes of definition besides, including the one to which his own favored 
definition, the Concept, belongs. Each of the other two broad classes of definition gives rise to a 
characteristic type of problem. Only those of a third broad type, which includes the Concept, can 
solve these problems. 
 In the first division of the Logic (the Doctrine of Being), Hegel will consider the 
categories of “immediacy” [Unmittelbarkeit]. These are non-relational categories. In other words, 
they characterize a thing as capable of being what it is independent of its relations to other 
things. Each such category is considered singly and is meant to be sufficient unto itself. 
Examples include the categories of quality and quantity. Hegel argues that such categories 
exhibit a problem he calls “passing into another” [Ubergehen in Anderes]. The problem is that 
these non-relational categories turn out to be relational after all. They seem to characterize the 
thing in question in non-relational terms. Yet it then turns out that these things, so defined, can 
only be what they are because of their relations to others.  
 In the second (the Doctrine of Essence), Hegel will consider the categories of 
“mediation” [Vermittlung]. These are explicitly relational categories. They characterize a thing as 
being what it is because of its dependence on something further, something independent of it. 
These categories come in pairs, ones in which their is asymmetric dependence of one term on the 
other. I mean pairs in which which the first term depends on the second to be what it is without 
their being a corresponding type of dependence in the other direction. For example, the effect 
depends on the cause, though not vice versa. Yet these categories exhibit a problem Hegel calls 
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“shining into  another” [Scheinen in Anderes]. The one-way relation of dependence they purport 
to identify turns out on closer inspection to be a complex form of interdependence. 
 In the third (the Doctrine of the Concept), Hegel will consider categories involving both 
“mediation” and “immediacy” at once (“… sich als das durch und mit sich selbst Vermittelte und 
hiermit zugleich als das wahrhaft Unmittelbare erweist”) (EL § 83 + Z). As before, they 
characterize a thing as mediated, dependent upon another to be what it is. Unlike before, 
however, this proves compatible with immediacy, since the other on which the thing depends is 
none other than itself in a different guise. At least initially, these categories come in trios. The 
main example is the structure Hegel calls “the Concept.” Hegel’s example of such a structure is 
the triadic one made up of the genus animal, the species horse, and, then, finally, the individual, 
this horse. For reasons I will go into below, these categories solve the problems of “shining into 
another” and “passing intro another.” Hegel calls the solution “development,” [Entwicklung] a 
term whose associations with the organic he readily exploits. 
 This chapter falls into four parts. In the first, I situate my account in relation to a debate 
in the recent literature between Jim Kreines and Robert Stern. In the second, I consider the 
categories of immediacy (Being) and the problem of passing into another. In the third, I consider 
the categories of mediation (Essence) and the problem of shining into another. In the fourth, I 
consider the Concept - the first category to unite immediacy and mediation - and show that it 
resolves the problems with the categories in the previous divisions, doing so through a process 
Hegel calls development. 
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i. What is Hegel’s argument for conceptual realism? The Kreines Stern debate  173
 By most accounts, Hegel defends an account of the nature of reality as “the Concept.” 
Some recent authors equate that account of reality with a position in metaphysics they call 
“conceptual realism.”  For these interpreters, Hegel is a conceptual realist because he is a 174
realist rather than a nominalist about universals. Moreover, Hegel is said to follow the 
Aristotelian tradition in viewing universals as immanent within the things that instantiate them. 
For this reason, he rejects a familiar Platonic conception of universals as transcending the things 
that instantiate them. Finally, Hegel is taken to view these immanent universals as prescribing to 
entities, especially teleologically organized entities like artifacts and organisms, the kind to 
which they belong. As a result, these immanent universals have a crucial metaphysical role in 
constituting entities as the distinctive kinds of entities they are and making them behave in the 
characteristic ways that they do. However, they also play a crucial epistemological role in our 
attempts to explain these facets of such entities.  
 Though agreed that Hegel is a conceptual realist, these interpreters disagree about how he 
defends that view.  I will consider and reject the two main proposals from the recent literature, 175
before turning to a third. In my view, Hegel’s justification is furnished by his theory of the 
categories. That theory yields an argument that runs as follows: Conceiving of reality as the 
Concept solves the two broad types of problem afflicting any other conception of reality.  
 I here follow Knappik (2016), who also poses this question. I also endorse Knappik’s answer to this question, at 173
least in broad strokes. On his view, it is the Logic as a whole which contains Hegel’s argument.
 Knappik (2016) even goes so far as to call this “the consensus view.”174
 See the exchange between Kreines and Stern (2016) in a recent issue of the Hegel Bulletin.175
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a) “Nothing but a presupposed fact of the Kantian philosophy”: Hegel and the 
“analytic/regressive” method 
 In recent work, Robert Stern (2009, 2016) has argued that Hegel defends his “conceptual 
realism” through a method of argument similar to the so-called “analytic/regressive” one from 
Kant’s Critical Philosophy.  In other words, Stern thinks Hegel defends his “conceptual 176
realism” on the grounds that this metaphysical doctrine is uniquely well suited to explain the 
possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge, particularly in the natural scientific domain. 
 As far as I know, however, there is only a single passage from the Logic in which Hegel 
explicitly discusses what Kant called the “the analytic/regressive” strategy of argument. Stern 
does not consider this passage, but I will argue that it raises both exegetical and philosophical 
problems for his interpretation (EL § 40A). Kant’s “analytic/regressive” strategy of argument 
presupposes that the natural sciences, at least, give us synthetic a priori knowledge. Yet Hegel 
denounces this presupposition as illegitimate: “nothing but a presupposed fact [of] the Kantian 
philosophy.” For Hegel, this presupposition is illegitimate because it begs the question against 
the Humean skeptic. The Humean skeptic can at least grant that we appear to have such 
knowledge:  “the fact that…universality and necessity [synthetic a priori knowledge - JM] are 
found in knowing is not disputed by Humean skepticism.” Unlike Kant, however, the Humean 
skeptic regards the appearance that we have such knowledge as misleading, a product of 
unreliable (or perhaps even error-prone) mechanisms in the human mind. For example, such a 
skeptic can agree that we appear to have knowledge of universal laws of nature. Yet she need not 
 I here defer to Stern’s account of what that strategy of argument consists in.176
!238
agree to the further claim that we actually do have such knowledge. This appearance, she would 
say, is misleading, a product of the fallacious inference that what has held true in all observed 
instances must hold true in all possible instances. 
 For Hegel, only the claim that we appear to possess synthetic a priori knowledge 
furnishes a truly neutral starting point for the debate between Kant and Hume. Once reframed in 
this way, however, the debate cannot be adjudicated in Kant’s favor. As an explanation of the fact 
that we do, in fact, possess synthetic a priori knowledge, Kant’s explanation may be preferable. 
From a certain perspective, any explanation would be, since the Humean view, denying that there 
is any fact standing in need of explanation, gives none. As explanations of the fact that we 
merely appear to have such knowledge, though, the two are on all fours with one another. Hence 
Hegel’s central criticism of Kant: Compared to the Humean skeptic, Kant has “merely put 
forward a different explanation of [the same] fact.”     177
 As I will interpret it, Hegel’s presuppositionless approach to deriving the categories will 
not presuppose that we are in possession of synthetic a priori knowledge. In this regard, it will 
not beg the question against the Humean skeptic. However, even a presuppositionless 
investigation of the fundamental concepts Hegel calls categories presupposes something not all 
opponents would grant. It presupposes that these fundamental concepts are of philosophical 
interest. Hence, it could be rejected by a radical empiricist who attempts to reduce all of human 
thought to the one stem of our cognitive power Kant called sensibility and is doubtful that the 
 Hegel does not appear to take seriously the possibility of arguing from the premise that we have synthetic a priori 177
knowledge in mathematics. Like the early analytic critics of Kant, Hegel rejects the claim that mathematical truths 
are synthetic at all, let alone synthetic a priori. He thinks they are analytic. Hegel’s position is developed through a 
detailed and painstaking critique of Kant’s own. In the first division of the Logic, Hegel expends considerable effort 
attempting to show that Kant’s examples (e.g., 7+5=12) do not support his claim that such truths are synthetic (WdL 
21:198/ SoL 172 ).
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other, understanding, has any significant role. Since the Humean skeptic is presumably one such 
radical empiricist, we appear to be back where we started. This alternative starting point may still 
beg the question against the Humean after all, even if not for exactly the same reason as before.  
Fortunately, Hegel has a response to such an opponent. In the introductory materials to 
the Science of Logic, Hegel responds to a critic in a way that is relevant to the present dispute. 
Hegel chooses as his system’s first principle the concept of being, but this critic rejects Hegel’s 
decision to begin from a first principle that is conceptual, rather than one that is non-conceptual, 
or purely sensible in character. (WdL 21:55/SoL 47, ). This critic can agree with part of Hegel’s 
case for beginning in this way. He or she can concede that such a first principle is presupposed 
by all other candidate concepts: the concept of the “I,” (Fichte) “substance” (Spinoza) 
“Indifference” (Schelling) and so on. Minimally, all are concepts of things that “are,” and so 
presuppose some antecedent grasp of the concept of “being.” Relative to these further concepts, 
then, the concept of being has priority. However, this critic points out that such a first principle, 
since it is a concept, will not necessarily be presupposed by a non-conceptual or sensible first 
principle: for example, the empiricist’s impressions of which all ideas are mere copies. Relative 
to the concept of being, then, and, indeed, all others, the sensible takes precedence, at least on 
this empiricist view.  
 In response, Hegel concedes that the Logic, taken in isolation, begs the question against 
such a radical empiricist opponent, but argues that it does not do so when it is understood to 
function in concert with the opening arguments of the Phenomenology, a work described here as 
an introduction to the philosophical system whose first part is set forth in the Logic (WdL 21:55, 
SoL 47). In Hegel’s view, the opening arguments of the Phenomenology, particularly the 
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argument of “Sense-Certainty,” refute this radical empiricist opponent by revealing his proposed 
first principle to be untenable. At least when he reprises this argument in the introduction to the 
lesser Logic, Hegel emphasizes one point in particular (EL § 20A). As Hegel reminds us, the 
protagonist of sense-certainty, as soon as he is called upon to report what he knows in language, 
must employ demonstrative/indexical concepts such as “this” “here” and “now.” Yet the inherent 
generality of these concepts betray the protagonist’s intention of referring to the particular-qua-
particular that sense-perception is supposed to yield. At least in this version of the argument, the 
outcome seems to be the following. If there is such a thing as the non-conceptual particular-qua-
particular, then it is epistemically irrelevant, and the protagonist seems to be forced to 
acknowledge some role for the conceptual in reporting what he knows. Less important than the 
complex details of this famous argument, and the many difficult issues it raises, is its bearing on 
our understanding of the larger strategy Hegel will adopt in responding to an empiricist critic. 
This is a strategy employed in defense of his system as a whole, rather than any particular part of 
it. This strategy is as follows. The explicitly conceptual starting point of the Logic, though not 
one initially shared by a radical empiricist who regards sense-experience as wholly non-
conceptual, may be one he can be compelled to take up by the prior argument of the 
Phenomenology, which reveals this conception of sense-experience to be impoverished. We will 
return to the question of the nature of Hegel’s strategy in responding to such a critic later. 
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b) Kreines and the argument from Kant’s standpoint of reason 
 In a recent book, Jim Kreines (2015) argues that Hegel defends an account of reality as 
“the Concept” by adapting an argument from Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic. Hegel agrees with 
Kant that human reason seeks the unconditioned. He also agrees that the way in which rationalist 
metaphysics does so is unsuccessful since it gives rise to antinomies. Yet Hegel departs from 
Kant in proposing that knowledge of the unconditioned might also be achievable by a different 
(and more promising) metaphysical view: conceptual realism.  
 In my view, this argument is question-begging in a way Hegel would find objectionable. 
In Kreines’s reconstruction of the argument, Hegel presupposes that reason seeks the 
unconditioned. However, we should recognize that a conception of ultimate reality as the 
unconditioned has (at least) two components:  
a) a distinction (at least a notional one) between the unconditioned and something further, the 
conditioned; and  
b) an account of the relation between the two: usually they are related as explicans and 
explanandum or else by means of some sub-species of this relation, e.g., cause and effect. 
To accept this two-component definition is to accept a conception of ultimate reality as 
“mediated.” A category pair like unconditioned-conditioned is found in any such conception. So 
too is a relation between the categories in the pair, like the explicans-explicandum relation. 
Unsurprisingly, then, virtually all of the types of unconditioned that Kant recognizes in the 
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Antinomies also appear among the “mediated” definitions of the Absolute, given in the Doctrine 
of Essence: cause-effect, part-whole, ground-grounded, substance-accident, and so on — indeed, 
even the conditioning-conditioned relation itself. 
 If I am right about this, the presupposition that ultimate reality is the unconditioned, 
implying the presupposition that it is mediated, begs the question against an opponent who 
conceives of ultimate reality as immediate. On this alternative conception, it is not that there is 
something (even notionally) distinct from ultimate reality that it explains. Rather, in the most 
basic case, it earns its status, as it were, by default — because it is all that there is. In other cases, 
it does so because, though it is not all that there is, it can be what it is independent of its relations 
to anything else, explanatory or otherwise. By endorsing a conception of the Absolute as the 
unconditioned, Hegel would beg the question against numerous figures from the history, 
especially the early history, of philosophy. The main such figure that Hegel identifies is 
Parmenides, but there are many others. Hegel’s category-theoretic argument for conceptual 
realism will avoid begging the question in this way. It will begin by positing for analysis a more 
basic conception of reality as “immediate.” Only once this conception has been refuted will it 
turn to an alternative conception of reality as “mediated.” 
 A second reason for doubting that Hegel’s argument in the Logic pre-supposes the 
standpoint of reason is that this standpoint may be a result of the argument rather than a 
presupposition of it. Instead of beginning with the standpoint of reason, the Logic may well 
begin with a version of the standpoint of sense-experience considered its first division, the 
Doctrine of Being. Interpreted in this way, the Logic would then proceed to the standpoint of 
understanding, considered in the second division, the Doctrine of Essence. Hegel gives this 
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description of the overarching structure of the Logic in the following description of the transition 
from the first division (Being) to the second (Essence): 
Sensoriness’s thoughtlessness, i.e. of taking everything limited and finite to be a 
being, passes over into the understanding's stubbornness, i.e. of grasping it as 
something identical with itself, something not contradicting itself in itself. (EL § 
113A) 
Here, Hegel describes the categories from the Doctrine of Being as characteristic of the 
standpoint of sense-experience, and also as afflicted by its main limitation: “thoughtlessness.” He 
then describes the categories from the Doctrine of Essence as characteristic of the standpoint of 
understanding, and as afflicted its main limitation: “stubbornness.” Presumably, the categories 
considered in the Doctrine of the Concept, the standpoint of reason, will surmount these 
limitations. 
 At first, it may seem utterly impossible that the Doctrine of Being could be the standpoint 
of sense-experience, and for a simple reason. It treats categories or concepts, rather than the non-
conceptual representations that might be thought to figure in sense-experience. However, Hegel 
seems to maintain that the Doctrine of Being embodies not just any version of the standpoint of 
sense-experience, but a conceptually articulate version of it. For Hegel, this is possible because 
the categories considered in this division, particularly the categories of quantity and quality, 
serve to constitute the image of the world sense-experience presents. As Hegel explains: 
 The immediate sensory consciousness, insofar as its behavior involves thinking, is 
chiefly limited to the abstract determinations of quality and quantity. This sensory 
consciousness is usually regarded as the most concrete and thus also the richest. It 
is so, however, only in terms of its material, whereas it is in fact the poorest and 
most abstract consciousness with respect to the content of its thoughts (EL § 85  
Z). 
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 The categories considered in this division are particularly well suited to inform sense-
experience’s image of the world because they are categories of the immediate. Sense-experience 
is immediate, though not necessarily for a more familiar reason given by Kant in the first critique 
and occasionally reprised by Hegel himself. On this first conception, sense-experience is 
immediate because it puts us in touch with the object in a relatively direct or unmediated way. It 
does not place a further layer of mental representations, concepts, between us and the object. In 
the present context, however, Hegel is claiming that sense experience is immediate for a less 
familiar reason. For Hegel, it is characteristic of sense-experience to present us with a world of 
objects that are immediate in the sense that they are independent of their relations to anything 
else distinct from themselves: “side-by-side…connected only by the bare also.” Hegel argues for 
this claim indirectly by observing that sense-experience cannot present anything richer in 
structure than this “side-by-side” unless it enlists the aid of another faculty: understanding. Only 
through the work of the understanding, and, in particular, a form of intellectual reflection 
subsequent to sense-experience, do we encounter mediation in the form of relationships between 
objects, e.g. causal relationships. 
Representation here meets with the understanding which differs from the former 
only in that it posits relationships of the universal and the particular or of cause 
and effect, etc. It thus establishes relations of necessity among the isolated 
determinations of representation, while representation leaves them standing side-
by-side in its indeterminate space, connected only by the bare also (EL § 20A). 
With this background in place, it becomes easier to see how the categories we have considered, 
categories of the immediate, serve to articulate sense-experience’s image of the world as 
immediate, the category of the finite will describe such objects as having definite limits that set it 
apart others. The categories of quality will describe objects as having features they can have 
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independently of their relations to anything distinct from themselves. The category of quantity 
will describe (groups of) objects as having such features.  
 Yet in all cases, these categories will fail to fulfill their appointed aim of describing the 
object as immediate, meaning sense-experience’s image of the world as immediate will be fatally 
undermined.  If the categories presented in the Doctrine of Being express (a conceptually 178
articulate version of) the standpoint of sense-experience, then Hegel’s critique of these categories 
will be a critique of this standpoint. Yet understanding the critique of the standpoint of sense-
experience Hegel advances will require us to take account of an important historical source of 
inspiration for it: Ancient skepticism. Chiefly relevant to Hegel’s critique of sense-experience is 
the Ancient skeptic’s opposition to a dogma of modern, Human skepticism: the conviction that 
sense-experience alone is the “true.” 
 Incidentally, Humean scepticism, from which the preceding reflection chiefly 
proceeds, must be clearly distinguished from Greek scepticism. Humean 
scepticism makes the truth of the empirical, of feeling and intuition its foundation, 
and from there contests the universal determinations and laws on the grounds that 
they lack justification through sensory perception. Ancient scepticism was so far 
removed from making feeling or intuition the principle of truth that to the 
contrary it turned first and foremost against the sensory. (EL § 39 A) 
By claiming that the Human skeptic regards sense-experience as alone “the true,” Hegel means 
to refer to the Humean’s claim that we are only justified in assenting to the contingent truths 
sense-experience yields: for example, truths concerning constant conjunction. According to this 
  Hegel’s account receives additional support from the (more recent) history of philosophy. Historically, there has 178
always been an extremely close association between empiricism and atomism. Both Humean Impressions and the 
logical empiricist’s “sense-data” alike are meant to be atomic. This is not simply because they are the most 
fundamental constituents of thought, and therefore of the world as it is presented in thought. It is also because they 
are prior to the relations they will ultimately enter into (associative relations, and logical relations between 
statements, statements incorporating terms that refer directly to “sense-data). The influence on classical empiricism 
was a physical form of atomism, deriving from the empirical sciences, whereas the influence on logical empiricism 
was a distinctly logical (and, occasionally) metaphysical form of atomism, frequently considered a priori. 
Interestingly, Hegel recognizes a third variety of atomism entirely, one that is a priori, but also not based on modern 
logic. It is based on his own logic.
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Humean, we have no rational justification for assenting to the allegedly universal and necessary 
valid truths that go beyond what is given to us sense-experience: for example, truths concerning 
necessary connection. In essence, then, the Humean’s skepticism is skepticism about the 
possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge. 
 For Hegel, this Humean insistence that sense-experience is alone the “true,” leaves open 
the possibility that sense-experience may fail to be “true” in another sense emphasized by the 
Ancient skeptics. Insofar as he wants to articulate his position, the modern Humean skeptic must 
offer some account of the content of sense-experience. Admittedly, this account may have been 
successfully purged of more controversial categories: for instance, causality. Yet this leaves open 
the possibility that such an account nevertheless draws on another more basic set of categories: 
quantity, quality, and the finite. As we have just seen, Hegel maintains that the standpoint of 
sense-experience is pervaded by such categories. Indeed, he proposes to critique this standpoint 
through a critique of the categories constituting it. From Hegel’s perspective, there is an opening 
for a critique of modern Human skepticism inspired by Ancient skeptical strategies of argument. 
As Hegel will show, even the more basic categories informing sense-experience, as the modern 
skeptic conceives of it, nevertheless give rise to contradictions.  Hegel does not mean that such 179
a skeptic will necessarily regard the senses as providing veridical representations of the so-called 
“external world.” Clearly, Humean skepticism is not incompatible with some version or other of 
“external world skepticism” (in fact, they are often thought of as closely associated). Sense-
 Hegel views many of these Ancient skeptical techniques of argument as forerunners of one he employs in in the 179
Logic. In particular, he views them as anticipating his own attempt to identify a contradiction inherent in the 
categories of the limit and the finite. Cf. VGP “Skepticism” 
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experience, though “true” in Hume’s sense, will be “un-true” in a sense emphasized by the 
Ancient skeptical tradition as Hegel interprets its legacy. 
 In mounting this critique of a (conceptually articulate version of) the standpoint of sense-
experience, however, Hegel departs from the Ancient skeptics in one crucial but decisive respect. 
For Hegel, contradictions in the categories, once identified, need not simply issue in a rejection 
of the categories in question. Any such outcome would only result in aporia, leaving us unsure 
how to proceed. Fortunately, Hegel maintains that these contradictions can be resolved, yielding 
a new set of categories that are not afflicted by (the same) contradiction. Hence, the critique 
issues not in aporia, but, rather, in a the forward progress of the dialectic. At that point, the 
process begins again. As we have seen, however, a critique of a certain set of categories is a 
critique of the standpoint they serve to express. Hence, Hegel’s departure from the Ancient 
skeptical approach to criticizing the categories also implies a different approach to the critique of 
these standpoints. In particular, standpoint of sense-experience will not not simply renounced. It 
will be renounced in favor of other successor standpoints that are more advanced: the standpoints 
of understanding and reason.   
 As before, the Logic's critique of modern Humean skepticism, inspired by Ancient 
skepticism, presupposes that sense-experience tacitly draws upon the fundamental concepts 
Hegel calls categories. Once more, then, this presupposition might seem to beg the question 
against an especially radical empiricist who rejects any role for the conceptual in sense-
experience. As we have seen, Hegel responds to radical empiricist critics of the Logic project by 
arguing that the Logic is meant to function in concert the Phenomenology. Fortunately, the more 
detailed account we have given of the Logic’s critique of Human skepticism has the potential to 
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enrich our understanding of how the two works function in concert. Putting the present account 
together with the previous one, we arrive at the following account of the division of labor 
between the two works. The Logic will critique the specific set of categories, or concepts 
informing sense-experience (quality, quantity, the limit, the finite), eliciting from the moderate 
empiricist a recognition that a richer set of categories are required (causality, substance, and so 
on). Yet it can only do so once the opening arguments of the Phenomenology has elicited from 
such an opponent the admission from a more radical empiricist that sense-experience is informed 
by some categories.  
      * * * 
 As I will reconstruct the argument for defining the Absolute as the Concept, it neither 
presupposes that we are in possession of synthetic a priori knowledge, nor that reason necessarily 
seeks the unconditioned. As we have seen, neither starting point is in keeping with Hegel’s ideal 
of a presuppositionless method of argument. Both beg the question against opponents Hegel 
wishes to convince (the Humean skeptic, as well as the Parmenidean metaphysician who defines 
the Absolute as immediate). Instead, the strategy of argument Hegel employs presupposes a 
different aspect of Kant’s Critical project: an interest in deriving the fundamental concepts Hegel 
calls categories. The strategy I reconstruct allows Hegel to avoid begging the question against 
these opponents, and enable him to respond to them convincingly. 
 A consistently presuppositionless approach requires that we begin with categories of the 
immediate, rather than those of mediation. This is because the appointed task of the former set of 
categories is a pre-requisite to the task their successors will perform. As Hegel puts it in the 
lectures, these categories of the immediate simply describe a “first.” Their successors, the 
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categories of mediation will need to do this and something additional. They will need to both 
describe a “first” and then relate it to a “second.” 
ii. The Doctrine of Being: regress problems 
 My aim in this section is to reconstruct Hegel’s critique of the categories of immediacy, 
categories like quality and quantity. These categories describe things as immediate or un-
mediated: capable of being what they are independent of their relation to anything else that is 
distinct from them. Hegel will seek to show that these categories are self-undermining. They turn 
out to entail that the things in question are mediated instead, a problem Hegel calls “passing into 
another” (EL § 84). Here, I will be extremely selective; I will focus only on Hegel’s critique of 
quality. 
 Hegel  defines a quality as a “determination [a specific feature or property - JM] that is 
identical with a thing’s being” (EL § 61). A quality is identical with a thing’s being in the sense 
that the thing would cease to be the particular thing that it is if it lost that quality. If the color red 
is defined by a certain qualitative characteristic, then the loss of that characteristic could lead it 
to cease being that color. Of course, there are cases in which a thing can remain the thing it is 
even when it loses a certain feature, but then this feature will not be a quality in Hegel’s sense of 
the term. Hegel calls such features properties, rather than qualities, and deems them irrelevant at 
this early stage in the Logic. They become relevant when we turn to relational categories. Here, 
however, we are concerned with what he thinks of as a more basic phenomenon.   
 Prima facie, the category of quality characterizes things as immediate. A thing is what it 
is in virtue of its own quality. Therefore, a thing characterized in terms of its quality should be 
!250
capable of being what it is independent of its relations to anything distinct from it. However, 
matters are more complex: 
 Hegel argues that this characterization of things as immediate turns out to inevitably 
entail characterizing them as mediated. Hegel’s explanation of why this contradiction arises 
invokes the famed Spinozist dictum so important to all of the German Idealists: “omnis 
determinatio est negatio” (SL 87, EL § 91 + Z). As a “determination,” a quality is necessarily 
some specific feature of a thing, one among (actual or possible) others. If that is so, then, it 
seems, a quality can only be the specific feature that it is insofar as it is not another. In terms of 
the Spinozist dictum, a quality can only be the “determination” that it is if it is not some other 
quality, defined as its “negation.” Yet if this is so, then an important implication follows for the 
thing that bears this quality, i.e., the thing that can only be the distinctive thing it is by virtue of 
bearing this quality. It follows that this qualified thing can only be the determinate thing that it is 
insofar it is not another thing, one defined as the negation of the first because it does not bear the 
original quality. If that is so, then a thing, defined in terms of quality, fails to be immediate. It is 
mediated, because it can only be what it is by virtue of standing in a certain relation to something 
distinct from it. 
 Occasionally, Hegel also describes this problem as one of indeterminacy. Defined as 
something (=a thing with a quality), a thing is the determinate thing it is by virtue of not being an 
other, something else defined as its negation (=a thing lacking the original quality). However, 
there is an equally valid argument for the reverse attribution. Relative to this other, it is the first 
thing that is the negation and the other that is the original something. But if so, then it seems the 
original something has ceded its status to the other. Once we recognize that the statuses of 
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something and other are relative, Hegel argues, it becomes hard to say which is which: “Both are 
determined as something as well as other : thus they are the same and there is as yet no 
distinction present in them.” (SL 91)  Hence, the categories of something and other have failed to 
allow us to fix the status of one item as the determinate something that it is, and that of the other 
item as its negation. 
 Determinacy must be introduced somehow, and Hegel maintains that the only way this 
can occur is for it to be introduced by an external observer. The result is that determinacy 
becomes observer-relative in a sense that is objectionable. For Hegel, rendering determinacy 
observer-relative is a non-solution, since it only pushes the problem of indeterminacy back a 
level. As Hegel explains, the observer may attempt to fix the identities of the original something 
and its other as the determinate entities they are through ostensive definition, deeming one “this,” 
or “A,” and the other “that,” or “B.” If the items are ostensively defined, as “this” and “that” or 
“A” and “B” then the determination of which is which reflects nothing more than the observer’s 
choice of a starting point, a choice which is completely arbitrary. In other words, the opposite 
choice could always be made, either by this particular observer or some other. Hence, 
indeterminacy remains.  
 We now turn to the final instance of the problem: an infinite regress. Hegel has two 
explanations for why this problem arises, one less complex and the other more so (EL § 95, WdL 
21:130-1ff./SoL 114ff.) The less complex explanation is simply that each determinate thing will 
have to have its determinacy fixed by another. That other, in turn, must have its determinacy 
fixed by a third other, and so on, ad infinitum.  
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 Why can two not fix one another’s determinacy, forming a closed system? Because that is 
what the dialectic of something and other showed was impossible. The result in that case is 
indeterminacy.  180
iii. The Doctrine of Essence: circularity problems 
 Let us now attempt to understand how the categories of mediation will remedy the defect 
in categories of immediacy. As we have seen, Hegel maintains that the non-relational categories 
turn out to be relational after all. They seem to define the thing in question as capable of being 
what it is independent of its relation to anything else. Yet it then turns out that these things, so 
defined, can only be what they were because of their relations to others. Hence, we must make a 
virtue of a necessity. Hegel proposes that we introduce a relational set of categories, ones that 
characterize the thing as capable of being what it is in relation to something else. Such categories 
will describe a thing as dependent on something else that is independent of it.  181
 Hegel uses a metaphor to describe these categories: “shining into another” (EL § 161). In 
this metaphor, a light source shines and the light it emits is the other into which it shines. The 
two are related as source and product. Hence, the categories from the Doctrine of Essence exhibit 
“shining into another.” They do so by defining a thing in such a way that it is mediated, and can 
only be what it is by virtue of its relation to another. An effect is an effect because of its cause, 
something grounded because of its ground, a manifestation because of the force its manifests, a 
 A more compelling explanation of why the regress results would require us to invoke the more complex 180
explanation, but we cannot do so here.
 It is somewhat unclear why Hegel begins with this conception of relations and only subsequently advances to 181
another.
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whole because of the parts making it up, and so on. Hegel is especially clear on this point in the 
lectures. As he argues, the categories of Essence are relational:  182
 Thought determinations in the logic of the essence are purely relative. Ground 
has meaning only by reference to existence, cause only by reference to effect, and 
so on. No such category is any longer purely independent of the other, but each is 
marked by its reflection within the other, by its reference to the other. (VL 129). 
 What, then, is the problem afflicting these characterizations of things as mediated?  For 183
Hegel, the problem concerns the form of argument used to justify conceiving of things in 
relational terms. More specifically, the problem afflicts this particular conception of what 
conceiving of things in relational terms entails. Suppose we argue that one thing is what it is 
because of its dependence on another that does not depend on it. For Hegel, this form of 
argument self-undermines, since it turns out to entail dependence in the other direction. Recall 
that, in Hegel’s analogy, the light depends on the light source, rather than the reverse. This form 
of argument seems capable of being put to an alternative and equally legitimate use, for the 
second is no less dependent on the first, though perhaps not for exactly the same reason. Light 
requires a light source, but it is no less true that something cannot be a light source without ever 
emitting light. This dependence is not attributable to any mysterious backward causal relation 
between the light emitted and the light source. Rather, the dependence is conceptual, since it is 
only relative to the light (actually or possibly) emitted that the light source can legitimately be 
defined as a light source at all. Similarly, it is only relative to some (actual or possible) effect that 
 See also Wolff (2012: 91): “Hence it is characteristic of the Doctrine of Essence that it deals only with correlative 182
determinations that, like appearance and essence, occur in pairs and relate to one another in what Hegel calls a 
relation of ‘reflection’.”
 I here follow Knappik (2016), who also discusses related problems from the Doctrine of Essence: doubling, 183
context-sensitivity, regress, and so on. I prefer to describe these as circularity problems. A more significant 
difference between Knappik’s account and my own is that his is framed in terms of explanation. 
!254
a cause can be a cause, only relative to something (actually or possibly) grounded that a ground 
can be a ground, only relative to an (actual or possible) manifestation that a force is a force, and 
so on. If formerly it seemed that the light depended on the light source, now it seems that the 
reverse is the case. We seem to be at an impasse. One and the same general form of argument can 
be used to justify the attribution and the reverse attribution.  
 A caveat. Occasionally, the new use found for original form of argument is not to effect a 
full reversal of the original attribution, but simply a partial one. For instance, the objector who 
maintains that a light source is defined relative to emitted light could concede that emitted light 
is defined relative to a light source as well, since anything emitted must be emitted from 
something. 
 Hitherto, shining into another has seemed to be Hegel’s name for a solution to the earlier 
problem of passing into another. Yet for complex reasons I will simply gloss over here it is also 
thought by Hegel to be an appropriate name for a new problem this proposed solution creates. 
 In the next section, I will briefly consider an example of the problem Hegel identifies 
with definitions of the Absolute as mediated, shining into another.  
 Let us now turn to a straightforward example of the problem afflicting categories from 
the Doctrine of Essence, categories that characterize things in relational terms (as mediated). A 
clear example of this problem is found in Hegel’s discussion of the category pair “whole and 
parts.” As Hegel writes, we seem to oscillate between considering the whole to have priority over 
the parts, and the parts to have priority over the whole. 
There is a passage from the whole to the parts and from the parts to the whole, 
and in the one [the whole or the part] the opposition to the other is forgotten since 
each is taken as a self-standing concrete existence, the one time the whole, the 
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other time the parts. Or since the parts are supposed to subsist in…the whole and 
the whole to consist of [bestehen aus] the one time the one, the other time the 
other is the subsisting [Bestehende] and the other is each time the unessential. (EL 
§ 136 A) 
 Here, Hegel offers a complementary description of the problem he calls shining into another. 
Any argument we give for the priority of the whole over the parts will only succeed on one 
condition. It will succeed only on the condition that we suppress (or “forget”) some additional 
facet of its relationship to the parts (“opposition to the other”), a facet that is difficult to reconcile 
with its alleged priority over them. The same is true for arguments for the priority of the parts 
over the whole. 
  Importantly, Hegel denies that the relational categories of part and whole from the 
second division (essence) apply to organisms. Only with a richer set of categories that become 
available in the third division (the concept) will we be capable of grasping the distinctive relation 
between part and whole characteristic of living beings. At this stage, there can only be 
asymmetrical dependence relations between parts and whole. At most, then, there can be a 
mechanical relationship between the two. In an organism, however, there is mutual dependence 
between the parts and the whole. We will revisit this point later. 
 Let us attempt to see how this dynamic might arise by examining an argument for the 
priority of the whole over the parts. At first, the whole seems prior, since it is independent of the 
parts. The whole can certainly survive the loss of any particular part. It can even survive the loss 
of any subset of its parts, or the set of all its parts, provided the subset or whole set is eventually 
replaced. The whole endures, even as the parts do not.  
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 Yet this very argument, when pressed further, turns out to reveal an important respect in 
which it is the parts and not the whole that are prior. By uncovering the true extent of the whole’s 
independence of the parts, the argument has revealed the limits of this independence. True, a 
whole may be independent of any particular part or set of parts (complete or incomplete). Still, it 
cannot survive the loss of any and all parts whatsoever. Without any parts at all, it would not be. 
Hence, the whole may be independent of any particular part, or (sub-)set of parts. However, it is 
not independent of parts as such. 
 If that is so, then it may seem that the parts are independent of the whole, and can subsist 
outside of it. Hegel confronts this claim with a dilemma. If we claim the parts can subsist outside 
the whole, then, it seems, we will have thereby ceased to conceive of these parts as parts at all. 
After all, the concept of the parts is an inherently relational concept. Parts are always parts of 
some (actual or possible) whole. This is not to say that we are not permitted to conceive of the 
parts in some other (non-relational) way, and then assert their independence of the whole — their 
independent status in relation to it. Rather than conceive of them as parts, we might conceive of 
these items as having some other defining (non-relational) properties. These independently 
subsisting items might be conceived of as atoms, for example. However, once we conceive of 
them in this way, we are effectively conceding that it is not as parts at all that they earn their title 
to be considered independent. It is as bearers of some other (non-relational) property that they do 
so. 
 Hence, we seem destined to revert to the first position. Once we concede that parts imply 
a (real or possible) whole of which they are constituent parts, then it would seem that the parts 
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cannot subsist independent of the whole. It is relative to the concept of a (real or possible) whole 
that some set of things gain their entitlement to be considered parts. At this point, we seem 
driven back to arguing for a conception of the whole as that on which the parts depend, at which 
point the process of oscillation begins again.  It would be interesting to ask if there is something 
inherent in the nature of relations (metaphysical, logical, social or otherwise) that makes such 
processes of inversion likely. Not every relation is symmetrical. If I am your parent, this does not 
entail that you are mine. However, every relation between one term and a second can always be 
viewed from the reverse direction, namely, as a relation between the second term and the first. 
The road from Athens to Thebes is also the road from Thebes to Athens; relationality is a two 
way street.  In terms of our present example, if I am a parent of yours, then you are necessarily 184
a child of mine, because that is just the same relation viewed from the reverse direction. Like all 
relations, then, the dependence relation, though not necessarily symmetrical in any simple sense, 
will be two-sided. And, Hegel argues, this renders it vulnerable to a distinctive kind of reversal or 
inversion. 
iv. The Doctrine of the Concept 
 In the Doctrine of the Concept, we turn to a set of categories that characterize the thing as 
both immediate and mediated at once. As in the Doctrine of Essence, the thing is mediated, since 
it is what it is by virtue of its relationship to something else that is distinct from it. At this stage, 
however, the form of mediation in question is compatible with immediacy for the following 
reason. In a sense, this further thing by which the thing is mediated is nothing distinct from itself 
 I here follow Descombes (2014), who makes this feature of relations a theme.184
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at all. Rather, it is simply the thing itself, albeit in a different form. If this is so, then it follows 
that the thing’s mediation by another is, at the same time, mediation by itself. It is therefore 
immediacy, independence of anything distinct from itself.   185
 Described at this level of generality, Hegel’s idea of something both mediated and 
immediate may seem to be a contradiction in terms. We must consider this new definition in 
greater detail if we are to dispel the impression that it is simply incoherent. 
 In the Doctrine of Essence, things were mediated, whereas in the Doctrine of the Concept 
things are both mediated and immediate at once. In order to clarify the difference between these 
two forms of mediation, Hegel introduces yet another metaphor. He distinguishes between the 
shining into another, found in the Doctrine of Essence, and a different process he calls 
“development,” found in the Doctrine of the Concept.  
 The way the concept proceeds is no longer passing over or shining in an other. 
It is instead development since what are differentiated are at the same time 
immediately posited as identical with one another and with the whole, each 
being the determinacy that it is as a free being…of the whole concept. (EL § 
161) 
 Passing over into an other is the dialectical process in the sphere of being and 
the process of shining in an other within the sphere of essence. The movement 
of the concept is, by contrast, the development, by means of which that alone 
is posited that is already on hand in itself (EL § 161  Z) 
 I differ here from an interpreter like Horstmann for whom the most basic case of such a relation is (some 185
Hegelian analogue of) Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception. In my view, the most basic case such relation is a 
more generic logical structure of which the transcendental unity of apperception is merely a single distinctive 
instance. The structure of the Concept belongs to the first part of Hegel’s system, logic, whereas the (Hegelian 
analogue of the) TUA belongs to the third, spirit. Only in the realm of spirit, is the structure of the Concept self-
conscious: only there is it a structure a thing can bear simply in virtue of thinking itself to do so. 
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We will now proceed to examine the contrast two forms of mediation in greater detail by 
comparing shining into another and development. 
 Chiefly important in this passage is Hegel’s claim that the form of mediation called 
shining into another involves a fairly stark distinction between a thing and the other to which it 
relates. Returning to Hegel’s metaphor, there is a clear distinction between the light-source and 
the light. In this way, the possibility of deeming one and not the other independent is (allegedly) 
preserved. It is the light-source that is independent, rather than the light. 
 By contrast, the form of mediation Hegel calls development involves a less stark 
distinction between the thing in question and the other to which it relates. In order to illustrate 
why this is so, Hegel asks us to consider a paradigmatic case of development: the processes of 
growth and maturation that occur in the realm of organic life (EL § 161 Z). As before, there is 
mediation. Like the light and the light source, the plant can be understood only in relation to the 
seed. Yet the form of mediation differs for the following reason: while the light is distinct from 
the light source, the plant is just the seed at a later stage of its development. For Hegel, the two 
are identical, because the plant has a single nature or essence, one that is manifested at all phases 
in the process of its development, though perhaps most fully realized at the end. (EL § 161 + Z). 
The term Entwicklung has a connotation Hegel may be drawing on in this passage: it connotes 
the uncoiling or unfolding of something. Hence, there is also immediacy. The plant’s dependence 
on the seed is self-dependence. In that sense, it is independent of anything alien.  
 The (Aristotelian) understanding of organic life on which Hegel’s notion of development 
relies is philosophically contentious. However, Hegel never explicitly defends it in these pages, 
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though he will do so much later in the chapter on the Idea. How, then, can he expect this (so far) 
undefended set of claims about organic life to bear so much weight at this early stage? The 
answer is that Hegel’s account of life does not need to be defended at this stage, because it has 
such a limited role. In these opening sections of the Doctrine of the Concept, Hegel’s account of 
life is only used for illustrative purposes. Like passing into another and shining into another, 
(organic) development is simply a metaphor illustrating how definitions of the Absolute in a 
particular division of the Logic operate, even definitions having very little to do with organic life 
in any ordinary sense. Like passing and shining, development is not itself an actual definition of 
the Absolute, although this may have been clearer in the previous division.  
 Having concluded his discussion of an illustration from the sphere of organic life, Hegel 
concludes that the form of mediation found in the realm of development is a form of immediacy 
as well. Since both are the same thing, this type of mediation is just the thing’s mediation with 
itself. Hence, this type of mediation is immediacy, because the relation that the thing stands in to 
another is really just a relation it stands in to itself. Of course, this immediacy differs from an 
earlier, simpler form in that it is compatible with a degree of differentiation between the Absolute 
and its other. In the Doctrine of Being, by contrast, immediacy often took a different form: it 
existed without differentiation, since the thing (typically) had no other at all. 
 By describing such a complex structure in detail, Hegel seems to have succeeded in 
showing that a definition of the Absolute in terms of the Concept would not be incoherent, at 
least. However, Hegel must now actually argue for such a definition. Since defining the Absolute 
in this way means defining it as undergoing development, in Hegel’s sense, arguing for this 
definition can only mean explaining why development solves the problems to which shining into 
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another and passing into another gave rise. We can briefly anticipate how it will do so by 
reflecting further on this metaphor, though more is required to argue for the claim.  
 Development will need to solve the main problem with shining into another. This 
problem, recall, arose in the following way. Initially, relations are conceived in such a way that 
one term is dependent upon the other, rather than the reverse. Yet it then seemed that there was 
dependence in the reverse direction as well. Development remedies this problem through a new 
conception of relations that does justice to their “two-sided” character. In these relations, the 
dependency of one on the other is acknowledged to co-exist with — even to imply or entail — 
dependence of the other on the one, though the dependencies need not be of the same kind. The 
plant depends upon the seed in one sense. The plant was produced by it. Yet the seed depends on 
the plant in another. The plant is its telos.  
 Development also remedies the problem of passing into another. That problem, recall, 
arose when characterizing things in non-relational terms turned out to entail doing so in 
relational ones. Yet development reveals these to be capable of coherently coexisting. The seed 
can only be understood in relation to something (notionally) distinct, the plant. Yet in another 
sense it is unrelated to anything distinct from itself, since that to which it relates is just itself in a 
different guise. 
 Crucially, the most extreme version of this problem also does not arise: the infinite 
regress. We can anticipate the form Hegel’s solution will take by recalling that seed and plant are 
repeating phases in a life-cycle: seeds grow into plants, plants produce seeds, and the cycle 
begins again. In this way, Hegel is able to halt any regress that might arise by showing that the 
!262
terms in a structure that exhibits “development” form a closed system: each refers to the next 
until the first is reached once more and the circle is complete. 
 Yet the metaphor also reveals the limitations of Hegel’s solution to the problem posed by 
passing into another. Clearly, there is a perspective we can take on seed and plant that will reveal 
something resembling an infinite regress. After all, we can ask where the seed came from, and 
then ask of that seed where it came from, and so on and so forth. There are organicist versions of 
the cosmological argument. Hence, Hegel’s solution cannot be to deny that there is a perspective 
on reality which will reveal the regress to be present. It must instead be to deny that this 
perspective exhausts the nature of reality, and, moreover, to offer an alternative that reveals a 
region of reality in which the regress is halted.  
 Especially as we prepare to consider specific examples of the definitions of the Absolute 
from this division, it is crucial to stress that development is only a metaphor. It is not literally 
true of every category or definition of the Absolute in the Doctrine of the Concept that it 
characterizes things as undergoing the form of development characteristic of living organisms. It 
is clearly true of one such definition that appears as the Logic draws to a close (“Life,” the first 
form of the Idea). In other cases, it is less clear. 
 The first definition of the Absolute as both immediate and mediated is the Concept. 
In defending his definition of the Absolute as the Concept, Hegel contests a common-sense 
understanding of concepts as self-standing individuals, each of which is capable of being 
understood on its own, apart from its relations to other concepts. Actually, Hegel argues, every 
small-c concept, in that ordinary sense, belongs to a tripartite holistic structure he calls the 
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Concept, a structure in which no one element-type can be understood apart from the other two. 
This structure comprises three basic types of element: universal, particular, and, individual. We 
will consider the definitions of these element-types in greater detail presently. For now, however, 
Hegel’s examples of universal, particular, and individual are helpful to consult: the concept of an 
animal (a “genus”), the concept of a horse (a “species”), and finally, this particular horse (the 
“individual”). “The horse is first an animal. and that is its universality. It then has its 
determinateness, which is its particularity-the species horse. Its particularity steps forth as the 
species of the genus. But third it is this horse, the singular subject.” (VL 180) 
 Even if the Concept must contain each type of element, it does not follow that it need 
contain any specific number of each type of element. It might well contain any number of 
elements of the different types. In the case of one element type (individual), it might well contain 
zero tokens of that type. Not all universal or particular concepts need have individual instances. 
Every ghost may be a spirit, but there may be no such beings. Yet, as I argue, the element-type 
individual remains an irreducible component of the Concepts for the following reason. Every 
universal or particular concept must be capable of having individual instances.
 Concerning the Concept, Hegel will make an argument we will spend the remainder of 
the essay reconstructing. For Hegel, the structure of the Concept is holistic: none of these types 
of element can be understood apart from its (actual or possible) association with elements of the 
other two types (Step 1). Moreover, Hegel draws from this the rather striking conclusion that 
each element-type is identical with the other two (Step 2). But then, Hegel argues, each element, 
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owing to its identity with the other two, must also be identical with the whole, understood as the 
full triad. (Conclusion). 
 As we will see, this three-step argument is crucial to Hegel’s overarching aims in the 
Logic, as they have been described here. It will be used to show that in the Doctrine of the 
Concept there is “development,” rather than the “passing into another” that occurred in the 
Doctrine of Being or the “shining into another” in the Doctrine of Essence. In this way, Hegel 
can claim to have shown that a category-type characterizing things as both immediate and 
mediated, rather than as either alone, succeeds where the other two types failed.  
 Begin with Step 1 of Hegel’s argument: the claim that each element type must be 
understood in relation to the other two. 
 In order to construct an argument for this claim, we can begin by attempting to define 
each element-type in isolation. We will then seek to show that these definitions always tacitly 
make reference to the other two element-types. Defined accurately, each element-type 
necessarily stands in some (actual or possible) relation to the other two.  
 It is relatively easy to understand why the element-types universal and particular cannot 
be understood in isolation. Suppose we ask what makes a specific universal concept, such as the 
concept of an animal, the concept that it is. We might plausibly answer that it is a certain 
(characteristically broad) scope of application that this concept has. This definition of a concept 
might seem to stand on its own, but it does not. After all, the specific scope of application of this 
concept must (at least partly) be defined in terms of the less general (particular) concepts 
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subordinated to the more general one and coordinated with one another. For surely the scope of 
the more general concept, animal, is such that it includes the less general concepts it subordinates 
to itself--concepts such as horse, mammal, and so on. They, at least, fall within its scope, 
whatever else does. We will soon have more to say about what else does. 
 Similarly, these less general (particular) concepts can only be understood when they are 
related to the more general (universal) concepts to which they are subordinate. Once more, 
suppose we ask what makes a particular concept, such as horse, the concept that it is. Once more, 
we answer that is a certain scope of application, a certain characteristically restricted scope of 
application. Here, too, it might seem that this definition is free-standing, but by now we know 
better than to assume this is so. Whatever else defines it, the scope of this concept is itself 
partially defined by the broader scope of the more general concept to which it is subordinate. 
Whatever else it includes, the scope of the concept mammal must admit of being characterized a 
restricted range of the scope of the concept animal.  We could also say that the scope of a less 
general concept that is subordinate to a more general one is defined relative to the other less 
general concepts with which this less general one is coordinate. Hence, the scope of the concept 
mammal would leave off where the scope of the concept bird begins, and so on and so forth. 
Once we ask how many further such less general concepts there must be, a role for the more 
general concept emerges. For the more general concept delimits the class of further less general 
concepts coordinated with any given one. Hence, defining one less general concept in relation to 
those with which it is coordinated amounts to defining it in terms of the more general one after 
all. This proposal too amounts to inter-defining particular and universal. Of course, this is not to 
rule out that its scope must also admit of being defined in an alternative way, as we will soon see. 
!266
 Universal concepts and particular concepts must be understood in relation to one another, 
since the scope characteristic of each can be understood only in relation to the scope 
characteristic of the other. Yet the inability of universal and particular to stand on their own 
becomes clear as soon as we ask about the nature of this scope itself, the scope in terms of which 
both are (inter-) defined. Ultimately, there can be no scope without at least one (actual or 
possible) thing that would be included in it: an individual. Hence, Hegel insists that alongside 
universal and particular concepts, there must be individuals. 
 Of course, Hegel should not be understood to be claiming that every concept, in fact, has 
individual instances, such that those which fail to do so, e.g. concepts of fictional entities, are not 
concepts. Rather, Hegel is claiming that a concept, to be a concept, must be capable of having 
instances. The question of whether a given concept has instances may not always receive an 
affirmative answer. However, the question is always apt.  
 The element-types universal and particular require the element-type individual. Why, 
though, does the element-type individual require those of universal and particular? Here, Hegel’s 
answer relies on the Spinozist dictum he has used throughout the Logic: “omnis determinatio est 
negatio.” The concept of the individual can only be the determinate concept that it is in relation 
to other concepts that it is not, viz., its negations. At this point, however, we appear to have two 
distinct choices of which concepts to select as the negations. Hegel is intent on opting for one 
rather than the other..  
 On the one hand, we can define the concept of an individual as the determinate concept 
that it is by relating it to a second concept, the concept of another individual that the first is not. 
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“This” over “here” can be defined in opposition to “that” over “there.” This definition of the 
concept of an individual would require no recourse to the second and third concepts of a 
universal and a particular.  
 As Hegel makes clear, however, this route should not be taken: “they are…not singulars 
that just exist next to each other” (WdL 12:52/SoL 549). For Hegel, this is essentially a new 
version of the same unpromising route that was already tried in the Doctrine of Being: “a 
plurality of this kind belongs to being.” Hence, conceiving of individuality in this way results in 
“passing into another,” a dynamic in which the concept of the particular can no longer serve as a 
definition of the Absolute. We can easily imagine Hegel giving the same arguments he did 
earlier. As before, there is a problem of indeterminacy: relative to “that,” the first “this” is “that,” 
and so the two seem to have exchanged their roles. 
 The alternative Hegel favors is to define the concept of an individual as the determinate 
concept that it is by relating it to the further concept of a universal that this individual 
instantiates. Or, rather, to two further such concepts, since Hegel believes there are always at 
least two: the one more general, the other less so. Henceforth, the concept of the individual is 
inter-defined with these two further concepts, the concept of the universal and the concept of the 
particular. It is the instantiating and they are the initiated. It is “this horse,” (animal) and they are 
“horse” and “animal.” As Hegel also says, this view is accommodated well by the traditional idea 
that the individual is the subject in which the universal and particular inhere. In defining the 
individual, we are referred beyond it to the particular and the universal.  
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 This comes at a cost, however. It entails that the concept of an individual cannot truly 
function on it is own without the concepts of universal and particular. On this view, one never 
simply deploys the single concept “this,” but, rather, always tacitly employs the triad “this horse” 
(“animal”).  
 Unfortunately, Hegel does not elaborate on this part of his argument. It would be 
interesting to consider whether this claim wins support from the argument of “Sense-Certainty,” 
in in the Phenomenology though Hegel does not do so here. Briefly summarized, that argument 
showed that the use of demonstrative/indexical concepts in isolation results in indeterminate 
reference. Across different uses or even in one and the same use, terms such as “this” can refer to 
virtually anything. It would be interesting to ask how the use of these demonstrative/indexical 
concepts in conjunction with other more general ones might mitigate the problem of 
indeterminacy: “this” “horse” (animal) cannot refer to just anything, though some indeterminacy 
will still be present. 
 To sum up: each element of the Concept, each of the sub-concepts that make up the 
Concept, must be understood in relation to the others. The individual is that which is subsumable 
under the universal and the particular. The particular is that capable of subsuming the particular 
and is subsumable under the general. The general is that capable of subsuming both.  
 Once we see that this is so, however, we are in a position to see that step 1 implies step 2 
straightaway. If all element-types must be understood in relation to one another, then all element-
types are identical with one another. To be sure, there is a sense in which they differ. We have the 
individual (subsumable by the universal and particular), the particular (capable of subsuming the 
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individual and subsumable under the universal), and, finally, the universal (capable of subsuming 
both). Yet there is another in which they are identical, a sense revealed when we remove the 
parentheses. All are instances of the same tripartite structure examined from a different angle. In 
each case, we are simply alighting on a different one of the three elements, but the other two are 
always tacitly present. As Hegel himself puts it, “each of the moments is the whole that it is, and 
each is posited as an undivided unity with it” (EL § 160). 
 This holist claim is only true of the element-types. It is not necessarily true of the tokens 
Hegel selects as examples of each element type. Universal, particular, and individual are 
identical, for the reason just given. However, animal, horse and this horse are not. (It might, 
however, be true of the full extensions of the element types, i.e. all of the tokens falling under 
them.) 
 It follows directly that each element-type is identical not only with the others, but also 
with the whole triad. Each is identical with the next, and each is identical with both others. 
However, the whole is just all three. Hence, each is identical with the whole. This is simply to 
reiterate the conclusion we just reached: each element is simply the same tripartite structure (the 
whole) considered from different sides.  
    * * * 
 The foregoing discussion positions us to understand how Hegel concludes that 
development solves the problems of shining into another and passing into another.  
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 Development solves the problem of shining into another in a simple way. It rejects the 
conception of relations that gives rise to this problem. Henceforth, relations will not involve 
dependence of one term on another that is independent. Rather, they will involve 
interdependence, though often of a complex kind. The dependence of one term on the other will 
entail dependence of the other on it. However, the forms of dependence may differ in each 
direction. 
 Development solves the problem of passing into another. That problem arises for a 
characterization of things in non-relational terms, as capable of being what they are independent 
of their relations to other things. That characterization turned out to entail that these things can 
only be what they are in virtue of their relations to other things. Now, however, there is more to 
the story. We have arrived at a stage at which these two characterizations can be reconciled. 
There will be a sense in which things can only be what they are because of their relations to 
others: the three components of the concept get their identities from their relations to one 
another. However, there will also be a sense in which things can be what they are independent of 
their relations to other things that are independent of them: because these components are all 
identical, their dependence on one another is really just self-dependence, and, in this sense, 
compatible with independence of a kind. 
 Development solves the problem of passing into another, because it avoids the problem 
of a regress. Since “all determination is negation,” each constituent of the concept can only be 
what it is when considered in relation to the other two. However, there is no threat of infinite 
regress here, since, at least from a certain perspective, the three form a closed system in which 
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we are constantly referred back to the term with which we began, rather than beyond it to yet 
another term. This closed system does not halt the regress by replacing the infinite series. 
However, it does so by existing alongside it and offering us a different perspective on the same 
phenomena.   186
vi. Judgment and syllogism 
 In this final section, I briefly consider the account of the forms of judgment and inference 
that Hegel develops on the basis of his account of the Concept. I only consider the account of 
judgment and inference briefly because I think it adds little to Hegel’s account of the Concept. 
This is best illustrated by contrasting Hegel’s account of judgment and inference with a received 
one. Judgments are often thought of as combinations of concepts, and syllogisms as 
combinations of judgments. Certainly, this is the way Kant understands them. Yet Hegel rejects 
this approach, arguing instead that judgment and inference are simply further instances of the 
Concept. Odd as it may sound, there is a sense in which judgments and syllogisms only contain 
one concept, the Concept.  The reason Hegel prefers this unusual view is that it gives him a 187
method of deriving the forms of judgment and inference which Kant lacked. In this way, he will 
succeed where Kant and the Aristotelian tradition before him failed. Because Hegel’s treatments 
of judgment and inference parallel one another almost perfectly, I will abbreviate the discussion 
further by focusing only on the former.  
 That the Concept formed a closed holistic system, in this way, was clearly a point of immense importance to 186
Hegel. It is one of the main factors he claims differentiates the structure of the concept from Spinoza’s substance: 
universal, particular, and individual derive from one another, and, as a result, are superior successors to substance, 
attribute and mode, which do not do so. 
 See also Schick (2002: 203).187
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 As I have said, Hegel’s judgments do not combine two or more concepts at all. They each 
employ a single concept, though one of a distinctive type: “the Concept.”  
The judgment is customarily regarded as a combination of concepts and, indeed, 
diverse sorts of concepts. What is right in this construal is this, that the concept 
forms the presupposition of the judgment and makes its appearance in the 
judgment in the form of the difference. But it is wrong to speak of diverse sorts of 
concepts, for the concept, although concrete, is still essentially one and the 
moments contained in it are not to be considered as diverse sorts. Moreover, it is 
equally false to speak of a combination of the sides of the judgment since…(EL § 
166 Z) 
However, it is nevertheless also true that a Hegelian judgment is articulate, even if its parts are 
not themselves self-standing or independent. How can this be? The answer becomes clear when 
we recall that the Concept has parts as well. If a judgment is little more than the Concept in a 
different form, then its parts will be the Concept’s parts. More specifically, they will be its three 
components (“moments”): universal, particular, individual. Putting all of this together, we can 
say the following. Rather than combine two distinct concepts, a Hegelian judgment simply 
reconfigures the three component parts of the Concept, universal particular and individual. When 
one judges “this horse is an animal,” one is not combining three separate concepts in the way that 
Kant might have thought. According to Hegel’s theory of the Concept, the three components, 
this, horse and animal, were not separate to begin with but interdependent components of a larger 
whole. Yet to know that a judgment reconfigures the moments of the concept is not yet to explain 
how it does so. What are the specific ways? 
 Because the Concept is defined as the structure in which these three moments are 
identical, the typical relation between them asserted in a judgment is one of identity. This means 
that Hegel regards identity as the fundamental case, not predication. Hegel does not deny that 
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judgment admits of being understood in terms of the distinction between subject and predicate. 
Yet he does treat predication as a special case of identity, and indeed a defective one. Hence, 
Hegel treats what would seem to be obvious cases of the “is of predication,” “the rose is red,” as 
cases of the “is” of identity. Ultimately, then, Hegel sides with ordinary language against 
traditional logic. In ordinary life, we have one word for the is of identity and that of predication. 
From a logical point of view, this can seem confused. For Hegel, however, they are genuinely 
modes of the same relation, identity. However, there is a much more profound reason than 
ordinary language. It is that identity is the relational form of the non-relational category of being 
from which all further ones derive. Hence there is a fundamental continuity between all of these 
disparate forms of it.  
 If judgment simply reconfigures the components of the Concept, then how does it 
reconfigure them? Originally, as parts of the concept, these components are configured in such a 
way that they are a) defined in relation to one another b) identical with one another and c) with 
the whole. If that is so, then, we can conclude that the forms of judgment will simply be so many 
new forms in which the identity between the Concept’s moments can manifest itself. What, 
though, are these new forms of the Concept’s identity? Once again, answering this question 
requires that we reflect more deeply on the nature of the identity relation between the Concept’s 
three moments. Here, it is important to realize that the three components of the Concept are not 
just identical, but are so in such a way that they perform a certain important function. That 
function is to resolve two broad types of problem that afflicted the two other broad types of 
definition of the Absolute. These are the problems of passing into another and shining into 
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another, problems afflicting definitions of the Absolute as immediate and as mediated 
respectively. 
 If that is so, then we have a basis for identifying the different forms of judgment as the 
plurality of different forms of the Concept’s identity. These will be forms of judgement that 
identify in different ways, each of which is more or less successful at fulfilling the constitutive 
function of this identity: resolving the problems of passing into another and shining into another. 
In other words, the forms of judgment will be forms of conceptual identity correlative with the 
two broad types of definition of the Absolute which gave rise to these problems. These are the 
two types definitions of the Absolute found in the Doctrines of Being and Essence. As Hegel 
makes clear, the distinction between Being, essence and concept is the basic principle of his 
derivation of the forms of judgment. It is what enables him to avoid a derivation that is arbitrary: 
…we initially obtain three main species of judgment, which correspond to the 
stages of being, essence, and concept. The second of these main species is then 
doubled in turn, corresponding to the character of essence as the stage of 
difference [Differenz]. The inner ground of this systematic [character] of the 
judgment is to be sought in the fact that, since the concept is the ideal unity of 
being and essence, its unfolding, as it comes about in the judgment, also has to 
reproduce initially these two stages in a transformation [Umbildung] that 
conforms to the concept, while it itself, the concept, demonstrates itself to be the 
determining factor for the genuine judgment. The various species of judgment are 
to be considered, not as standing next to one another with the same value but 
instead as forming a sequence of stages, whose differences rest upon the logical 
meaning of the predicate. (EL § 171 Z) 
Here, I will not go through the details of Hegel’s deduction, but merely limit myself to a broad 
remark concerning how it proceeds. Drawing on the above cited passages, I simply want to note 
that it cycles through the same argument that brought us from Being to Essence the Concept. In 
other words, it considers forms of judgment that are associated with either Being and Essence, 
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and are therefore expressive of a conception of the Absolute as either immediate or mediated. It 
rejects these forms of judgment on the grounds that they raise versions of the problems Hegel 
called “passing into another” and “shining into another.” Then, it settles on a form of judgement 
associated with the Concept that combines immediacy and mediation, thus solving these 
problems. 
vii. Conclusion: was Hegel a Brandomian inferentialist? 
 I close with a brief remark on the relationship of the foregoing to contemporary 
philosophy. A great many authors have attributed to Hegel anti-individualist or holist positions 
on the nature of concepts. In part, this is because Hegel is often seen as a forerunner of 
“inferentialism.” Seen in this light, Hegel a holist because he maintains that the content of an 
individual concept can only be understood when we consider the judgments in which it can 
figure, and, ultimately, the inferential relations between those judgments.  However, this differs 188
from the precise form of holism I have discussed here: the holism of the Concept. My topic is a 
form of holism that is concept-immanent, in that it obtains even before we take judgment and 
inference (syllogism) into account. In particular, this form of holism concerns the necessary 
integration of ordinary concepts in a structure Hegel calls the Concept. 
 In my view, the inferentialist reading of Hegel fails to capture something important. For 
Hegel, concepts are “truth”-bearers, independent of their relations to judgments and inferences. 
As we saw in previous chapters, Hegelian concepts are truth bearers because they can be 
(immanently) self-contradictory or fail to be. For Hegel, “truth” concerns a concept’s 
correspondence with itself, rather than with a world distinct from itself (mere “correctness”). 
 See Redding (2007), Brandom (2002), though in his  (2015) Redding voices some minor reservations.188
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However, Hegel’s view is not only distinct from inferentialism, but, in one respect,  opposed to 
it. This is not simply because Hegel understands the “truth” of individual concepts to be 
accessible independent of their roles in judgment or inference. It is because, contra 
inferentialism, he understands the truth of concepts to be a prerequisite to judgmental and 
inferential truth, rather than the reverse. The “truth” of the concept, the internal coherence of its 
structure, furnishes the standard by which the “truth” of the forms of judgment and inferences, 
the internal coherence of theirs, is assessed. Its structure is the basic one of which theirs are the 
two further possible instances. Moreover, it turns out to furnish the most important part of the 
constitutive standard by which they are evaluated.  Ultimately, then, the choice many 189
contemporary philosophers offer us between classical (Fregean) referentialism and inferentialism 
is a false one, at least from Hegel’s point of view. 
 Yet this is not to say that Hegel is a classical (Fregean) referentialist either. As we have repeatedly seen, 189
correspondence is a sub-philosophical topic for Hegel: “correctness” rather than truth.” 
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Conclusion.     Analysis, Synthesis, Dialectic 
i. The Self-Comprehension of Hegel’s Science of Logic 
 At the outset, we considered Hegel’s critique of the logic of the Aristotelian tradition, as 
well as of Kant’s transcendental logic. As we saw, these critiques have a parallel structure. 
According to Hegel, Aristotle’s logic and Kant’s transcendental logic are what we might call 
non-self-comprehending sciences. They comprehend their subject-matter, but not themselves. 
This is the devil’s bargain that Hegel thinks all non-ultimate forms of logic make. Knowledge of 
the object comes at at the cost of self-opacity. How, though, are these sciences self-opaque? 
Hegel’s answer is that they are in a much straightforward sense than might at first be apparent. At 
the very basis of these sciences lie certain claims about the mind. Although they are the basis on 
which so much in these sciences is proven, these claims about the mind are ones these sciences 
cannot themselves prove. In the end, these sciences will be answerable to other sources of 
justification, whatever exactly those might be (psychology, logic, something else). For this 
reason, these sciences cannot be ultimate in the way they have traditionally claimed to be.  190
 Here, Hegel hopes to succeed where his predecessors failed. Hegel’s science will differ 
from Aristotle’s and Kant’s in being a self-comprehending science. It will not just comprehend its 
subject-matter, but also itself. Its subject matter is transparent to it and it is transparent to itself. 
More specifically, Hegel holds that the account of the mind upon which his science depends will 
be proven true in the course of the science itself. Hence, Hegelian science will not be answerable 
 A more recent example of failure to self-comprehend might be logical positivism, a theory whose principle of 190
verification is not itself verifiable. Other examples, more likely to be known to Hegel, would be definitions of truth 
that, by their own lights, fail to qualify as true. 
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to any other science. Although I lack the space to discuss it in sufficient detail, I do want to 
briefly outline how Hegel’s Science of Logic achieves this feat of self-comprehension. 
ii. From the Concept to the Idea: (Finite) Knowledge  
 Commentators on the Logic vary widely in their views of when, exactly, in the course of 
its argument the knowing subject becomes an explicit topic. Straightaway in the Doctrine of 
Being? Only in the Doctrine of Essence?  Or in the Doctrine of the Concept? I hold the view 191
that this development does not occur until very late. More specifically, it occurs in the 
penultimate section of the Doctrine of the Concept: the discussion of Cognition (theoretical and 
practical), both forms of what Hegel calls the Idea. I regard the entirety of the Logic up to this 
point as free of any significant reference to the mental. The exceptions are examples Hegel uses 
for illustrative purposes. In Hegel’s definitions of categories like form/matter, and so on, he gives 
psychological or epistemological illustrations. Yet they appear alongside others that are 
biological, theological, political. At issue is something much more general of which all of these 
are just so many specific instances.  
 More often, the turn towards the knowing subject is said to occur earlier in the Logic, in 
the transition from the Doctrine of Essence to the the Doctrine of the Concept, the Objective to 
the Subjective Logic. As Hegel explains, the Objective logic (Being and Essence) is his settling 
of accounts with pre-critical metaphysics. That is why we find showcased there attempts to know 
the unconditioned without taking account of the nature and limits of our cognitive power: “The 
objective logic thus takes the place rather of the former metaphysics which was supposed to be 
 Longuenesse (2007) treats the transition from the Doctrine of Being to that of Essence as marking, in effect, a 191
Copernican turn away from pre-critical metaphysics and towards a recognizably Kantian form of idealism. Whereas 
an interpreter like Pinkard (2002) locates this development in the transition from Essence to the Concept. See also 
Burbidge (2014).
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the scientific edifice of the world as constructed by thoughts alone” (WdL 21:48-9/SoL 42). 
Similarly, Hegel describes the Subjective Logic as broadly Kantian in inspiration, the Concept 
being a version of Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception. If the Logic is a purified version 
of the history of philosophy, then the transition appears to have the following significance. The 
transition from Objective to Subjective Logic, Being and Essence to the Concept, would seem to 
be a version of Kant’s Copernican Revolution in philosophy. In this transition, Hegel would seem 
to follow Kant in rejecting pre-critical metaphysics’ attempt to know things-in-themselves in 
favor of an alternative model that takes account of the role of the knowing subject in making 
knowledge possible. Versions of this interpretation are defended not only by proponents of the 
post-Kantian interpretation, but also by some (neo-)metaphysical interpreters as well.     192
 In my view, the appearance of such a transition is misleading. As many have argued, the 
Concept cannot be identified with the knowing subject since it is a more generic structure than 
any found in the realms of nature or spirit (self-consciousness).  It is for this reason that Hegel 193
uses examples to illustrate it which have nothing to do with subjectivity, let alone subjectivity as 
Kant conceived of it in the transcendental deduction. The tripartite structure of universal, 
particular and individual has both spiritual and non-spiritual instantiations. The animal kingdom, 
as well as its species and their members, constitute one instance, but so too do the I-concept, all 
those beings using it to self-refer, and, finally, all of the representations they self-ascribe. In the 
former natural case, entities bear this tripartite structure without being conscious that they do so, 
whereas in the latter spiritual case they do so precisely by being conscious that they do. Yet in the 
 See Pinkard (2002: 249), 192
 See, among others, Houlgate (2006), Knappik (2016a), Tolley (2019). These authors are responding to Pippin 193
(1989).
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logic we are abstracting from this difference between nature and spirit. After the earliest editions 
of the Logic, the example of Kant’s TUA is dropped completely, a choice that would be difficult 
to explain if Hegel intended to simply equate it with the Concept.  
 Moreover, Hegel is fairly clear that the precise sense in which the subjective logic is 
“subjective” is an older Aristotelian one, having little to do with the sense Descartes would later 
give the term when he used it to refer to the knowing subject: “Similarly, the individual has the 
meaning of being the subject, the foundation which contains the genus and species in itself 
and is itself substantial” (EL § 164A). The subject in this older sense is simply that-which-
underlies in general, but not necessarily that-which-underlies our conscious states. In Hegel’s 
terms, the subject is the individual, e.g., “this horse,” which the particular and universal 
concepts, e.g., “animal” and “horse,” are said to be “in.” This is what Aristotle claims is true of 
particular substances in the Categories, and it is the basis of his claim that they are what is truly 
real. Particular substances are that which everything is said to be “in,” whereas other things, like 
the universals so central to Plato and his followers, cannot be what is truly real since they are 
simply said “of” substances. This also, I think, helps explain why Hegel goes on to define the 
Idea as the subject-object. Life is a version of the Idea, a subject-object, even though living 
things need not be self-conscious. They are subjects set over and against objects, not because 
they are knowers but because they cope with their environments in ways intended to preserve 
themselves. There is a certain reflexive relation to self in these organic processes, but it is not 
necessarily the reflexivity of self-conscious. Of course, cognition, the other version of the Idea, 
does involve this broadly Cartesian form of subjectivity, that of the knowing subject. However, 
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the Aristotelian sense of subjectivity emerges earlier in the dialectic than does the Cartesian, 
suggesting the former has a certain priority over the latter. 
 If this is right, then subjectivity must enter at a later point than in the transition from the 
Doctrine of Essence to that of the Concept. The only real candidate is the section on the Idea of 
Cognition, since nothing before that point treats subjectivity. There, Hegel considers a definition 
of the Absolute as finite cognition, theoretical and practical. Both are finite because they 
presuppose a distinction between the knowing and acting subject, on the one hand, and the 
objective world it seeks to know or act in, on the other.  
 For our purposes, the important point is that the argument of the Logic has vindicated a 
certain account of cognition whose status was previously uncertain. This is important because as 
we saw the conception of cognition Hegel appeals to in the Prefatory materials is not itself 
supported by argument. It is, instead, based on an appeal to “facts of consciousness” and other 
less rigorous methods of verification. The most noteworthy feature of Hegel’s account of 
cognition is the distinction between sensible experience, on the one hand, and conceptual 
thought, on the other. There are many further distinctions, between sensibility, representation and 
intuition, on the one hand, understanding and reason, on the other. Yet for our purposes it is just 
the broad dichotomy between sensibility and thought that matters. Crucially, this distinction is 
entailed by the finitude of cognition. We are dependent on affection by an independently given 
object, and sensibility is the mode in which we are affected. To be sure, Hegel’s case for a 
definition of the Absolute as finite cognition is more extensive. In reverse order, working 
backward from finite cognition, the components of that case are as follows. It first involves his 
claim that finite cognition is a higher form of the Absolute Idea or subject-object than life. It also 
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involves the broader claim that the Absolute Idea, or subject-object, in general, living or non-, 
represents a more advanced definition of the Absolute then either the Subjective or Objective 
Concept alone. Then there is Hegel’s general case for a definition of the Absolute as the Concept, 
and his case against those from Being and Essence. 
 Ultimately, the assumption Hegel makes at the outset of the logic concerning our 
cognitive power is only substantiated once we reach the end. That is because the argument of the 
logic has brought us to the conclusion that the Absolute is (finite) cognition. Yet as the qualifier 
finite makes clear, this cannot be the highest standpoint reached. As we will soon see, there is an 
even more dramatic respect in which the end of the logic returns us to the beginning. Finite 
cognition is not the most advanced form reached. That distinction belongs to the form of thinking 
we have been engaged in throughout the logic. We have been engaged in this form of thought in 
an implicit way through the logic, but will now become an explicit topic of reflection in the logic 
at its close. 
iii. From (Finite) Knowledge to Absolute Knowledge: Aristotle Again  194
 In the Idea of cognition, Hegel makes a stunningly simple argument for the claim that 
virtually all finite cognition is defective. Since this encompasses virtually all ordinary instances 
of natural scientific and mathematical knowledge, it follows that they are defective too. What is 
more, philosophy has often sought to emulate these methods, meaning it is implicated as well. 
Spinoza’s more geometrico is a clear case of this, and one deeply important for Hegel. 
Preliminarily, Hegel reminds us that we are here in the sphere of finite cognition, meaning we 
presuppose that the subject of knowledge and the object known are distinct. This form of 
 I have benefited in this section from consulting the discussion of Hegel’s critique of analytic and synthetic 194
cognition in Werner (2018).
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knowledge is achieved through the use of concepts by the knowing subject in conjunction with 
the sensible intuitions produced in her by the object known. Yet as Hegel also proceeds to 
explain, this process of knowledge formation through the cooperation of conceptual and non-
conceptual components can occur in one of two ways: analysis and synthesis. 
  In analysis, we begin with the particulars that are presented to us in sensible intuition. 
We then form universal concepts of them using Locke’s method from the essay of comparing the 
particulars, abstracting from the differences between them and reflecting on the similarities. Yet 
according to Hegel no such method can yield satisfying results. This method always runs into the 
same problem. We are always limited by the finite size of the sample from which we begin. 
There could always be further instances which undermine the classificatory scheme we have 
formed by reflecting on previous instances. They could reveal that what we have called “plus” is 
“qwus’’ or “blue” “grue.”  Here, Hegel is just reminding us of the problem of induction as he 195
so often has before.  
 A further problem arises once we recall the normative dimension of the Hegelian 
Concept. In Hegel, giving the concept of a thing is not just giving the necessary and sufficient 
conditions that a thing need meet to be considered an instance of its kind. It is also giving an 
account of what it is to be an exemplary or good instance of that kind. If that is so, however, then 
the method of analysis may lead us astray. Averaging across all of the instances encountered so 
far will not necessarily tell us what it is to be a good one. After all, good instances may be rare, 
and bad ones common. For this reason, analysis may not just yield a different result than the 
desired one, but the opposite result (WdL 12:214/SoL 712). 
 See Goodman (1973) and Kripke (1982)195
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 Because of these problems with analysis, we turn to a different method, synthesis, which 
moves in the opposite direction. Unlike analysis, synthesis begins from universal concepts 
possessed by the knowing subject and attempts on this basis to achieve knowledge of the 
particular objects presented by sensible intuition: “The advance from the universal to the 
particular characteristic of the concept constitutes the basis and the possibility of a synthetic 
science” (WdL 12:215/SoL 713). Here, Hegel is partly thinking of the method of division from 
Plato’s Sophist.  This is the method employed by Socrates and his interlocutors when they try 196
to figure out what defines somebody as a true philosopher, rather than a mere sophist. Using this 
method, we begin from a general concept, animal, and then divide it into various sub-concepts, 
rational and non-rational, proceeding in the same way until we arrive at the particular we want to 
classify: the sophist himself, as opposed to the philosopher. We then cast a backward glance up 
the Porphyrean tree, each node of which gives us a concept that the definition of our particular 
will need to cite (the intension, as opposed to the extension). For Hegel, the problem with this 
approach is its arbitrariness. We have many choices as to how to divide the concept with which 
we begin.  Because the manner in which we divide is not dictated by the concept from which 197
we start we must simply choose one. Should we start by dividing the rational from the non-
rational, the mammals from the reptiles, something else? Here, Hegel’s claim is not that we fail 
to make the correct choice, but that even where we do our victory will be a hollow one. If we do 
choose to divide a certain way and our choice is not random, then it must be because we are 
already anticipating the result we want to achieve. For example, we know that the sophist is a 
 In his lectures on Plato, Hegel displays a clear preference for the Sophist and Parmenides over all other Platonic 196
dialogues. As Gadamer (1976) observes, this situates Hegel firmly in the 19th century. According to Gadamer, these 
dialogues were virtually unknown in Germany before. 
 This point is made in Werner (2018: “Hegel on the Porphyrean Tree”)197
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type of animal already, which is why we start by dividing into animals and non-. That means that 
even in the best case, the method of division can only be a way of calling to mind and organizing 
knowledge we already have, not of acquiring new knowledge.  
 Admittedly, it would be legitimate to wonder if Hegel’s critique of this unusual method 
from an obscure Platonic dialogue can really constitute a critique of all non-philosophical 
knowledge. After all, it is not clear that non-philosophers use this method. Yet it seems to me that 
Hegel has a response to this worry. Hegel thinks that the synthetic method encompasses much 
else besides Plato’s approach in the Sophist. It is applied in  mathematical proofs such as those of 
the theorems of geometry, syllogistic arguments, and other much less exotic forms of knowledge-
acquisition than that described in Plato. In all cases, Hegel thinks, we only succeed because we 
already know what we claim to be discovering for the first time. Disappointingly, his 
explanations of why this is so in the less exotic cases are somewhat underdeveloped. Yet it is not 
difficult to fill in the details, especially when we cross-reference this discussion with others in his 
corpus. When we prove geometrical theorems, like the Pythagorean, no line we draw tells us 
what the next ought to be. How, then, do we know which one to draw? We must, as it were, 
anticipate the end result, and work our way back to where we currently are. Yet if we are doing 
this, we must already know what we are attempting to prove. It is for this reason that Hegel 
objects to modeling philosophical arguments on mathematical proofs. Yet the syllogistic 
arguments made by more traditional philosophers are no better in this regard. No premise tells us 
what the next ought to be. We must supply it ourselves. How, though, do we know which one to 
supply? Again, we must be looking ahead to the desired conclusion, working our way back from 
there to where we currently are. 
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 For Hegel, we avoid these problems only when we abandon the methods of knowledge-
acquisition he calls analysis and synthesis, both of which combine concept and intuition. We 
must turn to the method of philosophy, whose medium is pure conceptual thought without 
intuition. Using the same term he did in the prefatory material, Hegel describes philosophy as the 
abandonment of presuppositions: in particular, the presuppositions of analysis and synthesis. In 
other words, his logic not only commences with the renunciation of unexamined assumptions, 
but culminates in the realization that this approach to knowledge-acquisition is superior to all 
others. Once we reach this stage, we ask not whether some concept is “correct,” whether it 
corresponds with an object represented in sensible intuition. Instead we ask whether it is “true,” 
whether it corresponds with itself. Being is what simply is. Yet if that is so, then it is Nothing. 
And so on. Another way to put the point would be that Hegel regards the dialectic as a more 
rigorous method of operating with concepts than analysis or synthesis. That is because the 
dialectic need not rely on sense experience, which introduces an element of arbitrariness. 
 For Hegel, this method will not fall prey to the problems afflicting analysis or synthesis. 
We do not need to worry about the finite size of our sample. After all, there is no sample. There 
is no sensible component to our knowledge from which a sample would be drawn. Nor need we 
worry about the fact that the concept from which we start does not divide itself, or tell us which 
principle to use for the division. It does divide itself. It is itself the principle of its own division. 
Beginning with Being, the dialectic leads us all of its necessary forms: quantity, quality, Identity, 
and the rest. This is not one path among others, arbitrarily selected. It is the only one that can be 
taken, given this starting point and this method of progression. 
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 This alternative method is not just one being recommended to us for future occasions, but 
the one we have been employing all along. If the Logic culminates in an account of the type of 
knowledge achieved in speculative logic, then it has succeeded in comprehending itself. This is a 
type of reflexivity slightly different from that with which Fichte thought philosophy should 
begin, the self-consciousness of the knowing subject. It is instead the reflexivity that comes at 
the end of philosophy, when we achieve that rare thing, a theory that not only explain its subject-
matter but itself.  As we have seen, Aristotelian and transcendental logic failed to self-198
comprehend, but Hegel’s has succeeded where they failed. It can therefore claim to be ultimate 
in a way they are not.  
 As we have seen before, Hegel’s relationship to the Aristotelian tradition is complex, and 
in particular ambivalent. Hegel rejects the logic of Aristotle, denouncing it as the logic of the 
understanding. Yet he only does so because he is such an ardent admirer of another part of 
Aristotle’s legacy, his metaphysics. For Hegel, the former is an impediment to the latter. As 
Hegel quips, Aristotle would not have reached his most “speculative” insights if all he had been 
doing was constructing syllogistic arguments. Even as he takes an important step beyond the 
logic of Aristotle, then, Hegel pays tribute to his metaphysics.  
 In an addition to the main text, Hegel famously describes the Absolute Idea he Science of 
Logic as the God of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, thought-thinking-itself (EL § 236Z) (VL § 237). 
The passage is extremely well known, and has been extensively discussed. Yet approaching 
Hegel’s tribute to Aristotle  in terms of a problem in philosophical logic, the problem of self-
 This idea of a self-comprehending theory has a long afterlife in Marxism. Members of the Frankfurt School have 198
claimed that the enterprise of “critical theory” differs from “traditional theory” in being “reflective” in this way 
rather than “objectifying.” See Horkheimer “Traditional and Critical Theory” (1972), as well as the discussion of 
this idea in Geuss (1981).
!288
comprehension, allows us to see it in a new and distinctive light. At least part of what Hegel is 
claiming by describing his Logic as thought-thinking-itself is that it is self-comprehending in a 
way preceding logics are not. With the achievement of this form of self-comprehension, Hegel’s 
Logic comes to an end. Yet it is also only now that it can truly begin. 
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Epilogue.   Absolute Idealism for the 21st Century 
 In this brief epilogue, I relate my Hegel-interpretation to the most prominent recent 
attempt to re-actualize post-Kantian idealist thought for contemporary analytical philosophy: the 
writings of Sebastian Rödl. If, at the close of the 20th century, Brandom and McDowell  were 199
the two most important authors to defend German idealist or Hegelian positions in an analytic 
idiom, then today, two decades into the 21st, the most important is undoubtedly Rödl. 
McDowell’s chief interest was Hegel’s idea of “the unboundedness of the conceptual,” and the 
promise it held out of healing the divide which had emerged in Anglophone philosophy between 
mind and world, spontaneity and receptivity, scheme and content. By contrast, Brandom’s focus 
was Hegel’s proto-Wittgensteinian account of linguistic meaning as a norm-governed, socially-
situated phenomenon. For Rödl, however, the central idealist insight is that the judgments and 
actions of rational beings are essentially self-consciousness. Yet in contrast to McDowell and 
Brandom, whose writings have generated an enormous amount of discussion among Hegel 
scholars, Rödl’s have yet to do so. Fortunately, the period of relative neglect of Rödl’s writings 
by Hegel scholars appears to be over. In his forthcoming study of the Logic, Robert Pippin 
defends an interpretation of Hegel’s Logic substantially indebted to Rödl’s project, especially his 
first study Self-Consciousness. As Pippin argues, the Logic is itself an exercise in self-
 See Brandom (1994)(2002) and McDowell (1994)(2009)199
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knowledge, understood in the way Rödl advocates.  Here, I voice skepticism about 200
approaching Hegel’s project in terms of Rödl’s concerns. However, I will not dispute Pippin’s 
particular way of doing so. To a certain extent, our projects are orthogonal to one another. 
Whereas Pippin focuses on the Hegelian themes in Rödl’s first book, Self-Consciousness, I will 
here focus on what I believe to be anti-Hegelian moments in two more recent studies, Forms of 
the Temporal and Self-Consciousness and Objectivity: An Introduction to Absolute Idealism. 
i. Is Absolute Idealism “the science without contrary”? A Spinozist rejoinder to Rödl  
 I regard Rödl’s position as both philosophically compelling and undeniably idealist in 
inspiration. However, I also regard it as fundamentally un-Hegelian. In my view, Rödl’s is a form 
subjective idealism, rather than Absolute idealism. In other words, it more closely resembles the 
idealisms of Kant, Reinhold and Fichte than it does those of Schelling and Hegel. It may seem 
surprising that I would describe Rödl’s position as subjective idealist, given that his primary aim 
in recent work is to overcome a form of subjectivism: specifically, a naturalistic strain in 
contemporary philosophy that threaten to relativize the truth of our thinking to the human 
standpoint. As we will soon see, however, there remains a further respect in which Rödl’s 
position is subjective idealist, even if it succeeds in refuting this form of naturalism. In particular, 
Rödl endorses the methodological claim that the starting point of philosophy should be a certain 
 For Rödl, a number of distinctive features of the behavior of the first-person concept long discussed by analytic 200
philosophers are explained by its status as a vehicle of human self-knowledge. For example, the first-person concept 
is essentially indexical (Perry), rather than descriptive. Even when Oedipus himself uses it, the concept “I” does not 
behave in the same way as the description “the murderer of Laius.” Same reference, different sense. For Rödl, this 
difference is explained by the fact that, unlike the others, the first-person concept affords us knowledge of an object 
we ourselves are, rather than an object we must be presented with through perceptual experience. That is why 
Oedipus can knowingly self-refer using the I-concept, though not using the other description-based one. Following 
Rödl, Pippin regards this idea as central to Hegel’s Logic. Among other things, it is this which explains how Hegel 
can remain indebted to Kant’s conception of philosophy while avoiding relying extensively on claims about the 
mind or our cognitive faculties. Any such claim, Pippin argues, would be knowledge of a given object, rather than 
genuine self-knowledge. 
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type of securely grounded principle concerning the knowing subject. This makes his position ill-
equipped to respond to a type of skeptical challenge distinct from that raised by the reductive 
naturalist, but urgent nonetheless. I mean a challenge from a position that is also naturalistic, but 
different from any form of naturalism on the contemporary scene: Spinoza’s substance-monism. 
The subjective character of Rödl’s idealism also means that it is unable to successfully integrate 
a form of metaphysics descended from Aristotle. This is a form of metaphysics that is 
fundamentally non-Kantian-idealist but, I think, crucially important to Hegel: general 
metaphysics (ontology), understood in Aristotle’s sense as the study of being-qua-being.  
 For Rödl, the starting point of philosophy is the claim that judgment is essentially self-
conscious: the fact that she who judges something to be true knows that she so judges. On Rödl’s 
view, this is a truism.  Self-knowledge is internal to the act of judgment, so that I would not 201
count as performing that act unless I did so knowingly. However, it is also a truism rich in 
consequences for philosophy, especially for debates about the nature and possibility of 
knowledge. For example, a received view in philosophy has it that a judgment’s involvement 
with the standpoint of the knowing subject threatens to undermine its objectivity.  A properly 202
objective judgment states how things are, rather than how they seem from the limited perspective 
of some subject or other. However, Rödl’s provocative claim is that that the objectivity of my 
thinking, far from being undermined by the essentially self-conscious character of judgment, in 
fact presupposes it.  The broad strategy of argument Rödl pursues in showing this is to 203
establish that the knowledge internal to a judgment already implicitly contains knowledge of its 
 Rödl (2018: 5 ff.)201
 Ibid. 8202
 Ibid. 10 ff.203
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objectivity.  In particular, Rödl regards this assurance of the objectivity of my judgement as 204
contained in its very form: “things are thus-and-so,” “this S is P” and so on. For this reason, Rödl 
thinks it incoherent to be in doubt whether one’s judgments are objective. He then proceeds to 
convict many modern philosophers of precisely this incoherence. 
 Rödl’s main antagonist is a reductive naturalist who begins not with the subject of 
knowledge, but with a sensibly given object.  For the naturalist, judgments are effects of prior 205
causes, and indeed constitutively so. However, these are causes which could, in principle, escape 
conscious awareness, and nearly always do so in practice. On this view, the judgments of which I 
am conscious are episodes occurring in the brain, episodes which need not be conscious. Hence, 
self-consciousness is merely accidental to judgment, though it may of course accompany it in 
some cases. For Rödl, this naturalist thesis, if true, would threaten to render our judgments 
subjective. The reason is fairly subtle and easy to miss, but important to Rödl’s account. For 
Rödl, this naturalistic account would limit the applicability of our judgments to a range of objects 
(or properties of objects) accessible to the organ which the relevant science deems to be the 
underlying cause of our judgments, e.g. the brain. Here, Rödl is relying on a claim from 
Aristotle’s theory of perception. This is a claim to the effect that an organ like the eye or ear 
yields knowledge of a certain sub-set of objects or properties of objects, such as the visibles or 
the audibles. Aristotle draws from this fact the implication that if we do have fully objective 
knowledge, knowledge of objects-as-such, then this would have to be a form of knowledge 
achieved by means of no organ at all. As Rödl puts it in an earlier piece, being is not known 
 Ibid. 10204
 Ibid. Chapter 3: “Denial of Self-Consciousness”205
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through an organ like the brain (2014: 486). For this reason, Rödl regards the form of naturalism 
espoused by his opponent as incoherent, and for the same reason as before. Again, she who 
judges knows that she so judges. Since this self-knowledge includes knowledge of the 
judgment’s objectivity, she who judges cannot coherently embrace a conception of judgment that 
would undercut that objectivity. Hence, she cannot coherently judge that the cause of her 
judgment is an episode in the brain. If Rödl is correct, then it would not just follow that his 
opponents are wrong, but that it is impossible for them to even avow their position. If successful, 
then, Rödl’s account of self-consciousness would lack legitimate opposition. It would be, as he 
says, “the science without contrary.”  
 Although Rödl seldom, if ever, refers to Fichte, their positions bear several striking 
similarities. Both accord self-consciousness a foundational role, treating it as a type of 
indubitable first principle from which philosophy can draw important consequences. Both are 
idealists for whom the objectivity of knowledge, far from being incompatible with its status as 
essentially self-conscious, presupposes that status. Both share the same opponent, a reductive 
naturalist or, as Fichte would put it, “dogmatist.” In both cases, their opponent wants to begin 
from a different first principle, the object, and explain away the appearance that judgment is 
essentially self-conscious. Both Rödl and Fichte hold that their opponent’s position is self-
undermining, even incoherent. For both, idealism, if true, would lack legitimate opposition or be 
“without contrary.” Given the parallels between Fichte’s position and Rödl’s, it is surprising that 
he describes it as a form of Absolute idealism. Hegel and Schelling, the founders of Absolute 
idealism, thought of Kant, Reinhold and Fichte as subjective idealists. I am here less interested in 
the historical question of whether Rödl’s self-designation is accurate than I am in a philosophical 
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concern it raises about his position. In particular, I want to ask here whether the Absolute 
idealists’ critique of subjective idealism might apply to Rödl’s own allegedly Absolute idealist 
account. Doing so will require me to introduce a new character to the story, all-important to 
German idealism but not part of the intellectual universe of Rödl’s book: Spinoza. 
 For the sake of argument, I propose we simply grant Rödl’s case for his own idealist 
position and against his reductive naturalist opponent. Even supposing it succeeded in achieving 
the already quite lofty aim it sets for itself, Rödl’s science would still, I think, face legitimate 
opposition. In other words, it would still have a contrary, though not one Rödl himself ever 
explicitly considers. I mean Spinoza’s substance-monism. Not only is this position innocent of 
the incoherence Rödl describes, it also raises its own distinctive claim to be “without contrary” 
and therefore threatens to undercut the corresponding claim of Rödl’s own science to do so. 
There can be at most one science without contrary, so either idealism or monism (or both) must 
be false. Like the form of reductive naturalism Rödl considers, substance monism is an attempt 
to deny the objectivity of most ordinary claims to knowledge by showing that our thinking 
derives from something more fundamental. Unlike this form of naturalism, however, monism 
does not justify itself empirically: for example, through an appeal to neuroscience. It does not 
base itself on an empirically given object. Instead, its basis is an a priori argument in 
metaphysics. This is an argument to the effect that the whole of reality is a single non-thinking 
thing, and thought therefore something merely derivative. Philosophy’s first principle is an 
object, then, but not an empirically given one. Its implication is that most ordinary knowledge 
claims, even those successful by ordinary criteria, fall short, though for a reason not anticipated 
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by Rödl. The argument I will go on to give on behalf of this position is based on a single 
principle: “all determination is negation.” 
 Before proceeding, some clarification of the terminology is in order. Here, “determinate” 
simply means specific or particular. A “determinate” thing is some specific or particular thing, 
one among others. It is so by virtue of having certain “determinations” or specific characteristics, 
rather than others. By contrast, the indeterminate is not some one specific thing among others. 
Nor is it something defined as the thing it is by having certain characteristics rather than others. 
Rather, it is everything. It is the only thing that exists. At first it might be tempting to suppose 
that the indeterminate must have all possible characteristics, with the determinate merely having 
some sub-set of them. Yet this is unsatisfactory, since it is less a conception of the indeterminate 
than it is of the maximally determinate. Hence, we must opt for the alternative view that the 
indeterminate exists, and in such a way that it has no determinations at all. In Hegel’s terms, it is 
pure Being, as opposed to determinate being. It simply is, as opposed to being some way — or 
some number of ways — a thing could be.        
 This puts us in a better position to understand the meaning of the dictum “All 
determination is negation,” as well as its converse which states that the indeterminate is the 
absence of negation, pure affirmation or Being. Each specific thing, each specific feature or 
property a thing might have, is a non-being, something less than full real. That is because each is 
simply a different way of not being that which simply is unqualifiedly (Being). Put differently, 
being some particular thing, rather than another, some particular way rather than another, means 
not being that which simply is (Being). If true, this position would raise a unique type of 
challenge to the objectivity of thought, a type Rödl does not consider. If all determination is 
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negation of the indeterminate, then even paradigm cases of knowledge fall short of capturing 
reality as it truly is in itself. A judgment of the form “this s is p” describes a determinate object 
with determinate characteristic, but reality as it is in itself is indeterminate. Crucially, embracing 
Spinoza’s position does not mean committing the incoherence Rödl describes in his critique of 
the reductive naturalist. Denying the reality of the determinate only means withdrawing assent 
from claims that falsely assert its unqualified reality, not all claims as such. (This is not to deny 
that the position would have profoundly revisionary or even extremely unpalatable implications. 
It is just to say that the position would not cut the ground out from under itself in the way Rödl 
suggests reductive naturalism does). Moreover, Spinoza raises a novel type of challenge to 
idealism, and, in particular, its claim to be the science without contrary. Thought, as itself 
determinate, must be a negation of the indeterminate. It must be less than fully real as well. (In 
Spinoza, it is relegated to the status of an attribute of substance, rather than substance itself). 
Hence, idealism, a system that unfolds the consequences of thought or judgment, finds itself 
answerable to a more ultimate science, substance monism. However, the reverse is not the case. 
Idealism can provide an account of the concept of a determinate being or entity, as internal to the 
judgment: “This s is p.” However, it cannot provide an account of the concept of indeterminate 
Being, being-as-such (“is”)  
ii.  “Logic and metaphysics coincide” (again) 
 I turn next to a broader methodological issue raised by Rödl’s project, though relevant to 
the line of criticism I am developing against it here. In the introduction to his study on 
temporality, Rödl lays out an approach to philosophy based on Hegel’s dictum that logic and 
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metaphysics coincide.  Rödl understands logic to be a discipline defined at least in part by the 206
abstract perspective it takes on its subject matter.  I, this particular person (JM), can think some 207
particular thought, “the Cat is on the mat,” and do so in a particular time or place. However, 
logic abstracts from all that is concrete or particular in this episode of thinking and focuses only 
on its abstract formal features. For logic, all that is relevant is the form of my thought, “the S is 
P,” considered from the perspective of nowhere and no-when. That is because logic is interested 
in a form of truth to which none of what we have cast aside is in any way relevant: logical truth, 
as opposed to empirical truth. It is no concern of logic’s whether the cat is actually on the mat, 
but it is if I judge that “the S is P and non-P.”  These considerations are familiar from Frege, but 
there is a subtle difference between Rödl’s more Kantian-inspired or idealist conception of logic 
and Frege’s.  On a received view, Frege holds that the thinking subject is no concern of logic’s 208
either. Once again, the reason is that logic is interested in a form of truth to which the activity of 
thinking is irrelevant. Strictly speaking, it is the truth of the proposition itself and not the 
thinker’s act of judging it true, which logic treats. In Rödl, however, the thinking subject remains 
relevant to logic, because she survives the process of abstraction. The thinker of the thought 
remains a concern of logic, even if no particular thinker (JM) is of any concern to it. Rödl 
endorses a distinctive logical version of the no-thought-without-a-thinker principle, chiefly 
because he rejects Frege’s force-content distinction. Very roughly, this is the idea that we can 
distinguish between the proposition in itself, defined in terms of its meaning or truth conditions 
(“content”), and the subject’s act of judging it true (attaching to it a certain “force”).   




 Drawing on this conception of logic, Rödl argues that logic and metaphysics coincide, 
turning to Aristotle’s Metaphysics for inspiration.  For Aristotle, metaphysics differs from the 209
special sciences, each of which only considers beings or entities insofar as they belong to some 
particular type: living, natural, numbered, and so on. By contrast, metaphysics is the study of 
being-qua-being; in other words, it studies what can be said of beings or entities just insofar as 
they are beings or entities. Candidates for the status of being-qua-being will turn out to be form, 
matter, even perhaps the pair of them together (others, such as being one in number are 
considered in passing). In any case, Rödl argues that the abstract perspective adopted in 
metaphysics is the same as the abstract perspective adopted in logic post-Frege, which also 
abstracts from the properties of objects studied in the special sciences. He argues also for the 
historical thesis that Aristotle himself knew this, but I will leave this to one side.  Grasping this 210
equivalence therefore opens up the possibility of a unique type of metaphysical project in which 
our ways of representing something (logically or conceptually) yield insight into its nature.  
 An example of a figure who employs this approach is Michael Thompson, who Rödl 
discusses at points. Thompson’s project is to inquire into the nature of living beings by 
considering the distinctive type of judgments we form about them: more specifically, a class of 
judgments he calls “Aristotelian categoricals,” e.g., the elk mates in springtime, bears hibernate 
in winter, deciduous trees lose their leaves in autumn.  For Thompson, these judgments operate 211
in a way not well captured by classical first-order logic. After all, it is not literally true that, e.g., 
every elk mates in spring time, in the way that it would have to be if this were the type of 
 Ibid. 22-5. 209
 Compare Rödl (2019)210
 Rödl (2018: 199)211
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universally quantified statement considered in first order logic. This means that we need a new 
and distinctive logic to a accommodate our thought about the living, a logic in which such a 
judgment will not be falsified by the presence of counter-examples. There is a recognizably 
Kantian provenance to the project of approaching logic as metaphysics, characterized in this 
way. 
 As Rödl concedes, it would be possible to pursue metaphysics apart from logic.  Yet 212
this would be pre-critical metaphysics, meant here in a pejorative sense. Rödl believes that this 
enterprise is unpromising, since it has a tendency to take up unanswerable pseudo-questions. As 
an example, he cites the debate sparked by David Lewis between “endurantism” and 
“perdurantism,” a debate over whether temporally extended objects have temporal parts in the 
way that spatially extended objects do. Rödl formalizes these positions in (Tractarian) logical 
notation in an attempt to show that there is no real difference between them and that the debate is 
confused. Rödl attributes the confusion to these metaphysicians’ reliance on metaphorical 
language whose literal meaning remains obscure to them. Lewis’s counter-argument might be 
that logical notation has limitations of its own, and that it would be naive to assume that it 
always results in greater clarity. This is an important theme in Lewis’s defense of modal realism, 
an attempt to capture with realist metaphysics what could not be captured with boxes and 
diamonds.  Yet I must, once again, leave this to one side. 213
 My response to Rödl’s proposal that logic and metaphysics coincide is that it does not 




beings. Even if Rödl is right that the general perspective adopted by logic is the same as that 
adopted by metaphysics in Aristotle’s sense, the study of being-qua-being, this perspective would 
still be less ultimate than that of Hegel’s Logic project. As abstract as the starting point of Rödl’s 
project is, it it is not abstract enough for Hegel. In particular, it does not abstract from the 
assumption that there are a plurality of beings or entities. Once more, this is an assumption 
natural enough in ordinary life, but not in German idealist philosophy. There monism always 
remains an option.  
 Even assuming we began from a perspective that abstracted from the plurality of objects, 
there would remain in Rödl’s starting point a further concrete fact which must be checked at the 
door. This is the distinction between the knowing subject and the object of its knowledge. 
Beginning with Being means abstracting from this distinction as well. In metaphysics, we 
abstract further from Rödl’s already abstract starting point, leaving behind thinkers and their 
thoughts, the thinkers we ourselves are and the thoughts we ourselves have. The thought of 
indeterminate being may, in fact, be a thought had by a thinker. Yet it expresses a perspective on 
the world from which there are no thoughts, no thinkers. It annihilates its own status as a 
thought. That is what the thought of Rödl’s reductive naturalist did, but on empirical grounds. 
This is fundamentally different, however. It is Parmenidean or Spinozist rather than naturalist, a 
priori rather than empirical. It is without contrary in a way neither transcendental philosophy nor 
reductive naturalism can be. Spinozism may not be Absolute idealism’s final form. However, it is 
that idealism’s necessary starting point. 
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